AMERICAN DATU

JOHN J. PERSHING AND COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE IN THE MUSLIM PHILIPPINES, 1899-1913

RONALD K. EDGERTON



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Ronald K. Edgerton

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To my amazing wife, Thelma,
two extraordinary children, Kate and Jeremy,
their loving spouses, Van and Jenni,
and four astonishing grandchildren, Peter, Benji, Duncan, and Isaac

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Preface and Acknowledgments

This book highlights a seminal but largely overlooked period in the development of American counterinsurgency strategy. It examines how Progressive counterinsurgency ideas and methods evolved between 1899 and 1913 as Americans fought Philippine Moros in their first sustained military encounter with Islamic militants. It then compares those ideas and methods with current theory on counterinsurgency warfare as set forth in *The U.S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*.

This study does not, however, focus just on what Americans did in the southern Philippines a century ago. It also explores how Moros—Maranao, Maguindanao, and Tausug especially—contested American military intervention in their lives. How did they bend the narrative? How did Progressive counterinsurgency in Mindanao and Sulu come to have a Moro face?

Finally, *American Datu* analyzes how John J. Pershing, during his seven years of service among Moros, contributed to Progressive counterinsurgency tactics. How did his approach compare with Leonard Wood's radically different ideas on pacification? In the most creative years of Pershing's life, how did he pull together lessons learned from his Philippine experience to craft a relatively balanced and fullspectrum approach to fighting small wars?

I did not initially set out to write a book with these focal points. In fact, as I look at my starting outline and précis, I can find few points of similarity. More than in any other scholarly work that I have done, this book has taken unexpected twists and turns in almost every chapter. As I got deeper and deeper into my research, the evidence took me in new directions. At the outset, my views on Pershing, the Philippine Moros, and counterinsurgency warfare bore little resemblance to what I discuss here. Just as Pershing's Moro years turned out to be the most creative time of his life, so my work on this project has turned into one of the most creative times in mine.

A key moment in my research came during a visit to the U.S. Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. That's when I met and conversed with Dr. Conrad Crane, who played a central role in conceptualizing and writing *The U.S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. He understood immediately the potential relevance of Progressive counterinsurgency in the Muslim Philippines to small-war theory today. He encouraged me to focus on that aspect of my work. I thank him for that encouragement.

My grateful thanks also go to family, friends, and colleagues across the globe for their ideas, critiques, support, and patience as I have worked through my changing thoughts on Pershing and counterinsurgency warfare among Philippine Moros. My wife, Thelma, has urged me from the start to follow the evidence, trust in my research, and believe in myself. As an act of pure love, she has read and edited the text multiple times. My sisters, Kathy Kendall and Alicelee Edgerton, have graciously hosted me time and again in my research visits to their hometowns, Washington, D.C., and Carlisle, Pennsylvania. My brother, Bill, and his wife, Marilyn, have never failed to ask me how the book is going. And my children, Kathryn and Jeremy, both of whom are first-class researchers, have provided all the love, support, and critical thinking that any "pop" could ever desire. Many years ago Peter Gowing hosted me for a delightful visit to Marawi City and talked with me nonstop about the American "Mandate in Moroland." Annie Barva was the best editor with whom I have ever worked. Richard Gilbreath, cartographer-educator in Lexington, Kentucky, crafted the beautiful maps. And two anonymous reviewers greatly improved the text with their insightful critiques of earlier drafts. To all the archivists and librarians who have aided me, many thanks. And many thanks as well to son-in-law Van Tarpley, daughter-in-law Jenni Edgerton; Paula Tronolone; Rick and Amy Pruett; Jeff and Erika Pruett; Chris and Scotty Burns, my History Department colleagues Al Cornebise, Steve Powers, Mary Borg, Barry Rothaus, and Marshall Clough at the University of Northern Colorado; the High Plains Chautauqua friends who talked me into impersonating Black Jack Pershing; as well as David Caldwell, Pat Graham, Ila Leavy, Bill Agan, Tomas Santos, John Loftis, John Bookman, and Stow Witwer. I am deeply grateful to all.

Maps

Philippines
Batan Islands
Luzon Strait
Babuyan Islands
Babuyan Channel
0 100 200 mi
0 100 200 km
Lingayen Gulf
LUZON
South China Sea
Philippine Sea
Polillo Islands
MANILA
Bataan Peninsula
Corregidor I.
Lamon Bay
Catanduanes
Tayabas Bay
Marinduque
Rogay Gulf
Lagonoy Gulf
MINDORO
Sibuyan Sea
Tablas Strait
Mindoro Strait
Busuanga
Culion
MASBATE
SAMAR
Visayan Sea
PANAY
LEYTE
Leyte Gulf
Philippine Trench
Dumaran
Palawan
Panay Gulf
CEBU
Camotes Sea
BOHOL
NEGROS
Bohol Sea
Iligan Bay
Sulu Sea
Balabac
Balabac Strait
MINDANAO
Illana Bay
Moro Gulf
Davao Gulf
Basilan
Celebes Sea
Jolo
Tawi Tawi
BORNEO
Sulu (Jolo) Archipelago

The Philippines


Camp Keithly
Agus R.
Guimba
Marawi
Madaya
Toros
Dansalan
Ramain
Ramain R.
HILLY TERRAIN
0 3 6 mi
0 3 6 km
Cauayan
L A N A O
Malaig
Taraca
MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN
Oato
Tugaya
Ft. Pitakus
Taraca R.
Gadungan
Calahui
Bacolod
L A K E
Gata R.
Gata
Madumba
Maciu
Ragaan
L A
Paulas
Malaig R.
Talub
Sauir Bay
Ganasi
Binadayan
Bayang
Lake Dapao
Pandapatan
Sauir
Linok
Camp Vicars
Paiguay
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Gauan
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Lake Lanao and Environs


Mindanao
Area of Detail
Malabang
Buldun Valley
Lalabuan
Illana Bay
Parang
Cotabato
Rio Grande de Mindanao
Pulangi R.
Sirinaya
or
Ft. Pikit
Ft. Regente
Buayan
Barat
Kudarangan
Liguasan Marsh
Simpetan
Buluan
Lake Buluan
Davao
Mt. Apo
Digos
Davao Gulf
Sarangani Bay
0 25 50 mi
0 25 50 km

Cotabato


Jolo Island
Taglibi
Patikul
Gujangan Island
Bitinan Island
Lati
Jolo
Bun Bun
Bud Tambang
Bud Bagsak
Bud Dajo
Capual Island
Tandu
PANSUL
Seit Lake
GITUNG
Luuk
Tandu
Parang
Mt. Talipao
Bawisan
Maimbung
Tutu Bay
Bud Lumping
Parang
Maimbung Bay
Cotta Pang Pang
Dongdong Island
Patian Island
Pata Island
Kamawi Island
0 5 10 mi
0 5 10 km
Note: "Bud" is equivalent to "Mount"

Jolo Island

Surigao Strait
PHILIPPINE SEA
BOHOL SEA
Butuan
MINDANAO
Agusan
Dapitan
Cagayan
Iligan
L. Lanao
Bukidnon
8th Parallel
Zamboanga District
Lanao District
Malabang
Illana Bay
Davao District
Pulangi R.
Parang
Cotabato
Davao
Cotabato District
Gulf of Davao
L. Buluan
Zamboanga
Isabela
Basilan
Sulu District
Jolo
Jolo Island
Tapul Group
Siasi
Tawi Tawi
Borneo
Sulu (Jolo) Archipelago
Sarangani Bay
0 50 100 mi
0 50 100 km
SULU (JOLO) SEA
MORO PROVINCE

Moro Province

Introduction

This much they knew, but little more. Three of their comrades had been murdered and a fourth badly wounded as they explored the jungle trail from Malabang up to Lake Lanao. Intelligence reports identified Maranao Moros as the culprits, and their *datus* (chiefs) had spurned demands that the murderers, along with rifles and horses stolen in the raids, be surrendered to American authorities. Under the command of Civil War hero, famed Indian fighter, and two-time Medal of Honor recipient Col. Frank Baldwin, the Americans eagerly anticipated a fight, if they could just manage to reach the field of battle. Numbering more than 1,000 officers and men, they slogged up the same trail that Spanish general Valeriano Weyler had opened twelve years earlier in his failed effort to pacify the lake Moros. Each day they slashed down the jungle undergrowth and set up telegraph poles, only to find the next day that guerrillas, under cover of darkness, had stripped the telegraph wires and felled trees to impede their progress. As Moros took to firing on the Americans, Baldwin's show of force disintegrated into a mission of vengeance. Whoever these Moros might be, they needed to be taught a lesson.[1]

Ignoring telegrams from his superiors to await further orders before proceeding, Col. Baldwin invaded the lake country.[2] It didn't matter that Gen. George W. Davis eventually caught up with him and counseled patience and caution. The very size of their expeditionary force precipitated a hostile response from Maranao Moros, who equated it with Weyler's earlier invasion. Repeated American calls for peaceful negotiations did little more than anger and affront the sultan of Bayang, whom they blamed for the murders. Declaring that "the word of the Colonel is not the law of the Sultan," he vowed to recognize only the Ottoman sultan as his authority.[3] Meanwhile, Baldwin's men toiled through monsoon rains and rugged jungle terrain, their ranks depleted by dysentery and malaria. They couldn't drag field artillery up the steep trail and so had to make do with light mountain guns instead. To make matters worse, several hundred Maguindanao Moros

from Cotabato, hired as porters for the troops, turned around and went home. Their sudden departure, together with the illness and exhaustion that ravaged so many of his troops, left Baldwin with fewer than 600 military effectives to push forward against a foe that few of his men had ever seen, much less begun to understand.[4]

At last they crested the high country surrounding Lake Lanao and approached Bayang. When Baldwin received no reply to his ultimatum that the sultan surrender all guilty parties, he attacked on May 2, 1902. That date marked the first battle between Americans and Moros in the Philippine-American War that had begun three years earlier.

The Americans faced two large *cottas* (fortresses) on low hills overlooking Lake Lanao's southwestern shore. They took the first, called Binadayan, with little difficulty, killing sixteen defenders and suffering one wounded casualty. Deploying their mountain guns, they began shelling the second fort, called Pandapatan, in midafternoon. They could see three rings of trenches surrounding Pandapatan, manned by hundreds of Moros, with reinforcements streaming in by boat. Clearly, the fight for this second *cotta* would not be as easy as the first. Baldwin ordered his troops to advance deliberately across open ground between the *cottas*, and by 4:00 p.m. they had begun clearing the trenches, whose Moro defenders fled in full retreat. So far so good.

In his field notes on campaigning against Moros, John J. Pershing remarked that "military operations against the Lanao Moros differ from anything the American soldier had experienced." Comparing the fighting to Indian warfare on the high plains, he observed that the Native American, when fighting alongside other warriors, "usually held his position, … while the Moro retreats to his fort or cotta to make his stand."[5] He described *cottas* as veritable "fortresses." Usually square with sides 100 to 150 feet long and parapets up to 20 feet high, they had walls 12 to 15 feet wide at the base and angling back to 4 feet at the top. Constructed of earth but often faced with stone or closely interwoven bamboo trees, they typically had a 25- to 30-foot-wide ditch, even deeper than wide, surrounding them. On the inner side of the ditch, assaulting forces often faced a low berm covered with split bamboo and pocked with hollow bamboo tubes through which Moro defenders could fire their rifles. Assaulting forces also had to negotiate large pits lined with sharpened bamboo stakes and hidden by mats of bamboo and

grass. Entrance to and exit from the *cotta* came through hidden underground passageways so that defenders could escape undetected either to neighboring forts or to the lake. In addition to rifle fire, attackers could expect "all kinds of slugs of iron or stone" shot at them from *lantakas* (small muzzle-loaded brass cannon usually of Chinese manufacture). Thus properly outfitted for defense, Moros fought tenaciously and often to the death, shouting and beating large gongs all the while.[6] They presented a daunting prospect to any and all assailants—Moro, Spaniard, and American.

Unimpressed by such primitive defenses, Baldwin ordered the attack on Pandapatan. It came too late in the day. As dusk spread across the battlefield, and as assailants and defenders fell upon one another in hand-to-hand combat, the Americans had to suspend their long-range shelling. The attack stalled. Then Moros went on the offensive, streaming down the parapet and routing the astonished Americans. The latter counted among their dead First Lt. Thomas Vicars, for whom the new American military camp south of Lake Lanao would later be named.

There followed a miserable and terrifying night for American survivors, many of them wounded, huddled in the trenches and grass surrounding Pandapatan. A drenching rain soaked them through and through, and a thick fog concealed Moro warriors prowling the battleground with their *krises* (curved, two-edged swords), making any thought of sleep out of the question. Slowly but surely, one by one, the Americans crawled back to Fort Binadayan, taking advantage of the same fog that obscured their foe.

As dawn broke on May 3, it seemed that the fighting would be renewed, probably even more savagely than the day before. But Moro losses inside Pandapatan had been more devastating than the Americans realized, 300–400 out of an estimated 600 defenders, including the sultan of Bayang and other leaders.[7] A white surrender flag replaced the red battle flags flying over the *cotta*, and eighty-three survivors (the rest having escaped) laid down their arms.[8] Instead of fighting, the Americans assessed their losses, eleven dead and forty wounded, many of them grievously. In one battle, more Americans and Moros had died or been wounded than in the previous three years of American occupation of Mindanao and Sulu.[9]

1. “Some of the Moros had good rifles at Bayan[g],” 1902. Philippine Insurrection File, RG111-SC-84933, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

In what came to be known as the Battle of Bayang, Americans demonstrated their military superiority, especially in long-range firepower. They had won a clear victory, but at a cost. Baldwin came under critical fire for deploying only about half of his available forces in the late-afternoon attack on Pandapatan.[10] And in what should have been perceived as an overwhelming American victory, Moros seemed not, after all, to have learned their lesson. In the words of a Moro survivor,

> When Sultan Pandapatan died in the battle, his body was taken by his slaves and … brought inside the cotta…. All of a sudden a dazzling

> light coming from heaven appeared[.] Then a big chair was placed in front of the slaves[, surrounded by] … four [big] men all dressed in robes. They carried the dead body of Pandapatan … and placed it on the chair[.] Then the four men ascended to heaven bringing the corpse of Sultan Pandapatan[,] and suddenly they just vanished. It was believed that [they were] angels.[11]

While Sultan Pandapatan's heroic death in defense of his people and faith may have pleased God, as his followers believed, the severe loss of Moro lives, not to mention the lengthy American casualty report, definitely displeased Theodore Roosevelt. An enthusiastic supporter of the Philippine-American War in its early stages, he had begun to change his tune as news of American atrocities (especially the "water cure") soured public sentiment. Thus, it emerged that just as American enthusiasm for the Philippine war waned, America's first military encounter with Islamic militants began. Just as the war against non-Muslim Filipinos wound down, a new struggle between Americans and Moros heated up. How would this new conflict play out for both sides? And what might we learn from it today?

This study analyzes the emergence and development of a new strategy in the war that pitted Americans against Philippine Moros for more than a decade between 1902 and 1913. The term *counterinsurgency warfare* had not yet come into use, but that's exactly what American army personnel found themselves conducting. They brought with them ideas honed in the brutal Indian Wars on the great plains of North America. They soon found, however, that new times and contexts demanded new tactics and strategies. Progressive notions of professional and scientific war fighting made the old Indian fighters look like rank amateurs. And Philippine Moros, whom American commanders initially likened to Native Americans, shape-shifted into very different and very dangerous foes. What had worked in the post–Civil War West would not necessarily work in Muslim Mindanao. Indeed, Mindanao became a new laboratory for what I call "Progressive counterinsurgency" as it developed there. What was this new military science? Who emerged as leaders in its development? And how did the Moro context, the unique sociopolitical nature of Moro culture, help to shape

emerging American notions of counterinsurgency warfare? These are the central questions addressed in this study.

In this analysis, it will quickly become apparent that one man—John J. Pershing—cast an especially long and pronounced shadow over evolving American counterinsurgency practices. Pershing did not, at first, see himself in this role, and historians have overlooked his influence in this regard until now. Two other major figures—Leonard Wood and Tasker Bliss—also left their mark. They came, however, to stand for counterinsurgency tactics that did more to cast Pershing's approach in stark relief than to replace it. Their actions served, in the end, to demonstrate what *not* to do. Pershing offered, by comparison, a middle way that mediated between the extremes embodied by Wood and Bliss.

A sophisticated and Progressive counterinsurgency strategy did not appear in one fell swoop. Starting with Baldwin's blundering attack on Pandapatan, it evolved in fits and starts over the course of more than a decade. Tracing those sometimes bull-headed, sometimes prescient policy changes will occupy our critical attention throughout this study.

Although Pershing played a central role in the way that counterinsurgency ideas took shape in the Muslim Philippines, so, too, did the Moros. They bent the narrative, just as Afghans are doing to American counterinsurgency tactics today. A century ago, no American fully understood how Moros might influence and shape policy. But Pershing and his supporters came to acknowledge that they had to mold tactics to fit the local environment. To be successful, policy implementation had to take into account local leaders, customs, and priorities. Whatever new military strategy emerged from the interaction between Moro insurgents and American counterinsurgents, it would have a distinctly Moro face.

American public support for the Philippine war effort had hit a high point some fourteen months before the Battle of Bayang, when "Fighting Fred" Funston captured Philippine commanding general Emilio Aguinaldo in March 1901 in the most audacious military exploit of the war. When Aguinaldo agreed to sign an oath of loyalty and implore his troops to lay down their arms and accept American sovereignty, Vice President Roosevelt could hardly restrain himself from entreating President William McKinley to declare victory then and there. Filipinos, however, unaccountably refused to

quit. To be sure, some 12,000 did surrender with 6,000 weapons, and on July 4, 1901, Gen. Arthur MacArthur handed over executive power to civilian governor William Howard Taft in all but the Muslim areas of Mindanao and Sulu.[12] Nevertheless, significant pockets of Filipino resistance remained, especially in the province of Batangas just south of Manila and in the southeastern island of Samar, where, respectively, Gen. Miguel Malvar and Gen. Vicente Lukbán fought on. When Lukbán engineered a savage surprise attack on American troops occupying Balangiga, Samar, killing or wounding all but five of the seventy-four combatants on September 28, 1901, the defeat shocked Americans at home just as much as their troops in the Philippines. Coming only two weeks after McKinley's death by assassination, it raised severe doubts about the future of their civilizing mission in the Philippines.[13]

Theodore Roosevelt entered the White House a firm believer in America's Manifest Destiny in Asia, specifically in the Philippines. He ordered Gen. Adna Chaffee, MacArthur's replacement as commander of American forces in the Philippines, to crush the resistance. He defended American soldiers for using "severe measures when necessary," saying that he was "not in the least sensitive about killing any number of men if there is adequate reason."[14] And he reiterated his conviction that the "peculiarly trying and difficult war" in the Philippine Islands pitted "civilization" against "the black chaos of savages and barbarism." To be sure, some "black sheep" had given Americans a bad name because of their atrocities against Filipinos. Nevertheless, our soldiers were "doing a great work for civilization, … for the honor and the interest of this nation, and above all for the welfare of the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. All honor to them; and shame, thrice shame, to us if we fail to uphold their hands!"[15]

Having made his obligatory defense of Americans in harm's way, the president let it be known that he did not want to hear anything more about American soldiers abusing and massacring Filipino noncombatants. May 1902 marked the third month of Senate hearings on American atrocities in the conflict. Pro-war sentiment had plummeted as the public grew sick and tired of lurid testimony documenting torture and cruelty by Americans. It didn't help matters when soldiers defended their abusive behavior by asserting that "they are all lies, them things that's been published about cruelty to the Filipinos. You couldn't be cruel enough to the damn little

pests."[16] And testimony at Gen. Jake "Hell Roaring" Smith's court-martial in Manila added still more fuel to the fire. Yes, he had ordered his subordinate, Tony Littleton Waller, "not to burden himself with prisoners." Yes, he had told Waller to "kill and burn" and make the island of Samar "a howling wilderness." Yes, he had set an age limit of ten years on Filipinos to be regarded as combatants. And finally, yes, he had characterized his work in the Philippines as "shooting niggers."[17] With testimony like that, clearly the time had come for Roosevelt and all Americans to turn a new leaf in their so-called civilizing mission.

As it happened, President Roosevelt did not lack for army officers who advocated a more Progressive and professional American military. Just as Progressive ideas would revolutionize the American civil service, so they would inspire a new age of reform in the American military. Beginning with agreement on what could no longer be tolerated, young, ambitious, and hitherto stuck officers who had been repeatedly passed over for promotion in the old system of seniority looked with contempt on old, racist Indian fighters such as Jake Smith. With Smith at the helm, American soldiers would continue to kill and burn Filipinos and their dwellings. Coincidentally, they would also undermine ongoing home-front support for their mission abroad.

The president conflated progressivism not only with a modern versus an antiquated military but also with a transparent versus boss-ruled political process at home, an aggressive busting of monopolistic trusts, and a "civilized" versus hide-bound colonial policy in the Philippines. It all fit together. If Americans continued to be represented by Neanderthals like Jake Smith, they wouldn't be any more meritorious than the Spaniards who had ruled the archipelago for some 350 years. As Progressives, however, they were better than the Spanish, thought Roosevelt. They believed in public education for girls as well as for boys, an honest and rigorously trained civil service, a robust lifestyle, the values of hard work, entrepreneurship, risk taking, straight talk and individualism, the democratic principle of making government responsive to the people's will through initiative, referendum and recall, strong municipal oversight of public utilities, freedom of the muckraking press, transparency in politics, professionalism in public service, and the undisputed benefits of a free-enterprise system. To the extent that Americans instilled these values in Filipinos, they would be civilizing them.

To the extent that Americans treated the Filipinos contemptuously and abusively as inferiors, they would simply be putting a new face on Spanish colonial misgovernment, offering Filipinos little more than old wine in new bottles.

With few exceptions, American civilians who joined Governor William Howard Taft in governing the new colony espoused these same principles and values. American military personnel, in contrast, tended at first to carry with them more of the old pre-Progressive baggage in their Philippine campaigns. Not only did they take orders from old Indian fighters, but they also uncritically regarded Filipinos and Native Americans as equally savage and uncivilized. Some of these American soldiers came to appreciate that many urban Filipinos possessed at least as much education as they did. This did not, however, diminish their utter contempt for illiterate rural Filipinos living in the "boondocks" or for upland tribal Filipinos dwelling in remote mountain fastnesses. And what about the Moros? Even many mainstream Filipinos regarded Moros apprehensively as *kris*-brandishing fanatics and anti-Christian polygamists utterly beyond the pale. They posed as polar opposites to civilized, rational, and democratic Americans.[18] No wonder that America's first pitched battle with Moros turned into a wild melee. It could not have been otherwise, given their mutual incomprehension. Or could it?

When President Roosevelt went looking for a Progressive alternative to the likes of Frank Baldwin in dealing with Moros, he found just the man he wanted in Capt. John J. Pershing. Pershing had been in the Philippines since Thanksgiving Day in 1899. On the last day of that year, he set off for Zamboanga as the new adjutant general there. He spent most of the next two years in Zamboanga, and during that time he familiarized himself with the people and cultures of Muslim Mindanao. When given his first command opportunity in the Philippines, he surprised his superiors by asking for the small American garrison at Iligan, the coastal port and trading nexus for the Maranao Moros of Lake Lanao. He arrived in Iligan on November 1, 1901, and immediately set to work making connections with the hitherto unconquered and virtually unknown Maranao people.

In his efforts to deal with the Maranao Moros, Pershing naturally drew on his training and experiences going back to his West Point days in the 1880s. Not long after graduating as senior captain in 1886, he began chafing at army promotion practices based on seniority. Despite active service in the

Indian Wars of New Mexico and Montana territories, he did not win promotion to first lieutenant until almost six years later. Convinced of the army's need for reform, he accepted appointment as professor of military science and tactics and commandant of the University Battalion and Military Department at the University of Nebraska in 1891.[19] For the next four years he immersed himself in current theory on military science. Not only did he espouse modern military ideas in the classroom, but he also demonstrated the effectiveness of rigorous professional training on the drill field. His Nebraska University cadets won national drill-team competitions and became known far and wide as the "Pershing Rifles."[20] During his Lincoln years, Pershing also earned his bachelor of law degree from the university and published a book on battalion regulations. Commenting later on how proper training will mold citizens into effective citizen soldiers, he wrote: "It would be an excellent thing if every officer in the army could have contact in this way with the youth which forms our citizenship in peace and our armies in war."[21]

After a year of commanding Tenth Cavalry soldiers against Cree Indians in Montana, Lt. Pershing journeyed to Washington, D.C., as aide to Commanding Gen. of the Army Nelson Miles. There, he supported the general's efforts to effect a sweeping reorganization of the army, including its promotion system.[22] Miles put him to work studying new artillery and cavalry techniques and recommended him for the post of instructor in tactics at West Point in 1897. Desperate to participate in the Cuban campaign when the Spanish-American War broke out in April 1898, Pershing did not stay long enough at West Point to inject his new ideas into what he regarded as a woefully out-of-date curriculum. The terrible U.S. War Department inefficiencies and antiquated procedures that he witnessed in the Cuban war convinced him even more unconditionally of the need for Progressive reforms in the American military. Fighting side by side with other army reformers such as Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt sealed the deal. When Pershing reported for postwar duty in the office of Assistant Secretary of War George Meiklejohn, he immersed himself in studying Progressive military governance of occupied territories such as Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. In March 1899, he became chief of the War Department's Division of Customs and Insular Affairs. Had he stayed in this post, he might have gained fame as head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs.[23] Instead,

he used all his political savvy and army connections to exchange his desk job for active duty in the faraway Philippines. When he arrived in Zamboanga, Mindanao, on New Year's Eve 1899–1900, he was the most up-to-date officer, the most Progressive military official, and the most broadly experienced adjutant general that his superior, Maj. Gen. John Bates, could ever have imagined.[24]

2. Pershing and friends at Fort Bayard, New Mexico, 1886. Pershing is fourth from the left in the front row. Photo RG111-SC-96612, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

Two years later President Roosevelt understood that he had found a man of his own political inclinations in John J. Pershing. Pershing's progressivism, however, represented only one side of his training and experience. By May 1902, he had also become one of the American military's most experienced officers in working with and leading men from different racial and cultural groups than his own.

In his first assignment as a new graduate from West Point in 1886, Pershing had received orders to join the Sixth Cavalry in New Mexico. There he came under the influence of Gen. Miles, whose relentless pursuit of Apache chief Geronimo had finally born fruit with the famous chief's surrender a month before Pershing arrived. After four years of cavalry forays against remnants of Geronimo's Apache resistance, the Sixth got orders to join Miles in containing growing militancy among Lakota Sioux in the Black Hills of Dakota. They arrived in Rapid City just days before Chief Sitting Bull was shot and killed by an Indian policeman at the Standing Rock Agency. Pershing, now part of an armed force numbering 3,500 men, helped encircle hostile Sioux bands in the Pine Ridge Reservation. He was within a day's march of Wounded Knee on December 29, 1890, but did not play a role in that massacre by the Seventh Cavalry.[25]

There followed one of the most significant assignments of Lt. Pershing's early career when he received orders to take command of Troop B Oglala Sioux scouts in March 1891. Just as he would do later with Moro scouts and constabulary, Pershing got to know members of his company, learned a bit of their language, and became a strong advocate for utilizing trained local forces to deal with stubborn local problems. And just as he would later do with Moro chief Amai Manibilang, in the spring of 1891 he befriended a great Indian leader, Red Cloud of the Oglalas, appointing the chief's cousin, Thunder Bull, as his first sergeant. In April, he and his scouts were ordered to police the Wounded Knee massacre site. Would his troops remain loyal when they camped on this hallowed ground, or would they suffer from "bad hearts" and take revenge on their commander and other whites? In the words of Pershing's biographer, Frank Vandiver, "It required no imagination to feel unsafe at Wounded Knee, and Jack knew his predicament. Gradually,

though, he noted something important. Each time he left his tent, each time he returned to it, Thunder Bull or another of the noncoms lurked nearby and kept all strangers at a distance. This kind of security continued each time the troop took the field."[26]

By summer's end, when the Troop B Oglala Sioux scouts were discharged, Pershing had come not only to respect his troops but to admire them as well, admitting that he had learned much from them about cavalry tactics. For someone who would become a dyed-in-the-wool Progressive, the idea of learning military tactics from decidedly non-Progressive local inhabitants such as his Sioux scouts would be one of the most important and surprising lessons of his life. It would serve him well in his encounter a decade later with Maranao Moros, where the idea of a modern American military officer learning something from his decidedly unmodern Moro adversaries simply did not occur to many of his colleagues.[27]

Commanding Sioux scouts did not end Pershing's experience leading minority troops in the 1890s. Squeezed in between his four years of teaching at the University of Nebraska and his shorter stint at West Point, in 1895 he led a company of Tenth Cavalry "Buffalo" soldiers in Montana Territory. Once again he took pride in winning the respect and loyalty of troops "other than my own race and color."[28] Operating out of Fort Assinniboine, Pershing and Company D spent the summer of 1896 riding more than 1,000 miles across northern Montana rounding up and deporting hundreds of Cree Indians to Canada. Not very pleasant duty, to be sure, but the young lieutenant got along as well with his black soldiers as he had with his Sioux scouts a half-decade earlier. He believed that treating men with fairness and respect, regardless of their race or ethnicity, would always pay off. "I had always felt kindly and sympathetic toward them," he wrote about commanding black troops, "and knew that fairness and due consideration" would appeal to them just as much as to anyone.[29] These sentiments did not go unnoticed by his cadets at West Point a year later. Learning that he belonged to the Tenth Cavalry, they nicknamed him "Nigger Jack," a name later judiciously modified in the press to "Black Jack."[30]

Thanks to his experience commanding Sioux and Buffalo soldiers, Pershing brought with him to the Philippine Islands much more than up-to-date ideas about how to fight a successful counterinsurgency campaign.[31] Nevertheless, he was not without prejudice, and he had a long way to go in

translating his American experience of working with minorities into an effective Moro policy. There could be little question, for example, that he wholeheartedly endorsed the "worthy cause of spreading enlightenment and civilization among a horde of Oriental barbarians," as he said.[32] Like other Americans of his time, he also held generally negative and prejudiced views regarding "Mohammedanism" and its followers.[33] The years 1900–1901, therefore, can best be understood not as a time when he burst upon the scene as America's new hot-shot military reformer. Rather, in these still formative years he came under the influence of certain individuals and the ideas they espoused. Some of these men helped launch him on a successful military career in the new American colony, while some of their ideas diminished his effectiveness there. Taken together, these factors show Pershing to have been both a man of his times and a man who had the potential to transcend his times.

As adjutant general of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo from January 1900 until late October 1901, Pershing served as chief executive officer first for Gen. John Bates, then Gen. William A. Kobbe, and finally Gen. George W. Davis.[34] He lived with 20,000 other inhabitants in the beautiful town of Zamboanga, perched on the tip of southwestern Mindanao's long peninsula. Most of those other inhabitants identified as non-Muslim Filipinos, who had migrated there to farm and set up shop, and most lived in the *poblacion* (town center). Moros represented a minority of 2,000–3,000 there, living mostly near the water, where they fished and filled the city market with fresh seafood each morning. Chinese merchants and tradesmen and a few American entrepreneurs composed still smaller minorities.[35] Since American occupying forces still had a war going on with non-Muslim Filipinos, the garrison had more to fear from local Filipino revolutionaries than from Moros, who for the most part stayed out of the fray. Until 1902, Pershing saw more action fighting Gen. Nicolas Capistrano's insurgent force in Misamis Province, up on Mindanao's non-Moro north coast, than he did fighting Moros anywhere else in Mindanao.[36]

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3. Pershing with Gen. William A. Kobbe and other officers, Zamboanga, 1900–1901. Pershing is standing second from the left. Philippine Insurrection File, RG111-SC-83885, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

Confined to coastal enclaves such as Zamboanga, Americans had little knowledge of, much less control over, some 275,000 Moros living in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago in 1900–1901.[37] "With so large a territory, the best that could be done at first was to occupy the more important towns," Pershing later wrote. "There were few precedents and little knowledge of our new wards to guide us."[38] It made sense to avoid unnecessary conflict with Moros so long as the war with non-Muslim Filipinos continued to occupy most American forces up north. In Mindanao and Sulu, the Americans hunkered down and practiced what can best be described as enclave colonialism.

In the months after Gen. Aguinaldo's capture, many American army officers and their troops, assuming that the war had ended, happily awaited orders to go home. Pershing did not count himself among those anxious to leave the Philippines. After almost a decade, he had finally won promotion to the rank of captain in the regular army on February 2, 1901. His commanders regarded him as the most experienced and knowledgeable officer in Zamboanga and welcomed his advice on Moro affairs. Capt. Pershing needed to take advantage of any opportunity to jump-start his career, and Mindanao offered the best chance to do that. Therefore, when his promotion included orders reassigning him stateside, he looked frantically for an alternative. He eventually finagled a transfer to the Fifteenth Cavalry. Just posted to Zamboanga with "a hundred horses who never saw a soldier, a hundred soldiers who never saw a horse, and a bunch of officers who never saw either," the Fifteenth would need him every bit as much as he needed them.[39]

Pershing had more than professional reasons for wanting to stay in Zamboanga.[40] He had made close friends there with Sydney Cloman and Tom Swobe. Together, the three bachelors threw themselves into the local social scene with gusto. They drank, danced and caroused, and "built a quick and lusty reputation among Zamboanga's girls."[41] One woman in particular caught Jack Pershing's eye. Joaquina Bondoy Ignacio and her three sisters, non-Muslim Spanish Malay mestizas, ran "a small canteen for officers."[42] What began as a friendship soon grew into a much closer relationship.

Six years later, Pershing paid a price for his relationship with Ms. Ignacio. By late 1906, he had met, fallen in love with, and married Ms. Helen Frances Warren, daughter of Senator Francis E. Warren, who chaired the U.S. Senate Committee on Military Affairs. As we will see, by that time Pershing had gained fame as the "hero from Moroland," including special mention by President Roosevelt in his State of the Union Address in 1903.[43] With his father-in-law's help, he had won promotion from captain to brigadier general over the careers of 862 other aspiring officers.[44] When he, his wife, Frankie, and their infant daughter, Helen, arrived in Manila to take command of Fort McKinley, the principal American military base in the Philippines, he had reason to expect a triumphal welcome. He was instead greeted by scandal.



4. Zamboanga Filipinas, 1900–1902. Archibald W. Butt Album, RG165.7, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

Both in Manila and back in the United States, the press published accounts of “scandalous conduct” during Pershing’s Zamboanga days. Not only had he taken Ms. Ignacio as his lover, but he had also built for her a cottage “in which they lived almost openly.” With her, he had fathered two children. The eldest had died of cholera in 1902, while the other, Petronilla, lived with her mother in Zamboanga, where she received financial support from her father.[45]

Pershing vehemently denied these charges both in public and in letters to friends. The many affidavits that he collected in his defense included one from Joaquina Ignacio herself, acknowledging that “John J. Pershing, formerly residing at Zamboanga, is alleged to have lived with me openly and that I was his mistress, and that the said John J. Pershing constructed a house in the said town of Zamboanga, and otherwise provided for my support and keeping, and, furthermore, that the said John J. Pershing is alleged to be the father of two children by me. I do hereby solemnly swear that each and every one of the above allegations is wholly untrue and false in each and every respect.”[46]

Neither of Pershing’s principal biographers takes a stand on the truth or falseness of the allegations. Donald Smythe concludes that they “must stand as ‘not proved.’” Frank Vandiver, however, accepts the love affair as factual, while not commenting on the other allegations, saying: “In that place half way across the world from home, none surely would begrudge a soldier solace? … Virtue came in human things in Zamboanga, and the tropics molded morals.”[47]

“None surely would begrudge a soldier solace?” That depends. In early-twentieth-century American society, an interracial affair, even in the far-off tropics, occasioned scandal and opprobrium. In earlytwenty-first-century American society, the affair itself would generate little comment, especially for a forty-one-year-old bachelor. The fathering of children and then denying any and all responsibility, however, would give rise to outrage. Whether Pershing’s relationship with Joaquina Ignacio merits comparison to Colonel Pinkerton and Madame Butterfly, it provides a clear example of power inequality played out sexually in a colonial context.[48]

What did John Pershing think of himself—how did he imagine himself—in his Zamboanga sojourn from 1900 to 1901? Like it or not, the figure of Joaquina Ignacio looms large in the answer to that question. On the one hand, she represented the colonized woman, the recipient both personally and metaphorically of Pershing's personal power and potency. As Kristin Hoganson has pointed out in *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars*, many Americans, led by Theodore Roosevelt, believed that war in 1898 would vitalize their manhood at a time when American men seemed otherwise destined to become weak, soft, and "overcivilized."[49] Pershing personified the model of a strong, manly, and virile American male who understood the relationship between colonial power and sexuality in the Philippine-American War.[50] Here stood an American officer who believed in what Roosevelt called "a sexually restrained and self-disciplined masculinity."[51] With Joaquina, he didn't so much escape from the sexual repression of Victorian American society as epitomize the sexual potency of the conquering, white American male.[52]

One other thing may well have influenced Pershing's relationship with Joaquina Ignacio. She not only validated his power but also threatened it. As Ann Laura Stoler points out, "The cultivation of the European [or American] bourgeois self in the colonies … required other bodies" on whom the colonizer tended to become dependent for "an intimate set of exploitative sexual and service relations."[53] To the extent that Pershing made Joaquina an intimate part of his personal life—indeed, the mother of his children—he could hardly deny her influence and power. It was one thing to enjoy a brief tropical dalliance. American colonials at the turn of the century, however, fancied themselves as the seducers, not the seduced. In the racial stereotyping of the day, Joaquina personified a dangerously erotic counterpoint to Pershing's self-discipline, civility, sound judgment, and moral character. Thanks to her libidinal energies, she had the potential to seduce him away from his whiteness, which would lead to mixed-race mongrelization. He might cross the line between Anglo-Saxon respectability and mixed-race hybridity. She even had the power to destroy his moral authority. This "dusky Venus," this alluring sensualist, could turn the tables on her American conqueror. Instead of civilizing the savage, he himself could degenerate into savagery.[54] And lest anyone underestimate the morally

corrupting power of decadent and unrefined native women, consider how far away Pershing and his fellow American officers found themselves from the restraining influence of their home society, with its refined and virtuous women to remind them how to behave respectably.[55]

In the person of Joaquina Ignacio, therefore, Pershing confronted two extremely strong countervailing social imperatives. As a virile American military colonizer, he was expected to model not just discipline and self-control but also masculine power and manly potency among Philippine natives. This he could do with Joaquina. However, he had better do it very quietly and secretly because a second imperative exerted just as powerful a hold on him. Turn-of-the-century Progressive values obligated him to avoid all forms of miscegenation, which American social purity reformers (in the Women's Christian Temperance Union and American Purity Alliance, for example) conflated with immorality and the decay of virtue. Whatever his relationship with Ms. Ignacio might actually have been, Pershing found himself trapped between these two equally powerful American social expectations and constraints.[56]

What did he learn from the discomfort of his morally ambiguous position? Two things. First, that American social constraints, however powerful, weakened in proportion to how far away an American soldier found himself from the home front, and one could hardly get more distant from American social mores than Zamboanga. Second, that American Progressive values, although worthy in and of themselves, did not necessarily fit well into the Philippine context. To be successful, American colonial initiatives, including its counterinsurgency tactics, would have to take on an indigenous face. Gazing at the faces of his own children by Joaquina, John Pershing must have understood this admonition intuitively. One would have to carve out one's own path, both personally and militarily, amid the ambiguity inherent in implementing American military control over Filipinos, especially Muslim Filipinos.

Few Americans negotiated that path without stumbling, and Pershing proved no exception. To be sure, he earned the accolade "hero of Moroland" by implementing a policy that combined indefatigable relationship building among Moros with restraint in the use of armed force and a hands-off attitude toward Moro customs and lifeways. But he also earned at times the lead role in a cautionary tale about American arrogance and racial

stereotyping abroad. In a formative time for American policy making among Philippine Muslims, John Pershing went through a formative time in his own understanding of cross-cultural relationship building as it related to effective counterinsurgency warfare.

In engineering and articulating American counterinsurgency policy in Mindanao and Sulu, Pershing had a number of mentors and models. They included Europeans who had long preceded Americans as colonialists in Asia. For him, the Dutch in Indonesia (the Netherlands East Indies) and the British in Malaya offered especially prescient lessons to follow. Remarking that they "seem to have little trouble" in their colonies "in this part of the world," he attributed their success to an indirect form of colonial rule. "They maintain the kind of government they found in existence," he noted, and that's exactly what Americans should do with Moros, he thought. Following the Dutch and British examples, we should "preserve … [Moro] government in its integrity, and in all instances … uphold the authority of the Sultan or Datto in his own rancheria."[57]

Pershing's advocacy for indirect colonial rule echoed the opinions of his military superiors, especially Gen. William August Kobbe and Gen. George W. Davis. Both of these men brought with them to the Philippine Islands lots of racial and experiential baggage that constrained their success. They exhibited the arrogance of many American military commanders in dealing with nonwhite populations, an affliction they had first acquired in the Indian Wars of the American West. Conquer the savages, and leave no doubt as to your military superiority, they believed. But once you have pounded them into submission, keep your hands off their religion and culture and look for leaders among them who will collaborate. Don't try to rule them directly; that will just drag you into a quagmire. Once you have identified and selected pro-American leaders, let them rule themselves under your supervision and military control. That will be the recipe for success.

Kobbe didn't immediately impress Pershing, who served as his adjutant general. Always more spit and polish than his "disheveled" superior, Jack had grown impatient with Civil War veterans such as Kobbe, who held all the high-ranking positions in the army. The two men, however, soon hit it off. Both took an interest in Moro society and politics, and both took pride in cultivating close personal relations with Moros. Kobbe didn't stand on

protocol. “He would walk the streets of Zamboanga’s Muslim district in the evening, alone but for an interpreter, and stop to chat with ordinary people and ask questions.”[58] That impressed Pershing, who followed Kobbe’s example when he later took command of the American post in Iligan and began nurturing relations with Maranao Moro leaders.[59]

While Pershing worked closely with Kobbe, he looked to Kobbe’s successor, Gen. Davis, as his mentor in implementing the policy of indirect rule. In doing so, the personal situation that he found himself in, together with his earlier success in working with Sioux scouts, made him particularly receptive to colonial policies that privileged local customs over Progressive impulses for change.

Davis had been in Zamboanga less than two months when he wrote his “Report on Moro Affairs,” dated October 24, 1901. Although acknowledging that “my personal knowledge is necessarily limited,” he proceeded to make observations and recommendations as a selfdesignated expert on Moro affairs. He began by declaring that “our treatment of the Mindanao Moros and the pagan tribes” would be based on the same rules that had governed military relations with Indian tribes on the western frontier. Those tribes had enjoyed the right to “regulate their own interior tribal affairs according to native rules and customs.” “We did not interfere with their religious beliefs and worship.” We did not require them to pay taxes. And we did not interfere in their trade. Here in Mindanao the army had encountered “aboriginal and nomadic races not materially different” from North American Indians. And just like those American tribes, the “beehive of Mohammedan savages” in Mindanao labored under “many score of mere hereditary chiefs, each entirely independent of every other,” with “no central authority or common head over all.” It seemed that only the Islamic religion distinguished Moros from Native Americans.[60]

While on the surface seemingly respectful of Native American and Moro cultures, Davis laced his commentary with racist assumptions from start to finish. Advising against imposing a Western-style democracy on them too quickly, he opined that “the transition from patriarchal forms and mediaeval feudalism to a government of law was slow … even with the Caucasian race.” One could hardly expect these “savages” to manage it more easily, even under white tutelage. “How many of us have seen the failure of attempts to make self-governing citizens quickly out of … naked savages”?

Much better to respect their "conservatism and deeply rooted prejudice," he concluded, and to use their "Dattos in our efforts to lead these people away from slavery, polygamy, piracy and despotic rule."[61]

Failing to recognize his own "deeply rooted prejudice," Davis questioned whether Moros could govern themselves anytime soon. Like many Americans of his time, he counted both their race and their religion against them.[62] He bewailed the fact that "white men" could never be "induced to emigrate to the Moro country in tens and hundreds of thousands" to till the soil as homesteaders had done in the United States. No such easy solution could be expected for "the Moro problem."[63] Hence, he recommended a go-slow approach to changing Moro culture, not out of respect for that culture but because he viewed Moros as too savage to change in the short term.

When asked his opinion of a plan to populate Mindanao with "liberty loving negro settlers," Davis wrote a twenty-three-page answer that embraced the racism implicit in the proposal. Agreeing that the numbers of "superabundant blacks" greatly exceeded "home needs," he concluded that "surplus blacks" would not "be missed in the States." If, however, they came to Mindanao as contract laborers hired by white American plantation owners empowered to compel the "lazy or recalcitrant" to work, then they might turn the island into a profitable colony. And if some of them stayed and intermarried with Filipinas, that would make for a Mindanao population far better than "the native aborigines and savage Moros."[64]

In the early twentieth century, Davis's endorsement of intermarriage between American blacks and Filipinas probably didn't raise many eyebrows. Had he championed the idea of Filipinas intermarrying with whites, however, he would have raised a real hullabaloo. Although miscegenation might be acceptable for blacks and poor whites in the colonies, it remained off limits for white army officers. Both Americans and Europeans associated it with degeneracy. As the French novelist Marguerite Duras summed up the prevalent view, "White is, in effect, a color very easily soiled." Keeping whites separate from indigenous brownskinned people thus became "a central organizing principle of European [and American] communities in the colonies."[65]

The possibility of such miscegenation might have been on Davis's mind when he called Jack Pershing into his office and told him, "As you are the only man left here who knows anything about the Moros, I'm going to send

you to Iligan."[66] The general liked and admired Pershing, and he consulted with him often on Moro affairs. It seems likely, however, that in offering Pershing a way out of Zamboanga, he wanted not just to promote his career but also to extricate him from his relationship with Joaquina Ignacio.

At forty-one years of age, Capt. Pershing had earned just two promotions in fifteen years of service. His career didn't look very promising. Not surprisingly, he grabbed this command opportunity. Iligan's location some two days travel by steamer from Zamboanga also made it a felicitous choice—both distant from the city and still in regular touch via mail service. He arrived in Iligan with orders to take charge of the small American garrison and "make friends" with the Moros of Lake Lanao.[67]

Pershing spent the winter of 1901–1902 whipping the rag-tag American garrison into shape and making friends with Moros. Among his Maranao Moro connections, none proved more important than Datu Amai Manibilang, the principal leader of Lake Lanao's north coast. Pershing got a glimpse of Manibilang's stature when the *datu* visited him in Iligan:

> On the appointed day he came in great state, accompanied by a retinue of about thirty of his people. He was a tall, swarthy, well-built man, past middle age, clean shaven, as most of them were. His jacket was of many colors, his trousers tight-fitting, his turban smartly tied and set jauntily to the side of his head. Like all Moros he was barefoot. He rode a fine-looking pony—a stallion—and for stirrups used a small rope knotted at the ends which he grasped between the first two toes. On each side of his horse a slave trotted along on foot, one carrying his goldmounted kris, the other his highly-polished brass box containing betel nut, buya leaves, and lime…. Leading the procession was a guard carrying a gun and behind this dignitary came another. Then came minor chiefs, relatives, and more slaves, all in their choicest finery.

Pershing carefully avoided talking with his guest about "knotty questions" such as "slavery and the plurality of wives." As for American governance, he "announced to him that it would be my policy to permit the dattos to govern their own people in their own way but that the chiefs would be held

personally responsible for any infringement of the rights of others." The visit, he concluded, "seemed to be a success."[68]

In February 1902, Pershing received a much anticipated invitation from Amai Manibilang to return the visit by coming to see him in Marawi, on the shore of Lake Lanao. Pershing went alone (except for an interpreter and three "native scouts") and unarmed. Just as he had done with Red Cloud in South Dakota, he began carefully to carve out a personal relationship of trust and mutual respect with the chief. From midafternoon until late at night on February 17, 1902, he and the *datu* talked. They also ate and ate well. "I have never tasted more delicious chicken," wrote Pershing, who expressed surprise at the chinaware on which the food was served. The captain also showed surprise when his host brought him "an attractive and youthful member of his harem" and announced that the lady "would be my companion for the night." Confused and confounded, for he "did not want to impair in any way the friendly understanding … [he] had laboriously built up," Pershing managed to decline the offer without insulting his host, who "sent the lady away in the same matter-of-course manner as he had brought her in."[69]

Describing Manibilang as "by far the most intelligent Moro I have met" and as a man who "exerts great influence among Moros about the lake," Pershing noted that "the old Datto" probed him about American attitudes on "religion and government." Americans had "no intention of interfering with their tribal relations, their customs, nor their religion," Pershing responded. Despite such assurances, Manibilang "made it clear that Moros would look with [grave] suspicion upon the approach of troops in the direction of Marahui." Nevertheless, Pershing reported that "I was very favorably impressed with these people and am of the opinion that much can be done with them by appealing to their reason and … their desire for riches."[70]

By April 1902, when Col. Baldwin began laboriously slogging toward the doomed fortress of Pandapatan, Pershing's relationship with Amai Manibilang started to pay off. He wrote to his friend and other Moro leaders of Lake Lanao's north coast, asking for a conference to explain the situation. After some delay, he received their invitation to confer with them in Marawi. He set out immediately, once again unarmed and accompanied this time only by an interpreter. Upon arriving, he found the Maranao Moros "very much excited and frightened…. Many had packed up their household goods ready

to move and had sent their women and children to their forts and other rancherias." They had learned about the approach of Baldwin's sizable force, and they had received translated copies of Gen. Chaffee's proclamation demanding "delivery of the assassins [of American soldiers] and … restitution of … stolen property." Although Chaffee carefully blamed only specific south coast *datus* for the attacks, and although he acknowledged "no cause of complaint" with other Maranao *datus*, he also gave notice of his determination "to explore the country … about the Lake, to build roads, and to carry out in full the peaceful purpose of the Government," whatever that might be.[71]

"I am very much distressed," wrote Amai Manibilang to Pershing. "Our women and children were frightened when they heard that the Americans had reached Lanao. I shall be very sorry if they [Baldwin and his troops] come to Madaya [his *rancheria*], because you well know that there are none here with bad intentions toward the Americans…. If it is true that we are friends, think before you do us any harm."[72]

On April 28, Pershing held a conference in Madaya with "all the leading north Lake Moros … as well as many Moros from other sections of the Lake." He

> explained the meaning of General Chaffee's proclamation … and assured them that none who were friendly to us would be molested, but that it was firmly the intention of the Americans to go where they pleased throughout this island. The Moros are, as is well known, very jealous of their religion, and like all Mohammedans stand ready to defend their faith by force of arms…. At the conclusion [of the conference,] all, except some of those from the South Lake country, expressed themselves as satisfied that no general war was to be waged and that they could proceed unmolested in their religion and in the pursuit of their lawful and peaceful occupations.[73]

By the time of this conference, Pershing had learned about divisions within the Moro camp, and he determined to take advantage of them in order to keep north coast Maranaos from joining the sultan of Bayang and his south coast allies against Baldwin's intrusion. His friend Manibilang "practically control[led]" the north coast section, Bayabao, and Manibilang

assured Pershing that “all the Moros of Bayabao would remain friendly.”[74] Because his power did not extend over all Maranao Moros, however, Manibilang could not speak for two other subgroups, those clustered on Lake Lanao’s southeastern shore around Maciu, and the Onayan group to the southwest, which included the sultan of Bayang.[75]

Capt. Pershing did not succeed in completely isolating the Onayans, as he had hoped. He noted that some *datus* “declared sullenly that they would fight the Americans if they came.” At the conference, “one fiery datto walked directly up to me in a threatening attitude and charged me with having deceived them.” Amai Manibilang spoke up in Pershing’s defense, and “the excited datto cooled down.”[76] Nevertheless, Maciu’s intentions remained unclear until May 2, when Baldwin’s men attacked Bayang and discovered that old enmities still ruled the day, leaving the Onayan group to defend itself. Four days after the battle, Pershing received the following cable from Manibilang: “I am very glad to know that the General has reached Onayan … [Bayang], and has killed many Dattos who were opposed to him. When the General has dispatched all the bad Moros over there then you can go there with your friends, the Dattos of Bayabao, from here.”[77]

The irony that Baldwin’s victory at Bayang met with censure from his American commanders while it gave rise to admiration and even praise from Moros such as Manibilang could not have been lost on Pershing. Baldwin had known next to nothing about Maranao Moros and regarded them all as savage hostiles. He and his expeditionary force had approached each Moro village and *cotta* ready to fight. Pershing, in contrast, had “passed through many Moro villages without firing a hostile shot.” Described by his superior as “an officer of prudence, good judgment and tact … who … regard[ed] his duty as best performed when executed with the least force,”[78] he possessed the ability to see himself and other Americans through Maranao eyes.

To see oneself and other Americans through Maranao eyes raises some big questions: How could one reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable differences between theocratic Muslim patriarchy and Progressive American secular democracy? How could one work with highly personalistic *datus* and still remain true to one’s belief in uniform and transparent governance? How could one accept and promote local leadership and local interests and still advance the American colonial effort to build a modern Philippine nation-state?

In the eleven years from 1902 until 1913, American military personnel wrestled with these questions in pacifying and governing Philippine Muslims. In doing so, they did not steer an even and predictable course. To the contrary, they swerved all over the road, going from conciliation and indirect governance to confrontation and direct rule. It comes as no surprise that Moros responded to these different tactics in mixed ways, ranging from confusion and overt opposition on the one hand to hopeful collaboration on the other. Out of this mishmash, however, emerged over time a new and highly creative American policy and a unique Moro–American relationship. Americans gradually learned to combine the new social science of secular state building and the new military science of rational force deployment with the acknowledgment that their initiatives, both civil and military, would have to take on a distinctly Moro face.[79] The first sustained experiment in the application of this nascent Progressive counterinsurgency policy occurred in 1902–1903. Lake Lanao offered a perfect laboratory for this experiment: American military personnel and Maranao Moros served as the principal participants, and Capt. John J. Pershing emerged as the lead practitioner.

1

Pershing and Early Counterinsurgency among Maranao Moros, 1902

A few days after the Battle of Bayang, Capt. John Pershing received orders directing him to join Col. Baldwin as his intelligence officer at Camp Vicars.[1] Gen. Adna Chaffee, then visiting on a tour of southern stations, confided in Pershing that he desired "to avoid more fighting if possible without losing prestige." He wanted the captain to help Baldwin do what he could to pacify the Maranao Moros without resort to arms. When Pershing asked "how he expected … [him] to do that with a fiery colonel in command," Chaffee replied that he would "be placed in charge of Moro affairs and that orders would be given that no move should be made without … [Pershing's] approval."[2]

Both Chaffee and Gen. Davis had already ordered Baldwin "to cultivate friendly relations with the Moros." "By fair, straightforward and kindly dealings," he should "win their confidence." Under no circumstances short of an attack by Moros should he "resort to active hostilities … without authority from" his superiors.[3] Now they were sending a captain to ensure that the colonel followed their orders to the letter.

Pershing and Baldwin had worked together before, on Gen. Nelson Miles's staff in Washington, D.C., in 1897, and they tried to make a go of this awkward situation. Nevertheless, the colonel did not appreciate having a captain look over his shoulder. Even more, he chafed under the obvious implication that his superiors harbored doubts about his judgment. Indeed, he and Pershing (and by extension Davis and Chaffee) did not agree on how best to deal with the Moros. Baldwin believed that, "having once warned the Moros, we should not hesitate to take action against any group that did not readily accept American sovereignty." Looking out over the lake at the nearby *cotta* of Bacolod, where Moros were busily strengthening their

defenses, he argued that “such preparations in defiance of American authority should not be permitted.” Pershing countered that such a course of action would prove “impossible without excessive bloodshed.” “With forbearance,” he felt certain that “irreconcilable chiefs [could be reduced in number] to a comparative few.” The colonel, in Pershing’s opinion, although being “a fine soldier with a long experience in handling Indians, … was inclined to be impetuous.” Unlike Baldwin, Pershing counseled patience in dealing with Moros, lest American troops “provoke a religious war.”[4]

If we can judge the situation from Pershing’s diary entries, he and Baldwin must have had a lively strategy debate. The latter’s point of view can be gleaned from Pershing’s journal rejoinders. In response to Baldwin’s repeatedly emphasized point that standard military practice called for decisive action before an adversary could build up his defenses, the captain replied: “To force an issue now would no doubt have some advantages from a strictly military standpoint.” But “we had the power at any time to punish them regardless of the kind of defenses they possessed.” Meanwhile, the Americans could themselves build up their supply base and transport connection with the coast. They “could afford to wait and exhaust every effort to establish friendly relations.” “Even though it takes a year or more to convince some of them, we should … realize that they have held this country as their own for centuries…. Being savages, they are slow to understand our motives.”[5]

Although many men at Camp Vicars took Baldwin’s side in this debate, Pershing prevailed when the colonel won promotion to brigadier general and departed from Mindanao. Capt. Pershing took over sole command of the 700 men at Camp Vicars on June 30, 1902. He faced a daunting task of convincing not only Maranao Moros but his own men that his more conciliatory strategy should be trusted.

Camp Vicars had the distinction of being perhaps “the most remote station ever held by American troops.” Known as “the camp above the clouds,” it looked out over Lake Lanao from an elevation of 2,800 feet, approximately 500 feet above the lake itself.[6] What a lovely spot. In Pershing’s own words, “the landscape, with its graceful undulations, dotted with rice fields and rising from the shores of the lake to the low hills and the timbered

mountains beyond, was always beautiful, especially in the rich southern lighting of the sky at early morning and evening."[7] From their camp, troops could see all the way to Illana Bay to their west. And looking out over the 134-square-mile lake, they could see villages and *cottas* all around the shoreline, inhabited by some 78,000 Maranao (People of the Lake) Moros, who fished, tilled their rice fields, and grew *camotes*, maize, coffee, sugarcane, cacao, coconuts, tapioca, tobacco, cotton, and many fruits. Thanks to their industriousness, the fertile volcanic soil they had to work with, and the sixty to eighty inches of annual rainfall that turned the slopes around Lake Lanao into a glorious green, they produced a surplus of rice, which they exported along with abaca to Iligan and Malabang. They also wasted little time in making a profit by selling their commodities to American troops.[8]

The Maranao people were one of three principal cultural-linguistic groups of Philippine Moros, the other two being the Maguindanao of Cotabato and the Tausug of Sulu. These groups, together with the Samal, Yakan, Jama Mapun, and Badjao, made up approximately 99 percent of the Philippines' Muslim population.[9] Each group lived independently from the others, not recognizing a common sultan, language, or economic nexus. For that matter, they did not even acknowledge a common history. Only in their shared adherence to Islam and alienation from Christian Filipinos did they acknowledge a common purpose. Threaten their religion, as the Spanish had done, and they pulled together to fight tenaciously in the centuries-long Moro Wars. Back off and leave their religion alone, and they tended to pull apart and fight separately or not at all.

In his "Report on Moro Affairs," written in October 1901, Gen. Davis commented that the Maranao Moros had the distinction of being the only Moro group never to have been "subdued" by the Spanish.[10] Whether the other groups had, in fact, been subdued remains an open question, but by the late 1890s the Spanish had finally put an end to Maranao isolation, if not resistance. With a force of some 4,000 Filipino infantry led by 116 Spanish enlisted men, the Spanish managed with great difficulty to occupy Marawi and deploy four gunboats on the lake, shelling Maranao *cottas* at will and disrupting the local economy. They did not, however, hold Marawi very long, and they had virtually no impact on Maranao culture. The Treaty of Paris ended Spanish rule over the Philippines in December 1898. As

surprised and elated Maranaos watched, the occupying Spaniards suddenly evacuated the lake country and scuttled their boats.[11] When Americans marched on Bayang more than three years later, the Maranaos remained, in Davis's opinion, "comparatively the most isolated and least touched by external influences of [all] the major [Moro] groups."[12]

If Pershing also regarded Maranao Moros as "isolated and least touched," his visit with Amai Manibilang in early 1902 altered that impression. His host greeted him warmly in a "massive" house "built of hewn timbers, with plank floors and a high, steep roof, heavily thatched." Inside the home, he noted that "Moros did not veil and seclude their women like Mohammadans of the Near East." A "real spirit of affection seemed to exist in the families." He never noticed "a Moro wife or child abused in any way" and commented that "if cases of ill-treatment existed they were at least exceedingly rare."[13] All in all, these people seemed remarkably gentle and gracious, not to mention skilled at winning Capt. Pershing's favorable impression of them.

Pershing counted approximately 400 *rancherias* (settlements) around the lake, ruled by about 150 sultans, each claiming to be of royal blood.[14] Some of these sultans had large followings numbering in the thousands, whereas others could claim no more than two or three families as their followers.[15] No supreme leader ruled over the Maranaos, but there existed what one scholar has called "a confederation of independent principalities (*pat a pangampong*)."[16] Individual sultans tended to align with one of three power centers (*pangampong*), each said to have been organized by a mythical ancestor. Those on the lake's northern shore and numbering approximately forty-eight clans generally considered themselves part of the Bayabao network centered in Marawi. Those inhabiting the southern shore from Madumba to Sauir (at least twenty-nine clans) regarded themselves as Onayans. With their center at Bayang, most of the Maranaos who fought and died against Baldwin's troops belonged to this network. Finally, the Maciu group (at least eleven clans), claiming to be the most ancient, held sway in the fertile lands along the lake's eastern and southeastern shores.[17] It may be that the Bayabao and Onayan people had once been under Maciu, but they had long since ceased to accept the latter's overlordship. By 1902, in fact, none of the networks even accepted the absolute leadership of one of their own sultans. To be sure, some leaders, such as Amai Manibilang,

enjoyed more prestige and power than others, but even he exercised “very limited control over” his network of sultans.[18] His “shadowy overlordship” lacked enough authority to keep individual Bayabao leaders from raiding and fighting against each other.[19]

Under each sultan came *datus*, or chiefs, men lacking in claim to royal blood but sometimes more respected and powerful in their kinship-based communities (*agama*) than their supposed overlords. Chosen informally by their clan (*bangon*) based on their wealth, education (in the Qurʾan and sharia law), courage in warfare, and fairness in settling disputes, *datus* stood tall in their *agama*, but they rarely enjoyed sufficient power to bestow the right of automatic succession on their sons. “It frequently happened that an uncle or other powerful relative, or some charismatic or heroic or shrewd ‘commoner’ achieved the datuship by consensus of the old datu’s followers.”[20] Powerful *datus* could withhold their support from a sultan, making him little more than a titular leader. That’s exactly what happened in the Bayabao settlement of Bacolod. There the sultan desired to live in peace with the Americans. One of his *datus*, however, desisted, and that *datu* proved “strong enough to prevent the sultan from making terms of submission.”[21]

Kinsmen usually made up the core of a *datu*’s *sakop* (followers), who regarded him as their leader, arbiter, and commander in battle. They worked and fought for him, and if he suffered insult or injury, so did they. In return for their allegiance and tribute, “the datu protected them in war and peace, gave them food and shelter in economically critical times, provided for their annual religious feasts, counseled and led them.” In keeping with “the formal law of Islam and the customary law” (*adat*), he settled disputes among his *sakop* and helped to do so between *agama*. A strong *datu* would often catch the attention of disaffected Moros, who might shift their allegiance from their current weak or inept *datu* to him. In this way, he could amass a larger and larger following, so that no other chief or sultan would dare challenge his autonomy and military clout. As Pershing would soon discover, few sultans had the power to compel *datus* to comply with a treaty or other agreement, meaning that negotiated settlements sometimes had to be renegotiated with each *datu*. But what proved an irritation in governing Maranao Moros turned out to be a boon for successful counterinsurgency. This decentralized polity, this confederation of virtually

autonomous rulers, could be subjugated and controlled with a divide-and-rule policy.[22]

Two other characteristics of Maranao society, *maratabat* and *rido,* also tended to divide one Moro from another, offering Americans the opportunity to exploit divisions and separate one *cotta* from another in their counterinsurgency effort. The two cultural practices fit together and set Maranao Moros to fighting against one another instead of against a common foe.

In their fascinating article "The Maratabat of the Maranao," Mamitua Saber, Mauyag M. Tamano, and Charles A. Warriner tell of a *rido,* or blood feud, between two Maranao families that lasted almost fifty years. It began in 1898 when an impulsive youth (actually the nephew of a Bayabao sultan) kissed the sister of a Bayabao *datu*, thereby violating her *maratabat* (honor, face, or amour propre) and thus that of her whole family as well. Humiliated and deeply aggrieved, the *datu* waited for his chance and then murdered the kissing nephew with a spear, whereupon he fled to the neighboring *pangampong* of Onayan. When the sultan's *sakop* could not find the *datu*, they fell upon his poor sister and two male cousins instead, executing the latter and enslaving the girl. Their *maratabat* still unappeased, they searched high and low for the missing *datu*. As it happened, he met his death not at their hands, but at the hands of Col. Baldwin and his American troops while fighting with the Onayan people in the Battle of Bayang. That should have ended the feud, and for four decades it mostly did. Then came World War II, a time of disorder, terror, and … opportunity. We have already seen how the *rido* between these two families had morphed into a dispute between Bayabao and Onayan. When electoral politics took hold in Lanao, old animosities affected factional divisions as well. During World War II, these age-old feuds took on yet another layer of meaning as bitter confrontations between collaborators and anti-Japanese guerrillas. In this case, the kissing nephew's grandson joined the guerrillas, and the aggrieved *datu*'s grandson, now a rich plantation owner (*hacendero*), collaborated with the Japanese. "In the guise of a fish vendor, … [the] guerrilla … entered the plush residence of the *hacendero* and massacred the whole family with bursts of his burp gun." For this brutal act, he was awarded the military merit medal by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur and his liberating American army perceived only the top layer

of a decades-long feud, or *rido*, that predated any anti-American or anti-Japanese sentiments among Maranao Moros in World War II.[23]

Maratabat has to do with honor, face, and shame. In Maranao parlance, it consists of a "psychological substance" possessed in greater degree by high-ranked people than by commoners or, in the old days, by slaves. A low-ranked person usually doesn't possess much *maratabat* and so does not have a compelling duty to avenge his or her honor. A foreigner, non-Muslim Filipino, or fellow Maranao might even get away with subtly insulting such a person. But woe to the unwitting person who insults or shames the *maratabat* of a *datu* or sultan and his family. Even if the insulted party agrees to forgive the offense, such forgiveness might well lead to that party's social ostracism. Neighbors will say that he "has no shame." Knowing that "a man without *maratabat* is nobody," he will feel coerced by society into taking some action to prove that he values his honor. He faces a stark choice: either avenge the insult or get out of town, and his choice will affect "not only himself, but all of his clan."[24]

Over time, it became more and more common for Maranao families or even clans to conflate an individual's wronged *maratabat* with their collective honor, which proved especially the case when that individual happened to be a high-ranked person such as a *datu* or sultan. Every effort would be made to acknowledge the dishonored person's wounded *maratabat* and cool his hot heart before anger turned into violence. High-ranked arbitrators would be called in to negotiate a mutually agreeable settlement between the disputants. That settlement usually included brassware, livestock, and other valuables that the guilty party would be persuaded to pay the victim. But what if he could not pay? Then his *datu* would step forward to settle the account, expecting that the man and his family would repay him, if necessary, through indentured servitude. When this institutionalized form of conflict resolution worked, everyone breathed a sigh of relief. But it did not always work, and the price of failure could be a violent feud, or *rido*. At the very least, a *rido* involved families against families. When a *rido* took place between *datus* or sultans, it pulled whole villages or clans into violent struggle against one another. Such conflicts could be both widespread and catastrophic. And although "integral to the way of life of [all] Moro ethno-linguistic groups … [throughout] the

southern Philippines," *rido* became "most widespread and most vicious among the Maranao."[25]

The combination of *maratabat* and *rido* proved toxic to Maranao resistance against American pacification of the Lake Lanao region. While it cannot be said that the fifty-year *rido* recounted earlier convinced Bayabao leader Amai Manibilang to turn his back on the Onayan sultan of Bayang, it very likely made him more receptive when Capt. Pershing pleaded with him to stay out of the fray. Indeed, although Pershing probably did not understand *rido* or *maratabat* at first, Manibilang certainly did. From his point of view, it made sense in 1902 to use the Americans in Bayabao's ongoing *rido* with Onayan. How much easier to let Baldwin punish Manibilang's longtime rivals than to punish them himself.[26]

Where Amai Manibilang may well have seen an opportunity to strengthen his hand, so too did the Americans. They immediately set out to exploit the divided and turbulent nature of Maranao society.[27] "This circumstance," observed Gen. Davis, "is favorable to us in our efforts to bring these people under civilized control."[28] He went on to recommend the employment of "bloodless methods" to curry favor with as many sultans as possible, isolating the remaining holdouts in *cottas* that could be picked off one at a time. Although brave and fearless, Maranao fighters possessed "slight capacity for prolonged resistance against modern arms in the hands of trained men." Unlike American Indians or Filipino insurgents,[29] they fought "only in defense of their *cottas*." Whenever possible, they should be "taught how to improve their own natural and social condition, and benefit us at the same time." Possessing many "manly qualities," they "should be kept alive and not shot down in war."[30]

Davis and his protégé Pershing set out to keep Maranao Moros alive and not shoot them down in war.[31] They began by extending an open invitation for leaders to visit Camp Vicars. "Whenever any sultan or datto came to camp it was almost a state occasion. They brought a retinue according to their position as to wealth and heredity." Many visits resulted in "mutual declarations of amity," and on these occasions Pershing would present his visitor with an American flag to fly over his *cotta*. Oftentimes, he would also return the visit to his new ally's *rancheria*. In these conferences, the Moros "constantly reverted to the subject of religion," accusing Americans,

for example, of wanting to make them eat pork. Just as constantly, Pershing and his aids assured their wary hosts that they harbored no such intentions. Although some days brought little more than frustration, others led to small breakthroughs, as in the case of a sultan who asked Pershing "whether our God was the same as theirs." "There is but one God and He must be the same," replied the American. "Well, if that is so [then] we ought to be friends," came the response. And on another occasion an old and unfailingly dubious *datu* "finally capitulated," saying that "hereafter the echo of my voice will always be for peace…. I will be a friend of the Americans because you tell me that in America one can have any religion he desires. But do not bring hats here and make us wear them nor compel our women to wear skirts."[32]

What both Americans and Moros had to deal with in their slow and stumbling peregrination toward mutual comprehension had much more to do with metaphorical spectacles than with hats or skirts. They tended to see each other through lenses distorted by dualistic preconceptions.

From the American point of view, the duality looked more or less like this:

- Americans = modern, rational, democratic, and secular in their government
- Moros = traditional, superstitious, autocratic, and theocratic

From the Moro point of view, it looked like this:

- Moros = Muslim protectors of the faith; heroes in defending the will of Allah
- Americans = Christian invaders; defilers of God's will

To begin communicating effectively, the parties had to start seeing each other through different glasses. In *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, David Kilcullen discusses the same process of lens cleaning and seeing with new eyes. Referencing the Afghan War that began in 2001, he suggests that Americans initially conflated the Taliban with Al Qaeda fighters, simplistically regarding all of their foes as common enemies in a global war on terrorism. Slowly but surely they came

to understand the difference between “local fighters” or “accidental guerrillas,” on the one hand, and global terrorists, on the other. When they did this, when they began separating local interests and stakeholders from global terrorism and terrorists, they experienced a higher degree of success. They also experienced something like what their compatriots had discovered 100 years earlier in the Philippines.

According to Kilcullen, although the “accidental guerrilla” might get swept up in a national or transnational struggle, at heart he “fights principally to be left alone.” He might perceive the “Western presence” as “corrosive to local identity,” but just as likely he will fight Westerners for the same reason that he has opposed all invaders, whether Muslim or not. He stands against them because they occupy his space, not because he wants to attack their space. Far from being necessarily anti-Western or antimodern, the grievances that motivate him tend to be local and particular. “He follows folk-ways of tribal warfare that are mediated by traditional cultural norms, values, and perceptual lenses.” To see him as a Muslim sworn to kill Western Christians misses the point. First and foremost, he operates as an “accidental guerrilla” fighting for localized interests, leaders, and kin.[33]

Like Americans in Afghanistan 100 years later, John Pershing arrived in Mindanao knowing little about the local inhabitants or their world. He tended to conflate Maranaos with all Moros and all Philippine Moros with Malay Muslims in general. He looked out over his Camp Vicars domain and declared magisterially that “deception is a Malay characteristic.”[34] Not surprisingly, he concluded that the “most careful and patient handling was required” in dealing with people so “extremely jealous of their semi-savage freedom and suspicious of the outside world.”[35]

His choice of words reflected the overt racism of his time,[36] and his tendency to see all Muslims as dualistically “other” than Americans adumbrated American misperceptions of their Afghan foes as common enemies in a global war on terror in 2001. In both cases, it would take time and experience before Americans began to question the accuracy of their initial assumptions.

Such racial and cultural stereotyping retarded Pershing’s appreciation of important Maranao practices such as *maratabat*, and the consequence

almost proved catastrophic. Early in his tenure as Camp Vicars commander, he arrested a sultan whose followers had attacked Americans along the Malabang road.[37] Henceforth, Moro leaders would be held responsible for the anti-American activities of their followers, he declared. Not until those followers turned over the leader of the attacking party, a man named Tangul, would the sultan of Binadayan be released. Completely failing to understand how humiliating such detention would be for a Maranao leader and ignoring Moro protestations that the sultan's followers could not possibly catch and deliver Tangul, he held the offending chief in irons for weeks.[38] Finally, the man quite literally exploded with shame and attacked his American guards. When those guards responded by shooting him dead, Pershing had a major crisis on his hands. A prominent Maranao leader had been so humiliated by his American captors, his *maratabat* had been so dishonored, that he had felt impelled to engage in *rido* even unto death.[39]

Pershing always insisted that the sultan had gone "*juramentado,*" even though his own description of the incident suggests otherwise.[40] The term *juramentado* derives from the Spanish verb *juramentar,* "to swear an oath." Among Philippine Moros it signified "one who took an oath to kill the enemies of Islam" as a religious act. A *juramentado* would meticulously plan his attack in advance, binding up vulnerable parts of his body, dressing in a white garment, and taking an oath before a *pandita*, or imam, to kill infidels. None of these actions fits the sultan of Binadayan's case. Not uncommonly, Americans confused *juramentados* with *amuks*. In the latter case, the enraged individual would attack on the spur of the moment, killing anyone—men, women, children, other Moros, non-Muslim Filipinos, or Americans alike.[41] Maranao Moros in 1902 very likely regarded the sultan of Binadayan's actions as neither *juramentado* nor *amuk*, but rather as an example of justifiable *rido* in defense of one's offended honor.

Whatever the case, the incident clearly worried Pershing. He admitted: "I regret his death more than I can say."[42] Claiming his ally Datu Grande as a witness, he declared that the sultan had made a deathbed overture for peace. Not only did he hold the Americans "blameless," but he also "hoped that the Moros and Americans would forever be at peace."[43] Just in case that explanation did not ring true to the slain sultan's friends, he lined up American troops and ordered an artillery salute in the sultan's honor while returning the Moro's body to his relatives. When that show of force did not

deter angry Moros from attacking American outposts and a pack train over the next few nights, he pulled back the Camp Vicars defenses and prepared for a general assault.[44]

The sultan of Binadayan's death marked a significant step in the evolution of Pershing's thinking about Maranao people and how to deal with them. Before August 13, 1902, he had believed that Maranao Moros, being basically callow and unsophisticated people, could be handled by a generic policy of patronizing patience and forbearance. Like children, they would respond positively to kindness and outward displays of courtesy. "In dealing with these people, and knowing their traditions and their inclination to fight everything, it is remarkable how much can be accomplished by appealing to their reason," he opined. "The first step, however, is to gain their confidence. Get … [them] to understand your purpose … [and] intentions, then lead … [them]."[45]

When kindness and outward displays of courtesy failed to move these "wild and untamed" people, and when appealing to their reason also reached the limits of effective policy, Pershing resorted to intimidation. Taking the Binadayan sultan prisoner and holding him in irons for weeks can be understood only in this context. For all intents and purposes, he held this sultan as a hostage. Against repeated pleas for his release by multiple Maranao leaders, he decreed that the sultan would languish in captivity until he and by extension other Maranao leaders manned up to their responsibility for the behavior of their followers.[46]

Then came the Binadayan sultan's violent death at the hands of his American guards. Not only did Pershing suddenly lose his hostage, but he also lost his bargaining power with Maranao leaders. More significantly still, he lost prestige and personal honor in their eyes. And most important of all, he may have lost a bit of the cultural myopia that had so constricted his vision up to this point in time.

Pershing had been forewarned that using the Binadayan sultan as an object lesson would not work for other Maranao leaders. Again and again, his friend Amai Manibilang had advised against this mistaken notion. In a meeting on July 22, Manibilang had asked for the sultan's release, pointing out that the man's followers had, in good faith, turned in a stolen rifle.

PERSHING: I respect your request very much but must insist upon the delivery of Tangul.

MANIBILANG: He [the sultan] cannot catch Tangul.

PERSHING: He ought to have thought of that before. Hereafter I intend to hold all Sultans and Dattos responsible for the acts of their people.

MANIBILANG: A great many of them cannot control their people.

PERSHING: They must be taught then to do so, for we do not intend to remain here and permit renegade Moros to attack our soldiers and steal our property.

MANIBILANG: I have come a long way to help you arrange for peace among the Moros here, and you do not seem to want to follow my advice.[47]

Note that this advice and criticism came not from a hostile Moro but from Pershing's closest Moro ally. Manibilang wanted the American to operate from within the Maranao frame of reference. If Pershing would only act like a *datu* instead of like an arrogant outsider, he, Manibilang, would stand to reap the benefits of his friendship with this new chief. Why couldn't Pershing understand that Maranao Moros equated effective leadership with trust building, networking, respectfully attending to relationships, and arbitrating skillfully, not with treating potential followers like truant children? To the extent that the American acted like a foreigner, Manibilang, too, would be treated like an outsider by his peers.[48] To the extent that Pershing acted like a *datu*, the Moro would enjoy enhanced prestige in the lake country, thanks to his position as key intermediary between this powerful new *datu* and other Maranao leaders.

Manibilang worried not just about the Binadayan sultan's humiliation. His American friend simply didn't understand how to build relationships. When Sajiduciman (Sajid Usman), the principal religious leader (*pandita*) of Bayang, offered his friendship in return for *lantakas* and guns taken by American forces in the battle of Bayang, Pershing demurred, saying: "While I would like to have Sahiducima for a friend, I cannot afford to buy his friendship." A world of mutual incomprehension separated the two men. To give Pershing credit, he did ask: "What is the custom of the Moros, to

return those things they have captured in war? Are we not right in keeping them?"[49] But he stiffened his resolve against any suggestion that his friendship could be bought. Sajiduciman, in contrast, together with his intermediary Manibilang, understood his actions to be the first step in negotiating. That's the way *datus* worked. They negotiated and arbitrated between two parties in a dispute. The Americans wanted allies. Well, here stood a potential ally, Sajiduciman, who sought affirmation of his own stature—something that return of the guns and *lantakas* would demonstrate to his people. Didn't this American captain know anything about the art of give and take?

"If you will [just] take my advice with reference to Sahiducima, you will be successful," Manibilang pleaded with Pershing. "Sahiducima lost everything that he had in the battle of Bayan[g], and you should have pity on him." The advice fell on deaf ears. Failing to understand the crucial importance of an intermediary in negotiations like this, Pershing insisted that Sajiduciman himself "come and tell me" if he and his people "are in need" of help. And then he brought the negotiations to a close by adopting the role of overbearing schoolteacher: "Yes, there are points in your advice that I think are good, but … the lesson that the Moros are learning from the arrest of the Sultan of Binadayan will do much toward teaching them that those who commit offenses against us will be punished." He followed this comment with a veiled threat. "If there are any Moros who cannot control their people, I will be glad to assist them." To this threat Manibilang responded by saying simply, "I wish that you would go back to Iligan."[50]

Manibilang's advice did more to annoy Pershing than to change him at first. It may be that he recalled Datu Grande's warning not to put too much confidence in Manibilang, who, Datu Grande said, was just stalling for time until the Moros of Binadayan, Bayang, and Bacolod had finished their harvest and could renew their harassment of Americans.[51] When the two men conversed again on August 4, they "fought out every opposing proposition."[52] Writing to another *datu* a few days later, Pershing showed just how little he had learned. To release the sultan of Binadayan without the delivery of Datu Tangul, he argued, would "be inconsistent with the American idea of justice."[53] Within days of this letter, the sultan was dead, and other Maranao leaders didn't think much of "the American idea of justice." Facing a crisis, Pershing needed his friend Manibilang more than

ever. “I feel very much disappointed that you have not yet been here to visit me … and to use your influence with other Moros,” he wrote the day after the sultan’s death. “I want you to come with your leading dattos … and see me.”[54]

Amai Manibilang’s response shows that he still hoped for Pershing to learn the skills of Maranao leadership and become recognized as a *datu* within the Lake Lanao political network. “I will never be able to forget your good feelings,” he began but quickly warned: “Do not do with me what you did when I went to your post.” “As I have already told you, you should not impose the American law on the Moros until the time [when] all Dattos are your friends.” Lamenting that “you have not believed what I said,” he then turned to the heart of his message. Join the network. Accept the role that Maranaos are ready to bestow on you as a fellow *datu*. “Cease writing … letters with hard words.” “Have some regard for the people of Lanao.” Start negotiating, arbitrating, and building relationships with other leaders. Stop ordering them around. This will only make enemies of potential friends, and “it is hard to order enemies.” Much better to “study about the customs of the Maranaos.” That would make for a more promising future for everyone —Pershing, Manibilang, and all people of Lanao.[55]

John Pershing did eventually begin listening to Amai Manibilang. It took the Binadayan sultan’s death to open his eyes and clean his lenses, but he did gradually learn from his mistakes. Slowly and awkwardly he accepted Manibilang’s advice and began adopting the persona of a Maranao *datu*. He tried learning their language and began treating them like “accidental guerrillas” instead of imposing American ideas on them. There remained, however, a major problem with becoming like a *datu* and fitting into the Maranao way of life. Maranao Moros, including their *datus*, didn’t believe in equality for all. To the contrary, they practiced polygamy and slavery.[56] How could Pershing adopt the persona of a *datu* and stay true to his American Progressive roots as well?

In answering this question, Pershing adjusted his progressivism. Like any good American Progressive, he remained scientific and professional. But unlike his compatriots back home, he temporarily stifled his urge to reform undemocratic Maranao social practices. Enslaved Maranaos, women of all ranks, and uneducated youth would have to wait a while before tasting the fruits of American-made democracy. Progressive impulses could not be

permitted to undermine the Americans' first priority—pacification. Military necessity dictated that Maranao big men—the *datus* and sultans—had to be wooed first. Social reforms aimed at democratizing Maranao society would threaten their rank and patriarchal control, making it more likely that they would violently resist pacification. The Bayang sultan, for example, had been vanquished in one day because he fought virtually alone. Had he been joined by his Bayabao and Maciu neighbors, fighting furiously against a perceived threat to their culture, he would have presented a much more formidable challenge. Logic dictated that the Americans adopt a policy of divide and rule, and the logic of that policy dictated in turn that they postpone implementing socially progressive reforms.

Such reasoning raised a delicate issue. In an already unpopular war, just about everyone on the home front (especially Progressives) could agree on one thing: American troops should not be deployed in defense of distinctly un-American and undemocratic practices such as polygamy and slavery.

But Progressives were not just idealists; they had a practical side, too. A rational, legible, practical progressivism in war connoted a systematic progression of changes, beginning with pacification and eventually leading to democratic political and social reforms. A successful Progressive in the Philippine Moro context, Davis and Pershing argued, would need to be both practical and patient. Citing one Moro leader who had "compared the average Moro to an untamed horse," they agreed that if Americans "attempted to ride him at once he would probably buck." If, however, they exercised patience, "went at him gently and gained his confidence, he could be ridden without difficulty."[57]

The practice of polygamy occasioned comparatively little hand wringing among American military officers, who wrote it off as collateral damage for women who had the misfortune of being Muslims. Like praying five times a day and giving alms to the poor, it just came with the faith. Anyway, the American commitment to separation of church and state forbade them from interfering with any of these practices, including polygamy. Conveniently, this commitment also meant that they would not be threatening the polygamous privileges of *datus* and sultans they needed as allies. And perhaps to assuage their collective conscience, they noted that "the number of wives … [is] limited by the husband's ability to take care of them,"

inferring that so long as they weren't divorced, these women at least would not go hungry.[58]

The policy of ignoring slavery in Maranao society proved to be much more problematic than turning a blind eye to polygamy. While Capt. Pershing preferred to be "noncommittal for the time-being [about military policy on Moro slavery],"[59] Gen. Davis felt moved to write a separate report on the issue. He argued, first, that Maranao Moro social practices should not be compared to the American experience. Slavery in particular took a much milder form among Moros around Lake Lanao than it had in the American South. Second, it would be impractical to free the slaves with or without remuneration for their owners. "Many thousands,—probably tens of thousands, would continue in voluntary servitude," there being no other place for them in Moro society. Third, Davis echoed the arguments of former American slave owners by claiming that "[the Moro slaves] are not specially unhappy as slaves, for they have few wants or necessities, save those that are felt by all animals." Finally, he noted many instances of Christian Filipinos who also practiced slavery, concluding that "it will never be eradicated in these islands until public sentiment … is opposed to it, and this sentiment will be of slow growth."[60]

Having freed themselves from the potential fetters of social progressivism, Pershing and his fellow officers in Lanao set about winning the hearts and minds of Maranao big men, if not their wives, followers, and slaves. By the end of August 1902, the captain had begun to feel comfortable playing the role of Datu Pershing. He had come to understand the importance of networking among Maranao leaders. Slowly but surely he also grew to recognize the vertical nature of their relationship building. Maranao *datus* and sultans did not want to regard him as one among equals. Equal relationships connoted friction, competition, and tension to them. Just as they felt comfortable having their *sakop* depend on them, so they sought to cultivate a dependency relationship with their new American leader. But would Pershing respond in a culturally appropriate way? Would he understand that cultivating dependencies meant more than just talking? That he would need to help them financially from time to time? To step in and arbitrate their disputes? To guarantee their security in inter*pangampong*

disagreements and confrontations? In other words, would he learn not only their spoken language but their cultural language as well?

Just as Pershing made efforts to learn the Maranao spoken word,[61] so he became conversant with their cultural vernacular as well. When, for example, the new sultan of Bayang complained about rice fields that American cavalry horses had destroyed, Pershing took advantage of this opportunity to nurture dependency. He agreed to accompany the sultan personally in order to "appraise the loss." The sultan wanted 300 pesos in reparations, saying that "you paid the Sultan of Binadayan 100 pesos and I have lost much more than he." But even back in May 1902 Pershing had his intelligence sources, and one of them, the sultan's cousin, had told him that the sultan would "be satisfied with 100 pesos." That, presumably, is what he got.[62]

The young American commander did not sit back and wait for Maranao *datus* to approach him for favors. He actively reached out to them. In letter after letter, he invited *datus* and sultans to pay him a visit: "We could become personally acquainted" and might even form "a lasting friendship" based on "mutual confidence."[63] "I remember our personal friendship," he wrote in another letter, telling Amai Manibilang of his high regard for him and other Moro friends "as though you were brothers."[64] Standoffish Moros, however, could not be considered friends, much less brothers. Friendship had to be personal. Hence, when he received word that certain Moros pledged their friendship but "did not want us to come to their rancherias," he could "not understand this sort of friendship." "The way to make friends is to come personally and visit us, … not … to send us messages of friendship in which they tell us not to come and visit."[65]

Despite these efforts, some *datus* and sultans remained hostile, and hit-and-run attacks on American patrols and pack trains, usually with the purpose of making off with rifles, continued to keep the occupying soldiers on edge. Could it be, Pershing wondered, that Moros did not appreciate the benefits of American rule? Perhaps an appeal to their pecuniary interests would help, for, after all, "we bring more money into your country." "We will build roads for you to the sea-coast and therefore we must hire men to work." "Our troops need supplies and we will purchase your cattle." "Moros can use their horses to pack for us." "Our soldiers will … spend a great deal … for fruit and farm products and other things you have to sell."

“Eventually our business men will come and buy your coffee, … gutta percha, … cocoa, … rice, … cattle and the various kinds of cloth that your women make to sell. If we do these things it will certainly benefit you. Then why should you not welcome us here among you?”[66]

When Moros rejected such promises of friendship and profit, Pershing assumed that bull-headed ignorance must be the reason. “We wish you to be happy,” he reiterated with some exasperation. “We will not kill your people nor take your women nor your children. We will not molest your property nor take it without paying for it; we will not disturb your religion nor will we try to change your lawful customs; in short, we will treat the Moros as we treat each other—with justice and fairness. In coming among you,” he concluded somewhat disingenuously, “we have no other aim than to make you our friends.”[67]

Over time, more and more Maranao leaders responded positively, if guardedly, to such personal overtures and assurances. Happily, Pershing received a letter from the sultan of Binadayan’s surviving relatives, promising their ongoing friendship despite the sultan’s violent death. The captain, however, would have to be patient. Only after twenty-eight days of mourning would their elders talk with him regarding “the best way of assuring our [continued] friendship.”[68] The sultan of Uali’s friendship also came with a hint of doubt. Yes, he would “cease to fight,” but he would need to “think for a month if … [he would] be your friend or not.”[69]

Other Maranao leaders approached their relationship building more directly. The sultan of Bayang, for example, asked Pershing to help pay the funeral expenses of a son who had died of illness.[70] The sultan of Maciu requested paper on which to write more often and promised to ask all Maciu *datus* to be the captain’s friends.[71] Amai Manibilang wrote to thank him for the carabao (water buffalo) he had promised.[72] And the sultan of Oato complained that Pershing had betrayed their relationship and shamed him before everyone around the lake by promising to visit him and take his side against his Maranao enemies but then not showing up! How could he do this after adopting Oato’s son as his own? Did his friendship amount to nothing more than an affair of words? It seemed that Pershing had “a lack of confidence about lending … arms to us.” “I wonder at your lack of faith in us,” scolded the sultan. “Be sure that our friendship is worth more than 100 rifles.”[73]

Just as Maranao sultans and *datus* sought to turn their relationship with Americans to their advantage, so Pershing tried to do the same. Few of the Moros who visited Camp Vicars came away without having been probed for information about other Moros. Many proved quite willing to inform on their peers. Some, like Amai Manibilang, even agreed to become informal emissaries. Over time, Pershing amassed a treasure trove of information about marriage ties between Maranao leaders, feuds, factional alignments, and reputations.[74] Piece by piece, strand by strand, he became thoroughly familiar with Maranao leadership as a network with fault lines and rifts that he could exploit. This information proved invaluable to him as the year 1902 wore on.

The case of Datu Adta provides a good example of how Pershing turned potential enemies into informants. The Americans had arrested his sultan, having caught him with a stolen rifle. Adta hurried to Camp Vicars, declaring it to be just a "misunderstanding." Not the sultan but a band of thugs led by Bugulung had been the culprits who had killed one American, stolen his rifle, and sold it to the sultan. Pershing responded that Adta "would have to prove he was my friend by bringing in the murderers." Adta returned to camp the next day "with a party of slaves carrying the dead bodies of Bugulung and his brother, each lashed to a bamboo pole," and deposited them in front of the captain's tent. Pershing freed the sultan, and thereafter Adta became one of his "most trusted Moro confidant[s]."[75]

In addition to Adta and, of course, Manibilang, Pershing counted Datu Grande and Datu Amai Tampugao among his most loyal informants.[76] When Grande and his people felt threatened by Bayang, the American "loaned him two Carbines for his protection."[77] He occasionally paid Grande for information about hostile leaders, their networks, and potentially threatening activities.[78] Tampugao at first could not be trusted as much as Grande. To be sure, he freely offered information on the hostile *cottas* of Maciu and Bacolod. He explained that befriending Americans would, in the minds of Maciu and Bacolod Moros, "displease the Almighty," while killing Americans would guarantee a ticket "straight to heaven." But when Pershing confronted him with information that one of his close neighbors had led ten Moros in cutting telegraph wires, he caught Tampugao by surprise. Faced with an intelligence network far more sophisticated than he had realized, the man became one of Pershing's more trusted informants.[79]

When the leader of Ganasi came into Vicars, Pershing pumped him for information on who stole telegraph wires along the Ganasi trail.[80] When Datu Gundar arrived, he questioned him carefully about Bacolod's defenses.[81] And when the sultan of Pualas paid a visit, he received a grilling about marriage and blood relations among Maranao leaders, a topic that fascinated Pershing.

PERSHING: Where is Datto Limon … , your brother? Is he not a relative of Ahmai Manibilang?

PUALAS: Yes. He married a niece of Ahmai Manibilang.

PERSHING: Where is Ahmai Sumagayau?

PUALAS: At Dapao.

PERSHING: What is his other name?

PUALAS: Daya. He is the elder brother of Datto Idil.

PERSHING: Is Ahmai Sumagayau a relative to Ahmai Manibilang?

PUALAS: I don't know.

PERSHING: Is Ahmai Sumagayau a brother of Sultan Idil[,] who wishes to make war with the Americans?

PUALAS: Yes.

PERSHING: Where is Sultan Idil?

PUALAS: In the mountains of Lake Dapao.

PERSHING: Why does he wish to be an enemy?

PUALAS: Because he lost everything at the hands of the American soldiers.

PERSHING: What news have you of Bacolod?

PUALAS: The Sultan of Bacolod will resist the Americans.[82]

As a would-be *datu*, Pershing began making progress in networking with his Maranao peers. But he still had a way to go. Stubbornly holding to a conviction that Moros and Americans could settle their differences by

sitting down and negotiating a formal treaty, he invited Moro leaders to a conference. The turnout, despite Manibilang's mediation, proved disappointing. Only Amai Manibilang and a few of his allies showed up.[83] Those conspicuously absent included Sajiduciman, the *pandita* of Bayang. Just the day before the conference, Sajiduciman had asked to shake hands with the captain. As they shook hands, Manibilang (once again acting as intermediary) remarked: "Every ill feeling that existed between us is by this act washed away."[84] While willing to shake Pershing's hand, however, Sajiduciman and many of his peers remained unwilling to sign a treaty.

During negotiations for the treaty, Amai Manibilang once again played the role of Maranao tutor and wise counselor to the earnest and likable but seemingly slow-witted American captain. He recommended that "before putting this treaty in force … you make friends with more of the Sultans and Dattos."[85] In point of fact, most Maranao leaders preferred informal and personal relations over formal and impersonal treaties, whether with Americans or each other. Few showed any interest in signing an agreement with occupying forces. Remember that only three short months earlier those same forces had killed hundreds of Moros in the Battle of Bayang. Whereas the Americans had a clear and present interest in stabilizing the peace-and-order situation around Lake Lanao, local Maranao leaders preferred a much more fluid and dynamic state of affairs. Even American leaders such as Gen. Davis never signed onto the project. Faced with such a tepid response, Pershing eventually let his treaty proposal drop. One of its provisions, however, reveals a great deal about its author's evolving but still inchoate ideas on dealing with Maranao Moros.[86]

The would-be treaty proposed to establish a "judicial tribunal … to have jurisdiction over all questions of dispute between Sultans or Dattos … or between the people of different rancherias." Comprising five Moros "learned in Moro law," this body would have two justices chosen by American military authorities, two by sultans and *datus* who had signed the treaty, and a fifth by the four other appointees. Signatory Moros would agree to submit to this tribunal all "questions that cannot be otherwise … settled, and the decision of a majority … shall be the judgment of the tribunal and shall be final."[87]

In this article, Pershing sought to apply American Progressive inclinations to Maranao concepts of dispute settling. Recognizing the

centrality of good negotiating skills for all successful Maranao leaders but regarding their system of arbitration as too localized for maintaining peace and order throughout the lake country, he sought to create, in effect, a court of appeals.[88] Individual *datus* would continue to arbitrate local disputes, but there would now be an appeals tribunal to settle ongoing differences between *rancherias* before they burst into open hostilities.

In an effort to bring peace and order to the region, Pershing thus proposed to graft a formal and relatively impersonal institution onto the highly personalistic and informal arbitration system operating in the lake country. Superimposed on the localized and decentralized dispute-settling process would be a regional and centralized institution. Atop a heterogeneous and irregular customary procedure adjudicated by locally selected and untrained arbitrators would be a much more homogeneous system of justice administered by distant judges "learned in Moro law." Empowered to overrule the obscure and arcane practices of lesser *datus* would be justices presumably informed by the modern principles of transparency and legibility. In short, although Progressive values and procedures would not replace customary law, they would have the last word.

In one other way Pershing's proposal for a Moro tribunal revealed both his American Progressive assumptions and his lingering ambiguity about Maranao Moro ways of doing things. As he proudly pointed out to *datus* and sultans attending the August 6 conference, the tribunal would work on the principle of majority rule. "For instance, should a question come up and one party not agree to the decision of the tribunal, that party would be bound to [it]" even if only three of the five justices agreed.[89]

One can only imagine the stony silence that must have greeted this explanation of majority rule. What made perfect sense to the American captain made no sense to his Moro audience. Arbitration for them had nothing to do with persuading a majority of arbitrators to agree with one point of view or the other. Rather, it connoted negotiating until a mutually agreed upon solution could be reached. The purpose of arbitration was not to establish guilt or innocence, but to settle a dispute before it flared into hostilities. How could the two disputants be persuaded not to engage in *rido*? How could the hot tempers of their dispute be cooled? How could a more general conflagration be avoided? The worst scenario imaginable

would be a three-to-two decision by the arbitrators. That would just anger the losing party all the more, with violent acts of vengeance sure to follow. No. Both parties had to be mollified. The art of negotiating had to do with assuaging the bruised *maratabat* of both parties, not just of one. In this system of dispute settling, Pershing's majority-bound tribunal would be a disaster.

Once burned and more than twice warned, Jack Pershing warmed to the role of *datu* in the weeks and months after the Binadayan sultan's death. He didn't cease being an American Progressive. He did, however, learn to become an effective *datu*, even if a rather Progressive one. Understanding the merits of a controlled and deliberate show of military force in consolidating alliances and isolating opponents, he led his first military offensive southeast against the stubbornly hostile *cottas* of Sauir and Maciu (a campaign that is analyzed further in the next chapter). In the course of two separate marches between September 18 and October 3, American troops methodically invested and burned the numerous *cottas* of their opponents. Thanks in part to mountain guns capable of accurately shelling *cottas* from a distance of hundreds of yards, American military superiority proved devastating, and few Moros disagreed with Pershing's assessment that he had given Moro opponents "a severe lesson."[90]

Having demonstrated the mailed fist of American power, Capt. Pershing donned the velvet glove. Reaching out to two of his most inveterate opponents, he agreed ceremonially to adopt one each of their children. In the case of his old nemesis, the sultan of Bayang, where at one point the women and children had fled to another *rancheria* fearing for their lives, he adopted the daughter of an important *datu*.[91] He invited her to witness his cavalry on parade in Camp Vicars, asked her to "use all your influence among the women of Bayan[g]," and promised her (somewhat ambiguously?) that his soldiers would "always have for you and all the Moro women the same respect that we have for our own women."[92] He also adopted the heir apparent, or *rajah mudah*, of the Oato sultan. From this man's point of view, such an act connoted American support for his dispute against a neighboring settlement. Pershing didn't see it that way. He refused to enter the fray either by strongarming the offending neighbor or by supplying the *rajah mudah* with guns so that he could carry out his own

attack. He sought, like a veteran *datu*, to make use of his allies without being used by them in turn.[93]

Making use of savvy Maranao leaders without becoming their unwitting foil did not come easily. In fact, it took a good deal of cunning. Not known for his artfulness, Pershing had to grow into this role. His failed effort at dispute settling by tribunal showed just how far he still had to go. But in his communications of late 1902 and early 1903, he exhibited more and more shrewdness. When, for example, he received an alarming letter from the mother of his adopted daughter expressing fear for the Bayang sultan's life in an impending revolt, he immediately called the sultan's bluff. If, in fact, the man faced a potentially dangerous threat from one of his *datus* (supported by Sajiduciman), then the American offered to "send troops in[to] Bayang whenever you desire them."[94] Knowing that the sultan would prefer a visitation of the plague over American troops marching into his settlement, Pershing then wrote to Sajiduciman, reporting the sultan's suspicion of his "evil intentions." The revolt ultimately came to nothing. Whatever his intentions, Sajiduciman had been found out, and the Bayang sultan had become more dependent on his American neighbor. Without lifting a finger, Pershing had propped up a teetering ally in a strategically important *rancheria* close to Camp Vicars. With or without his dispute-settling tribunal, he had begun to mature into the role of a successful arbitrator.[95]

Like any successful *datu*, Pershing learned that power came in many guises. Moros could never ignore the threat of military force. A canny touch for resolving disputes also helped.[96] But the American had many other tools in his *datu*'s toolbox. He had, for one thing, money, with which he could provide relief for victims of a typhoon in July and a severe earthquake in August.[97] Again and again, he offered medicine to people afflicted by a severe cholera epidemic. "We will do everything we can to help all Moros," he promised, "our friends and our enemies alike," who should not have "any fear of coming to us for medicines."[98] He hired Moros in the vicinity of Camp Vicars to build sheds for livestock on the post. He paid them for wood and hay. And at the daily market, Maranao farmers made money selling food and supplies for Pershing's 700 men each day.[99] Although it begged incredulity to claim that "all Moros who have received the Americans as friends are well and happy," it could be said that they had

begun to regard Pershing as a big man or *datu* of region-wide importance by the end of 1902.[100]

From November 26 until December 2, 1902, Pershing carried out his most audacious demonstration of just how far his power and influence had spread in the lake country. Accompanied by some fifty-five American troops aboard a small flotilla of *vintas*, he crossed the lake from south to north, showing the flag all the way. Moros from each of the lake's west coast *rancherias* "came along side in vintas and hailed us, and others called to us and cheered us from their places." The people from many Bayabao settlements turned out en masse. At Marawi, Pershing directed a volley to be fired in Manibilang's honor. To his surprise, the salute "was immediately returned." Then "music from the Culintangan and Agung" began, "creating a din not however displeasing to the ear."[101]

Market day in Marawi fell on the second day of the American visit. Some 500 Moros showed up, full of curiosity because many had never before seen an American. As they gathered around, Pershing promised that his soldiers came as friends and "would not molest them in any way." He knew, however, that the expedition itself, much more than his words of assurance, had impressed the Maranao Moros. For those who might still harbor thoughts of resistance, the expedition demonstrated "the ability of … Americans to go [anywhere around the lake] … when they please[d]."[102]

After this show of force, it only remained for Pershing, who had emerged as the most famous leader in all the lake country, to be formally recognized as a Maranao *datu*. That's exactly what happened on February 10, 1903.

The day began when the American captain marched his troops the short distance from Camp Vicars to Bayang. There they met hundreds of Maranao leaders and their *sakop*, and none other than Pershing's old foe Sajiduciman escorted them into the *cotta*. Although the *cotta* failed to impress the American as more than "a medieval fortification," Pershing acknowledged that it was "well designed" and "very strong."[103] He proudly remarked that for "the first time since [Commodore] George Dewey entered Manila Bay … officers of the United States Army … [had] gained access to a Moro fort without a severe fight. An American flag was hoisted over the fort, the American troops stood at attention and presented arms, and the field battery fired a salute to the flag."[104]

Then the sultans and *datus*, "well-armed with rifles, spears, krises and campilans,"[105] ushered their visitors to a spot near the shore of Lake Lanao. There they held a conference, "the people standing around in a circle, the chiefs and … [Pershing] in the center, squatting on … [their] heels, the lines of American troops in the background." Into the very center of the circle strode "an aged Mohammadan priest in gorgeous trousers of many colors and a robe of yellow silk," followed closely by a slave bearing a large red parasol. "A treasured copy of the sacred Koran [one of only a few then owned by Maranaos] … was brought forth with solemnity and placed on a mat of native fibre in the center." Pershing and all the rulers placed "their hands upon the Koran and, with great solemnity, … [took] an oath of eternal friendship, allegiance to the United States, and cessation of warfare against each other." Thereupon, Sajiduciman leaned over and with great formality informed a startled Pershing that he "had been elected a datto" with all the rights and privileges of a Maranao *datu*.[106]

Pershing thus earned the highest honor that Maranao Moro leaders had ever bestowed upon an American. He could never have won this honor without becoming a player in the Maranao social and political context. Nor could he have achieved this distinction without learning to treat recalcitrant Maranao leaders as "accidental guerrillas" rather than as irreconcilable enemies. In the weeks and months since the Battle of Bayang on May 2, 1902, he had spent at least four days in building relationships with Moros for every day of fighting them. Slowly but surely and informally rather than formally, he had begun to practice a new kind of counterinsurgency warfare. Much more relational and multidimensional than anything he could have imagined just a year earlier, it emerged as an American way of war with a distinctly Moro face.

2

The Mailed Fist of Progressive Counterinsurgency

Pershing's Lake Lanao Campaigns, 1902–1903

Not all Maranao Moros had been beguiled by Datu Pershing's charm offensive. Some could not forget that he represented a foreign occupying army. Some had even told him as much. "We do not want you to live in Lanao," declared the leaders of Bacolod. "All the Dattos of the laguna [lake] will make war against you because we profess only one religion which is that of Stambul." Lest the Americans fail to take this threat seriously, they "burned [the letter] in six places," meaning nothing less than war.[1] Then on July 4, 1902, with 700 of their peers enjoying American hospitality and games in a grand celebration at Camp Vicars, the same leaders sternly admonished their American occupiers that "you should not be here among circumcised Moros, for you are not circumcised."[2] The only way that Pershing could win their cooperation would be to visit Bacolod for the purpose of being circumcised.[3] "We want war, and if you do not get out of here and go back to the sea … [then] you are a lot of rascals."[4] "Take care, for the day of judgement is near at hand."[5]

It would take Pershing a while to accept their invitation to visit Bacolod, and when he did so in April 1903, he came not to be circumcised but to conquer. He recognized that Bacolod had emerged as the strongest *cotta* on the lake. Before attacking that fortress, he needed to tune up his rusty troops and perfect his counterinsurgency tactics against a less-formidable foe. As noted in the previous chapter, he did this against the sultan of Maciu and his allies in September and October 1902, just before a terrible cholera epidemic ravaged the lake country. The epidemic killed at least 1,500 Maranaos and compelled him to quarantine his troops inside Camp Vicars.[6]

Capt. Pershing first requested permission to attack recalcitrant Maranaos on August 12, a day before the imprisoned sultan of Binadayan's explosive

rido and death at the hands of his American guards.[7] Even before his death, attacks on Camp Vicars had increased in number and ferocity as the sultan's sons and allies tried to rescue him.[8] And after his death, Americans faced raids almost every night as their assailants "proceeded to make the night hideous by beating drums, firing in our direction, and yelling."[9] Troops noticed war flags flying over the rebuilt Bayang *cotta* close by the camp. They heard Moro stories of catching Camp Vicars by surprise and killing every American. Telegraph wires kept getting severed. Moros everywhere seemed to be fortifying their *cottas*. War fever rent the air.[10]

Pershing took action to defend Camp Vicars against these "disconcerting" incursions. But his most effective tactic also turned out to be the most terrifying for his own men. He deployed troops in four-man outposts (relocated each night) to ambush prowling Moros before they reached the camp's defenses under cover of darkness.[11] Despite the obvious hazards of this stalking-the-stalkers game, the tactic worked, and Moro raids diminished in strength and numbers. Nevertheless, by the end of August Capt. Pershing had concluded that "a good sound drubbing" would be needed to put an end once and for all to the nightly attacks. That drubbing could be achieved only by going on the offensive.[12]

When Pershing received permission to attack on September 5, he had everything in place to guarantee success.[13] He possessed a large force of American soldiers chaffing to break out of their camp routine and teach their Moro assailants a lesson. He had accumulated detailed information about the lay of the land and Maranao political divisions. And he had cultivated friendly relations with Moro allies, isolating recalcitrants in manageable pockets of resistance. He thus knew that his campaign would not spark a general conflagration in Lanao.

Compared to sophisticated twenty-first-century theories on counterinsurgency warfare, Pershing's tactics in late 1902 still appear quite simplistic. Even before embarking on his first campaign, however, he had learned a few things. As we have seen, he had whole-heartedly embraced relationship building with Moro leaders as a first step in maneuvering for power among them. From the beginning, he also grasped the importance of molding tactics to fit local conditions. In early-twentieth-century Lanao, that meant clearing Maranao Moros out of heavily defended fortresses with the least possible loss of life.

Before setting out on a march, Capt. Pershing made a habit of composing messages to opposing Maranao sultans and *datus* asking them, for one last time, to stand aside and let American expeditionary forces pass through their *rancherias*. Failing to receive a satisfactory reply, he marched his troops loudly and menacingly against a chosen *cotta*. He arrayed his forces around the *cotta*, holding his men largely beyond the range of rifle and *lantaka* fire. When his infantry had deployed, he ordered the mountain guns to unlimber and begin firing shrapnel into the *cotta*. Sharpshooters sent out ahead of the main force helped stifle return fire. Slowly and deliberately, he tightened the noose, sending small assault parties forward to discourage counterattacks. He did not try to cut off escape routes, offering Moro fighters the opportunity to flee. Once their *cotta* stood virtually abandoned, they could watch from hiding places as American troops burned any remaining structures and food stocks within it. Then Pershing and his command moved on to the next fortress, systematically repeating the process over and over again. Sooner or later, this modus operandi held the promise of discouraging most Moros from opposing American rule and persuading them to cooperate.

Pershing's approach had all the subtlety and artistry of a juggernaut. It stressed caution over verve and predictability over surprise. It left little or nothing to chance in its slow, methodical, and stolidly unsexy tactics. Those tactics, however, were perfectly suited to the local environment. Such a deliberate show of force complete with step-by-step escalation gave Moros lots of opportunity to change their minds and surrender without massive loss of life. Meanwhile, those who chose to stay and fight in their *cottas* did so at a great disadvantage in the face of American artillery. The very success of this strategy eventually convinced Moro resistance fighters to adopt guerrilla hit-and-run methods. Those new methods, in turn, called for a more sophisticated and full-spectrum counterinsurgency policy, as we will see in the next chapter.

Pershing finally set out with a force of 546 officers and men on September 18, 1902. He marched not against Bayang or Bacolod, but rather against the *cottas* of Butig and Maciu to his east. Most of the attacks against Vicars had originated from that sector, where the local sultan had drawn around him "a crowd of renegade Moros from Butig and its subordinate rancherias."[14]

Confronted with such a force, surely the offending Moros would cease their hostilities, control their followers, and deliver up the arms they had stolen from American troops. Failing that, they faced bombardment, assault, and destruction.[15]

Informed by an allied *datu* that sultan Uali of Butig had no intention of giving up without a fight, Pershing led the bulk of his command against the sultan's *cotta* at Gauan. Nearing the Uali domain, they followed a narrow wooded ridge until they ran into a fort on the shore of Lake Butig. Across the lake stood another fortress. Pershing deployed two companies, leaving two others in reserve, and opened up long-range artillery fire against the *cottas*. Within minutes, Moros began fleeing both forts. Yet after entering the nearest one, troops continued to come under fire. After a half-hour of brisk fighting and aided by reinforcements, the Americans overran a hidden *cotta* from which that fire had been coming. They found three dead Moros inside and evidence of several others having been wounded before escaping through an opening in the wall. They burned the *cotta* and then returned to their base camp, having sustained not a single casualty.[16]

Pershing's troops, remembering how they had been greeted by a white surrender flag the morning after their assault against Pandapatan *cotta* back in May, fully expected the same but instead discovered only red war flags flying over sultan Uali's remaining fortresses the next morning. As they advanced, they met and repulsed an attack by forty Moros, some of whom they trapped in a wooded ravine, while the others escaped to a *cotta* about a mile away. They immediately invested one fortress, flanking it with infantry and blasting it with the field guns. Once again, Moros began escaping even though their *cotta* provided a strong defensive position. Inside the *cotta*, troops found "a large quantity of rice in a … substantial building," all of which they burned along with the contents of a smaller *cotta* nearby. Once again they returned to camp.[17]

Having cleared away most of the fortifications guarding approaches to the alluvial peninsula on Lake Lanao's southeastern shore, Pershing's expeditionary force set forth again early on September 20. Before noon, they reached high ground above the fortress of Sauir that stood on the lakeshore and protected their objective for the day—Maciu. As his troops rested and Pershing composed an invitation for Maciu's leaders to meet him in his camp, all of a sudden Moros opened fire from multiple positions. In their

response, the Americans demonstrated their military superiority in three ways. First, they bombarded Moros who tried to cross an arm of the lake some 1,800 yards away, sinking one *vinta* with remarkable accuracy and discouraging others from reinforcing Sauir. Second, they rushed one company forward against a *cotta* that covered their approach, taking the position after a twenty-minute firefight. Finally, they attacked the *cotta* of Sauir itself, first wreaking havoc with their artillery and then charging the fort with their infantry. No more fighting ensued. The soldiers found cook fires still burning inside, but no Moro defenders. They burned "a large, well-constructed building … containing rice, coffee and cocoa" and turned their attention to Maciu.[18]

Where Maranao Moros failed to stop the American advance, poor intelligence and boggy terrain succeeded. Pershing admitted that he "had had difficulty in obtaining any accurate information about trails and roads, as well as about the location of cottas." As his troops turned in for the night at Sauir, he tried to remedy the intelligence situation, only to discover that the only trail to Maciu was "impassable at this time" owing to its "swampy condition." Not to be denied easily, he spent the day of September 21 exploring alternative approaches and directing the construction of bamboo rafts for his troops to cross the arm of Lake Lanao and come around behind Maciu. During most of the afternoon, those rafts came under fire from Moros hidden in deep grass, but American scouts and sharpshooters "prevented any close range firing." Despite their efforts, the rafts got stuck in a dense growth of water lilies bordering the swampy edge of the lake. After two failed attempts, Pershing finally abandoned the attack, admitting his "very great" disappointment and that of his entire command.[19]

On September 22, the Americans turned back. They had overrun and destroyed eight *cottas*, killing or wounding at least sixty Moros while losing no lives among themselves. But they had failed to take Maciu. As they returned to Vicars, Maciu Moros rejoiced in their "victory," firing rifles and *lantakas* and hurling all manner of verbal abuse at their would-be conquerors. Thoroughly annoyed, Pershing ordered a parting artillery and mortar barrage against celebrating Moros some 3,000 yards away. "The range proved too great for accurate firing," but he and his men had the satisfaction of watching the Moro throngs disperse in fear for their lives.[20]

Pershing and his command learned a number of lessons from his first, somewhat frustrating expedition against Maranao insurgents. First, they could not count on their foe to fly the white surrender flag after just one afternoon of battle, as had happened at Pandapatan. Moros might be badly outgunned, but Americans had better not underestimate their toughness and courage. Second, Maranao Moros seemed to understand the strategy of trading space for time, abandoning one fortress after another only to renew the battle on a different stage. Third, they clearly grasped the principle of using terrain to their advantage, building *cottas* on ridge lines that commanded points of strategic advantage or on the shores of impassable swamps that drastically reduced their enemy's firepower advantage. And fourth, they knew the lay of the land far better than the Americans did. They could disappear into fields of tall cogon grass or along hidden waterways uncharted on any maps, moving from *cotta* to *cotta* completely undetected by their adversaries. With all his allies and collaborators among Maranao sultans and *datus*, Pershing had believed his tactical intelligence to be sufficient for a successful campaign. Clearly he would have to obtain better information, especially of the trails and terrain, before embarking on other campaigns against other opponents.

That said, Pershing knew that his first campaign had demonstrated the efficacy of his careful and deliberate tactical approach. Despite long years of training as a cavalry officer, he had deployed his troops like an infantry commander. Instead of utilizing his horsemen to surprise the enemy with lighting strikes, he had marched his men slowly and noisily, hoping that the sheer size of his command would convince Maranao leaders to surrender. When they refused to be awed by this show of force, he turned to his artillery and then infantry rather than to his beloved cavalry, eventually ordering the latter to dismount and join the infantry in attacking on foot. The approach lacked glamor and had a touch of posturing to it. But looking out from their *cottas*, many Moro defenders got the message. By the time Pershing ordered the artillery barrage to commence and infantry assault to follow, few of those defenders remained at their posts for long. As a result, Moro loss of life in defense of their fortresses averaged fewer than eight men per *cotta*, and American troops sustained virtually no losses. Meanwhile, the march had provided Pershing with a much better understanding of the Maciu

sector's natural obstacles. In his next campaign, he would come armed not only with superior firepower but with superior engineering skills as well.

Having received new orders to march against Maciu, Pershing set out again on September 28 to subdue the Maciu sultans once and for all.[21] Although the men under his command numbered only 412, they included 22 officers and enlisted men from the Corps of Engineers.[22] "Fully equipped with axes for felling timber and … tools … for constructing boats or opening up trails, the command was ready for any emergency."[23] Also accompanying the expedition were several "friendly Moros," including Datu Grande of Makadar, Datu Amai Dirambang of Oato, and their followers.[24]

This time the Americans made it all the way to Sauir on the first day and established their base camp there. Facing a newly reinforced *cotta* across the arm of Lake Lanao, they immediately set out to find an alternative route to Maciu. A reconnaissance party discovered an old and swampy trail obstructed by trees that Moros had recently felled. Capt. J. J. Morrow of the Engineer Corps estimated that it would take 200 men at least two days "to make it passable." Facing that unenviable task, Pershing and his troops retired for the night.

September 29 found the Americans engaged more in painstaking construction than in fighting. To be sure, they returned fire against Moros in their new fort and encountered "strong resistance" from Moros occupying the same ridge line and *cotta* that had slowed their advance a week earlier. Pershing himself led the charge against a stronghold in which twelve Moros perished. In the main, however, they spent the day clearing and improving the swampy trail and constructing a catamaran out of two large *vintas* furnished by allied *datus* from the Oato *rancheria*.

Pershing determined to move on Maciu the next day, completing improvements to the trail as he and his men advanced. Accordingly, his entire command, except the pack train and a fifty-man camp guard, started down the swampy trail. Despite all the engineers' hard work, it remained so muddy in parts that mules hauling the artillery had to be unpacked several times and their loads carried by the men. It took all morning to reach a ridge line overlooking Maciu. Two *cottas* stood between them and their objective, one of them occupied by "the defiant Sultan Gandauli." Within twenty minutes of Pershing's order to commence artillery and rifle fire, Gandauli and his men (numbering 150 in all) had deserted both *cottas*. This time the

American captain chose not to let them escape unharmed. He ordered the infantry to pour “volley after volley into the retreating Moros.” They killed or wounded “a great number” before survivors reached temporary safety in the Maciu *cotta*.[25]

Nothing now stood between the Americans and Maciu. Nevertheless, Pershing decided to give Maciu’s sultan one more chance to stand down. As the American troops awaited a reply to his note, they burned the two forts they had taken. Wondering if they would need to attack Maciu itself, they set up camp for the night.

They needn’t have wondered. Pershing received a message from the sultan announcing that he and 200 warriors would be ready for the Americans on the following day. When the infantry moved out on the morning of October 1, 1902, they met Moro skirmishers almost immediately. Pershing posted his artillery and deployed two infantry companies. They advanced down into the valley, unmoved by “cries of defiance” from their foes. As they neared the cluster of five Maciu *cottas*, their captain positioned three companies from right to left, leaving a fourth in reserve to protect the rear. After a pause to ensure that all troops had fully deployed, he ordered the battery to open fire.[26]

The battle of Maciu gave Pershing and his troops their first real test. Their foe initially met the slow and deliberate American assault with “a vigorous fire from *lantakas* and small arms.” Undeterred, the Americans advanced to within 100 yards of the main fortress, enveloping but not occupying the other four *cottas* as they did so. From close range, the artillery and infantry fire “had a demoralizing effect” on Maciu’s defenders. Above the din of battle could be heard “prayers of the *panditas* for their dead and wounded.” Still, the Moros would not quit. They did not just hole up in their fortress but harassed their enemy’s rear area even as the battle raged around the *cottas*. Frustrated and irritated, Pershing watched as dusk turned to dark. His troops had drawn a tight noose around the remaining Maciu *cotta*, but they faced a long and nerve-wracking night.[27] A reporter from the *Manila Times* asked him: “Are you going to storm the cotta tonight?”

“No, we would lose too many men.”

“But aren’t you afraid they’ll sneak out in the long grass during the night and get away?”

“That is exactly what I expect them to do.”[28]

The Americans crouched down in rank cogon grass ten to fifteen feet tall, knowing that they might be ambushed at any moment by Moros hidden in narrow ditches running through the grass. Pershing tried “to overcome the darkness” by lighting a fire between his lines and the *cotta*. That worked for a while, but nobody got any sleep as yells, chants, prayers, and occasional gunshots pierced the night. Around 3:00 a.m., the firing rose to a crescendo as Moros tried unsuccessfully to break through the American lines.[29]

As it turned out, the nighttime attack brought an end to the battle of Maciu. When daylight broke over the battlefield on October 2, Pershing’s men probed the *cotta* and discovered that its remaining defenders had escaped through underground passageways, leaving it empty of warriors. The Americans burned “a large supply of rice and provisions” together with the remaining structures. “The interior of this cotta showed that the owner was of some distinction and evidently wealthy as Moro wealth goes,” observed Pershing. But what about that owner? Had he escaped? Had he been killed? Just as Pershing pondered those questions, a Moro *juramentado*, acting alone and armed only with a *kampilan* (a heavy two-edged sword), sprang out of the grass and attacked his lines. He hacked one soldier before anyone had time to react. Then he kept on attacking across a distance of thirty to forty yards, falling dead only after being shot seven times. “This Moro … afterwards proved to be [none other than] the Sultan of Maciu.”[30] Commenting that this sultan represented “the last of a long line who had always fought Christians,” Pershing acknowledged that he “had held out against us … purely as a matter of principle, and he vindicated his courage in his death.”[31]

The Americans marched back to Camp Vicars on October 3, but not before they had destroyed every other Maciu-allied *cotta* in the vicinity. As they set fire to buildings in the deserted *cottas*, “the smoke and flames of the burning nipa [palm roofs] … gave a satanic setting to the scene.”[32] Amazingly, the Americans had suffered only two casualties and no deaths. Pershing gave no estimates of Moro losses, but from internal evidence in his report it seems likely that at least 100 Moros were killed or wounded.[33]

By any measure, Pershing’s march on Butig and Maciu must be counted a success. His command had lost not a single man while sustaining only two casualties. Between Butig and Maciu, they had killed at least 100 Moros and wounded that many more, but their slow and deliberate approach had been

far less deadly than Baldwin's against Bayang five months earlier. They had left every opposing Maranao *cotta* in ruins. They had, in short, demonstrated the futility of Moro fixed-place (*cotta*) resistance to American military might.

Many Maranao *datus* and sultans got the message. As October progressed into November, hitherto standoffish sultans and *datus* appeared at Camp Vicars to meet with Pershing. Meanwhile, raids on the camp fell off, as did ambushes along the road from Malabang.[34] The Bacolod leaders remained hostile, but Pershing, Davis, and Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner agreed to pause and see if the Bacolod sultan, known to be wavering in his opposition, might prevail against militant *datus* and the *panandungan* in his *rancheria*.[35]

The pause turned out to be much longer than planned because the cholera epidemic struck and American troops had to remain quarantined in Camp Vicars. Not until April 1903 did the epidemic abate enough to permit new campaigning, and the months of April and May also marked the dry season in central Mindanao. Time for Datu Pershing to go after the few remaining holdouts: Bacolod in the west and Taraca in the east. On April 2, 1903, orders came down from Davis and Sumner to conduct an exploratory expedition up the west coast of Lake Lanao, from Camp Vicars all the way to Marawi. The Bacolod *cotta* stood right in the way. If its leaders chose to obstruct American passage through their turf, Pershing would have no alternative but to remove them forcibly from his path.

Although ready and raring to go, the American captain couldn't march against Bacolod without for one last time pleading with Moro holdouts to wake up and appreciate their good fortune in falling under American tutelage. In less than a year, he reminded them, his troops had employed many Moros "at good wages" in building roads from Iligan to Marawi and Malabang to Vicars. They had "purchased a great deal of Moro produce" and established a good market at Bayang. They had not molested any Moros "except some who attacked us." They had "not interfered with the customs, habits, government nor religion of any Moro." And they had "kept every promise." Couldn't Bacolod's leaders see that the Americans had come not "to make war, nor to dispossess the inhabitants of Lanao of their lives, property or anything that is theirs"? Rather, they had occupied the lake

country “for the good of the Moros,” so that “all fair minded Moros who know us have become our friends.”[36]

Incomprehensibly to Pershing, there remained “two or three dattos [who] refuse our friendship simply because, as they say, they do not like the Americans.” If they would just “visit me as soon as possible and talk with me,” surely he and they could iron out their differences. So many had “suffered from disease.” So many had lost cattle and carabaos that they had to farm “by hand or not at all.” If only they would pay him a visit. He would not let them down. “I will give employment to many,” he promised. And if he could find out how many replacement carabaos they needed, he would “try to procure them.”[37]

But if those two or three isolated *datus* persisted in obstructing “the establishment of universal peace in the Laguna,” then they would “suffer the consequences of their stubborn ignorance.”[38] They had a stark choice: peace and prosperity under benevolent American rule or military defeat and destruction.

On April 5, 1903, having received no response from Bacolod’s militant faction with their “savage pride,” Capt. Pershing set out with 515 troops, cavalry, engineer and hospital corpsmen, two mountain guns, two 3.6-inch field mortars, four large Moro *vintas*, 164 pack mules and ponies carrying four days’ rations, and one journalist observer, Mr. A. Henry Savage Landor.[39] The Americans also came equipped with good intelligence. Thanks to their forays against Butig and Maciu back in September, they knew what to expect and what it would take to ensure quick and decisive victory.

By this time, the *panandungan*’s militant faction had taken power from the Bacolod sultan who continued to be wary of openly confronting Pershing. For some time, the faction had been strengthening their defenses, even as the Americans watched apprehensively from a hill above their Vicars camp. The Bacolod *cotta* had the advantage of good strategic location at the tip of a ridge overlooking Lake Lanao. Wouldbe attackers faced the unenviable task of approaching along a narrow trail atop the ridge line, where Moro defenders could pick them off from the *cotta*’s walls. Those walls measured 100 feet square, 12 feet high, and 15 feet thick, with revetments of stone and bamboo. What’s more, they were surrounded by a massive ditch some 30 to 40 feet wide and deep. Inside the *cotta*, “a substantial shell-proof roof made of bamboo and mud” would partially

absorb shrapnel from American artillery.[40] Protected by these strong and ingenious defenses, some 200 Moro warriors beat on their *agungs* (gongs) and flew their war flags, daring the Americans to attack.[41]



5. Capt. Pershing in the advance on Fort Bacolod, April 8, 1903. Philippine Insurrection File, RG111-SC-84921, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

Like his Bacolod foes, Pershing, too, had prepared for this day. “I have worked on this fight,” he wrote to a colleague, “as I foresaw long ago that it must come, and the whole thing from the beginning worked out as planned.”[42] His plan called for an assault against the fortress not from the vulnerable ridge line, but from the north. Such an attack held the promise of avoiding heavy American losses on the ridge, while also putting Bacolod’s defenders at a disadvantage given the high ground north of the *cotta*, which would enable American artillery “to drop projectiles down into their fort.”[43] Gaining that high ground, however, necessitated some very hard bushwhacking up ridges and down into heavily wooded ravines, then up new ridges and down again into swampy hollows. Knowing what lay ahead for his men, Pershing ordered them into camp at Madumba near a beautiful spring as night fell on April 5.[44]

All night long Moros probed the Americans’ lines, at one point creeping up to an outpost and wounding two enlisted cavalry troopers. And when Pershing’s force resumed the march early next morning, “a large party of … [Moros] came out to fight” before retiring to “their flag-bedecked stronghold” when fired upon.[45] Owing to extremely rough terrain, a deep, 800-foot-long defensive ditch, and skirmishes in which several small forts and parties of Moros “were either destroyed or dislodged,” the Americans did not gain the high ground north of Bacolod until 4:00 p.m. When heavy rain descended on the combatants, Pershing might well have called off the advance and rested his men for another night. Not so. With artillery and mortars blasting away at the fort, he ordered three companies of soaked-to-the-bone soldiers to form a skirmish line and advance down a steep ridge toward the *cotta*. By nightfall, the mud-covered Americans had largely enveloped Bacolod, reaching all the way to the lake on the left flank.[46]

To discourage Moro surprise attacks at night, the Americans managed to light bonfires in front of their lines despite the rain. During the night, “a great many” Moros, including all remaining women and children, escaped by way of the lake.[47] Dawn brought with it a successful foray against “Moros who had caused some annoyance by firing into camp.” Meanwhile, troops on the right flank succeeded in extending their line all the way to the lake,

completing the fortress's envelopment. The time had come for Bacolod's final destruction. But wait! Around 9:00 a.m., firing from the fort ceased, and a white flag appeared. Then there emerged a small delegation composed of the *panandungan* and two *datus*. Pershing, with an officer and interpreter, met them midway between the lines. The Moro leader offered to surrender with the condition that his men should keep their weapons and not be taken prisoner. Absolutely not, responded Pershing, who had lost all patience with Bacolod's obdurate hostility. "As this leader had refused to confer with me before the battle, he evidently did not trust us now." "Nothing but unconditional surrender could be accepted."[48]

"Unconditional surrender!" The *panandungan* had never heard of such a thing. For this inveterate arbitrator and dispute settler, nothing ever needed to remain unconditional. From his point of view, why negotiate at all except to reach accommodation by mutual compromise so that further bloodshed could be avoided? To humiliate your opponent by demanding abject surrender invited nothing less than ongoing violence and the probability of a blood feud. Maranao Moros simply did not act this way. And yet here stood this so-called American *datu* demonstrating his utter ignorance of Maranao culture and customs. Deeply offended, the Moro leader marched back to his *cotta,* hauled down the white flag, and ordered his fighters to fire away at the American infidels.

The importance of this moment in Pershing's career cannot be overestimated. Certainly he understood how the Maranao arbitration process worked. He knew that the Bacolod *panandungan*, in personally leaving his fortress and appealing to him on neutral ground, had acted within long-accepted Maranao customary parameters. The appropriate and anticipated response required that he not humiliate the man but rather sit down and work out a mutually agreed upon accommodation. Since arriving in Maranao country, that's how he had learned to operate, exercising patience and forbearance as he arbitrated time and again between Moro disputants. He had become so good at cooling everyone's heart in such negotiations that he had been elected the first American *datu* in Philippine history.

However, had he not already offered Bacolod's leaders ample opportunities to face reality and negotiate with their undeniably powerful American occupiers? All his efforts had been spurned. For months he had been the recipient of truculent letters threatening that "if you stay here, we

want to fight you." Well, here he stood, together with 515 troops and artillery, ready to fight. Did the *panandungan* think that this force represented nothing more than a drill team of cadets like the Pershing Rifles, trained to impress an audience without hurting anyone? Did he regard the whole confrontation as merely a Philippine "dramadrama," "full of sound and fury but signifying nothing"? Perhaps that explained why, as he faced his enemy, the Moro leader worried not about the death and destruction surrounding him, but about so-called disrespectful behavior by Pershing's troops. "If the Americans want to fight us," he protested, "tell them to fight like men. While American soldiers are besieging my fort I see them down by the water-side eating up all my cocoa-nuts. This is infamous, and is not war!"[49]

Pershing understood what was really going on inside the Bacolod *cotta*. Surrounded, outgunned, and overmatched, the *panandungan* sought, more than anything, to avoid personal humiliation. In response, the American would give him room to escape death, but not to escape being shamed. Once Pershing had lost patience with his foe, had mobilized an overwhelmingly powerful force, and had cornered his opponent, he regarded negotiations as little more than surrender proposals. That became his modus operandi as he faced Bacolod, and it remained his modus operandi for the rest of his military career.

Nevertheless, when the *panandungan* turned his back and angrily ordered a resumption of hostilities, Pershing must have wondered if he had overreached. Perhaps this explains why he did not, in turn, order a final assault that morning or afternoon or evening. He later admitted that "the final assault could have been made then." After all, his "artillery had completely destroyed the embrasures and loopholes in the cotta walls, making it difficult for defenders to fire effectively, as every man who showed even his head above the parapet became a target for our sharpshooters."[50] Nevertheless, he paused and waited, hoping to avoid the loss of life that a full-scale assault would surely precipitate.

When the sun rose over Bacolod on April 8, it looked for all the world as if Pershing's patience had borne fruit as Americans beheld another white flag fluttering above the *cotta*. Once again the *panandungan* came forward. Once again Pershing went to meet him. Once again they negotiated. And once again the negotiations failed.

As the Moro leader walked back to his fortress, Pershing understood that the man was walking to his grave. Too much had transpired for him ever to surrender. His pride and reputation, indeed his whole identity, had become embodied in that fortress standing athwart the American advance and pacification of Lake Lanao. He had to die. There remained no other path for him than the path of personal destruction. Reluctantly, Pershing acknowledged this fact. Reluctantly, he ordered the final assault at last.[51]

6. The big trench of Fort Bacolod, April 8, 1903. RG111-SC-84927, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

On the afternoon of April 8, Americans and Bacolod Moros fought what Pershing called "the best fight of the Moro campaign."[52] A company of infantry advanced against the *cotta*'s west wall, while another company of dismounted cavalry, armed with a Maxim gun, attacked the north face. They provided covering fire for a third enhanced company of troops, who dumped felled trees into a section of the *cotta*'s surrounding moat, topping off their work with a bamboo footbridge. Over the makeshift bridge charged more than 200 infantry and cavalry, forming a line on the berm that bordered the moat. Down from the parapet, "like bees from a hive," rushed Moros, who furiously engaged their attackers in hand-to-hand combat, slashing *kampilans* and *krises* against rifles and bayonets.[53] The Moros succeeded in wounding three Americans, but they faced a much better-armed and trained foe. In a scene "never to be forgotten," the Americans shot and bayoneted sixty Moros, who fought "desperately" and "to the death."[54]

When troops cleared Bacolod of its last defenders, they discovered the *panandungan* together with three other leading *datus* among the dead.[55] Fearing the presence of cholera inside the *cotta*, Pershing ordered his men back, but not before putting it to the torch. As flames spread, they eventually reached the powder magazine. "Bacolod blew up with a great cloud of smoke."[56] The once-proud fortress lay in ruins.

"Bacolod is fallen," wrote Pershing to his former adjutant George T. Bowman. "We had nine men wounded in the [three-day] fight and all will recover." "Of the Moros killed there were many dattos, the Panandungan in particular—all told about 120. We could have killed more but what's the use. They have learned their lesson, and I think [they] will be good. … Of course we could have taken … [Bacolod] earlier but would probably have lost a lot of men." Although the victory might have been more brilliant had he thrown caution to the wind and attacked without delay, it stood as "quite brilliant enough … with its hand-to-hand fights on the parapets."[57] In the meantime, the boom of Bacolod's exploding powder magazine carried around the lake both literally and figuratively. Pershing's command had spectacularly destroyed Lanao's strongest *cotta*. What other Maranao Moro would dare stand in the way of such an overwhelmingly powerful American force?

Incomprehensibly, the violent destruction of Bacolod had little immediate effect on its neighbor, Calahui, located just three miles northeast along the lakeshore. “What on earth will it take to teach these Moros a lesson?” Pershing must have wondered as his troops faced more war flags and hurled curses from the walls of this new fortress on April 9. Once again they confronted rough terrain that slowed their advance, but by late afternoon they had their artillery in position to rake the *cotta*’s interior with lethal accuracy. Calahui’s defenders fired on them “with great vigor,” but it soon became evident that “they could not remain long in the fort without great loss.” Situated on a rugged peninsula encircled on three sides by water, Calahui could not be surrounded, meaning that Moros could take advantage of nightfall to escape by *vintas*. This they did all through the night. Early the next morning, there appeared an American flag carried by a child. “Cautiously, at first, and then gaily,” the boy marched toward the American lines followed by the fort’s remaining leaders.[58] Pershing met them and accepted their surrender. They reported that 250 men had occupied the *cotta*, including some from Taraca across the lake. Most had slipped away by boat, taking the wounded with them and leaving behind twenty-three dead. Pershing’s men suffered no casualties. They burned the fort and then turned north, wondering how many more red-flag-festooned *cottas* awaited them.[59]

Instead of war banners, they discovered American flags waving from every fortress for the remainder of their march all the way to Marawi. What a relief to reach the friendly country of Amai Manibilang’s Bayabao allies. To be sure, the Americans had defeated Bacolod and Calahui without incurring any loss of American lives to this point. But even as they rested outside of the latter fortress on April 10, they learned of an ambush against troops left behind at Bacolod. This time they did lose a man, and three others suffered severe wounds.[60]

Spared from having to mount another *cotta* assault after Calahui, they remarked on the beauty of the countryside, “most of it under cultivation in neatly kept fields,” and on the “extraordinary industry” of local farmers. When they reached Malaig near Oato, “Datto Amai-Buncurung and his pretty daughter received … [them] in their beautiful house, which was of enormous size, with huge beams and panels of carved wood.” The daughter “thrust a frail little arm from the rectangular slits of windows, and fondly grasped the sun-burned hand of her adopted father, Captain Pershing.”[61]

Discarding his weapons and donning his *datu* persona, the captain sat down to arbitrate an old feud between the sultan of Oato and a neighboring *rancheria*. Then on April 12 he marched his troops past friendly *cottas* all the way to Marawi, greeting delegations of *datus* from each settlement as they passed.

There ensued two days of meetings with representatives, including Amai Manibilang, of all the principal Bayabao *rancherias*.[62] Determined to sustain the momentum of his successful march, Pershing even prevailed on Manibilang and neighboring leaders, including the Marawi sultan, to act as go-betweens with still hostile Taraca to the east. This embassy delivered a letter from Pershing and then reported that they had persuaded Taraca to stand down and "accept American friendship."[63] In the meantime, the Americans marched back to Camp Vicars along the lake's west coast. They mapped the area and ascertained where a wagon road could be constructed. Most importantly, they received "a succession of … picturesque demonstrations" from "groups of peaceful Moros following their sultans, dattos, priests and other leaders, announcing their loyalty."[64]

Pershing had reason to believe that he had successfully pacified all of the lake country by mid-April 1903. In their latest operation, his men had killed more than 150 Moros, wounded at least that many more, reduced two of the lake's strongest *cottas* to smoking ruins, and shored up alliances from Bayang to Marawi, while sustaining just fifteen American casualties, including one death.[65] In Pershing's mind, the campaign had been "the largest single success that had been made in the islands."[66] Now he had only to await a visit by Taraca's leaders, who had agreed to join Amai Manibilang, the sultan of Marawi, and other allied Moros in a meeting with the American *datu* on April 27.[67]

That meeting never happened. Too many Taraca Moros had returned from Bacolod proudly touting the courage they had displayed there and challenging their compatriots to join in resisting the American infidels. They won the day against others who wanted to meet with Pershing and avoid bloodshed. Those others had promised too much. Joined by their allies Manibilang and the sultan of Marawi, they had agreed not only to visit Camp Vicars but also to accompany the Americans on a march around the east side of Lake Lanao, right through Maciu and Taraca.[68] Had Pershing ignored the

militants and gone about his business consolidating gains on the lake's south, west, and north shores, Taraca's more peace-inclined leaders might eventually have prevailed. But the rainy season loomed, when Lanao's eastern shore would turn into a quagmire. Pershing knew better than to wait. He also understood that his military superiors, Generals Sumner and Davis, expected nothing less than a total conquest of the lake country, dramatized by a complete march around Lake Lanao.[69] Finally, he did not fail to comprehend how his lake campaign had captured the public's imagination back home. Thanks to journalists such as Henry Savage Landor, even the president had taken notice of a hitherto obscure captain fighting Moros in Mindanao. Marching completely around the lake had the makings of a grand narrative. Leading that march offered the opportunity for Jack Pershing to become an American hero.[70]

And so the Americans set out again, this time on May 2, to explore, as they said, the last twenty miles of unmapped terrain on the east coast of Lake Lanao. They numbered 534 officers and enlisted men, including infantry, cavalry, engineers, hospital corps, and field artillery units with two mountain guns and one 3.6-inch field mortar. Pack trains consisting of more than 200 ponies and mules carted five days rations and forage, and several large *vintas* furnished by allied *datus* accompanied the expedition. By its sheer size, the command sent a message to all east coast Moros: tangle with us at your own risk.[71]

This time they marched right past Maciu without incident. After they had crossed the Malaig River and reached the vicinity of Gata, they rested while the first of several Moro delegations approached, bearing American or white flags and proclaiming their friendliness. They reported, however, that Amai Benanning of Gata intended to fight, and they "endeavored to dissuade" Pershing "from passing through that rancheria." Following the formula that had worked so well for him at Bacolod and Calahui, the American commander ordered his troops into camp within sight of Benanning's *cotta* "in order to give those Moros time to fully consider the matter." Then on the morning of May 4, he ordered the advance against Gata. Virtually on cue, there appeared a delegation from the fortress expressing a desire for friendship. Instead of attacking Gata, Pershing welcomed Benanning's peace overture. Then he resumed the march toward Taraca.[72] So far hardly a shot had been fired.

As the Americans neared Taraca, they beheld a sight that got their hearts pounding and adrenalin rushing. There, directly ahead of them, situated in a row of timber skirting the Taraca River stood Datu Ampuan Agaus's *cotta*, "literally covered with [red] war flags." The battle of Taraca, the wildest and most ferocious encounter of the entire Lanao campaign, was about to commence.

The battle did not unfold exactly according to Pershing's timetested plan. As his troops moved forward, they "ran into a marsh and the command literally bogged down." It took them two hours to build a causeway for the main body of troops and animals to cross.[73] When around noon they had negotiated this obstacle, they faced a different configuration of fortifications than they had seen before. Instead of a single *cotta*, Datu Ampuan Agaus had constructed a hornet's nest of fifty or more small fortifications, some hidden by vegetation and positioned to provide cover for Moros as they poured enfilading fire into the American lines.[74] To Pershing's relief, *datus* from two of these forts abandoned Ampuan Agaus and "came out with white flags … [saying that] they wished to be considered friends."[75] That permitted the Americans to advance virtually unimpeded for some 300 yards, and two companies of infantry, supported by artillery, proceeded to start surrounding the main *cotta*. As they did so, Moros gathered on the walls of their white-flag-flying *cottas* "like spectators at a sports event."[76] What they soon beheld, however, bore little resemblance to a game.

"Almost as soon as it arrived in position," Pershing's right flank "received a heavy fire from the woods along the Taraca River." Meanwhile, his left flank came under fire from a small *cotta* as well. Had the surrendering *datus* lured their American foe into a trap? Scrambling to respond, Pershing ordered Lt. George C. Shaw and his company to attack. As Shaw and his men charged, dismounted cavalry took their place in the skirmish line, and artillery blasted the main *cotta*. More effectively than at Bacolod, where the "shell-proof" roof had offered some protection, the Maxim guns raked the main fort with such effect that defenders, in Pershing's words, "could do us little harm." But Taraca's leaders had also learned a few things from the Bacolod fight. Their *cottas*, hidden in timber along the river, did not provide such open and inviting targets for American field guns to maul. Shaw and his men had to attack without the benefit of effective artillery. They quickly ran into stubborn resistance, against which they advanced through the

woods, fighting almost every step of the way. Leading the charge, Shaw and two of his men scaled the wall of a big, red-flag-flying *cotta* called Pitakus. They immediately paid a price for their recklessness. Moro firearms, mostly old Remingtons, might prove quite ineffective at long range, but within the confines of a *cotta* they hit their mark. Shaw's two compatriots collapsed with serious wounds, leaving the lieutenant alone with his .45-caliber revolver. He fired round after round until other Americans scaled the opposite wall and distracted Moro defenders long enough for Shaw's men to reinforce him. From their position atop the walls, American troops caught the remaining defenders in a deadly crossfire. Some Moros charged into the withering fire and died in handto-hand combat. A few surrendered, but ninety perished (including the sultan of Pitakus), and thirteen more suffered wounds. American losses in this short but vicious battle numbered two dead and five wounded.[77]

Despite its one-sided casualty count, the fight at Pitakus *cotta* turned out to be the least one-sided battle in the larger Taraca campaign because Shaw didn't have the benefit of artillery cover when he scaled the walls and faced the furor of Moro defenders. Back at the main Taraca *cotta*, Pershing's tried-and-true strategy of long-range artillery bombardment and methodical infantry envelopment had the usual result. By nightfall, the fortress had been reduced to a charnel house. In the night, some defenders escaped while others rushed the American lines and engaged in fierce combat. The next morning witnessed a white flag flying above the ruined *cotta*, and Datu Ampuan Agaus came out to surrender. He left behind him in Taraca as many as 160 dead Moro warriors. In all, some 200–250 of his compatriots had died in this terrible last battle of Pershing's Lake Lanao campaign.[78]

Amid a heavy rainstorm that night, Datu Ampuan Agaus and three other prisoners escaped into the dark. Their escape did not delay Pershing's troops as they set out for Marawi the next morning, May 6. It turned out, however, to be an important event because Ampuan Agaus went on to lead Maranao guerrilla opposition to American pacification for years after Pershing left Lanao.[79]

Less than fifteen miles separated Taraca from Marawi, but it took the Americans three days to traverse that distance. Just as had happened in their first foray against Maciu in September 1902, Pershing's powerful but heavy-laden force bogged down in rain-soaked terrain. At least they did not have to

attack any more *cottas*. The defeat of Taraca persuaded all but the most avowedly anti-American sultans along Lake Lanao's eastern shore to take down their war flags and pay Pershing a courtesy visit.[80]

On May 8, 1903, Pershing's command marched into Marawi, where Gen. Sumner, "beaming with congratulations," welcomed them. They rested and provisioned for the next two days, while it began to dawn on them that people all around the lake, around the archipelago, and even across the Pacific had heard about them. They listened while Maj. Robert Bullard regaled them with a story about the aftermath of their victory at Taraca. Rushing into his camp, a Moro had urged Bullard to hoist a white flag over Marawi, saying that the Americans had all gone "juramentado!" Having vanquished Taraca, the now legendary American and his warriors were "coming down the lake killing everybody they saw."[81] Pershing must have greeted this story with a mixture of amusement and chagrin, for he still hoped to be remembered not for going *juramentado* and killing everyone in sight, but for sparing the lives of his foes. What would the deaths of 200–250 Moros in the Taraca and Pitakus *cottas* do to his reputation?[82] Including the body counts at Bacolod and Calahui, his troops had killed 350–400 Moro fighters in the past month, losing only three of their own in the process. Although no single battle had been as deadly as Baldwin's fight at Bayang a year earlier, Pershing's famed march around the lake turned out to be both destructive and bloody.

At first glance, American troops seemed like equal-opportunity destroyers in April and May 1903, wreaking death and destruction across all three power centers (*pangampong*) into which Maranao Moros had loosely organized themselves. Many Onayan Maranaos who had survived the slaughter at Bayang died at Butig and Sauir. Bayabao fighters bore the brunt of the Bacolod and Calahui assaults. Finally, Maciu Moros made up most of the dead at Maciu, Pitakus, and Taraca. A closer examination, however, indicates that the campaigns gave rise to winners as well as losers. Among the former, none emerged as more powerful than Bayabao leader and Pershing ally Amai Manibilang. He had tried to persuade breakaway Bayabao fighters, led by the *panandungan*, to stand down at Bacolod and let Pershing pass. When they spurned his mediation efforts, Manibilang watched as the Americans wiped out his opponents within the Bayabao *pangampong*. When Maciu Moros also repulsed his mediation efforts, they,

too, paid a severe price. Together with Onayan Moros who had fallen at Bayang, Butig and Sauir, all except Manibilang and his allies stood vanquished or annihilated by May 1903.

Little wonder that Pershing's "old friend Manibilang" greeted him so warmly at Marawi. He had "become a sage if not a prophet among his people for having been the first … to make terms with us."[83] He brought with him the sultan of Ramain, one of the last holdouts against American conquest, and he took pleasure in presenting his American friend to Pandita (Imam) Nuzca, "head of the Mohammedan faith at Lake Lanao." At no other time had Pershing's close relationship with Manibilang paid higher dividends. As much as anything else, that relationship had convinced Imam Nuzca "to forswear religious war or jihad against the Americans." By May 1903, the imam "opposed resistance against us on religious grounds and declared to the people that they would be punished in the hereafter for all such conduct."[84] In Pershing's mind, this declaration provided vindication for everything he had stood for in Lanao. Not usually given to hyperbole, he later crowed that "the visit of this holy man was of signal importance … [as] an announcement that at last the outpost stronghold of Islam in the east of Asia had capitulated."[85]

Loath to slog back to Vicars via the swampy east coast whence they had come, Pershing marched his men west out of Marawi on May 10. Was he also thinking of the symbolic significance of marching completely around the lake, through every lakeshore *rancheria*, past every vanquished *cotta*, and between rows of white-flag-flying Moro residents? Certainly such a march made for good copy back home. It even caught the eye of Elihu Root, secretary of war, who cabled his thanks "to Captain John J. Pershing and the officers and men under his command … for their able and effective accomplishment of a difficult and important task."[86]

As the Americans marched through one pacified settlement after another, they also marched into local legend. They had demonstrated unquestioned military superiority over a local population that admired and respected military prowess. They had transformed Camp Vicars from a tenuous toehold in a dangerous and hostile region into a new center of power in Mindanao. And their leader had entered Maranao folklore as the unquestioned super*datu* over all other Maranao *datus*. How would Capt. John J. Pershing use his new fame and fortune?

Unfortunately for the ongoing success of American pacification efforts in Lanao, Pershing did not immediately use his new glory to initiate an era of peace and prosperity among Maranao Moros. Nor did he stay around long enough to begin building a new edifice for political and administrative unification in the region. Rather, he turned his attention back to the United States and to the politics of promotion in the officer corps. Within days of returning to Vicars, he successfully applied to be relieved of his command. By the end of the month, he had left Mindanao for Manila. And on June 26, 1903, he departed Manila, bound for duty in Washington, D.C.[87]

His abrupt departure left a hole right in the middle of American military rule over Lanao. At a time when Americans should have been shifting their focus from military pacification to governance (or, in counterinsurgency parlance, from clearing to holding and building), they metaphorically treaded water. It would take another five years of counterguerrilla pacification efforts before the real work of political and administrative unification could begin in Lanao.

3

Seeking Balance in the Scaffolding of Progressive Counterinsurgency

Jack Pershing had every reason to stay in Lanao and leave a lasting legacy there. The lake country of Mindanao had witnessed nothing less than his coming of age as an exemplary commander among Progressive reformers in the American military. Praises came pouring in from his superiors, who lauded him for having "accomplished a feat that has generally been deemed impossible." He and his men had met "a savage foe," "overcome great natural obstacles," and faced "a deadly disease," and they had done all this "cheerfully and manfully."[1] Throughout his year at Camp Vicars, he had exhibited "qualities not easy to find combined in one man; capacity for command, physical and mental vigor, infinite patience in dealing with … fanatical semi-savages, wise discretion, a zealous desire to accomplish the work set for him, and knowledge of the Moro character."[2] And "when nothing remained but to crush the resistance," he had so disposed "his force as to accomplish the result with the least possible loss."[3]

While basking in the glow of approval from reformist American generals, Pershing also delighted in the respect and trust he had earned from his Moro allies. He cherished the title of *datu* that they had bestowed on him and loved being called upon to act as a *datu* in settling differences among them. Some of his own troops might regard him as cold and aloof, but few Moros saw him that way.[4]

In every *rancheria*, Pershing could identify the leaders, their positions, and their stature among local residents. He knew how many *sakop* owed loyalty to each leader, and he had something to say about each one. Sultan Dimau of Binadayan impressed him as a "young man [who] promises to be [a] strong sultan" and a "good friend." Sultan Gunda, while also a "good friend," had grown "old [and] cranky." The sultan of Bayang had "little

influence," but as the "son-in-law of a staunch friend," Amai Buncurung of Oato, he should not be overlooked. The sultan of Marawi was "much respected." The sultan of Guimba, a "follower of Manibilang," had "been of assistance to us … [and was] probably reliable." As for Datu Amai Pasandalan of Pantauan, Pershing praised him as a "strong man" who had "served Americans in many ways." Still, he couldn't compare with Datu Grande of Makadar, who had "given every possible evidence of loyalty and friendship" and had proven to be "entirely trustworthy."[5] On and on, Capt. Pershing gave his opinion of leader after leader. Little wonder that one American associate commented: "Pershing's interest in the Moros amounts to a mania."[6]

Not just friendship but also success and approbation made Pershing think twice about leaving Lanao. He had learned so much in his year at Vicars. When he first took command, he had already understood what not to do. He had not forgotten the inhumanity that had often accompanied military pacification of Native Americans. And in early May 1902 he had witnessed the brutality of Baldwin's assault against Bayang. Since that time, he had learned the art of applied military science, adapting theory to fit local context again and again. He took to heart as a lowest common denominator the principle that "the smaller the loss [in Moro as well as American lives] … , the greater would be his merit."[7] Beyond that, he set in motion a new strategy for successful counterinsurgency.

He applied the rational, quasi-scientific, deliberate, precisely planned and carefully ordered precepts of modern military practice. Persuade Moro leaders to cooperate with American interests by engaging them in lengthy negotiations and promising to respect both their culture and their personal positions of power. Entice them with the apple of friendship, then brandish the stick against those who refused to be seduced. Intimidate them with large numbers of American soldiers marching openly and menacingly toward their fortresses. Surround those fortresses. Offer a last opportunity to flee for their lives. And then methodically pound holdouts into shell-shocked surrender with superior firepower. Finally, send in the infantry to finish the job. Nothing creative, innovative, or brilliant. When compared with twentyfirst-century ideas on counterinsurgency warfare, this strategy couldn't seem less agile, flexible, or sophisticated.

Even as early as 1903, however, these heavy-handed tactics did not tell the whole story, for Pershing quite rapidly learned to complement them with lessons gleaned from his experience in Lanao. Among these lessons, he stressed the importance of flexibility, patience, strong relationship building, and attention to local political realities and personalities. If military tactics of his time emphasized an almost formulaic approach to war, personal experience in Lanao affirmed the wisdom of a more organic effort molded to fit the local situation. If tactics acquired from manuals tended to evolve from the metropolis and trickle down, tactics gained from experience emerged from the bottom or ground level and moved up. And if book learning prioritized detailed advance planning, experiential learning highlighted the virtues of creativity and spontaneity in warfare. The blending of these two approaches resulted in a strategy that exploited both American military strengths and local Maranao weaknesses. Usually based on good intelligence regarding the lay of the land and the nature of local political-social networks, this strategy prioritized both careful planning and limitless flexibility. And the new Progressive counterinsurgency strategy remained as practical and pragmatic as its principal practitioner, Capt. Pershing, could make it.

Had Jack Pershing taught a course in counterinsurgency tactics in 1903, he might well have illustrated each of his main points by providing an example from his personal experience in Lanao. In shorthand, he could have summed up his comments by reciting the following words: the small hill, Linok, Gata, Bacolod, and Taraca.

The Small Hill Located a short distance from Camp Vicars, a small hill became the place for almost daily *bicharas* (informal conferences) between the captain and Maranao *datus* and sultans. Here he got to know his neighbors and listened to their grievances against Americans as well as against their fellow Moros. He spent hours and hours mostly listening, occasionally questioning, always nurturing relationships. In his evolving Progressive counterinsurgency policy, the small hill came to represent the importance of getting to know (1) one’s potential enemy; (2) the relations (by birth, marriage, and alliance) of different potential enemies; (3) the animosities between them that could be exploited in the interests of divide-and-rule control; and (4) the most efficacious steps one might take to assure

stronger relations (even dependency ties) with one's allies. What better place to learn about all aspects of Maranao life and culture than the small hill?[8]

7. Pershing and Datu Pedro near Camp Vicars, 1903. RG111-SC-80361, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

Linok Once a commander had begun to crack the code, to know and be known, and to understand local life and culture on more than a superficial level, then (and only then) should he act or not act, as the case may be. Thus, Pershing chose not to attack the red-flag-flying *cotta* of Linok. He and his command passed right by the obviously hostile fortress in April 1903. He could easily have destroyed the place. But he had been in Lanao almost a year by that time and had come to understand something about Maranao *maratabat* (honor). Those war flags represented not so much the sultan's enmity as his honor. The worst thumping that Pershing could give him would be to ignore the whole business. Humiliated by the American's dismissal, his honor bruised and tattered, the sultan would be furious. But he would also be relegated to his proper place in the political order of Lake Lanao rather than turned into an honorable hero and martyr among fellow Maranao Moros.[9]

Gata Thanks to his *bicharas* on the small hill, Pershing came to the conclusion that the sultan of Gata would welcome him for a visit. This information, however, turned out to be mistaken, for when he visited the *rancheria* in February 1903, guided by a Gata Moro, he encountered war drums beating, warriors yelling defiance from the parapets, and war flags flying over Gata's principal fortress. He might well have unlimbered his artillery and ordered his infantry to attack, but he understood that virtually every Maranao leader had his own internal enemies. Factional loyalties divided nearly all *ranchерias*. Always prepared to exploit such fault lines within seemingly united Moro encampments, he sent the sultan a note with a "friendly message." When he received a "hostile" reply, he admitted that "the temptation was very great" to "accept the challenge," as every man in his column wanted to attack. "In view," however, of "serious negotiations that had [earlier] taken place, … [he] concluded that these Moros must be temporarily under the spell of a few hotheads." Therefore, "with considerable reluctance," he ordered an about-face and "marched the command back to Vicars without firing a shot."[10] As one member of the expedition noted, "It certainly required a high quality of courage to turn and leave without a fight."[11] But the strategy worked. In response to a personal

letter from Pershing transmitting an offer from “your uncle Amai Manibilang” to accompany him on a visit to Vicars, Gata’s leader, Amai Benanning, resumed negotiations.[12] When the captain next marched his troops along the road to Gata some three months later, Benanning welcomed him as a friend and ally. By demonstrating forbearance in the face of hostility, Pershing gave Gata’s pro-peace faction time to prevail against their internal opponents. Once again, by choosing not to employ the power at his disposal, he had countered potential insurgency without any loss of life.[13]

Bacolod Skillfully exploiting fault lines between pro- and antiwar factions such as those fragmenting Gata became a Pershing trademark. Then came Bacolod, where he learned that he could expose divisions even among Moros who shared the same faction and completely agreed in their unequivocal hatred of the American invaders. Patient application of superior firepower proved to be the most effective method for dividing the *cotta*’s determined defenders. As we have seen, the Americans surrounded Bacolod and then stood back for two days while their artillery methodically tore apart its defenses. “Of course we could have taken it earlier but would probably have lost a lot of men,” wrote Pershing.[14] In the two days of artillery pounding, many of the fortress’s warriors bolted. Estimated at more than 200 when the Americans first arrived, their number had dwindled to no more than 100 when the final assault began.[15]

Taraca This vast complex of fortresses on Lanao’s eastern shore came to represent yet one more lesson in Pershing’s evolving strategy of Progressive counterinsurgency. Despite his victory there, the American captain learned at Taraca something about the limits of American firepower. From his point of view, the battle should never have happened. By May 1903, thanks to months of attempted negotiations and the violent destruction of Bacolod, Taraca’s leaders should have sued for peace. Indeed, Pershing fully expected them to do just that as he amped up pressure and deployed his network of Moro allies in a campaign of persuasion to avoid violent confrontation. Nothing worked. The Taraca Moros simply would not stand down. In this last terrible battle of his Lake Lanao campaign, Pershing came face-to-face with an enemy that refused to acknowledge the genius of his sophisticated new counterinsurgency strategy. Against all his resolve to avoid unnecessary

bloodshed, the American and his command slaughtered 200–250 Moros in subduing Taraca.

What possibly might Americans learn from this carnage? Hadn't they already defeated Maciu, Bacolod, and Calahui, not to mention Bayang? Had they been sucked into a horrific game of "Whack a Mole," with each whack more violent than its predecessor: 100 dead at Maciu; 120 at Bacolod; 200–250 at Taraca? What would it take to pacify these people? Instead of learning not to challenge America's superior firepower, some lake Moros obstinately redoubled their efforts to devise new defenses and strategies. Instead of giving up, they remained stubbornly confident that new methods and resolve would neutralize U.S. power, just as they had kept the Spaniards at bay. Whether their efforts involved clusters of *cottas* partially protected by thick undergrowth (as at Taraca and Pitakus) or decentralized warfare in the form of roving guerrilla bands, the Maranao Moros promised to keep fighting. At the time of his greatest triumph in early May 1903, Jack Pershing thus also faced a new realization. Despite all his victories, he had yet to win the war in Lanao.[16] Despite the growing sophistication of his thinking on counterinsurgency warfare, the goal of complete victory remained elusive. He and his troops could kill Moros in disturbing numbers, but they could not seem to vanquish them.

Did Pershing wonder if it might be best simply to declare victory, however incomplete, and sail home with his troops as heroes? And yet didn't this unfinished business call for someone just like him to complete the job? Who better than he could pacify the Maranao Moros once and for all? Who better than "the hero of Moroland" could successfully take the next step and install a modern government in Lanao? Who could lead in setting up a Progressive administration, building schools, improving public health, engineering roads and bridges, and elevating these people beyond their "retarded civilization."[17] Indeed, there remained much to be done, not just in Lanao but in all of Moroland. As even some Maranao leaders agreed, if anyone could do it, Jack Pershing could.

At the beginning of 1903, Pershing definitely wanted to stay in Lanao and lead the American effort not only to pacify Moros but to govern them as well. As early as January, he began cajoling Gen. Davis to keep him in

Mindanao long enough to "work out … a satisfactory solution" to the problem of Moro governance "regardless of the time it requires."[18] He even went over Davis's head all the way to Washington, D.C., where his friend Judge Charles E. Magoon had earned the respect and trust of Secretary of War Elihu Root.[19] "From time immemorial," he explained to Magoon, the Moros had understood "nothing but a one-man government … [that is,] a government by the individual." No one more than he, Pershing, possessed the knowledge and experience to be that individual. He had worked hard to "meet them personally" as the "one man representing the American government and carrying out a fixed policy." And he had succeeded. "They regard me as representing the President of America and as especially sent here to command this Moro district." But they worried: "What will your successor do? We will not know him nor have confidence in him as we have in you!" To this query Pershing had replied that he would "be here for a long time to come." He sincerely hoped that he would be allowed to stay because the past year in Lanao had immersed him in "the most interesting work," and he "could write a volume on it." As he had told Gen. Davis, "I hope to remain … as I have … a knowledge of conditions here, especially of Moros, that qualifies me to do good work."[20]

It will be remembered that in addition to doing good work, Jack Pershing also had a personal reason for staying longer in Mindanao. Back in Zamboanga there lived a woman reputed to be his *querida* and a child widely believed to be his daughter. Joaquina Ignacio and young Petronilla must have exerted yet another powerful enticement for the forty-two-year-old American bachelor to remain in the southern Philippines and leave a literal as well as military legacy there.

Thus, with so many motives for staying in Moroland, it comes as a surprise that Pershing asked for reassignment back to the United States just days after completing his march around Lake Lanao. He stood at the height of his glory, primed to implement his evolving counterinsurgency ideas not only in Lanao but in all of Mindanao and Sulu. What caused him to change his mind?

In his autobiography, Pershing attributed his sudden change of heart to deteriorating health. "Although deeply interested in the [Moro] problems," he wrote, "I was forced to the conclusion that … I should return to the States for a period of rest and recuperation."[21] Gen. Davis reached the same

conclusion, saying that “the last year’s work for Captain Pershing … was so arduous, and his physical condition so unsatisfactory, that I felt warranted in giving him a leave of absence.”[22]

After three and a half years of service in Mindanao, Jack Pershing did need a break. His deteriorating health, however, provides only one reason why he asked for reassignment in May 1903. He had begun to think about a change of venue some two months earlier, when he learned that his mentors and patrons, Generals Davis and Sumner, had received notices of reassignment that would remove them from their Philippine commands in July. Without their support and advocacy in Manila and Zamboanga, he could not be assured that any of his ideas and recommendations for pacifying and governing the Moros would be honored or implemented. He acknowledged his concerns in a letter to Davis in early March. “I hope some policy, even though tentative, may be outlined before you leave the Division,” he wrote, “as the changes soon to take place will probably leave us at a standstill or may possibly bring about something radical.” Reiterating his belief that the lake Moros should “all be under one … military head, … [whether that head] be called ‘Commandante’ or Military Governor,” he requested that he “be considered in that connection” before Davis’s departure.[23]

Davis made no effort to grant Pershing’s request at a time when the latter had not yet begun, much less victoriously completed, his famous march around Lake Lanao. Then in late March 1903, the captain learned that Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood had been appointed to replace Gen. Sumner as his new boss in commanding the Department of Mindanao.[24] In one way, that must have come as good news because Wood’s appointment spelled victory for Progressive reformist officers against their old-guard counterparts in the American military. But in another way, Wood’s arrival in Zamboanga spelled doom because he had openly criticized the timidity of Pershing’s mentors in Moroland. Like the captain himself, Sumner and Davis had done nothing to wipe out slavery and polygamy among Moros. Their deference to Muslim sultans and *datus*, in fact their whole policy of indirectly ruling Mindanao and Sulu through Moro leaders, appalled Wood. In no uncertain terms, he let it be known that the days of mollycoddling Moros must end.[25]

Jack Pershing didn’t think of himself as a mollycoddler, and it remains doubtful that the sultans and *datus* of Maciu, Bacolod, Calahui, and Taraca

thought of him that way either. Also, his references to the "savage" Moros and their "retarded civilization" indicate that he shared Wood's assumption of white Americans' cultural superiority over Philippine Muslims. But he had developed both respect and fondness for Maranao Moros in his year of living among them, something that certainly could not be said of Gen. Wood. Should he, perhaps, cling to his position and fight for his Maranao friends and allies against this new American cultural crusader?

Pershing had established so many close personal relations in both Zamboanga and Lanao that he probably would have remained in Mindanao had it not been for his glorious victories in April and May 1903. When his troops successfully defeated Bacolod and Taraca and marched around Lake Lanao, and when he found himself crowned the hero of Moroland in the American press, he grew not only in stature but also in ambition. Talk began to circulate that promotion in rank all the way from captain to brigadier general might not be out of the question. According to his old friend Avery Andrews, Secretary Root had told him that if "Pershing doesn't look out, he will find himself in the brigadier general class very soon."[26] Jack Pershing suddenly began to contemplate a future that he could not have imagined when the year began.

Indeed, it made sense to move on, however wrenching that decision must have been. But before leaving Mindanao, Pershing wrote a poignant farewell letter to his friend Amai Manibilang. After explaining that he must go "to America on account of my [deteriorating] health," he thanked Manibilang "for the services … you performed for me and for the Americans in the interests of peace." "I shall always regard you as my best friend," he wrote, adding, "I shall think of your lakeside home as my home," and "I will come back some day to see you." In the meantime, he asked his friend to act as his personal intermediary with other Moros. And then, as a subtle reminder of how he had helped Manibilang by subduing all his political enemies around the lake, Pershing concluded with the words: "Remember me to all the Dattos of Bayabao."[27]

The significance of this letter should not be underestimated, for it demonstrates how comfortable Pershing had become within the context of Maranao social and political leadership. First, he emphasized the deeply personal nature of his relationship with Manibilang as his "best friend," whose home would always be Pershing's home as well. Next, he subtly

reminded his friend that Manibilang owed the Americans a debt of gratitude for entering into the Maranao power struggle and defeating all of Bayabao's competitors and foes. Finally, he bestowed upon Manibilang his personal imprimatur. As his trusted designee, the Moro leader would stand alone in relaying Datu Pershing's parting words to other Maranaos around the lake.

Having taken steps to consolidate the hitherto disorganized Maranao political structure, Pershing sought to add religious endorsement to his choice of Manibilang as paramount leader in the lake country. He did this by writing a second letter, addressed in this case to "my friend Nuzca."[28] As Manibilang's ally, the *pandita* had warned other Moros that fighting against the Americans was "not supported by the teachings of the Koran."[29] Happily agreeing, Pershing wrote that he had "heard the good advice you have given other Moros who do not know us," and he entreated Imam Nuzca to continue counseling all Moros "to be at peace with us and among themselves." As a "remembrance," he enclosed with his letter a copy of the Qurʾan, expressing his hope that "all the Moros will follow your interpretation of its teachings relative to the friendship that should exist between us."[30]

These letters to Manibilang and Nuzca further help to explain Pershing's decision, however reluctantly made, to leave a place that he loved, a place that had witnessed his emergence from obscurity to fame. His near-constant campaigning since early April had certainly taken a toll on his health, and he understood that Gen. Wood's impending arrival would not be in his best interest. Nevertheless, he needed to convince himself before leaving that the task of pacifying the lake country had been largely (if not completely) accomplished. With his friends in unparalleled positions of political and religious power among Maranao Moros, he had reason to be optimistic that local residents would enjoy years of relative peace and order after his departure. Maybe, after all, this was a good time to go home. In the meantime, he spent hours briefing his successor, Col. Alexander Rodgers of the Fifteenth Cavalry, and expressing confidence to his Maranao allies that "Colonel Rodgers would be guided by the same principles of justice and consideration that they had learned to … expect" when he, Pershing, "had been among them."[31]

And so it came to pass that Capt. Pershing reviewed his troops one final time, bade all his friends farewell, and at last boarded a ship bound for

Manila. There he huddled with his mentor and patron, Gen. Davis, who had strongly approved of his reassignment. Together, the two men feared that Leonard Wood's appointment as Mindanao Department commander would jeopardize their efforts to pacify Moroland without sparking a full-scale religious war. But Wood wouldn't take over until August 1903.[32] There remained time yet for Pershing to join Davis in leaving a lasting political and administrative legacy before heading home. The general was already hard at work with Governor William Howard Taft on creating a new political entity called "Moro Province," as mandated by Act 787 of the Philippine Commission. Perhaps Capt. Pershing could help in constructing a scaffolding for the governance of this new province, thereby preempting Wood's imperial designs not just in Lanao but in all of Moroland. Then he could travel to Washington, jockey for promotion using his fame and glory, and possibly come back to the southern Philippines as both brigadier general and governor of Moro Province.[33]

Pershing and Davis had only three weeks before the captain's projected departure on June 26, not a lot of time to leave a permanent legacy for Moros. But they had the advantage of knowing exactly what they wanted to do. They also possessed the savvy to understand their competitors, including (1) mainstream (non-Muslim) Filipino politicians who would not countenance any proposal to grant Moroland autonomy from the rest of the Philippines; (2) American civilians who chafed at continued military control over Moros; (3) old-guard military officers impatient to take over from the upstart captain and his patrons; and (4) fellow Progressives such as Leonard Wood, who vowed to stop coddling Moros and give them a good thumping instead.

Together, the two men navigated between all of these competing factions in Manila and Washington, D.C. They worked closely with Governor Taft, who in turn assured Filipino politicians that the new Moro Province would not result in an autonomous Moroland. Meanwhile, Taft's close relationship with President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Root (strong supporters of a more modern and progressive American officer corps) guaranteed that old-guard officers would not fill the vacuum left behind by Davis and Pershing once they departed for home. In only one respect did Davis and Pershing fail. Against powerful proponents of America's civilizing mission in the

Philippines—men such as Roosevelt, Taft, and Wood—they stood no chance of protecting Moros from the onrush of American cultural imperialism.

The Moro Province Act, passed on June 1, 1903 and due to be implemented on July 15, began by precisely defining the new province's boundaries. Then it mandated that its government was to "be Civil in all respects except that the agents for conducting it … [were to] be largely Military." It would, in fact, "be a form of Civil rule controlled and regulated by the Military."[34]

The civilian governor general of the Philippines would appoint Moro Province's governor and other top officials, all of whom would report to him. As for the provincial governor, he would be both civil governor of the province and "commanding general of the Department of Mindanao and Jolo." This turned out to be the case for the first three Moro Province governors: Leonard Wood, Tasker Bliss, and John J. Pershing. Each would furnish copies of reports not only to the civil governor of the Philippine Islands but also to the commanding general of the Philippine Division.[35]

The new province had five districts: Sulu, Zamboanga, Davao, Cotabato, and Lanao. Each district would be governed by a district governor, secretary, and treasurer, all appointed by the provincial governor (with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council). Like the provincial governor, district governors could be army officers.[36]

The provincial governor "shall see that the laws are faithfully executed by all officers of the province, districts, subdistricts, and municipalities." In doing so, he would have "control, through the proper district governors, of the municipal police." "Through the … assistant chief of Philippine Constabulary," he would also "control the … Constabulary within … Moro Province." Furthermore, he could "suspend … any district officer for misconduct or incompetency in office."[37]

The governor, secretary, treasurer, attorney, superintendent of schools, and engineer constituted the provincial Legislative Council.[38] Empowered to raise and disburse revenue, the Legislative Council also had authority to formulate new laws "for the organization and support of a public-school system," "for the creation of local governments," "for the organization and procedure of district courts," and "for the abolition of slavery and … suppression of all slave hunting and … trade." Finally, the Legislative Council had power to delay the "transition from military to civil control in

those districts in which, in its judgment, it would not be wise immediately to establish complete civil government."[39]

Although the new Moro Province Act could not have seen the light of day without Governor Taft's participation and support, Gen. Davis left his imprint on virtually every page. In fact, the act represented nothing less than the capstone of Davis's evolving policy for pacifying and governing the Moros. And where Davis's words gained expression in Act 787, they echoed the ideas of his man on the ground, Capt. Pershing. The end result was a balanced policy with aspects of both direct and indirect colonial rule throughout.

Thus, the new provincial governor remained a military man, as Davis and Pershing always insisted, but he should be a veteran civil administrator as well as a military leader.[40]

Said governor had orders to visit each of the province's five districts "at least once in every six months." Clearly, Taft and Davis had in mind a vigorous, forceful, hands-on officer (like Pershing or Wood) for this appointment.[41] The appointee must also "acquaint himself, as far as practicable, with the language and customs of the Moros and other non-Christians in the province."[42]

The new superintendent of schools had explicit orders to make English "the basis of the public school instruction" as "soon as practicable." However, this prioritizing of English "shall not prevent the instruction by native teachers in Arabic, Moro, or other languages of the locality."[43]

The Legislative Council had the power "to enact laws for the creation of local governments among the Moros and other non-Christian tribes." However, these local governments must conform "as nearly as possible to the lawful customs of such peoples." Moreover, they must vest "in their local or tribe rulers as nearly as possible the same authority over their people as they now exercise."[44]

The governor and secretary of each district could be appointed directly by the provincial governor, regardless of whether they had passed any "previous [civil service] examination[s]." However, after eighteen months of service they must be able "to pass a satisfactory examination in the principal local dialect of their respective districts." Thus, they didn't have to pass a civil service exam, but failing an exam in the local dialect would "be sufficient cause for dismissal."[45]

Among all the Moro Province Act's directives, none reflected its balancing act more than its legal mandates. Remarkably, the act specified that "Courts of First Instance and justices of the peace … shall not have jurisdiction to try civil or criminal actions arising between Moros" or between Moros and other non-Christians. With exceptions, these cases should be adjudicated by district courts.[46]

District courts would "consider and decide civil and criminal actions arising between Moros, between members of non-Christian tribes, and between Moros and members of other non-Christian tribes." These courts would act a little like customary *datu* arbitration councils. To be sure, the district secretary would preside, and the courts' decisions needed to be approved by the district governor. But the justices had to be Moros (or non-Christian tribesmen if the disputants counted themselves as tribal minorities or at least one Moro and one non-Christian if the case involved both). Furthermore, Act 787 authorized district governors (or "other provincial or district officers") to act as *datus* by adjusting "all differences between sultans, dattos, and any independent local authorities, and … enforcing their decisions upon such differences." Finally, the Legislative Council got orders to "collect and codify the customary laws of the Moros." Such laws could be modified and amended as the council decided. But "the Moro customary laws thus amended and codified shall apply in all civil and criminal actions arising between Moros," and the new codification had to be printed in English, Arabic, or the local Moro dialects "as may be deemed wise."[47]

These legal mandates provide a perfect example of Gen. Davis's and Capt. Pershing's balanced approach to working with Philippine Muslims. Davis had first introduced them in 1902 in "Notes on the Government … [of] Non Christians in Mindanao." In that report, he had recommended that the commanding officer "should have power to mitigate and pardon sentences imposed" by the district courts. But that officer should be prepared for a different interpretation of justice than his own American concept of it. "According to Moro ethics there is no such thing as a crime against the State." Justice for them did not inhere in a sentence incarcerating the guilty party. Such a sentence made no sense to them because the victim received no compensation. Arbitration courts, therefore, should follow Moro custom and impose fines commensurate with the suffering endured by the victim and his *datu* and kin. In this system, "the wrong and injury, whatever be its nature,

… [could] always be righted and the demands of … Moro justice fully satisfied" by the payment of a fine in the form of money, animals, or other valued items, including slaves. Americans could only expect to reduce crime among Moros, wrote Davis, to the extent that they helped make "wrongdoing expensive." That would represent a system of justice that Moros could really "understand."[48]

In still one more way did Gen. Davis and Capt. Pershing strive for balance as they contemplated how best to pacify and govern the new Moro Province. As we have seen, Act 787 directed the Legislative Council to "enact laws for the abolition of slavery." That said, however, nothing in the act specified how slavery should be abolished, whether suddenly or gradually and whether for all slaves or just for some. To say the least, this remained a thorny issue.

In 1902, Secretary Root had ordered American occupying forces to turn their attention to the problem of slavery among the Moros. They should go slowly, however, and "not immediately free the slaves by a single act," for this would "require a war of extermination in which a large part of the slaves would probably be found fighting against us." Such a peremptory act of liberation would also have the unintended consequence of leaving Moro slaves with "nowhere to go and no way to live if deprived of the protection and support of their present masters." Root recommended, instead of a single act, "a process of gradual and steady reduction," requiring "patience and good judgment" but "resulting ultimately in the extinction of the practice of slavery."[49]

Davis and Pershing agreed with Root's emphasis on "patience and good judgment." As we saw in chapter 2, the general had originally championed a policy of noninterference in his "Report on Slavery." Postulating that Moros "are not specially unhappy as slaves" and that "many thousands … would continue in voluntary servitude" if all were "made free to-morrow," Davis had concluded that it would be "quite impracticable to secure the freedom of slaves by remuneration of the owners."[50] In the meantime, Capt. Pershing had written that "slavery as it exists here is not … slavery in our sense of the term, except in a very few instances." Since few cases had come to his attention of slaves being treated as other than members of their owner's family, he recommended that the subject "be left untouched until we understand it better."[51]

Davis and Pershing thought of pacifying and governing Moros as a step-by-step process. Progressive counterinsurgency meant, for them, a procedure in which one should de-emphasize the need for social reforms until the goals of clearing and holding had been attained. By virtue of military necessity, establishing strong interpersonal relations with local big men (sultans, *datus*, etc.) came first. That meant temporarily curbing impulses toward democratic reform that would alienate the very leaders they sought to befriend and thus fuel insurgency in the process. But holding off on reforms did not mean denying those reform impulses forever. One must think in terms of a timeline. Different priorities necessitated different policies. As long as pacification remained priority number one, social reforms would have to wait.

By June 1903, pacification of Moro Province had progressed far enough, at least in the eyes of Davis, Pershing, and Taft, for occupying forces to undertake some social reforms. Specifically, the time had come "to enact laws for the abolition of slavery and the suppression of all slave hunting and slave trade."[52]

With some trepidation concerning the impact of social reforms on peace and order in Moroland, Pershing and Davis (and Taft to a lesser extent) attempted to carve out an antislavery position that complied with Root's instructions. Seeking balance as always, Davis described the policy as "regulated liberty." Based on lessons he had learned in occupying hostile Indian reservations in the American West, this policy would "spare the Moros from the besetments and influences that have worked the destruction of savage aborigines elsewhere" (as in the United States).[53] It would do this by paternalistically protecting them from being overwhelmed by outside forces (i.e., Christian missionaries and non-Muslim settlers). Under American military rule, the Moros would be honored in their leadership and respected in their religion, customs, and conservatism and even in their "deeply rooted prejudice."[54] However, Americans would not just stand around and permit Moros to rule arbitrarily. Many of the Moros, after all, held "human life as no more sacred than the life of an animal."[55] No. The Moro leaders would be "held responsible for the proper control of the[ir] people," and they would be restrained from the most egregious miscarriages of justice, such as slave raiding and trading.[56]

Indeed, the Moros would be restrained from holding slaves at all if those slaves escaped and fled to American authorities with their grievances. Although the Moro Province Act did not recommend a grand Lincolnesque emancipation proclamation, it did suggest that "so-called slaves," as Pershing labeled them, would soon have the law on their side if they chose freedom over continued servitude.[57] Americans might not interfere actively in emancipating slaves from *datus* and sultans. But neither would they continue to ignore the issue or return any slaves who appealed to them for protection and freedom. Americans were, after all, "the advance guard of civilization."[58] As such, they would energetically promote education, enhance trade, and pay Moros in cash for road work, hoping that these modernizing policies would serve to encourage individual independence and undermine slavery over time.

Looking back five years later on his immensely successful time in Lanao, Jack Pershing acknowledged that "the conquest of the Moros has … only begun." Despite all the victories, all his immersion in Maranao culture, and all his time spent cultivating friendships, it would nevertheless "be many generations before … [the Moros'] lawless inclinations can be entirely overcome." As Brig. Gen. Pershing remembered the people whom he had grown to respect and love, he mused that "true conquest must be accomplished [not by military force but] by the tedious process of education. It should not be accomplished by extermination."[59]

4

Leonard Wood and Counterinsurgency in Lanao and Cotabato

In the thirty-two months from August 1903 through March 1906, Moro Province heated up and then exploded. More than 100 engagements pitted Moro fighters against American and Philippine Constabulary forces during this time. As many as 4,000 Moros died in these battles, while their enemy's losses neared 100.[1] Dozens of *cottas* lay in smoking ruins, while civilians in nearby *rancherias* fled for their lives and suffered terror and displacement if not worse. As one American, constabulary inspector John White, described the situation, he and his colleagues had stirred up a "nest of human hornets."[2]

Accounts of the new Moro Province governor Leonard Wood's counterinsurgency campaigns in Lanao and Cotabato provide cautionary tales of the price inflicted on innocent civilians by American ignorance. What happened, especially in Cotabato, simply did not have to happen. The insurgency there had remained localized until Wood's actions kicked it into high gear. Had he possessed a better understanding of political factions and divisions in Cotabato, he could have isolated insurgents and defeated them without wreaking death and destruction on the populace. As it turned out, his aggressive actions inflamed Moros to join together in fighting against American rule. Their opposition, in turn, convinced Wood to implement a scorchedearth policy. Thousands of innocent noncombatants paid the price.

Even in 1903–1906, however, organized armed resistance to American control remained the exception rather than the rule in Lanao and Cotabato. Law enforcement officers mainly faced sporadic and spontaneous acts of violence that sprang from the failing Moro authority structure as much as from overt anti-Americanism. Some of their assailants attacked suicidally, intent on killing as many infidels as possible before dying. Others, such as

Datu Ampuan Agaus of Lanao, simply refused to be pacified. Like Wily Coyote, they mastered the art of not being governed, annoying Americans with hit-and-run tactics while never seriously contesting their hold on power. In fact, most attacks on American troops came from Moros intent not so much on ousting the invaders as on stealing their rifles. Raids of that sort did not constitute some kind of pre-Maoist revolutionary tactic to utilize your enemy's weapons against him. Rather, they enhanced the power of the raider against anyone, Moro and non-Moro alike, in an ongoing struggle for power in a loosely structured and habitually violence-prone society.

What Americans like Gen. Wood labeled as acts of "armed resistance," Moros regarded as cases of nimble opportunism in their neverending effort to accrue more personal power.[3] Bunched together, these acts gave Wood cause to orchestrate grand campaigns against what he called "open defiance." The occupying forces themselves, however, rather than their new subjects, proved to be the most violent element in Moro Province. Their campaigns witnessed hundreds of armed troops marching through the countryside against local residents, few of whom had hitherto regarded themselves as anti-American rebels. Their artillery wrought destruction to dozens of *cottas*. Their body counts repeatedly divulged that Americans were killing Moros at a rate of ten, twenty, or even fifty to one. And where their troops didn't spark retaliatory violence, their policies—especially enforcement of the *cedula* tax and antislavery law—did. In the end, Americans wreaked much more violence on Moros than they ever suffered from Moros in return.

By the time Leonard Wood arrived in Zamboanga as governor, he had left the pathway of his life strewn with equal numbers of detractors who hated him and loyalists who admired him.[4] He came not as just another colonial official but as an emerging star who consorted with presidents as their equal. He had charisma. A tall, muscular man who "cultivated an athletic, military bearing," he "stood out in a crowd" and "demanded respect."[5]

Born the same year as Jack Pershing (1860), he had grown up under the tutelage of New England Calvinist parents described as "warm-hearted, strong-willed, rigid, thrifty, [and] intolerant."[6] On graduation from Harvard Medical School, he signed up as an assistant army contract surgeon in 1885. Off he went to Arizona, and there he displayed the qualities—courage,

tenacity, toughness, and absolute moral certainty—that came to be trademarks of his character.[7]

He rode more than 3,000 miles with the Fourth Cavalry, chasing down Apache chief Geronimo and eventually receiving the Medal of Honor for his efforts.[8] In the process, he became a lifetime devotee of the active life, physical fitness, riding, hunting, and sports. With a chest "like a barrel," he ceaselessly sought out contests of physical strength and willpower, such as football and boxing.[9] He prided himself on feats of extraordinary endurance and scorned weakness of any sort. He came to believe that through hard work, constant self-improvement, and uncompromising personal effort, the "right sort of white man" could achieve anything.[10]

Like Pershing, Wood joined the ranks of military reformers. He criticized the officer corps for being out of date, out of shape, and riven with corruption and favoritism, arguing that it desperately needed vigorous new leadership and Progressive reforms. In 1897, he met a kindred spirit who not only agreed with him about the army's inadequacies but also possessed the clout to do something about them. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt praised the "very interesting Dr. Wood" when their paths crossed, and the two men immediately struck up an "inseparable" friendship. Together, they "hiked … , swam in the Potomac, and played football wherever they could find a flat patch of ground."[11] "You will be pleased to hear," wrote Roosevelt to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, "that I have developed … a playmate who fairly walked me off my legs; a Massachusetts man moreover, an army surgeon named Wood."[12]

Scarcely a year later, when the Spanish-American War broke out, Roosevelt and Wood joined forces to create the First United States Volunteer Cavalry. True to their belief in physical fitness, they recruited horseback-riding volunteers from across the American West and rejected "any man whose stomach was bigger than his chest."[13] The fact that Colonel Wood commanded the regiment did not deter reporters from calling it "Roosevelt's Rough Riders."[14]

On July 1, 1898, Wood's command, including Lt. John J. Pershing as an officer in the African American Tenth Cavalry as well as Roosevelt's Rough Riders, joined in the attack on Kettle Hill and San Juan Heights in Cuba. In the general confusion of the afternoon, Roosevelt stole the media show when he ordered his famous charge up San Juan Hill.

There followed one of the most important periods of Leonard Wood's life, his time as military governor first of Santiago and then of all Cuba. In both cases, he ruled not only as an authoritarian but also as a Progressive leader. He wore out his staff by working from 5:00 a.m. until midnight day after day, and his efforts paid off. He greatly improved public health (eradicating yellow fever, for example), cracked down on rampant corruption, cleaned up the prisons, implemented judicial reforms (including legal representation for all defendants), constructed hospitals and nursing schools, quadrupled the public-school budget, and vastly increased enrollment in primary school, where teachers taught in Spanish.[15]

Although a great Progressive in the areas of public health, education, and civil service, Governor Wood proved anything but Progressive regarding political reforms. Jealously guarding his authority, he looked with suspicion on any Cuban political efforts that threatened to vitiate his paternalistic power. Thus, he dragged his feet on popular demands for voting rights and independence. In 1901, he received new bargaining power when Congress passed the Platt Amendment to the U.S. military appropriations bill.[16] It stipulated that termination of American military rule could take place only if delegates to the Cuban Constitutional Convention capitulated and accepted blatant infringements on independence.[17] Grudging acquiescence by Cuban leaders finally cleared the way for national elections, and on May 20, 1902, Wood formally transferred power to the new Cuban government.[18]

Leonard Wood left Cuba reluctantly. He confided in his diary that "it would have been much better for the Cuban people if we had remained several years longer."[19] In point of fact, he did not believe that Cubans possessed the capacity to govern themselves independently. Although he got along well with many educated Cubans, for him they remained exceptions to the rule. Otherwise, he held "a Social Darwinist's low opinion" of the great majority of Cuban citizens' capacity to climb the ladder of progress.[20] Thanks to the elite, Cuba might someday merit annexation as an American state, but that would take years of education under American tutelage and supervision. Immediate independence, however, would spell disaster.[21]

The man who left Cuba in May 1902 arrived in the Philippines fourteen months later as a brigadier general in the regular army, having jumped over 530 more senior officers in the process.[22] In the eyes of many, including himself, he had achieved the status of a great man. No one had more energy,

and no one brought more sheer will and determination to his job. Like the Indian god Ganesha, he promised to sweep away all obstacles.

Unlike the revered Ganesha, however, Gen. Wood raised hackles and struck fear in the hearts of many by the time he arrived in Moro Province. He had already earned the dislike (and in some cases open enmity) of 530 American officers thanks to his controversial promotion. He quickly added to his list of enemies Filipino nationalist leaders and in Mindanao the Maranao Moros of Taraca and Datu Ali of Cotabato. While Americans disapproved of his aggressive politicking for promotion, Moros despised his arrogance and condescension. And while his American critics regarded him as a bull in a china shop, his Moro adversaries felt deeply threatened by his disregard for their culture.

In both his aggressive military campaigns and social reform policies, Leonard Wood inaugurated a period of roiling violence in Moroland. Many Moros saw themselves as under attack socially, culturally, and religiously, and they reacted with predictable fury. Just as predictably, Wood regarded Moro stubbornness, not his own actions, as the main problem. To him, Moros were "religious and moral degenerates,"[23] nothing more than "a treacherous, unreliable lot of slave hunters and land pirates."[24] They lacked all "decency, humanity and good government," necessitating deployment of overwhelming force to impose a lawful government on an "utterly lawless" society. In pursuit of this goal, he proved incapable of recognizing either the viability of Moro customary law or the culpability of his own tactics and policies in enflaming violence. The "savage" nature of those people always rendered, as he said, his "expedition[s] necessary."[25] As he proceeded to stir up the "human hornets," he held those same hornets accountable for the violence.

Leonard Wood had built his reputation in Cuba as a man who got things done. He had proved less successful (indeed, less interested) in cultivating relationships with the Cuban people. The same can be said for his modus operandi in Lanao, where he made little effort to take advantage of the personal ties that Jack Pershing had painstakingly nurtured with Maranao leaders. Meetings that Wood did have with *datus* often turned into pedantic monologues in which he lectured far more than he listened. He grew impatient with long *bicharas* in which local leaders voiced their grievances

and solicited his empathy and favor. What for them represented a culturally important effort to cultivate strong interpersonal relations struck him as just an irritating attempt to ingratiate themselves. He intended to correct their mistaken view of themselves as his equals rather than his subjects.

Wood refused to acknowledge Lanao District's relatively peaceful and orderly situation when he took command. He admitted that "one American expedition," Pershing's, had passed through the lake's eastern shore, but it had "affected only a small portion" of the population. "Our conciliatory and good-natured policy" had nurtured in Lanao Moros not a high regard for Americans as benevolent rulers, he felt, but rather a scorn for them as "cowardly and weak." The "easy policy and timid attitude" of Pershing and Davis had "resulted in the Moros looking upon us as a poor enemy and acting accordingly." Having little acquaintance with Lanao and its Maranao Moro residents, Wood concluded that he faced nothing less than "open defiance of our authority."[26]

A close examination of two American documents, however, suggests that Gen. Wood should have paid more attention to his own military intelligence. Both documents enumerate many "acts of lawlessness" committed by Maranao Moros between July 1903 and March 1904, with one focusing just on violent acts against American soldiers.[27] But even in that case, the violence hardly measured up to "open defiance of our authority." In fact, few attacks involved more than a handful of Moros. To the contrary, much of the violence clearly harkened back to the old days of Moro *datus* fighting other Moro leaders, except that the usage of stolen American firearms made new disputes more deadly. Other disturbances took the form of slave raids on non-Muslim Filipinos, another age-old practice that had terrorized residents of northern Mindanao for centuries. Lanao Moros also threatened road crews (both Moro and non-Muslim) laboring to build bridges and roads from Malabang and Iligan up into the lake country.[28]

As for anti-American acts of violence in Lanao between July 1903 and March 1904, the documents counted a total of sixteen attacks on troops, mostly to steal their firearms. Many of these assaults came against soldiers engaged in hunting. In July, four Moros surprised one group of hunters. Then in August "about 15 Moros from Lake Lanao attacked a fishing party of 7 [Americans]." In the most serious assault in the nine-month period, "Moros of Cauayan and Taraca" attacked a boat guard at Marawi in

November, “killing four men and carrying off their arms.” The following month witnessed “Moros of Ramaien” firing on a duck-hunting party. Unknown Moros assaulted wild-pig hunters in January. In other January incidents, Moros “concealed in the grass” near Camp Vicars killed a soldier, and Moros of Ragaan made off with two rifles. In February, two American sentinels in their camp along the Agus River sustained bullet wounds from unknown Moros. Finally, in March a party of Moros killed a sergeant in Marawi.[29] None of these attacks actually threatened American military domination over the lake region, but they left occupying forces feeling anxious and edgy amid a population that seemed more and more hostile.

Maj. Robert L. Bullard, commanding occupying forces in Lanao after Pershing’s departure, determined to put an end to these depredations, fulminating in his diary: I “have wrangled with Moros about stolen rifles and pistols until I am ready to kill them.”[30] His superior, Gen. Wood, enthusiastically agreed with these sentiments. Newly arrived, full of vim and vigor, and anxious to upstage Pershing’s ballyhooed march around the lake, Wood surprised Bullard by announcing that he would forthwith lead his own march around the lake. Irritated at Wood’s unwelcome interference in Lanao, Bullard grumbled: “The Gen[eral] is manifestly out for all the credit and honor and glory.”[31]

Bullard had just had his own violent personal encounter with lake Moros. The sultan of Toros had armed himself with “American stolen rifles and ammunition” and prepared to attack a Moro neighbor with whom he had been feuding. When the major ordered him to surrender his stolen arms, the sultan and his men fled across the lake in their boats. Bullard gave chase. Then, “under pretense of friendship,” “a priest of Toros made his way” to Bullard’s boat. No sooner had he climbed aboard than he whipped out his *kris*, killed a soldier, scattered friendly Moros, hacked another soldier, and “like a mad man” rushed at the major himself. Bullard fired “four or five shots” into the man, who fell, *kris* in hand, at his feet. His boat “bloody from end to end,” the shaken American remarked: “I never saw the like. It was a narrow escape for me. [That] priest was the fiercest creature I ever saw, eyes glaring and fiery.”[32]

Wood’s expedition around Lake Lanao turned into a fiasco. In early November 1903, he marched his large force along the lake’s west side, accomplishing little and learning nothing, thanks (in Bullard’s mind) to his

“sheer lack of knowledge of the people … [and] country.” He “seemed to want to do everything himself without availing himself of any information.” When they reached their halfway point at Marawi, Bullard advised his commander to call off the expedition. Torrential rains had turned the ground ahead of them on the lake’s east coast into a bog. Disinclined by nature and ego ever to admit defeat, Wood marched on. “Under great difficulties of mud and water,” his command camped in a marsh, while out on the lake a number of their boats sank in stormy weather, losing one man by drowning, 37,000 rounds of ammunition and twenty rifles, and five days’ rations. “This day showed that [the] expedition was doomed to failure,” wrote a disgusted Bullard, but “the general manifested no disposition to use guides,” preferring instead “to stagger around in the mud, marshes and brush and find his own way.”[33]

After another miserable day of slogging through “bottomless” mud, with everyone soaked to the bone from relentless rains and with a mere two days’ rations left for the command, good news arrived in the person of a Moro courier. He brought a telegram calling for immediate reinforcements to extinguish a threatened uprising on the distant island of Jolo. Facing another week of misery and “probable fighting” before completing his circuit of the lake, Wood finally relented. He ordered his forces back to Marawi and thence to the seacoast, where they boarded ships bound for Jolo. And so on November 7, 1903, poised at the gates of Taraca’s *cottas* that protected Lanao’s most hostile and recalcitrant Moros, Gen. Wood abandoned the field of battle. Girding their loins for battle, the astounded Taraca *datus* instead beheld the Americans in retreat. Their boisterous victory celebration did not go unnoticed by Moros around the lake.[34]

Left to himself, Bullard waited for the rains to abate as he looked for an excuse to make amends. He didn’t have to wait for long. In mid-December 1903, some of his soldiers out on a duck-hunting excursion took fire from hidden assailants near the town of Ramain, north of Taraca. Having been elevated to the position of Lanao District governor, Maj. Bullard called upon the sultan of Ramain to produce the culprits. Although the sultan had “professed great friendship,” he resorted to delaying tactics. A month passed, and the guilty parties remained at large. Under cover of darkness on January 22, 1904, Bullard took 200 men and a Vickers Maxim gun, stole away from Marawi in a flotilla of boats, and surprised the sultan on the

outskirts of Ramain. The man had prudently been strengthening his defenses, but he had imprudently neglected to guard against an attack so soon. As the Americans advanced on Ramain's principal *cotta*, drums beat the alarm, and Moro defenders, caught sleeping in outlying villages, streamed toward the town. "We had evidently arrived before we were expected," crowed Bullard. He deployed his men and opened fire with the Maxim gun, advancing slowly against the town, which he "found to be one great fortified camp." Caught by surprise, the defenders did not have their *lantakas* in place, nor had many of them taken up positions in their *cottas*. In a furious but short fight, the Americans killed thirty-two Moros, losing only one of their own.

Having made his point, Bullard ordered his men back to their boats for the return trip to Marawi. Their short voyage proved unexpectedly harrowing when a storm blew up and capsized his boat. Nevertheless, Bullard declared his mission a success, believing that he had brought peace at last to the marshy, boggy, and stubbornly anti-American eastern shore of Lake Lanao.[35]

Peace, however, continued to elude the lake district. Taraca's leaders remained aggravatingly defiant. They may not have attacked "each and every body of troops entering into or approaching their territory," as Gen. Wood claimed,[36] but they had stolen "a considerable number of rifles" and declined to surrender the "perpetrators" or to return the stolen property. They did not even agree to negotiate. Meanwhile, they "continued their traffic in slaves and … refused to surrender a number of captured Christian Filipinos." From Wood's point of view, they left him no choice. He must teach the Taraca Moros that their "open and vigorous pursuit of slave dealing" would not be sanctioned and that their defiance of authority would not be tolerated.[37]

Once again taking matters into his own hands, Wood called upon the Taraca sultan to meet him at Camp Vicars in order to discuss "the various acts of hostility" allegedly committed by his people.[38] When the sultan failed to respond, Wood launched a punitive expedition. On April 2, 1904, he sent 553 troops and dismounted cavalry by boat across the lake, while the bulk of his command, numbering 740 officers and men, marched out of Vicars along the lake's southern shore. The amphibious force met vigorous resistance when they landed south of the Taraca River, and in the fighting that ensued they killed more than seventy Moros. Meanwhile, the main force took sniper fire where they camped for the first night. After another day's march past

rancherias of mostly friendly Moros, the main column assaulted and destroyed the *cottas* of Amai Benanning and Ampuan Agaus on April 4, although they failed to capture either leader. There followed another nervous night in obviously hostile country.

On April 5, Wood's two columns hooked up and marched on Taraca itself.[39] They shelled, occupied, and destroyed some thirty *cottas*.[40] Writing in his journal about this day, Lt. Horace Hobbs described how when one of his men took a round in the head, "all the Moros in that fort were killed and the place … destroyed." Meanwhile, twelve Moro captives "attempted to escape and were all killed."[41]

Despite these losses, fewer than 100 Maranao had died up to this point in the fighting, versus two Americans. In his report on the campaign, Wood repeatedly stressed his resolve to minimize the loss of life, especially of noncombatants, insisting that "every effort was made not to disturb … Moros who were friendly."[42] The relatively low loss of life, however, eventuated less from Gen. Wood's tactics than from the new Maranao stratagem of trading fixed locations for space and time. They simply disappeared, leaving the Americans to thrash around in the Taraca mud. For the next four days, Wood's almost 1,300 troops searched in vain for their foe. His diary entries betray his growing frustration with an enemy who would no longer stand and fight. In a comment foreshadowing American "search-and-destroy" tactics in Vietnam, he wrote on April 7: "I have decided to go thoroughly over the whole valley, destroying all warlike supplies, and dispersing and destroying every hostile force." Intent on wiping out "every cota where there is the slightest resistance," he concluded somewhat implausibly, "While these measures may appear harsh, it is the kindest thing to do."[43]

"In dealing with the Moros," Wood came to believe that "the experience of three hundred years has shown them to be treacherous and fanatical, and that they respect only force."[44] The army needed to act with "firmness and the prompt application of disciplinary measures" he declared, if it hoped to "maintain order" and "prevent loss of life and property." In contrast, "dilatory tactics, indecision and lack of firmness will result in a carnival of crime and an absolute contempt for our authority in this region."[45]

Having "summarily dealt with" all the "acts of armed hostility and lawlessness" perpetrated by Taraca, Wood boasted of an end to "serious"

organized resistance.[46] Not everyone shared his optimism. District governor Bullard acknowledged that “the punishment” had scared people, and “for the first time the lukewarm and hostile are showing some disposition to submit.” Although the Taraca expedition had “laid waste the Moro country about the Taraca river,” “the actual military results were small.”[47]

Gen. Wood’s attack on Taraca represented his fifth “disciplinary measure” in his first eight months as governor of Moro Province. He had led two expeditions on the island of Jolo and yet another up the Rio Grande in Cotabato, in addition to his two Lanao forays.[48] No one could accuse the general of sitting back and taking it easy. A man of action, he much preferred fighting Moros to governing or talking with them. In his first two years as governor, he commanded a total of eight campaigns to enforce peace and order in the province.[49]

In Cotabato District, Wood managed to stir up opposition just about everywhere he went. That he did so cannot always be blamed on his imperial heavy-handedness, but his ignorance of Cotabato’s Maguindanao Moro society certainly served as a contributing factor. In short order, he blundered into an age-old geopolitical division between Maguindanao leaders, whom he also antagonized by threatening their power base and even (at least from their point of view) their religion.

In counterinsurgency warfare, success tends to accompany those who find a way to use their enemy while avoiding the pitfalls of being used by their enemy in return. Among the Maguindanao, Leonard Wood fell into the trap of being used by the very people he sought to control.

It happened this way. All societies have their fault lines, oftentimes dating back centuries. In Maguindanao (a name meaning “People of the Flood Plain”) society, leaders of *sa-raya* (the upper valley) had traditionally competed for power with those of *sa-ilud* (the lower valley).[50] As savvy competitors, they kept an eye out for allies, following the time-honored adage that one’s enemy’s enemy can usually be counted on as a potential friend. Thus, if *sa-ilud* leaders became enmeshed in the Spanish colonial nexus, *sa-raya* leaders rejected Spain and turned south to Sulu, Borneo, and Singapore for allies and trading partners. In fact, that’s precisely what happened in the late nineteenth century. When Americans arrived to take the Spaniards’ place, *sa-ilud datus* knew just what to do; they determined to ally

with the new colonialists, just as they had done with their predecessors, against their traditional *sa-raya* Maguindanao enemies. It remained to be seen if the Americans could so easily be manipulated. Thanks to Leonard Wood, they could.

Sa-ilud "was essentially a coastal state," or *negeri*, with its center of gravity the Rio Grande (or Pulangi) Delta and the urban center called Cotabato (Stone Fort).[51] Its influence spread across the water to Zamboanga and up along the western coast of Mindanao into the Visayas. With a strong navy to "extract tribute from coastal towns and channel trade" into its port city, it reaped wealth and power as a trading entrepôt.[52]

S*a-raya*, in contrast, stood as an inland sultanate, with Buayan (Dulawan) as its focal point.[53] Its sultan drew upon a vast wealth of resources. Around the Liguasan Swamp spread miles of rich agricultural land supporting a sizable population of farmers, who grew rice, sugar cane, coffee, and other products.[54] Although the *sa-raya* sultan never failed to cultivate trade with *sa-ilud*, his wealth did not depend entirely on doing so. Trade contributed to but did not define his principal source of power—namely, control over production of rice and other commodities in the rich lowlands of his domain. Moreover, he had yet another trading option if *sa-ilud* tried to cut him off from the coast. Traveling overland from the Pulangi lowlands south to Lake Buluan and on to Sarangani offered *sa-raya* not just a profitable alternative but an avenue for political independence as well.[55]

In the nineteenth century, as Spain gained control over trade in the Sulu Sea, the *sa-ilud* sultan felt constrained to curry favor with his longtime enemy. He signed a treaty with Spain and then welcomed construction of a Spanish fort and naval base, even requesting a Spanish garrison for Cotabato city.[56] He lost prestige as more and more Maguindanaos came to regard him as little more than a puppet of Spain. Then in the 1860s, he ceded all of Cotabato to Spain, accepting in return an annual pension. In effect, he became just another "paid official in the [Spanish] colonial administration."[57]

The Cotabato sultan's submission to Spain betrayed both his *sailud* followers and his upriver rivals. Not surprisingly, the latter witnessed "a massive movement of population" from *sa-ilud* into their turf. This influx turned into a near flood after the Buayan leader's son, Datu Uto, helped defeat a Spanish force of 500 soldiers and Cotabato auxiliaries sent to pacify

the interior in 1864. In no time at all, Datu Uto emerged as the hero of Maguindanaos, who took pride in fighting for independence against colonial domination.[58]

As Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto has shown, by 1878 Uto had won complete control over *sa-raya*, earning the unofficial title "Sultan of the River."[59] He amassed wealth by imposing a stiff toll on all vessels bringing commodities past his strategically located capital of Bakat and on to Cotabato.[60] He also profited from the sale of slaves. Captured by his *sakop* (followers) and allies from the Tiruray, Manobo, and other non-Islamic tribal minorities (*lumads*) nearby, these slaves brought a hefty profit when sold (often for firearms) in the flourishing slave market of Sarangani. In fact, the Spanish first became acquainted with Datu Uto in 1860 "as the captain of two boatloads of slaves" bound from Sarangani Bay for Sulu.[61] Different sources estimate that Uto owned between 3,000 and 5,000 slaves, an unimaginable number for all but the wealthiest planters in the American South before Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. Other Maguindanao *datus* had fewer slaves, some as captives from slave-raiding expeditions, others as debt bondsmen. Regardless of their type of servitude, slaves represented "the most important index of prestige and power in traditional Magindanao" society.[62]

At the apex of his glory, Uto enjoyed legendary fame as a great warrior and pirate captain, the "one-eyed man" who had lost an eye in battle against Spain, and the very embodiment of anticolonial resistance.[63] He also laid claim to another source of power. When late-nineteenth-century insular Southeast Asia witnessed a major expansion of pan-Islamic ties with the Middle East, Uto reinvented himself as chief defender of Islam.[64] With great alarm, the "Sultan of the River" watched Spanish forces bring Jolo Muslims to their knees in a bitter and bloody war ending in 1876. When the vanquished Sulu sultan (just like the *sa-ilud* Cotabato sultan) cravenly accepted a pension from the Spanish government, Uto aligned with *datus* who refused to join the sultan in collaboration. Thus did his image transform "from merely … a powerful chief to the symbol of Magindanao's integrity as a segment of Darul-Islam [House of Islam]." He and his warriors regarded themselves not just as traditional opponents of their longtime *sa-ilud* enemies but also as heroic fighters for the cause of Islam against Spanish Christian invaders and their fawning Cotabato fellow travelers.[65]

Luckily for the Americans, by the time they set out to pacify Muslim Mindanao, Datu Uto had fallen from power. Despite his heroic stature, army of slaves, and stockpile of arms, he suffered defeat by Spanish forces and their Cotabato allies in 1886–1887. He subsequently endured the destruction of his *cottas* and the defection of many slaves and supporters. Capitalizing on their military success against him, the Spanish constructed forts to cut him off from access to firearms, slaves, and trade. “Bereft of wealth, … the Datu of Buayan could no longer attract a following.”[66]

But watch out! Despite his fall from power, Uto’s legacy as defender of *sa-raya* lived on in his son Datu Ali.[67] Likewise, the fault line in Maguindanao geopolitics between upriver and downriver power centers remained as deep as ever. If the Americans chose to ally only with *sa-ilud*, they would alienate *sa-raya*, with its strong sense of separate identity and proud history of defending Islam.

When the Americans came ashore in Cotabato, they quickly took stock of the political situation. It required no great sagacity to curry favor with a Chinese Maguindanaoan named Datu Piang, who had succeeded in both securing Spanish protection and consolidating *sa-ilud* support in the 1890s.[68] He had also managed to cross over into *sa-raya* and woo a number of Datu Uto’s supporters into his camp. So powerful had Piang become by the end of Spanish rule that he declared himself “Sultan of Mindanao.” He then attacked remnants of Uto’s *sa-raya* network who refused to accept him as their overlord. At the pinnacle of his prestige, he betrothed his daughter Minka to Uto’s son Datu Ali. In short order, Piang came closer to unifying all of Maguindanao than any other leader since the seventeenth century.[69]

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8. Datu Piang and supporters, date unknown. Philippine Insurrection File, RG111-SC-81145, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

True to his reputation as a nimble intermediary between foreigners and Maguindanaoans, Datu Piang proved ready and willing to work with the new imperialists. He painstakingly cultivated smooth interpersonal relations with American officers, whom he visited regularly and upon whom he bestowed gifts ranging from an engraved *lantaka* for a general down to a half-dozen eggs for a second lieutenant.[70]

By working with him in return, perhaps Americans could pacify all of Maguindanao society without serious opposition. But they would have to avoid falling into the trap of seeming to side with *sa-ilud* or *sa-raya*, thereby accentuating rather than mending that age-old division in Maguindanao society.

Key to walking this tightrope would be American success in cultivating relations not only with Datu Piang but also with his son-in-law and *sa-raya*'s new leader, Datu Ali. Like his father, Ali traced his lineage back to the Prophet Muhammad. In addition, he claimed possession of magical powers thanks to a vial of 700-year-old sacred oil worn around his neck and a 300-year-old sarong that protected him from bullets.[71] With or without these amulets, he impressed Americans as "wily, sagacious and tough."[72]

Gen. William Kobbe, who preceded Gen. Wood in Moroland, did try to work with Ali.[73] His efforts seemed to be paying off when the *datu* accepted an invitation to lead a Moro delegation to the World's Fair in St. Louis in 1904.[74] Ali even borrowed $10,000 from his fatherin-law to help pay for his entourage. Like the erstwhile bridegroom, however, he got jilted at the altar. Facing the likelihood that Ali's multiple slaves and wives would offend visitors to the fair, American authorities reneged on their invitation in order to avoid embarrassment. Feeling duped and betrayed, Ali endured humiliation throughout Cotabato. Instead of continuing to work with Datu Piang as an American ally, he denounced American imperialism, called upon fellow Muslims to join him in armed resistance, and set to work constructing the largest *cotta* in all of Mindanao.[75]

Datu Ali rose in opposition to American colonial rule not only because of the World's Fair fiasco but also because he opposed Leonard Wood's policy on slavery. The new governor had wasted little time in passing a law

abolishing slavery in the province in September 1903. As already noted, Moro leaders had long based their power on how many slaves they controlled. They suddenly learned that “every person who buys, holds, sells or otherwise disposes of any person as a slave” would henceforth be guilty of committing the crime of slaveholding, punishable by up to twenty years in prison and a fine of up to 10,000 pesos.[76] By definition, every one of them faced an impossible choice: either free your slaves and effectively cease to be a *datu* or hold onto your slaves and become a criminal. Not surprisingly, many chose the latter course by openly rebelling against American colonial control.

According to Wood, Ali “refused to obey the anti-slavery law and attempted to raise the whole Cotabato valley in revolt.”[77] Reports in February 1904 warned that he had attracted hundreds of Moros to his fortress in Sirinaya, where *panditas* were “agitating the people and preaching … holy war.”[78] Wood determined to snuff out this purported threat even though Ali had not attacked or harmed any Americans.

Datu Ali certainly used the growing anti-American sentiment to mobilize as many people as he could. It should be noted, however, that mainly *sa-raya* (not *sa-ilud*) *datus* responded to his call. In fact, most of them owed allegiance specifically to the Uto family as the late-great Sultan of the River’s sons, brothers, nephews, grandsons, and grandnephews. Although five other *datus* and sultans joined these family members specifically to resist giving up their slaves, Datu Ali’s revolt had all the markings of a struggle for power between the old *sa-raya* Uto clan and the upstart *sa-ilud* leader Datu Piang, supported by his American patrons and discredited sultan.[79] Willy-nilly, Leonard Wood had fallen into a trap. Assuming Datu Ali’s movement to be an anti-American revolt that must be wiped out, he failed to comprehend that by weakening Datu Piang’s traditional upriver rivals, he was playing directly into Piang’s hand.

Altogether, some 2,000 Moros busied themselves in constructing the huge Sirinaya *cotta*. It measured approximately 1,300 yards on its front, making it “larger than thirty or forty ordinary cottas combined” and capable of holding a garrison of 5,000 men. In a rare compliment to his Moro foes, Wood pronounced it “the best Moro work” that he had encountered, “exceedingly well designed, with flanking bastions, [and] guns well placed,” and located next to a “deep and muddy estero.” The “extensive character” of these

defensive works, together with the “large following that had gathered” inside, rendered it “absolutely necessary,” in Wood’s mind, “to disperse” the insurgents or entirely “abandon that section [of the] country.”[80]

Wood claimed that Ali opened hostilities and accused him of “treachery” when his men fired on American troops who arrived at Sirinaya on March 7. Once again, the former Rough Rider failed to consider how his enemy might have perceived *him* as the aggressor when he suddenly showed up at Sirinaya with some 235 infantry, cavalry, marines, sailors, constabulary, and a field artillery battery. Impressed by the size and sophistication of Ali’s defenses, Wood delayed attacking until reinforcements arrived three days later. All day long on March 10, he “shelled the Moro works leisurely” from a range safely beyond that of Ali’s *lantakas*.[81] Then, early the next morning as the American troops prepared to launch an assault, they beheld a white flag flying from the enemy’s works.[82]

When American troops entered Ali’s abandoned fortress, they found many bodies inside and other evidence of Moro losses, numbering 108 dead and wounded, although Wood estimated in his official report that the shrapnel fusillade had killed no more than 20 to 30 Moros.[83] For the next three days, his forces searched fruitlessly for Ali, who eluded capture even when Datu Piang betrayed him by revealing his upriver hiding place.[84] It took that long to completely destroy the great fortress as well. Troops did succeed in capturing Ali’s brother, but they faced the realization that their prey, in good guerrilla fashion, had lived to fight another day.[85]

Despite Ali’s escape, Wood declared victory in his Sirinaya campaign, mistakenly believing that he had “entirely destroyed the prestige” of Ali and his allies and that the Pulangi River Valley “will be rid of their pernicious influence in the future.” Far from acknowledging defeat, however, Datu Ali swiftly abandoned his fixed-position defensive tactics in favor of mobile, hit-and-run guerrilla warfare. For more than a year and a half he eluded capture, and his guerrilla tactics drove Wood to adopt a heavy-handed search-and-destroy strategy that uprooted thousands of noncombatants and paralyzed trade in the region.[86]

Wood’s assessment of the Maguindanao situation reveals more about his own myopia than about the actual state of affairs. From his point of view, the revolt provided an object lesson in why his hardline counterinsurgency approach merited support and praise. Coddling Moros, as Gen. Davis and his

protégé Capt. John Pershing had done, just enhanced their "contempt for American authority." Equating their conciliatory approach with weakness, Ali had "naturally concluded that [they] were afraid." No surprise, then, argued Wood, that Ali and his sycophantic allies had scorned the new antislavery law and scoffed at American efforts to enforce it. Instead of complying, they had organized, in Wood's mind, a "conspiracy to resist American rule." In addition to "coercing and frightening" their Maguindanao brethren into "active resistance," they had conspired to enflame the Maranao Moros to the north, sending "runners all through the Lake region trying to get recruits and assistance." Thank heaven that he, Gen. Wood, had arrived in time to implement his tough new policy and arrest the spread of lawlessness across the Pulangi Valley. Mindful of his critics and doubters back in the United States, he emphasized how few casualties had resulted from his aggressive approach.[87]

Wood got it right when reporting that Datu Ali and his allies reacted to the antislavery law with outrage. They regarded it as a personal affront to their status and an assault on their power. The Moro Province governor, however, completely missed other dimensions of the conflict. By assuming that Moros accepted his assurances of religious impartiality, he discounted reports that many Islamic religious leaders (*panditas*) interpreted the American assault as a threat to their religion. And by regarding Ali as a personal enemy whose revolt single-mindedly threatened American power, he played right into the hands of Ali's competitors, such as Datu Piang and his *sa-ilud* supporters. As the shrewd Datu Piang knew all too well, Wood's attack on Sirinaya, whatever else it might do, weakened Piang's *sa-raya* adversaries, especially Datu Ali. Why not use the unwitting Gen. Wood and his American soldiers to do Piang's dirty work for him?

Leonard Wood's lack of comprehension about Maguindanao society did not deter him from pursuing Datu Ali come hell or high water. American patrols scoured the countryside around the Liguasan Swamp. On May 8, one of those patrols followed a swampy trail leading into the village of Simpetan, where Ali was believed to be hiding. The Americans walked straight into a deadly ambush. As the first squad maneuvered around a muddy water hole surrounded by dense cogon grass, they suddenly came under murderous fire from some fifty Moros. Within minutes, those Moros "practically annihilated" the Americans, leaving fifteen dead, seven

wounded, and two captured out of forty-one in the company. Having surprised his foe, Datu Ali then shocked the Americans by releasing both captives as an "act of mercy."[88] With them came a message asking for a truce. Ali knew that he could not hope to prevail against both the Americans and his Maguindanao opponents led by Piang. Wood, believing that he had Ali on the ropes, demanded his immediate surrender and mobilized what came to be known as the Second Rio Grande Expedition.[89]

Although Datu Ali understood his vulnerability, by May 1904 he had achieved an aura of invincibility among Maguindanaos, who regarded him as a folk hero. Among Americans, he had also become a larger-than-life figure who had both gained their respect and stoked their fear. Had he not, after all, treated American prisoners well and even released them unharmed after Simpetan? But those prisoners and other shaken survivors told of being horrified as they listened to their wounded comrades' screams and the "dull thudding sound" of Moros hacking them to death.[90] Determined to teach Ali a lesson, Gen. Wood led more than 500 troops deep into the region surrounding Liguasan Swamp, all the way to Simpetan. The operation proved to be fruitless, long on hardship and short on battles with rebels. Instead of fighting, Wood and his men gathered up "the bones and remains" of "men cut to pieces," boiled them, and then took them back for burial. "Very disagreeable" work, to say the least.[91] Perhaps a little chastened, Wood returned to Zamboanga and wrote his official report. Datu Ali had clearly earned his respect since early March, when Wood had described the rebel leader as "a worthless man noted principally as a gambler" and had accused him of using "the slavery question as a lever to stir people up."[92] After the Simpetan ambush, this so-called worthless man impressed Gen. Wood as "a good deal … [like] Geronimo" and "by far the most capable Moro we have run into," who had been fatally underestimated by "over-confident troops."[93]

In their long and frustrating effort to catch Datu Ali, American troops had more to contend with than their elusive and persevering enemy. As they slogged through mud, they found themselves in some of the most inhospitable terrain anywhere in the Philippines. For a thousand square miles in the Pulangi River Valley, a maze of tributaries, swamps, and morasses impeded their progress.[94] Passage through tall and sharp cogon grass often meant toiling through waist-deep "water trails or esteros" that Moros had carved out for their dugout canoes. "Into these tunnels scarce a breath of air

penetrate[d],” and broiling heat from the sun made the cogon fields “stifling and suffocating.” Meanwhile, “mosquitos [*sic*], chiggers, flies, and other insects swarm[ed] … and add[ed] a hundredfold to the usual hardships of campaign[ing].” Worn out from lack of sleep, the men fell prey to disease and general malaise. And because it proved slow and exhausting for them to bushwack, American patrols usually followed Moro trails, thus exposing themselves to the constant threat of ambush, as occurred near Simpetan.[95]

As a concession to the adverse conditions, if not to Datu Ali, Gen. Wood organized four provisional companies comprising 130–150 infantry and cavalry selected by their company commanders for their physical capacity, marksmanship, swimming ability, first-aid proficiency, and hiking experience in the tropics.[96] Ordered to track down Ali and bring him in “dead or alive,” these companies pursued him relentlessly across hundreds of miles of Pulangi Valley ground.[97] What began as a hunt for just one man devolved into a massive search-anddestroy operation. “Troops are on the move, covering the country in all directions,” wrote Wood.[98] Upriver society would never be the same.

The transformation of American strategy from a focused manhunt to broad and destructive sweeps through the countryside came about for one reason: troops, however well trained and persevering, simply could not find their quarry. Ali invariably received advance notice of their proximity to his hiding places, and so he vanished, along with his entourage and allies. Wood resolved to make him as helpless as a fish out of water by denying him his civilian supporters. Borrowing a page from his government’s eviction of the Cherokees and their subsequent “Trail of Tears,” he ordered all friendly Moros to leave their upriver villages and congregate near American bases at Fort Pikit and Reina Regente or in proximity to Datu Piang’s fortresses. Any Moros who refused to come in would be deemed hostile and their villages burned by American troops.[99]

Thousands of Maguindanao Moros obeyed these orders. In September 1904, Wood counted 2,000 “assembled about Pikit and 4,000 near [Datu] Piang’s place, [with] probably 4,000 scattered along near the river.”[100] In all, some 15,000–20,000 may have been displaced.[101] American troops on patrol found the countryside “almost deserted.” “The occasional natives with whom … [they] came in contact fled.”[102] When Ali retreated from one village, exasperated soldiers in one company “burned … [it] to the ground,

destroying many great and intricately designed bamboo houses (in which were stored many thousands of pounds of rice).” In another place, they “burned about 100 shacks and nearly a ton of … rice.” They sacked Buluan and fanned out in small patrols to “forage and plunder” and burn every village they came across. In one “hastily vacated Moro settlement,” they discovered baskets containing “pieces of roots,” suggesting to them that the scorched-earth policy, while cruel, was effective because “anyone reduced to eating roots … must be having a hard time.” Over the course of two weeks in September, this single American company “totally destroyed” seven settlements and burned eighteen to twenty tons of stored rice.[103]

Following orders to shoot “any Moro [still residing] more than two miles away from [their post at] Kudarangan,” the same company set out repeatedly to scour the countryside in pursuit of Datu Ali. As 1904 gave way to 1905, they continued their scourge, and when they doubled back to check on settlements they had razed earlier, they found nothing more than “ghost towns, forlorn, silent, with weeds and jungle creepers closing in all around.” But Ali still eluded them, and they rarely even caught sight of their Moro foes. “Why don’t these bastards stand and fight?” fumed their commanding officer. “I hate this business of burning houses and food.” Calling his mission “seemingly fruitless,” he concluded by labeling the campaign against Datu Ali nothing less than a “savage little war.”[104]

The savagery of this “little war,” together with his troops’ repeated failures to locate Datu Ali, embarrassed Gen. Wood. Clearly he had underestimated his foe when he had prematurely declared in his diary on September 18, 1904: “Active hostilities about over.”[105] Had he also missed an opportunity for peace? Early on, when he had received a letter from Ali promising “to come in if I would pardon him and let him and [Datu] Piang rule the country,” he had rejected the offer out of hand. Instead of a pardon, he had offered no more than trial by a civil court.[106] Unimpressed, Ali had demurred. Then in October 1904, believing that his adversary must surely be getting worn out, Wood suspended search-and-destroy operations and used his old intermediary Datu Piang to help open secret negotiations. Ali still insisted on a pardon and the right to live independently with his people (including slaves) in return for his surrender.[107] Wood countered with unconditional surrender and the promise of a fair trial. Once again, Ali

declined the offer. Wood launched three more months of scorched-earth campaigning in November 1904.

When Wood suspended hostilities again in February 1905, some 10,000 displaced *sa-raya* residents returned to their charred and despoiled villages.[108] Not until July, however, did Datu Ali prove willing to deal. According to Capt. Frank McCoy, Ali wrote a letter to his enemy. If Wood insisted on nothing less than unconditional surrender, then Ali would fight to the death if necessary. But if the American agreed to pardon or parole him, Ali would collaborate with Datu Piang in bringing peace and order to Cotabato. As it happened, Gen. Wood had left Moro Province to undergo an operation in the United States for a benign brain tumor. Acting governor Capt. George Langhorne sent Dr. Najeeb Saleeby, respected Islamic scholar and Moro Province's superintendent of schools, to meet with the famed guerrilla face-toface. Triumphantly, Saleeby returned with Ali's offer to sign an oath of allegiance, surrender his firearms, and even assist in collecting the *cedula* tax from Moros across the Rio Grande Valley. It seemed that the "savage little war" had ended at last.[109]

Not so. Like Wood, Langhorne insisted on unconditional surrender or nothing. Even offering Ali a fair trial seemed too lenient for him. "From experience with our own Indians and the English and Dutch in their various colonies," Langhorne opined, "it would seem better to get entirely rid of a disturbing element like Ali." "Every concession to an Asiatic … is a mistake. It is only when they beg for mercy that they should get, not more than they beg for, if anything, less."[110]

It took another three months, but the Americans finally got their man. The previous May (1905), Capt. McCoy had hiked overland from Davao District across the Mt. Apo watershed into southeastern Cotabato. Why not do this again with a strong and mobile American force? Perhaps he could evade Moro spotters, who always raised the alarm whenever American patrols approached Ali's hideouts near Liguasan Swamp and Buluan.

McCoy and his command sailed south around the Mindanao coast to Digos in Davao District. There they disembarked and hiked across the rugged Mt. Apo divide and down into Cotabato. It took them a week, but when they hit Ali's hideout on the morning of October 22, 1905, they caught him by surprise. McCoy had seventy-seven handpicked soldiers; Ali had ten men plus his sons and two wives. As the Americans burst upon him, he

leaped up, grabbed a rifle, and shot one of the advancing troopers. That's all the time he had before a pistol round knocked him to his knees. "Struggling to rise, Ali was killed by a fusillade of rifle fire." His guards wounded two soldiers before they too were shot, along with two of his sons and his wives. It had taken the Americans nineteen months since the fight at Sirinaya, but at last their nemesis, Datu Ali, lay dead at their feet.[111]

With Ali's death, the swarm of "human hornets," as constabulary inspector John R. White called them, finally began to calm in upriver Maguindanao country. Thanks to his American allies, Datu Piang as well as Sultan Mangigin and other *sa-ilud* leaders reigned supreme over Cotabato. Might things have turned out differently? Inspector White certainly thought so. Citing the model of Colonel Lea Febiger, the district's first governor, who had befriended Ali and "shut the other eye at such exhibitions of Moro customs as slavery," White argued that "the bloody chapter of our campaign in Cotabato … might never have been written." He continued: "Of course, it was not to be expected that the feudal conditions of Moro misgovernment … could be replaced by an administration modeled on American ideas of the rights of man without a certain amount of friction and even bloodshed. But the amount of each might have been much reduced by a policy which used personal influence rather than the Krag to enforce necessary and wholesome changes."[112]

Like many of his peers, Inspector White had initially accepted violent confrontation as the natural by-product of an epic struggle pitting not just Moros against Americans but "the most backward and barbaric East" against "the most advanced and energetic West."[113] Not until later, on the small island of Tapul in the Sulu Archipelago, did he begin to regard the conflict surrounding him in slightly less culturally myopic terms. Greatly outnumbered by hostile Moros who steadfastly refused to pay a fine of seven rifles imposed by the Americans as punishment for their piracy, White feared for his life. True to his hornet metaphor, he equated his task of securing those rifles with the unenviable job of collecting "the sting from a wasp."[114]

Endeavoring to make himself comfortable on the roots of a great *banyan* tree beside the Sulu Sea, White began a *bichara* with Moro leaders, who completely surrounded him. At that moment, it seemed to him that "Washington D.C. was a long way from Tapul." Late into the night, he

listened to their complaints of American interference in their ancient customs. In the morning, the *bichara* began again. For some thirty hours, "they minced no words." Showing himself to be just as stuck in his ways as his hosts seemed in theirs, he persisted in portraying the encounter as an example of "the old, old business of civilization versus barbarism." To continue roaming the Sulu Sea as they had always done, that's what they really wanted. "Poor, anachronistic Sulus!"[115]

Under that *banyan* tree on the island of Tapul, however, Inspector White did catch a glimpse of what he called "the Moro point of view." At some point in the long *bichara*, it dawned on him that Moros did not regard themselves as inferior to their American foes. Against all the evidence of American superiority in technology and democratic principles, they held themselves as equals. From their point of view, he and his fellow American imperialists remained "no better than themselves." How confounding to an early-twentieth-century American filled with Progressive notions of Western superiority. It seemed that these Moros regarded themselves as inheritors of a tradition every bit as great or greater than that of their American invaders. To them had been granted the duty and honor of defending the great tradition of Islam in Asia. As equals, as fellow warriors, and as defenders of the faith, they stood as one in beseeching the Americans: "Let us alone!"[116]

John White was lucky to get off the Island of Tapul with his life. When his Moro hosts eventually offered up seven rifles as payment of their fine, he didn't hang around to inspect them. Admitting ruefully that they had won a partial victory by palming off worthless hardware (only two of the guns even functioned), he acknowledged that they had also won a measure of his respect.

Inspector White had learned something that his superior officer, Gen. Wood, never understood. White's growing respect for his adversary contrasted glaringly with Wood's assessment of Moros as "stupid fighters" whose prowess had been "tremendously exaggerated."[117] With considerable insight, White remarked that Philippine Constabulary units, as opposed to American army search-and-destroy commands, possessed strength that "lay in the[ir] very weakness which invited attack."[118] Wood, in contrast, always advocated fighting from a position of overwhelming strength. Not surprisingly, Moros learned that defending their *cottas* against such a force would cost them dearly. After the Sirinaya and Taraca debacles in March and

April 1904, they melted into the jungle and lived to fight another day. Unlike Wood's bludgeon-them-into-submission philosophy, the constabulary invited attacks and then responded by employing jungle-warfare training to defeat their foe.

More than just tactics, however, divided the Philippine Constabulary from Gen. Wood's approach to counterinsurgency warfare. The constabulary's recruitment and training of Moros, its acceptance of Moro customs, its awareness of local fault lines (such as *sa-raya* versus *sa-ilud*) that could be exploited, and its light footprint in searching for the enemy—all these factors contributed to its success. In short, when Gen. Wood repeatedly criticized Gen. Davis and Capt. Pershing for tactics that made Americans look weak and indecisive, the Philippine Constabulary entered the debate by enhancing the Davis–Pershing strategy in its effectiveness.

By 1904–1905, Americans in Mindanao had divided into two camps regarding counterinsurgency policy, with Leonard Wood and his entourage on one side, Davis, Pershing, and constabulary officers on the other. The debate between these camps began in Mindanao and especially in Lanao and Cotabato. It continued in Sulu and particularly on bloody Jolo Island, where Moros rose up against American imperial rule again and again in the early twentieth century.

5

Comparative Counterinsurgency and the Moros of Jolo

In his book *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, John Nagl outlines two approaches to counterinsurgency. The “direct approach” aims to annihilate insurgents with overwhelming military force, while the “indirect approach” seeks to win people’s loyalty. The direct gives priority to military attrition; the indirect regards military campaigns as, at best, politics by other means while always striving for a political solution as the central ingredient of victory. The one focuses on annihilating guerrilla fighters, the other on gaining the support of civilians upon whom those guerrillas depend.[1]

Although these two approaches seem diametrically opposed to each other, Americans in early-twentieth-century Moro Province didn’t always see it that way. Indeed, points of agreement outweighed disagreement at first. Two of those points, in particular, won almost universal support. The first, an assumption of racial and cultural superiority, had few doubters in either camp. Just about every American officer and soldier assumed that Moros were racially inferior to Anglo-Saxons and needed to be civilized.[2] They might disagree on the best method to employ in accomplishing this goal, but they all regarded themselves as participants in some form of civilizing mission. To be sure, many Americans respected Moros for their fearless courage, untamed spirit, virility, rugged physicality, and fighting prowess as well as their industry, cunning, and willingness to sacrifice their lives for a higher cause. Their praise, however, came off as patronizing and backhanded as even the most outspoken defenders of Moro virtues regarded their wards as at best savages with a hopeful future. They also agreed, just as uncritically, on an imperial historicist view of the past. Comfortably moored in the waters of American progressivism, they assumed that Moros represented a primitive stage in the same universal process of historical

evolution that had impelled Americans into modernity. Not unlike Native Americans, Moros manifested all the traits of primitive people. And just like their Native American counterparts, they could—with proper guidance, instruction, and coercion—progress up the ladder toward the bright new dawn of full civilization modeled by white Americans.[3]

U.S. military personnel in Moro Province shared another point of agreement regarding Native Americans and Moros: their counterinsurgency tactics derived directly from the Indian Wars back home. It didn't matter that some took the direct approach, while others preferred the indirect. All agreed that the Moro War had its tactical roots in the Indian Wars. Most, in fact, had cut their spurs on the latter, including Gen. George W. Davis, Gen. William A. Kobbe, Gen. Leonard Wood, Capt. John J. Pershing, and Maj. Hugh Lenox Scott, among many others. "The Moros of the main groups are very much like our Indian tribes," wrote Wood. They "are like the best of the North American Indians … in love of independence, dignity and pride," agreed Kobbe. Pershing added that "in stealth of movement these [Moro] warriors … [are] more crafty than even American Indians." And many American troopers unhesitatingly transmuted the phrase "the only good Indian is a dead Indian" into "the only good Moro is a dead Moro."[4]

Tracing the evolution of American counterinsurgency tactics, Andrew Birtle has argued that the early-twentieth-century U.S. Army was a "child of the frontier."[5] Together with lessons learned in Gen. Winfield Scott's Mexican campaign and from guerrilla warfare during the Civil War, fighting Native Americans on the high plains prompted army leaders to shape an "informal" doctrine on how best to operate in "small wars."[6] Guided since 1863 by General Orders 100, which "strictly forbade all forms of wanton destruction, looting, and pillaging, as well as acts of cruelty, torture, or revenge," they recognized that the army "had a moral obligation to protect the people under its control from undue hardship and to provide them with basic governmental services." That said, they also adhered to the "hard-war" tactics of Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, who reminded them that the army had to deal not only with hostile militants but with hostile noncombatants as well. Like it or not, they must be prepared to make these hostiles, "old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war."[7] Balanced between this hard-handed approach and the more conciliatory guidelines of General Orders 100, American commanders

gradually evolved a “conceptual framework” for combating insurgencies at home and abroad.

In applying this evolving conceptual framework against American Indians, Generals George Crook and Nelson Miles played an especially important role. Between 1865 and 1898, they honed counterinsurgency field craft in pacifying the Sioux, Apaches, and other tribes of the American West. They stressed flexibility and mobility in war fighting. They emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering. They trained troops for small-unit cavalry surprise raids on unsuspecting Native American villages. They emphasized keeping the initiative in aggressive night maneuvers and dawn attacks especially during cold winter months, when their foe tended to be less elusive. And they developed realistic field exercises that stressed self-reliance, independent-unit action, open-order tactics, and individual marksmanship. Although they did not codify any hard and fast rules for irregular warfare, they provided a model for young turn-of-the-century officers such as John Pershing and Leonard Wood to follow.[8]

By the time Americans found themselves facing Moro insurgents in the Philippines, it only remained for them to professionalize the counterinsurgency tactics and strategies practiced on the high plains of the American West. Publication of John Bigelow’s *The Principles of Strategy* in 1894 provided them with a good text. The would-be modern and professional army officer of the Progressive Age learned that he must mold his tactics to fit each particular situation. He must take into consideration the local population’s temper in calibrating the most efficacious mix of hard and soft military policies. And he must pay close attention to the climate of opinion at home as well. In short, he must be prepared to apply rational and scientific calculations in managing his military assets and maximizing his chances of success in each specific situation.[9]

Despite their shared assumptions of racial superiority and of how Indian fighting on the frontier offered lessons for pacifying Moros, Americans in the Philippines discovered that they could not agree on one-size-fits-all tactics. In the harsh realities of counterinsurgency warfare against Moros, they carved out competing strategies. On the American frontier, one could move back and forth tactically between forcing Indians to assimilate and

honoring tribal leaders and their customs. In Mindanao, these competing approaches hardened into bitter confrontation. Indirect counterinsurgency prevailed in the early years (1899–1902), when the main American military effort focused on defeating non-Muslim Filipino revolutionaries to the north. A paucity of troops in Mindanao and Sulu necessitated that Kobbe, Davis, Pershing, and others work closely with Moro *datus* and sultans in order to minimize violence and speed the success of their pacification effort. Later, when more American troops could be relocated from the pacified north to the unpacified south, proponents of direct counterinsurgency came to the fore. Their competitors, however, did not abandon the field. To the contrary, they denounced the destruction and slaughter wrought on Moros by their American counterparts. In the debate that followed, modern American counterinsurgency strategy found its first formal expression.

On one side stood advocates of indirect counterinsurgency, who agreed with the strategy laid out by Gen. George Davis and implemented by Jack Pershing and constabulary officers such as John White. On the other side stood Gen. Wood and most members of the Moro Province Legislative Council, who favored a more direct approach. The challenge for both camps boiled down to how best to win the general population's support in an armed struggle with Moro insurgents.

Supporters of indirect counterinsurgency emphasized the following priorities:

1. Keep your troops disciplined, respectful of local culture, and controlled in their relations with the local populace. Follow General Orders 100: no atrocities, torture, or other acts of gratuitous violence against noncombatants.
2. Learn everything about the local environment, including the terrain, trails, and waterways as well as the local cultural and political context, language, leaders, networks, and social fault lines. Study, memorize, and map the political as well as the physical environment. And gather all the intelligence and local informants that you can.
3. Spend your time first and foremost in cultivating close interpersonal relations with local leaders, understanding their hierarchy of needs and grievances, helping to address their concerns, and fashioning with them

local networks of trust. Become, in a sense, a *datu* among *datus*. Via this gradual, culturally conservative, stageby-stage approach, seek to isolate uncooperative insurgents in a smaller and ever more dispersed minority, denying them popular support.

4. Tailor your military strategy to the local environment, and, whenever possible, try to minimize violence by training and employing small, highly mobile constabulary patrols (composed of trained Moro and non-Muslim Filipino soldiers with American officers) rather than big American infantry and cavalry marches. Equate success not with insurgent body counts, but with other measurements of popular acceptance, if not support. For example, ask yourself how secure noncombatants feel, as manifested by their participation in routine daily activities such as shopping and farming, by their willingness to inform on insurgents, and by their collaboration with Americans in infrastructure improvements. In short, regard military force not as the central means of attaining victory, but as politics by other means.[10]

Proponents of direct counterinsurgency proponents such as Gen. Wood and his supporters did not contest points one and two. They, too, recognized the value of discipline among their troops and of intelligence gathering in understanding the local terrain as well as local political networks, leaders, and fault lines. They did not, however, place as much emphasis on building relationships. They stressed the following instead:

1. With a nod to fairness, Americans in Moroland must be prepared to exercise firmness. Taking a page from William Tecumseh Sherman's hard-war approach, they must acknowledge the necessity of demoralizing their foe by employing, where necessary, scorchedearth tactics, confiscation, and concentration of the civilian population. A strategy of ceaseless military patrols that offer no quarter and dispatch guerrillas as common criminals will prove the most likely to pacify Moros efficiently.
2. Effecting a military solution to the insurgency by hunting down and annihilating one's foe represents the lowest common denominator in successful counterinsurgency warfare. With victory on the field of battle

would come political success. The one necessarily precedes the other; without military conquest, there can be no genuine pacification.

3. Contrary to the indirect counterinsurgency approach, violence, according to advocates of direct counterinsurgency, should not necessarily be minimized. Quite the opposite. The American military should be a revolutionary vanguard in turning Moro society upside down. Just as Americans could not tolerate the abhorrent feudalistic practice of slavery at home, so the American military must not, in good conscience, turn a blind eye to slavery among Moros. Regardless of Moro cultural priorities, and acknowledging that challenging those priorities would alienate local leaders such as Datu Ali, American military personnel cannot morally do otherwise. Indeed, American officers who curry favor with slave-owning local *datus* in hopes of pacifying them without violence should not be praised but rather condemned for choosing expediency over morality and betraying American democratic values.
4. It follows that overwhelming firepower, shock, and awe offer the greatest opportunity for success. After all, why not utilize America's most obvious asset, its military superiority? To be sure, deploy American-trained and led constabulary regulars as well, but American troops and artillery should bear primary responsibility for achieving victory. With military victory will come political submission. And with the forced submission of tyrannical *datus* will come realistic hope for genuine social change: slaves will go free, polygamy will end, and universal education and prosperity will replace ignorance and poverty for all Moros as a by-product of American military pacification.

Whereas Davis and Pershing de-emphasized the importance of social and cultural differences between American Progressive ideals and patriarchal and hierarchic Moro customs, Wood confronted them head on. Once Americans had asserted control over these subject people, didn't they have to stay true to their democratic principles? Hadn't they fought a bloody war just forty years earlier to exterminate the scourge of slavery from the United States? What hypocrisy to befriend Moro slave owners who held hundreds and even thousands of men, women, and children in bondage. Quit being so "timid." Employ, where needed, a "heavy hand."[11]

All in good time, responded their counterinsurgency competitors. First things first. And the very first things to do required interacting with Moro leaders, listening to them in endless *bicharas*, figuring out local political divisions, comprehending local issues and interests, addressing complaints, working within and respecting their arbitration system, acknowledging the threat of Western democracy to Islamic religious leaders, and gaining trust. They understood that insurgents should not be regarded necessarily as anti-American. Rather, there existed "a competition among many groups, each seeking to mobilize the populace in support of its agenda."[12] Violent acts often had roots deep in the natural fault lines of a society riven by age-old quarrels, vendettas, and feuds. Instead of being directed against Americans, most crimes involved Moro-on-Moro conflicts. When Americans entered the picture, and when one Moro faction sided with them, their longtime enemies could be expected to do the opposite. That did not turn those enemies into anti-American Muslim insurgents. Rather, it meant that Americans had become part of a factional alignment dating back decades. Understanding that alignment and basing tactical decisions on that knowledge would go a long way toward avoiding a general Moro versus American conflagration.[13]

Over time, employing the vehicles of public education, thriving trade, and rising prosperity, the Americans would exterminate not masses of people, but rather the pernicious institutions of slavery and polygamy that bound those people into a feudalistic system of shared hardship. In short, they would work from within the Moros' weltanschauung; become *datus* among their *datus;* enter into their arbitration system instead of dismissing it as a farce; isolate recalcitrants and defeat them, if possible, with constabulary units; and gradually, oh so gradually, open schools to combat illiteracy and educate their children about the modern world.

In the areas of public education, infrastructure improvement, and trade enhancement, advocates of both direct and indirect counterinsurgency found room for agreement amid all their differences. They discovered, in fact, that when push came to shove, what really mattered had more to do with implementation than with theory. Direct counterinsurgency policies, for example, could be implemented gradually and with the cooperation of many local leaders, thereby minimizing violent opposition without compromising values. Indirect policies, in the meantime, could be

misapplied so that they discouraged emerging Moro reformers from becoming leaders. Implementation turned out to be every bit as important as theory in successful counterinsurgency.

As has already been discussed regarding Datu Ali, and as will shortly be noted with respect to Panglima Hassan, American advocates of direct counterinsurgency too often abjured gradualism, substituting haste for patience in implementing reforms. In their hurry to civilize Moros, they unnecessarily stoked anti-American fury among the very people they aimed to help. They missed multiple opportunities to collaborate with Moro strong men, opting instead for provocative tactics and negative stereotyping that made cooperation virtually unthinkable. They substituted arrogance for understanding, abusive posturing for respect, and stern hectoring for patient negotiation. They walked heavily instead of lightly. They ended up contributing to societal breakdown instead of helping to alleviate the conditions out of which violence emerged.

This need not have happened. Even avowed direct counterinsurgency supporters might well have implemented policies in a much less confrontational manner. The very nature of a loosely structured society leaves room for maneuver with local leaders, who have just as much at stake in the new order as do the new colonialists. Those common interests provide common ground for collaboration. They offer room for the emergence of a common cause. They open the door for the establishment of personal relationships. In the vernacular of Filipino nationalism, both sides participate in what amounts to "compadre colonialism."[14]

Within the nexus of this *datu* or "compadre colonialism," space existed for the gradual implementation of many social and economic reforms, with buy-in from local leaders over time. That didn't happen. As we have seen in Lanao and Cotabato, American military policy swung away from Davis and Pershing's indirect approach toward Wood's much more direct practices. How did the evolving American conceptualizations of best counterinsurgency practices play out in a third Moro region? What did the Tausug Moros of Sulu have to say about all this?

"It is correct to say," writes anthropologist Thomas Kiefer, that Tausug "culture is heavily preoccupied with the problems of violence and its control." Although "it would be misleading to say that all Tausug are

violent … [;] law, political activity, feuding, and conflict comprise the major focus of an adult man's concern."[15] In 1900, a Tausug man's principal concern was the unwanted American military occupation of his homeland. He and his fellow warriors had violently resisted Spanish conquest and conversion for centuries, and they did not shrink from doing the same against Americans. Proud memories of fighting against imperialists had deeply imprinted their sense of identity, if not their DNA. Their sultanate had been "the largest and most powerful political entity in the Philippines, embracing at least a quarter million persons," before Spain had colonized most of the archipelago more than three centuries earlier.[16] They had resisted then. Indeed, they had always resisted. From their point of view, they had never been defeated. Just let the newcomers threaten their independence, not to mention their religion. Woe to the Americans who dared test their fighting mettle as the new century dawned.

It didn't help matters that Americans completely underestimated the Tausugs in the early years of U.S. occupation. Admittedly, these people had a well-known history of violent slave raiding across the Sulu Sea, up into the Philippine Archipelago, south across the Celebes Sea, down into the Indonesian Archipelago, and west all the way to the Malay Peninsula. But the Tausug remained, Americans thought, just one small ethnic group living for the most part on one little island, Jolo, that measured only thirty-seven miles long. They might depict themselves as fierce slavers and pirates, but their primary occupation consisted of dryland rice farming. Strip away all their exotic posturing, and they looked at best like peasants with primitive weapons who had finally been defeated by the Spanish in 1876–1893. Since then, their sultan had been reduced to an impotent clown parodied by George Ade in his musical comedy *The Sultan of Sulu*.[17] Neither he nor his people commanded much respect from their powerful American occupiers.

But these people didn't act like humble peasants. To the contrary, they projected an image of pride and swagger with their colorful clothing and ever-present *kris*. It could not be denied that they dominated other ethnolinguistic groups of the Sulu Archipelago, including the Samal, Badjao, and Yakan. They had reduced many of these people to mere clients or *luwaan*, literally meaning "that which was spat out."[18] Specifically, Tausugs regarded the Badjao as "worthless people; killing them … [was] just like killing monkeys."[19] And what about all those slaves? In the century

before their long-delayed conquest by Spain, the Tausug had enslaved hundreds of thousands of people, perhaps 300,000 in all.[20] Maybe these people had more going for them than first met the eye.

The name “Tausug” means “People of the Current.” They had risen to power in the late eighteenth century as part of the burgeoning capitalist world system when British and Dutch merchants entered the Sulu Zone looking for marine and forest products to trade for Chinese tea. For centuries, Chinese junks had sailed down to Sulu in search of luxury goods such as camphor, edible bird’s nests, pearls, mother-of-pearl, tortoise shell, and wax. In the late 1700s, European and American country traders came searching for those same products to trade in the China market. The country traders brought to Sulu cloth and other manufactured goods that made the Sulu sultan rich and powerful, especially because those goods included a growing stash of firearms and ammunition.

It only remained for the sultan to ensure a steady supply of local products to exchange for weaponry and manufactured goods. That presented a problem, however, because harvesting marine and forest products required a ready supply of laborers, and few Tausug men and women could be spared from their intensive rice cultivation. How to solve this labor-shortage problem? First, the sultan and his Tausug *datu* allies “established a virtual monopoly over external trade.” “This gave them control of the local redistribution of manufactured goods, including the weapons essential for warfare and slave raiding.” With this new weaponry, they outfitted Iranun and Samal raiders to capture and enslave hundreds of thousands of people, terrorizing coastal communities all across insular Southeast Asia. Jolo Island turned into “the major regional slave market.”[21] Its population increased from approximately 40,000 in 1770 to 200,000 in 1814, with slaves making up a majority in some parts. Thus did slave raiding become central to the spectacular rise of the Tausug people and their sultanate in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.[22]

Comparing the Tausug sultanate with its Maguindanao and Maranao neighbors helps to highlight what American military leaders tended to miss. Although all three societies numbered slaves among their population, slavery played a much more prominent role in Tausug history than it had in the others. It should have come as no surprise to Americans that their antislavery legislation would enflame greater resistance there than in

Cotabato or Lanao. Likewise, because control over slaving had contributed so centrally to the Sulu sultanate's wealth and power, abruptly outlawing slavery would predictably prove especially threatening to the Tausug leadership. Granted, the sultan had fallen on hard times. But no other Philippine sultanate had attained such fame in fighting for Islam against the crusading Spanish. Nor could any other regime equal its reach of power and influence across the South China Sea. And no other could awaken so many memories of greatness. Perhaps even more important, the Tausugs' history of almost continuous warfare had "had a formative effect on [their] religious development.… Faced with an ethnocentric and militant [Spanish] Christian missionary zeal to the north, the Tausug conception of Islam grew naturally to emphasize the militancy of the holy war, or jihad against … non-believers."[23] By the early twentieth century, whether Tausug warriors rose up to protect Islam, to oppose modern cultural intrusions, or to reclaim the glory of their old sultanate, hundreds of them felt compelled to declare yet another holy war when the Americans arrived.

Perhaps jihad was inevitable from the start given the multiple points of conflict between American Progressivism and traditional Tausug culture. Whereas the one heralded equal rights for all, the other favored a more hierarchical model of society that located the sultan on top and thousands of slaves on the bottom. If one insisted on a separation of church and state, the other abhorred such an immoral idea. If one equated polygamy with savagery, the other regarded it as perfectly acceptable for those who could afford more than one wife. If one denounced slavery as barbaric, the other defended it as mutually beneficial for master and slave. And if one claimed the right to civilize with a Krag rifle, the other claimed the mantle of Islamic leadership in struggling against Western imperialism.

Despite these points of difference, four years passed before the two sides clashed in earnest. Following a strategy of indirect rule, early American military leaders sought to avoid conflict wherever possible. Prompted by an overarching policy of avoiding anything that smacked of religious war, at least until U.S. troops could be freed up from the conflict against Filipino revolutionaries, Generals John Bates, William Kobbe, and George Davis tried to work with the Sulu sultan and his *datu* allies. Doing so required that they not make a big deal of slavery or polygamy in Sulu. Although they all agreed that slave raiding had to end, they insisted that Moros practiced "an

extremely mild form" of slavery.[24] Facing anti-imperialist outrage over their "abhorrent … hypocrisy," the generals argued that "so-called slavery among the Moros is distinctive" for three reasons: "1st. Because slaves are almost exclusively of the same race as their masters, 2nd. Because there is no wide social inequality or manner of living apparent between master and slaves, [and] 3rd. Because servitude is, as a rule, voluntary. 'Slaves' are frequently willing retainers, do not perform hard labor, receive greater benefits than they confer and often transfer their allegiance unhindered."[25] The system all added up to something more like a dyadic relationship of mutual obligations between patron and client than to slavery as practiced in the antebellum American South. And anyway, the generals insisted, when Moro slaves escaped from their masters, and when they appealed to Americans for help, the army always protected them. Army leaders remained ambivalent, however, about why these "so-called" slaves, if indeed they served as "willing retainers," chose so often to escape.[26]

At the center of early American indirect rule over Moros stood the Bates Agreement. Signed by the sultan of Sulu, his principal Moro allies, and Gen. Bates on August 20, 1899, it received President McKinley's approval "subject to the action of Congress" and with the reservation that it should not "be deemed in any way to authorize or give the consent of the United States to the existence of slavery in the Sulu Archipelago."[27] For his part, the sultan formally recognized American sovereignty "over the whole archipelago of Jolo and its dependencies," while the United States agreed to respect "the rights and dignities of His Highness the Sultan and his datos." Americans also promised to "give full protection to the Sultan and his subjects in case any foreign nation should attempt to impose upon them." Further, they pledged not to interfere with Moro religion and religious customs. Trade would be "free, unlimited, and undutiable." That said, "piracy must be suppressed," and the sultan and his *datus* agreed "heartily" to cooperate in effecting that end. In classic indirect-rule fashion, crimes committed by Moros against Moros would be tried and punished by "the government of the Sultan." "In all other cases persons charged with crimes and offenses will be delivered to the United States authorities for trial and punishment." Finally, the Bates Agreement took a page from earlier Spanish compacts with the sultan in turning him, for all intents and

purposes, into a colonial employee, paid a monthly salary of 250 Mexican dollars.[28]

The Bates Agreement never won U.S. Senate approval. Article 10 gave senators pause, despite President McKinley's assurance that it would never be used to authorize slavery. By stating that "any slave … shall have the right to purchase freedom by paying to the master the usual market value," the article all too clearly acknowledged the existence of masters and slaves in the Sulu Archipelago.[29] Thanks to the Senate's inaction, Leonard Wood felt no compunction about ignoring the agreement and declaring it null and void in 1903.[30]

An agreement like the one signed by Gen. Bates in 1899 might have worked had he arrived in Sulu fifty years earlier. At that time, the Sulu sultan still enjoyed enough wealth, power, and prestige to have successfully enforced treaty provisions among his people. As God's servant on earth, he possessed great religious merit. As a descendant of the Prophet and thus as Sulu's greatest defender of Islam, he could not be challenged. As supreme arbiter of disputes, he retained unparalleled moral authority among Tausugs across the Sulu Zone. And as keeper of weaponry accumulated in trade, he had enough muscle to punish noncompliers.[31]

That power, however, had waned since the 1840s, when the Spanish started employing steam-driven gunboats against the sultan's *prahus* (small sailing vessels) and their slave-raiding warriors. In 1851 and again in 1876, the Spanish assaulted Jolo Island and razed Jolo town. The sultan retreated to Maimbung on the island's southern coast. When an army of 2,000 Tausug warriors failed to destroy the Spanish garrison in Jolo town, he signed a treaty recognizing Spanish sovereignty in 1878.[32]

Spanish conquest of the Sulu sultanate had much to do with squeezing off the slave trade that had brought so much prosperity to Sulu a hundred years earlier. A reduced trade in slaves continued with Datu Uto of Buayan, but even that ended in 1885–1886, when the Spanish closed down Sarangani Bay. Uto's fall from power thus occurred as an extension of the Sulu sultan's decline.[33]

By 1899, Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram II, who had ascended to the Sulu sultanate five years earlier, had become a figure of ridicule to the Americans.[34] Lacking the personal strength of character necessary to unite his Tausug people against the new American invaders, he presided over

what had become a very weak "segmentary state."[35] Instead of marshaling support and inspiring loyalty, he gambled money away in junkets to Singapore. He had come to depend more and more on Spain's stipend just to live.[36] Whereas the traditional Tausug polity had been pyramidal, with the sultan at the apex and *datus* ruling over regional or local followings, the political pyramid in Sultan Kiram's time had flattened out. Power had diffused throughout Sulu, with individual leaders sometimes enjoying virtual autonomy within their personal networks and counting as many followers (*sakop*) and slaves as the sultan.[37]

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the Bates Agreement didn't work out. As the sultan's power diminished, he couldn't compel his Tausug people to honor its provisions. Americans drew the conclusion that if the sultan's own people didn't respect him, why should they? That line of thinking made logical sense, but it overlooked a crucial distinction the Tausugs made between the sultan as an individual and the sultan as God's servant on earth. They could disagree with and even oppose an individual sultan without losing respect for the institution he represented. The occupant of the office of sultan "was not infallible. He could commit sins and go to hell like any man." Nevertheless, the sultan stood as God's *khalifah*, or local representative, executing "God's will and sovereignty by implementing what was prescribed in the Shariáh." God manifested his will through him as *halip tul rasul*, successor of the Messenger / Prophet, with "the Prophet's blood … [running] through his veins."[38] "As Allah's deputy and as one who replaced the prophet Muhammad, the person of the Sultan was so sacred … [that] no man can do him bodily harm without incurring God's wrath and terrible punishment in this life and in the life to come."[39] Thus, the man whom Americans dismissed as a buffoon because of his personal weaknesses remained in the eyes of his Muslim followers both awe inspiring and sacred, and the office he occupied possessed *barakat*, "God's blessing or grace."[40]

Even as the sultan lost political power and military might, he retained his position of preeminence as Allah's representative and Islam's sacred center in Sulu. Failing to recognize his centrality to Islam and Islam's centrality to Tausug identity and pride, Americans insulted him at their peril. Up until 1903, they avoided confrontation, but by that time the opportunity to impose their will on Sulu appeared too good to pass up. For the first time,

they had the necessary troop strength to aggressively take the offensive. They had plenty of grievances and scores to settle, thanks to the sultan's inability to fulfill his commitments in the Bates Agreement. They had tired of making excuses for the embarrassment of slavery. And they had learned enough about Tausug politics to identify factions that they could manipulate in dividing and ruling.

It only remained for an American military leader to seize the day and not shy away from direct rule over Moroland. That man appeared in the person of Gen. Leonard Wood. Never had Moros met an American so strong-willed, certain of his beneficence, indefatigably vigorous, and utterly determined to improve them—with or without their approval or cooperation. Never had they confronted such a tireless, relentless, and driven American ruler. And never had they felt so threatened in their cultural and religious practices by the new imperialists from North America.

A "great man" Wood might be, but by the time he arrived in Zamboanga, he had developed some bad habits. As a confirmed social Darwinist, he regarded his new Moro wards as even more savage and farther down the historicist ladder of civilization than Cubans, placing them "on a level with our poorer Indians."[41] He confided to Mrs. Wood that "it will be many years before they can govern themselves."[42] The sultan of Sulu impressed him as "a pretty large size edition of a humbug." All in all, Tausug Moros amounted to "nothing more nor less than an unimportant collection of pirates and highwaymen."[43]

In Wood's new and disconcertingly alien Philippine post, so many of his strengths turned into deficits. His hyperenergetic American candoism came off as bating and bullying. His refusal to take "no" for an answer looked like pure stubbornness. And his conviction that Moro *datus* would, of course, violently oppose his Progressive reforms made conflict between Americans and Philippine Muslims a self-fulfilling prophecy. To the extent that Leonard Wood enraged Moros in Lanao and Cotabato, he stirred up a still angrier and more outraged furor in Sulu. For all of his great qualities of character and leadership, by 1903 the new brigadier general had become his own worst enemy.

Predictably, mounting violence accompanied the Tausug Moros' growing opposition against Gen. Wood's aggressive implementation of American imperial control. This violence occasionally took the form of suicide attacks by Moros on American troops occupying Sulu in 1903–1904.

Already predisposed to orientalize Moros and regard them as violent barbarians, Americans regarded the *parrang sabbil* (both the person and the practice), the Tausug equivalent of the Spanish term *juramentado*, as confirmation of their worst prejudices against these people.[44] In one personal account after another, memoirists regaled their readers with lurid accounts of *kris*-wielding Moros wildly hacking up unsuspecting soldiers until other Americans killed them with .45-caliber revolvers.[45] "Fanatics," Leonard Wood called them. "Savages," John Pershing added. "Suicide bombers" would have been their label had bombs rather than *krises* been their weapons of choice.

The words *parrang* and *sabbil* derive from the phrase *perang sabil* in the Malay language, where *perang* means "war" and *sabil* is short for the Arabic *fi sabil Allah*, "in the path of God." "A person who dies in the path of God is considered a martyr (*shahid*), and is entitled to the immediate rewards of heaven [as promised] in Sura iii 156 of the Q'uran [*sic*]: 'If ye be slain or die on the path of God, then pardon from God and mercy is better than what ye have amassed.'"[46]

The path of God—spelled out, this meant the path of meritorious action and regular performance of ritual obligations. A man should strive to acquire merit by performing ritual obligations that include prayer, tithes, almsgiving, and pilgrimage. In addition, he should seek merit by performing acts of kindness, pity, and good will. And, when necessary, he should be prepared to set himself in violent opposition against evil. "Those who attack the sanctity of Islam are evil." If Americans threatened the Tausug people, who regarded themselves as defenders of Islam, then they threatened Islam itself. By their actions, the Americans made themselves evil in the eyes of God, and to attack such evildoers constituted meritorious action. Furthermore, "to be innocently killed is meritorious, [and] a person is innocent if attacked by an evil person." Therefore, to suffer death at the hands of evil American soldiers, as in *parrang sabbil*, won merit for the deceased.[47]

The path of God had room for many different kinds of violent encounters with evildoers. As we have already seen, hundreds of Maranao Moros followed this path by defending *cottas* against Capt. Pershing and his troops. Hundreds more regarded themselves as defenders of the faith when they joined with Datu Ali in Cotabato. That said, the individual *parrang sabbil* or *juramentado* stood out from the rest. In this horrendous form of suicide, a man went to an American encampment and "ritually began to murder non-Muslims until he in turn was killed."[48] No manner of persuasive and reasoned argumentation sufficed. One had no choice but to shoot him down like a rabid dog before he killed everyone in sight.[49]

Of course, a *parrang sabbil* who attacked Americans in the early twentieth century might have done so for completely unreligious motives. He might have been personally insulted, shamed, and humiliated. He might have had reason to blame Americans for the loss of a loved one. Or he might simply have been looking for a chance to demonstrate his bravery, daring, and indifference to pain. Accused criminals might choose *parrang sabbil* as "an honorable death with religious merit rather than an ignoble death at the hands of the law." Motives and circumstances varied greatly. And regardless of those motives, a man who chose this terrifying individual jihad destroyed any shred of sympathy that American soldiers might otherwise have had for Moro fighters. But to dismiss him as a fanatic or mentally unstable person utterly beyond the pale of civilization missed the point: his act won him respect and honor among Tausugs as an "altruistic suicide sanctioned by the deepest religious values of the society." Not uncommonly, they praised him as a heroic martyr worthy of being glorified in poetry and song.[50]

Americans not only condemned acts of *parrang sabbil* but also exaggerated their number. A document in the papers of Jolo governor Hugh Scott counted only three incidents of *parrang sabbil* against Americans across the entire Sulu Archipelago between early September 1903 and the end of March 1904. Of the 134 "cases of lawlessness" enumerated in this document, only twelve involved Americans, including the three *parrang sabbil* plus two other attacks, three cases of stealing American property, three of disobeying American orders, and one of disturbing the peace.[51]

Use of this document calls for a number of caveats. First and most significantly, it does not include the widespread violence that accompanied

sweeping American military campaigns in November 1903 and again in January through March 1904. Second, it lists only “cases of lawlessness” that came to Governor Scott’s attention, counting, for example, only two cases of rape in nine months. It seems likely that many other incidents of Moro-on-Moro violence also escaped the governor’s attention. But anti-American acts by Moros in Sulu would not have gone unnoticed.

Ninety-one percent of the violent incidents occurring in Sulu in the months immediately following Leonard Wood’s arrival were examples of Moro-on-Moro lawlessness. Forty-one of these incidents (30 percent) fell into the category of theft, mostly of livestock, and many had to do with feuds between *datus*, whose followers stood accused of stealing their opponents’ property to avenge perceived wrongs. Thirty-eight (28 percent) took the form of kidnapping, usually with the intent of selling victims into slavery. There were seventeen murders of Moros by Moros and seven anti-Chinese incidents. No other category of lawlessness counted more than four examples.[52] All in all, it appears that Sulu society experienced a significant amount of violence and feuding. One looks, however, in vain for an explosion of *parrang sabbil* attacks.

Where Americans faced violent Tausug opposition in the months after Leonard Wood took over, they did not, with three exceptions, experience this opposition in the form of *parrang sabbil* fanatics suicidally attacking them in defense of their faith. Rather, they faced furious hostility when they, under Gen. Wood’s leadership, initiated their own violence by carrying out large-scale military sweeps across the Jolo landscape, seeking to pacify and tame Moro *datus* perceived to be anti-American and antireformist. When attacked, Tausug *datus* and their followers certainly did fight. Otherwise, they directed most of their hostility against each other.

Over time, Americans faced more and more violent anticolonial opposition in Sulu. But in the first nine months after they began to enact social reforms such as abolishing slavery, they experienced not a united society hell bent on wiping out American imperialists and their Progressive reforms but a deeply divided and “segmented” society that needed help in dealing with its violent dysfunction. The people they met did not see themselves as insurgents or as heroic *parrang sabbil*. They did not join in a holy war to defend their faith against the invading infidels. Yes, they feared the new foreigners who imperiled their way of life. More immediately,

however, they focused on threats to their well-being from other Moros who answered to other *datus* with grievances against their own leaders. Had Leonard Wood not marched his troops across their land and through their towns, had he not swept the terrain in his aggressive search for insurgents, it remains doubtful that the Tausug people would have risen up in large numbers to resist Americans at all. It was not Wood's reform policy itself but his provocative actions in implementing this policy that made the difference.

6

Hard War in Jolo

In early October 1903, Americans in Jolo City awoke to discover that some 2,000 Moro warriors had encamped nearby, threatening to overrun the town.[1] Their sudden arrival came as a surprise. Could this be the rebellion that some had predicted since Gen. Wood's promulgation of the new antislavery law just two weeks earlier? Governor Hugh Lenox Scott certainly thought so, accusing Moro leader Panglima Hassan[2] of plotting with other *datus* "to take and loot Jolo."[3]

Hassan had never treated Americans very cordially, but until October 1903 he had not seemed overtly anti-American either.[4] Indeed, earlier American assessments of him had been quite positive. At a time of waning American confidence in the sultan of Sulu, they had even begun to woo Hassan as a possible counterweight. On April 14, after American cavalry found themselves surrounded by 500 Moros from Parang District and forced to retreat in humiliation, Generals Sumner and Davis sat down with Hassan to seek his support and play on his hatred of Parang.[5] Hassan did not take the bait, remaining steadfastly independent and beyond American control. Nevertheless, he impressed Col. William Wallace, commander of Sulu, as the most powerful leader in Jolo and perhaps all of Sulu. "If he were Sultan, he would rule," wrote Wallace, comparing him favorably to the impotent sultan.[6]

Whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, Americans have frequently sought out and supported indigenous leaders like Hassan. As a man of humble birth who rose to prominence by virtue of his personal magnetism and strength of character, he brings to mind Ramon Magsaysay, for example, who became the American antidote to communism in the Philippines after World War II. Hassan even impressed Leonard Wood, who described him as a "fine looking" and "intelligent Moro."[7] And Governor Scott later acknowledged that he "admired him as a savage and liked him as a man."[8]

9. Sulu governor Hugh Lenox Scott and Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram II, 1904. Philippine Insurrection File, RG111-SC-104587, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

Notably, neither Wood nor Scott praised Hassan for his independence of mind and character. But that's what Moros liked about him. After all, hadn't he stood up to the sultan, telling him to "shut up" at one point? And hadn't he responded to Scott's imperious summons by writing that his "desire to see my father, the governor, is still small"?[9] For many Tausug Moros, Hassan had attained the status of folk hero in whose honor they composed ballads.[10] In their minds, he had grown so great that "he could pick the stars from the sky," according to the sultan.[11]

During the month before Hassan and his warriors confronted Scott in early October, Hassan had focused on alliance building. By blustering and cajoling, he had welcomed other leaders into his growing coalition. However, to argue that this coalition represented an explicitly anti-American threat risks oversimplifying the situation. Yes, Hassan quickly took advantage of growing tension and mounting anti-American sentiment owing to Gen. Wood's grand promenade in late August when he marched American troops around the island in a show of force that terrified many Tausug civilians. And he profited from American blunders as well. None of these mistakes proved more telling than the decision to meddle in internal Tausug politics by insisting on the arrest of a Moro named Biroa, who had tracked down two of his father's escaped slaves, recapturing one (a girl) and killing the other. Joloanos, including Hassan, objected to this interference, arguing that Biroa and his father had a perfect right to deal with their slaves in a manner consistent with Tausug custom. Scott himself later admitted that the American "demand [for Biroa's arrest] should never have been made in the first place," noting that the Bates Agreement expressly forbade such mixing in internal Moro affairs.[12]

American blunders had much to do with their inexperience. Scott and his boss, Leonard Wood, set off on their grand promenade just two days after arriving in Jolo on August 24. During the operation, they publicly embarrassed the sultan's brother, the *rajah mudah* (heir apparent), taking great pleasure in the man's humiliation.[13] Two days later they found themselves in face-to-face negotiations with Panglima Hassan. The savvy Moro leader "turned out his dancing girls and spear dancers" in welcome but

remained enigmatic whenever the Americans pressed him.[14] Scott and Wood simply didn't know how to deal with this sagacious negotiator. Hassan, in the meantime, had begun to regard American officials as ignorant, arrogant, and offensive bullies.

Could Wood and Scott have benefitted from longer and deeper experience in Jolo before diving into the center of Jolo's deeply divided and endlessly complex political scene? No doubt. Might more experienced American leaders have taken time to assess the situation before marching around the island and frightening noncombatants? Definitely. Could they have worked with Hassan to bring a degree of order to the badly decentralized Jolo "segmented state"? Possibly. From Hassan's point of view, Americans represented not an irreconcilable enemy so much as a powerful but uninformed menace that might be manipulated in his political favor. After all, even these callow colonialists could see that the toothless sultan offered little hope of bringing peace and prosperity to the island. Perhaps if Hassan succeeded in consolidating his alliances and presented himself as a more commanding alternative to the sultan, he could impress them enough to sit down and work with them for their mutual advantage.

Gen. Wood's antislavery ordinance of September 24, 1903, would have added another layer of complexity to the Americans' relationship with Hassan, but it remained just a rumor until Wood announced it in Jolo late in November.[15] In any event, it did not keep the *panglima* from seeking one last opportunity for finding common cause. When he arrived with his 2,000 warriors on October 6, he came to negotiate from a position of strength, not to attack. A close analysis of his subsequent meeting with Governor Scott suggests that this last effort failed mainly because of Scott's inexperience and Hassan's misjudgment of American military capabilities, not because of the new antislavery law.

The meeting focused on two issues, the first having to do with relationship building. Could the *panglima* and governor build a lasting relationship based on mutual respect and understanding? Hassan, who expressed "great affability," hoped that they could.[16] Pointedly reminding Scott of the sultan's ineffectiveness in capturing Biroa, he declared that the fugitive "could come to-night" "if I would send for him." He, Hassan, had successfully brought a number of powerful *datus* together in an effort to stop the feuding that "ruins the country." Didn't Scott recognize how valuable he could be in bringing

order to Jolo's dysfunctional segmented state? "I could take the responsibility," he offered.[17] Indeed, Hassan could help Scott in many ways if the governor could be persuaded to see him as a potential ally rather than threat.

Scott dismissed this offer out of hand. He had other things on his mind than building a close patron–client relationship with this Moro. First of all, he wanted to impress upon Hassan his subordinate status in the chain of command. The *panglima* needed to understand that "when I send for anybody, I don't care who he is, he has to come; that is what I am governor for." And second, he had no intention of substituting Hassan for the sultan in the chain of command. Scott categorically rejected any intimation that this Moro might become his personal intermediary. As a superior officer to his subordinate, he demanded instead that Hassan obey orders and end his perceived insubordination. If the *panglima* would just behave and accept his proper place in a command structure crowned by the American governor, with the sultan as his dependent ally, then he could prove his fealty by coming when bidden and leaving his 2,000 followers at home.[18]

So much for relationship building. But perhaps the two men could at least agree on another issue having to do with slavery. Hassan had not seen the new and as yet unenforced antislavery law, but he had heard about it. Although he didn't object to the law itself, he wondered how flexible the Americans might be in its implementation. Based on the Biroa case, he understood that escaped slaves who sought haven with Americans would be protected by their new hosts and that Moro slave catchers would not be allowed to march in and take their slaves back. Hassan seemed to accept that new state of affairs, like it or not. But what about debt peonage? What about people who owed a debt to a *datu* and served that *datu*'s bidding as indentured servants until the debt had been repaid? What if they escaped and sought haven with Americans? Would they, too, be protected and thereby permitted to laugh off their debt?

Important question. When Panglima Hassan asked Governor Scott whether the rumored antislavery law applied to debt peonage, he understood how an affirmative answer would threaten the whole *datu* system in Jolo. If debt bondsmen could escape and seek the protection of well-meaning American colonials determined to abolish slavery in all its manifestations, then *datus* could no longer be expected to pony up for their *sakop* in

arbitration settlements. Successful arbitration depended on the guarantee of repayment, if necessary through bonded service. Did the governor understand the implications of strictly interpreting debt bondsmen as slaves who would be protected if they fled their masters (and their debt)? Did he understand that such a strict interpretation would threaten the very foundation of *datu*ship in Jolo?

Governor Scott, still only six weeks from setting foot on Jolo, did not understand. He responded by lecturing Hassan on the evils of all slavery, equating it with savagery and its abolition with civilization. “People that own half of the world and have more than half of all the money and power have no slaves,” he admonished. “They have determined that there be no slaves. I don’t recognize slaves; no man can be the property of another, like a horse or cattle.”[19]

Hassan was stunned. Hadn’t Scott’s predecessor, Col. Wallace, explicitly told the sultan that debt bondsmen “are not slaves”? Hadn’t he specifically stated that whereas “slaves coming to me for protection will be declared free,” “the foregoing does not apply to people who have agreed to work for a certain person for a certain length of time to cancel a debt…. Such people, if they run away, might be compelled to return and complete their contract.”[20] Obviously, the Americans had either lied or arbitrarily changed their minds. Did they understand that their new interpretation of slavery would undermine not just the institution of slavery but that of the *datu*ship in Tausug society as well?

Hassan had entered his meeting with Scott thinking that he might negotiate a possible patron–client relationship with the Americans. This new relationship would be based on acknowledgment of their mutual power and shared interests. Concerning slavery, it would accommodate very different cultural and political imperatives. Scott’s uncompromising attitude instead convinced Hassan that the Americans profoundly threatened Tausug culture. “I would be ashamed,” he scolded Scott, to welcome a man who had run away from his debt obligation.[21] “I would be ashamed,” he might have added, “if I didn’t fight against such scorn for Tausug culture and the institution of *datu*ship.” What had begun as a jockeying for power and position between two adversaries had become in Hassan’s mind a shameless insult to his people and their way of doing things. Such an insult must be avenged, if necessary, by violence.

For Governor Scott, his meeting with Hassan held no such portentous meaning. He meant simply to protect American prestige and win his adversary's respect so that Hassan would obey him as a good subordinate in the military hierarchy.[22] He planned to use that hierarchy in repairing the dysfunctional, "segmented," *datu*-centered state that ruled Jolo. The damage, however, had been done. When Hassan returned to his home district, Luuk, he no longer regarded Scott as a potential patron, but rather as a threat to his own political culture and religion.[23]

It is tempting to compare and contrast Hugh Scott's contentious meeting with Panglima Hassan and Jack Pershing's *bicharas* with Datu Manibilang just a year earlier. In the latter case, Pershing had entered into the Maranao weltanschauung as a *datu* among *datus*. Where Scott insisted on Hassan's recognition of the major's superior position, Pershing had jettisoned rank for relationship. He had honored Maranao *datus* rather than regarding them as ignorant adversaries. He had even tried to learn their language.

For all his blunders in August–November 1903, Hugh Scott does not deserve such an unfavorable comparison. Indeed, he and Pershing shared much in common. Like Pershing, Scott had gained a reputation for relationship building among Native Americans when posted to the American frontier for service in the Indian Wars. He, too, had successfully commanded Native American scouts. And, more than Pershing, he had become an expert on tribal languages.[24] It comes as no surprise, therefore, that it did not take him long to begin building strong and enduring relationships with Tausug leaders in Jolo. However, in the first few months of his tenure as governor, he lacked both the knowledge and independence of mind necessary to avoid an unnecessarily hard war in Jolo.[25]

Given more time and experience in Jolo, Scott might not have botched his chance with Hassan, but he knew that his superior officer, Leonard Wood, would have disdained any effort to build a working relationship with the *panglima*. Wood's contempt for Moro culture colored everything he did in the last months of 1903. He dismissed Tausug leaders such as Hassan as "corrupt, licentious, and cruel" *datus* who exercised "arbitrary power resulting in the indulgence of unbridled lusts [and] robbery." He accused Muslim priests, "who practically preach … holy war," of promoting mayhem and murder. He censured both *datus* and priests for the "serious disorder, often amounting to anarchy," plaguing Jolo society. What folly to

negotiate with such people, much less trust them. In point of fact, “a condition of well-organized rebellion existed,” with none other than Panglima Hassan at its head.[26]

By the time that Governor Wood wrote these words in December 1903, a “condition of well-organized rebellion” did indeed exist in Jolo. It resulted, however, not from any irreparable division between American and Moro culture or owing to the specific issue of slavery, but to the Americans’ blindness and blunders. What happened in November 1903 marked no “clash of civilizations.”[27] To the contrary, it represented a tragically avoidable conflict in which even Governor Scott described its leader, Hassan, not as a rebel or revolutionary, but as a mere “outlaw chief.”[28] Even the issue of slavery need not have precipitated armed conflict, given the Qurʾan’s emphasis on freeing slaves as meritorious action. In any case, Hassan himself did not list the antislavery law among his grievances.[29]

Toward the end of October 1903, an American military map-surveying party entered territory controlled by an ally of Hassan, who ambushed the party. A firefight ensued in which eight Moros died and two Americans were wounded. Scott never accused Hassan of having ordered the ambush, but he reported that the *panglima* immediately “sent men and rifles” to where his ally had taken refuge. According to Scott’s informant, Hassan had “several thousand men assembled” nearby, primed to attack Jolo town should American troops leave it unguarded.[30] In addition, Hassan reminded his allies (Scott claimed) that they had agreed to join forces against the Americans in the event of war, and “now is the time to stand by the agreement.” Faced with such a potentially large and hostile force, Scott ordered the surveying party back to the safety of Jolo town. In due time, he said, “an attacking force should be organized” to teach Hassan a lesson.[31]

According to a “Ballad written and sung by Jolo Moros,” Americans and Jolo Moros approached an impasse. “It was like a disease that could not be cured.” “Let us all fight,” Hassan concluded. “If we don’t be quick our religion will be taken away from us.” Accordingly, “he called … people from the hills and … coast,” saying, “Let us fight well and not … [hesitate] to protect our religion.”[32]

Despite these hostile words, Hassan and his Tausug allies neither attacked nor even prepared to do so. In the meantime, Scott’s report on the ambush and his recommendation that “an attacking force should be organized,”

reached Gen. Wood. At this point, Wood's ill-advised march around Lake Lanao had bogged down in the monsoon rain and mud, and he desperately sought a way out of the morass. He called a meeting of his officers and announced an "uprising of Moros" on Jolo against which Scott had sent a request for "reinforcements at once." Abandoning the Lanao quagmire, Wood marched his command to Iligan, where they boarded ship for Zamboanga and then on to Jolo. They arrived, much to Governor Scott's surprise, on the night of November 11–12, 1903.

Wood's sudden arrival in force also came as a surprise to Panglima Hassan. Together, Wood's and Scott's forces numbered almost 1,250. After disembarking, Wood's troops marched overland directly toward Hassan's undefended house near Lake Seit. They encountered neither an organized resistance nor any stout defensive positions or *cottas*. Nevertheless, they managed to kill dozens of Moros (including many innocent members of a wedding party) and burn every house in their path.[33] By the time they reached Hassan's *cotta* and home, the *panglima* had fled. Scott successfully tracked him down and captured him with the help of a prisoner turned informer. Upon their return to camp, they discovered that the *panglima*'s house had been set afire, an event that "seemed to depress the Moro chief greatly." Scott "sympathized with him in his loss, for it was probably the largest and best native house on the island, … one in which he had taken great pride." Wood ordered Scott to take his prisoner back to the troop ships. On the way, they ran into an ambush, during which Hassan escaped and Scott received severe bullet wounds that mangled both of his hands.[34]

In the next week, while Scott began a long and painful recovery, American troops scoured the swampy terrain around the Luuk District, burning and looting at will and killing hundreds of Moros in vicious small-unit fighting.[35] Then they set out to punish Hassan's allies. First, they surrounded Maharajah Opau's *cotta* in Luuk and secured his surrender. Next they marched up to Taglibi on the northwest coast, where they surrounded Maharajah Andung, the Hassan ally who had fired on American surveyors back in October. In furious fighting on November 19–20, one American was reportedly "hacked to pieces by a woman warrior," and some seventy-five defenders died. Wood's troops then destroyed all Andung's shelters and entrenchments. They also burned the *cotta* of another Hassan ally before marching back to Jolo, carrying with them "a good deal of plunder."[36]

In what they called their Second Jolo Expedition from November 12 to November 22, 1903, American troops killed as many as 1,500 Moros, although Gen. Wood estimated the count to be more like 1,000 to 1,200 versus one American killed in action and seventeen wounded.[37] Hassan remained at large, but Wood and his men concluded that they had taught their Moro enemies a lesson. In fact, however, they had ignited a Tausug resistance movement that continued off and on for more than a decade. In the course of their counterinsurgency campaign, the Americans would leave thousands of Moros dead and wounded. November 1903 thus marked the beginning of a hard war indeed in Jolo.

The American military effort in Jolo, both up to this point and in the months that followed, exhibited what *not* to do in successful counter-insurgency warfare. Despite eventual attempts by Governor Hugh Scott to repair relations with local leaders and work within their politicaljudicial system, his fellow Americans managed to ignore most of the following warnings:

- Don’t take action that will enhance the chaos and dysfunction of your colonized people’s already weakened state, kindling greater disorder in the process.
- Don’t create a leadership crisis or power vacuum; don’t humiliate and undermine leaders such as the sultan by turning them into collaborating puppets in the eyes of their people.
- Don’t take steps to turn what was fundamentally a horizontal and factional struggle for power among local leaders (with each seeking to ally with Americans against their rivals) into a vertical struggle pitting the local populace against you as a threat to their culture and Muslim religion.
- Don’t assume that the dysfunction you witness in the local political process is endemic, racial, or due to social / cultural backwardness. Don’t disrespect their culture. And don’t permit yourself to act from inexperience, ignorance, and prejudice.
- Don’t scorn, ridicule, and undermine the local arbitration system upon which their leaders depend for power, prestige, and influence.
- Don’t assume that direct colonial policies such as the antislavery law will automatically trigger a violent reaction. It all depends on implementation.

- Don’t employ military power as your preferred method, but rather as your method of last resort.
- Don’t miss opportunities (such as Scott’s meeting with Hassan on October 6) to build relationships at the expense of rank.

As Leonard Wood’s counterinsurgency policy blundered into the listed “don’ts,” it missed many of the following “do’s”:

- Do work with local leaders in an effort to reduce systemic violence and resistance to change.
- Do foster personal relationships with strong and highly respected local leaders (such as Hassan) as potential allies rather than enemies.
- Do make every effort to prevent horizontal, factional divisions in the political process from becoming vertical, cultural, or religious divisions between yourself and the local populace.
- Do respect and immerse yourself in their culture and language.
- Do work both within and outside their arbitration system by becoming an arbitrator/*datu* yourself.
- Do implement direct colonial policies (such as the antislavery law) gradually, always demonstrating a willingness to make short-term compromises (as in the case of debt peonage) in the interest of longterm acceptance and common purpose.
- Do stand ready to employ military power, but as a last resort.
- Do grab every opportunity to build relationships at the expense of rank.

Between November 1903 and March 1906, war convulsed Jolo Island as Americans under Gen. Wood battled Tausug Moros convinced that they faced an enemy who threatened their way of life and religion. It stands as a tragically unnecessary war that could have been avoided had its American protagonists followed the basic principles outlined for successful counterinsurgency policy.

In Wood’s mind, thanks to the fact that *datus* like Hassan ruled over a society of hapless dependents devoid of enterprise and initiative, tracking down and eliminating a leader with Hassan’s credentials would pretty much do the trick. And if a few other recalcitrant *datus* failed to get the message, they too could be easily dispatched. After all, they had few places to hide on

an island measuring a mere 37 miles at its greatest length and inhabited by only 45,000 Moros since the terrible cholera epidemic that had killed 5,000 the previous year.[38] Hassan and his ilk simply didn't stand a chance, in Wood's mind, especially because his local enemies, who had become America's collaborating allies, controlled half the island's 345 square miles. American troops had only to corner him like a trapped rat, and they would nip this socalled rebellion in the bud.

Few Tausug Moros shared Gen. Wood's assumptions. As they looked around them, they saw many determined and resourceful fighters prepared to die in defense of their way of life and religion. And Panglima Hassan had the luxury of many hiding places from which to choose: "almost impenetrable jungle," "dense swamps," numerous volcanic craters, and the homes of his fellow Tausug people, who venerated him as a great hero.[39] Many Jolo volcanoes had heavily wooded sides and steep slopes, and the people of Luuk District swore to fight either with Hassan or in honor of his memory. It would not be so easy to run this man to ground or extinguish the conflagration he had begun among his people.

On February 14, 1904, Americans got their first taste of just how determined Moros had become to fight them unto death. Cotta Pang-Pang, at the base of Bud (Mt.) Lumping in southern Luuk District, marked the spot. Intelligence sources told Scott (who led the American assault with both arms in bandages and slings) that his adversary had taken refuge in the *cotta*. Undeterred by the fort's stout defenses, even when his Parang District allies declined to move forward, Scott shelled the *cotta* for two hours before ordering a general assault by some 150 American troops. There followed ferocious fighting as troops made their way over one barrier after another and finally up the walls and into handto-hand combat with Moro defenders.[40] The battle lasted for five and a half hours in all. When surviving Moros retreated with untold numbers of wounded, they left behind 226 bodies. Remarkably, the Americans counted among themselves only seven wounded and no dead.[41]

Among the Tausug wounded in Cotta PangPang lay Hassan's most loyal lieutenant, Laksamana Usap, who escaped after hiding in a pile of corpses.[42] As for Hassan himself, he and his family had left the fortress well before the battle began. Scott continued to believe that capturing the *panglima* (he hoped not to kill him) would put an end to the uprising. But it troubled him

that so many Moros had fought to the death rather than respond positively to two cease-fire orders he had given his troops during the battle. Something else bothered him as well: in dozens of interviews he conducted with Moro captives, he learned that he and his command had fallen prey to manipulation by his collaborating Moro allies, including that so-called fool, the sultan. As he listened to one interviewee after another, Scott became aware that the sultan and his allies were using him in their efforts to eliminate Hassan and his faction as their principal competitors for power in Jolo. Indeed, it seemed that the sultan had tricked the unwitting Americans into doing his dirty work for him.[43]

After escaping the slaughter at Cotta PangPang, Hassan and his family eluded pursuers for two weeks, but allies of the sultan discovered him on March 1 in a house near PangPang. They captured some members of his family and killed others, but the *panglima* escaped once again. Scott had sent an informant to the house of a Hassan relative, suspecting that he might seek refuge there, even though its location on Bud Bagsak fell well outside the Luuk District. This time he guessed right. He surrounded the mountain and caught Hassan by surprise in Bud Bagsak's crater on the morning of March 4, 1904. He called for the *panglima*'s surrender, but Hassan "rolled into a ravine wounded, shooting his Krag rifle at everybody he could see, getting a cavalry soldier through the pelvis" and narrowly missing two others. From every direction on the walls of the crater, American troops fired on him. When a bullet broke the bolt on his Krag rifle, "Hassan drew his barong" and charged a sergeant, who killed him with a round through the head from a Colt 45. "A great cry of joy … [rose] from every side," wrote Scott. "We all gathered on the rim then, watching the sun come up, illuminating a glorious view over land and sea." The governor "felt too badly over [Hassan's] death" to examine the body, but his men reported that Hassan "had thirty-two Krag balls through him and was only stopped by the Colt 45—the thirty-third bullet."[44]

Triumphantly, Scott "sent out announcements everywhere saying that Hassan was dead and the war was over…. Everybody should return home and, after resting, go on cultivating the soil in peace."[45] Like another American declaration of victory some 100 years later, this pronouncement turned out to be premature. Even as it made the rounds, Hassan's lieutenant, Laksamana Usap, recovered from his wounds at PangPang, "gathered about

200 outlaws," reinforced the walls of another *cotta*, and "refuse[d] to surrender."[46]

Although Usap certainly had reason to despise Americans after their destruction of his PangPang *cotta*, he also harbored deep animosity against his Tausug factional rivals, such as Maharajah Indanan of Parang District. Traditional factional lines of division, in fact, continued to carry impressive weight in Jolo, even as some hitherto nonallied *datus*, seeing few alternatives after Hassan's death, joined the sultan's loose coalition.[47] These Moro-on-Moro rivalries became less obvious as Moro resentment against American military control spread. Like varnished layers in a medieval palimpsest, however, they revealed themselves to the careful observer, even as overt anti-Americanism grew. And after March 1904, anti-Americanism did spread as the Americans gave Jolo Moros more and more reason to fight.

Two grievances in particular motivated Tausug Muslims to resist American rule either overtly or, more often, covertly.[48] First, the unilateral abrogation of the Bates Agreement in March (painfully bringing to mind the arbitrary termination of so many nineteenth-century treaties with American Indians) infuriated members of the Tausug elite, especially the sultan and other leaders who had been quite literally on the American payroll.[49] Second, Gen. Wood's implementation of the *cedula* alienated just about everyone, enemy and ally, elite and commoner, by offending their Muslim religious sensibilities.[50] Together, the antislavery law and Wood's ongoing efforts to undermine *datu* power fueled increasingly violent antipathy against American rule in Jolo. They turned the lull in fighting that followed Hassan's death into a widespread round of rebellion that convulsed the island in 1905.

After the Americans' unilateral abrogation of the Bates Agreement in 1904, the sultan confronted them with a list of five concessions they should make in return for his cooperation. "Don't ask us to pay the poll tax (*cedula*) forever" stood out as demand number one.[51] When they put him back on the payroll at $3,000 a year, he came around, even volunteering to be Jolo's first taxpayer and decreeing that all Moros should join him.[52] Despite Sultan Kiram's cooperation, "the feeling among people … on account of the Cedula" continued to worry Scott. Writing to Wood, he described it as "a more serious and [more] widespread feeling by far than obtained in Hassan's

case, and it is rapidly growing."[53] Once again, leaders of the Luuk District, Hassan's former domain, led in fanning the flames of anti*cedula* sentiment. Old factional identities also lurked just below the surface as Luuk's age-old enemies, such as Kalbi, Joakanain, and Indanan (not to mention their titular leader, the sultan), ganged up on Hassan's former lieutenant, Laksamana Usap. In January 1905, Scott watched as so many of his efforts to build an edifice of cooperation among Jolo leaders went up in the smoke of a burgeoning uprising.

All through the relatively peaceful months following Hassan's death in March 1904, the governor received worrisome reports from carefully cultivated Moro sources that Usap was constructing a strong new *cotta* not far from PangPang and stirring up trouble. He claimed to be building the fort not to fight Americans, but to protect Luuk's citizens and allies against their factional enemies. Scott dismissed that excuse, but in fact it made more sense to build a *cotta* against traditional Moro enemies than against American forces with their devastating artillery. Seeking to avoid another bloodbath like PangPang, Scott pressed Usap "to come in here and give up." And he also emphasized that the *laksamana* had "to get the women and children out of the way." "We don't make war on women and children," he insisted, "and we feel badly every time we have to kill one."[54]

Scott's words may have been meant as a rare expression of regret by an American to a Moro, for Usap's daughter had been killed at Cotta PangPang. That being said, the governor had grown accustomed to bullying Moro *datus*, and the Luuk leader eventually responded by coming in as bidden.[55] "I don't want to resist you," he asserted, "and I beg you to forgive me for my past offenses." Scott responded guardedly: "Are you talking with your mouth or your heart?" "I am the same inside as outside," responded Usap. Unprepared to accept a Moro's promises so easily, Scott threatened to employ a new "gun … to knock down your wall … and throw the stones right on top of you, like a grave." "You need not bring a big gun," answered the *laksamana*. "There is no need to fight me." "If you mean what you say," said the governor, still unconvinced, "I want you to fill up your cotta or give it up." "I will do it," promised Usap.[56]

When Usap failed to act promptly on his promise, Scott persuaded the sultan to gather "a party of Moros[, who] partly destroyed the cotta."[57] That only served to convince Usap that his traditional Moro enemies, now allied

with the Americans, would destroy him if he didn't defend himself. Marshaling support from other Luuk chiefs, he assembled some 400 men to help reconstruct and defend his fortress. He also denounced the *cedula*, convincing Governor Scott that because his Moro allies had "failed to get … [Usap] through inability or lack of desire," he would have to take matters into his own mutilated hands.[58]

In early January 1905, Scott sent "different chiefs" to Cotta Usap "to get out their relatives and those they could influence," an effort that succeeded in persuading "a large number" of mostly women and children to evacuate. Then, on January 7 he surrounded the fort and called on Usap to surrender. When the *laksamana* responded by shooting at Scott's interpreter, the governor ordered an artillery barrage that blasted the *cotta* for more than five hours. After the Moro leader rebuffed a last call for his surrender, shouting, "You cowardly Americans may know what it is to surrender, but we Moros do not understand what it means," Scott ordered an assault.[59] American troops swarmed through a breach in the wall and overwhelmed the few defenders still standing.[60] Among the 150–200 bodies strewn around the *cotta*, plus "quite a number … killed outside," they counted Laksamana Usap, lying under a bomb shelter amid the remains of women who had refused to leave.[61] Among themselves, the Americans counted two dead and five wounded.[62]

Instead of teaching Moros a lesson, as Leonard Wood predicted, the American slaughter of Tausug warriors first at Hassan's *cotta*, then at PangPang, and again at Cotta Usap enflamed Moro defiance. Up to January 1905, insurgents had stayed pretty much within the borders of Luuk District. After that time, it seemed, in the words of one Moro leader, "that the whole island … [was] on the point of rising."[63]

Governor Scott warned Gen. Wood that the situation was "changing for the worse." "There is a spirit and feeling among the Moros I have never seen before," he wrote, "bolder and more widespread, and you can do nothing with them among those hills of jungles without at least three battalions."[64] Not just Americans felt that spirit of defiance. So did Moros, such as Datus Joakanain and Kalbi, who had paid the *cedula*. They had done so "in good faith, expecting to be protected." Instead, they lived "in great danger of being killed and robbed, as their lives and property … [were] being threatened everywhere."[65]

The new spirit of opposition coalesced this time around a murderous bandit whose following brings to mind the Abu Sayyaf organization today. Like other hostile Tausug leaders, Pala claimed a connection with Panglima Hassan, in this case as "a strong sympathizer."[66] In December 1904, he and his men migrated to Sabah in British North Borneo, where they terrorized and then massacred some twenty-six Malays, including women and children. When the British went after him, Pala fled back to Jolo, where he sought refuge near Bud Talipao. He started construction of a *cotta* and began "preaching against … payment of the cedula." He attracted other disaffected Joloanos by decreeing jihad against the American infidels. More than Americans, however, he terrorized fellow Moros.[67]

Pala swore merciless vengeance against Moro "pigeaters" who collaborated with Americans by paying the *cedula*.[68] Governor Scott tried to mobilize his Moro allies to gather intelligence, isolate the bandit, and avoid a general conflagration, a tactic that did not impress either his boss, Gen. Wood, or the British, who demanded Pala's capture and extradition without further delay. He got little help even from the sultan, whose indifference sparked rumors of his complicity with Pala.[69] Not until late March 1905 did Scott send out a rapid attack force that surprised Pala in his *cotta* but came up empty-handed when their prey "ran out" the back and disappeared into the jungle.[70]

By April, Pala's uprising had become a reign of terror. Jolo town swelled with frightened refugees from the interior as reports circulated of armed bands kidnapping, killing, burning, and looting. One band attacked the plantation of Governor Scott's interpreters, the Schuck brothers, just a few miles outside Jolo's town walls, prompting fear of an impending attack on the town itself, where residents could hear gunfire every night.[71]

It took Gen. Wood a while to answer Scott's calls for help because Pala's uprising contradicted the optimistic reports Wood had been relaying about peaceful conditions reigning in Jolo.[72] Finally, he led a force of 726 troops to Jolo, bringing the island's garrison up to 1,260 regulars, Philippine Constabulary personnel, and Philippine Scouts.[73] They set out on May 1, 1905, and stayed out for twelve days in what became known as Wood's Third Jolo Expedition. They had marched only twelve miles when they came under fire as they filed past a "completely concealed" *cotta* commanded by Pala's ally Peruku Utig at Tambang Pass just north of Bud Dajo. The fortress

withstood a day of artillery bombardment. Then at daylight on May 3, Wood ordered an assault despite knowing that “a number of non-combatants” remained in the *cotta*. The defenders fought tenaciously, killing six Americans and wounding seventeen others, while losing some 100 themselves, including Peruku Utig and “a number of women.” According to Wood, “the women were armed and fighting among the men.” In particular, he noted the death of a woman “known as one of the most beautiful women in Jolo” and “the leading spirit in the uprising and … resistance.”[74] Another 200 Moros escaped and retreated to the top of Bud Dajo, where they began carving out a defensive position that ten months later would become the site of a horrendous slaughter.[75]

After burying their dead, Wood and Scott marched south to Bud Talipao, where Pala once again avoided their pursuit by abandoning his *cotta* and disappearing into the jungle. This time, however, constables tracked him down. On May 5, American forces assaulted and overran Pala and his warriors, killing him and some twenty-five others while sustaining losses of five killed and four wounded in ferocious hand-tohand combat.[76]

Pala’s death didn’t end the turmoil in Jolo, which continued in the island’s far eastern sector, in the swamps around Bud Talipao, and on the mountain top of Bud Dajo, among other places. When Gen. Wood left Jolo on May 13, 1905, he took credit for restoring peace and order. To the extent that order prevailed, however, it had to do more with Governor Scott’s exceptional efforts than with his commanding officer’s military campaign.

Governor Scott sought to defuse the tension in Jolo in two ways. First, he backed off on collecting the *cedula*. Second, he determined to become a *datu* among Joloano leaders.

Scott weighed the benefits of *cedula* enforcement against its drawbacks and concluded that forcibly extracting a registration fee from Moros amounted to bad policy both militarily and ethically. A long drought had withered crops across the Sulu Archipelago, leaving “many widows, orphans and grown men too weak or sick” to work. “If we permit a single Moro to die for want of food,” Scott contended, it would be “a blot on our civilization.” And yet even while Moros faced impending starvation, Americans had gone ahead and collected “10,000 pesos for Cedulas from this district.” The time had come to stop this, he argued, and to show Moros

that “this Government has other functions than to tax and fight.” Instead of extracting a peso each from adult males, American policy should be to assist Moros “in their extremity.” That would “bind them to us strongly in a way that nothing else will accomplish.” Moreover, that’s what “is done by every humane government in the world.”[77]

While forbearing to press the *cedula* issue helped reduce tension between Americans and Moros, working closely and respectfully with their headmen held promise of reducing cultural suspicions and animosities in the long term. That’s just what Governor Scott learned to do, spending more and more of his time and energy cultivating strong interpersonal relations with these proud and fearless Muslim men. By and large, he came to respect them, and they returned the favor, regarding him as a man of courage who had refused to abandon his responsibilities during months of recuperation from his terrible hand wounds sustained in November 1903. As they met with him repeatedly in 1904–1905, they also grew to like him, regularly calling him “our father” and in Hadji Butu’s case naming a child after him. Even more significantly, they accepted him as a fair judge within their own system of customary law. Again and again, they turned to him as a one-man court of appeals when unable to resolve conflicts among themselves. In numerous reports of his rulings, no mention is made of punishing a guilty party by sending him to jail.[78] The governor instead entered seamlessly into the local arbitration system by punishing or fining the culprit, as in the case of Hadja, who stole Salahuddin’s horse. “What did you steal that horse for?” queried Scott, to which Hadja responded, “I wanted it.” That answer, however honest, failed to impress the governor, who directed Salahuddin to punish the man as a thief and fined Hadja’s accomplice fifteen pesos.[79]

Despite Scott’s willingness to compromise on the *cedula* issue, it remained a sore point among many Moros. For those who refused to register and pay, Jolo’s many volcanic peaks offered refuge as huge, natural *cottas*, especially if their slopes and craters could be cultivated for food crops. Among those peaks, none provided more protection, abundant water, and open land than Bud Dajo as it loomed just southeast of Jolo town. Moros who escaped the assault on Peruka Utig’s *cotta* congregated there in growing numbers after May 3, 1905.[80] Scott persuaded his principal allies—Joakanain, Kalbi, and Indanan—to hike up the mountain and assure people that they would not be punished if they returned to their villages. They

succeeded partially, and most of the alienated families resettled in their lowland homes, leaving fewer than fifty on the mountain. But in November war gongs again sounded atop Bud Dajo as rumors spread that the Americans planned to attack and eliminate any holdouts. Again, Scott's Moro allies persuaded people to come down. By year's end, "only eight men remained on top of Bud Daho with their families … , and these were very peaceable and could be brought down one or two at a time if gently handled." Thinking that another crisis had been averted, Scott departed Jolo on January 1, 1906, for a leave of absence in the States. No sooner had he sailed away than disaffected Moros began congregating on Bud Dajo once again.[81]

So crucial had Governor Scott become to keeping the peace in Jolo that his departure in January 1906 must be considered a contributing factor to the tragedy on Bud Dajo that followed.[82] He might well have helped dissuade Moros who again began congregating there. Their principal complaint remained the hated *cedula*, which they all refused to pay.[83] In their minds, agreeing to this *jizya* (per capita tax) would signify not only an act of submission to an infidel government but also an act that would forever defile them, the equivalent of riding on a hog instead of a white horse bound for heaven as martyrs in defense of Islam.[84] Better to fight and die for Islam as communal *parrang sabbils* than to descend from Bud Dajo and compromise their religious beliefs.[85]

This single issue, however, does not explain why hundreds of women and children as well as men sought refuge on Bud Dajo, especially after Scott agreed to back off on enforcing the *cedula*. When asked, most cited fear as their reason for taking such drastic action: fear of the Americans, of their former *datus*, of thieves, of violence and lawlessness everywhere. All of these fears, whether justified or not, can be summarized as anxiety that their known world threatened to collapse around them. This fear of disintegration proved sufficiently pervasive to convince a growing number of Joloanos to leave the comforts of their lowland homes, trek up the mountain, and endure the hardships of eking out a bare existence in a crater.[86]

Still another fear influenced Bud Dajo refugees as well. Datu Adam expressed it when he told an interrogator that he dared not leave the mountain because "people on the other side of the hill … would take away

his property and his wife and children."[87] Thus did old factional animosities follow them to their place of refuge. Up on the mountain, refugees clustered with their factional allies and had little to do with other factions. The majority had been the *sakop* of brothers Joakanain and Kalbi. They had broken away from their leaders when those men joined the sultan in agreeing to pay the *cedula* and in requiring their followers to do the same. They joined Imam Harib on the mountain's east side or (with Maharajah Indanan's breakaway *sakop*) Imam Sanuddin on the west. A smaller group, led by Datu Adam (formerly loyal to the sultan and his major supporters) commanded the south side.[88] Finally, at least some remnants of the Luuk District warriors who had coalesced around Panglima Hassan and Laksamana Usap in 1903–1905 also joined one faction or another on the mountain.[89]

Once again, in early 1906 Governor Scott's allies, Datus Joakanain and Kalbi, hiked up the mountain to corral their breakaway followers back into the fold. Together with the *rajah mudah,* Maharajah Indanan, and Sawajaan, they repeatedly tried to cajole or bully their former *sakop* into submission. Joakanain even complained that his knees had gotten sore from climbing up and down the mountain so many times.[90] They eventually confessed that "these people were beyond them and … their control, [and] did not follow their advice nor obey their orders."[91] In fact, their former *sakop* effectively had no other place to go. They couldn't go back. As one of their leaders said, "We are afraid to stay down below."[92] From their point of view, "if they went below they would die, and if they stayed up on the hill they would die, so they might as well stay on the hill."[93]

They could only hope that the Americans would just leave them alone. But that could not be. Essentially, these fear-driven people sought refuge in a remote location away from all their troubles only to discover that those troubles would follow them and soon multiply beyond their worst nightmares.

Joloanos who had broken away from their traditional leaders did not suddenly become freedom-loving democrats. Rather, they sought new authority figures, turning more and more to religious leaders, Muslim clerics such as Imams Harib and Sanuddin, who welcomed them into their growing flock atop Bud Dajo.[94] Wood's direct-rule policies, however mediated by Scott, didn't drive people directly into the arms of anti-American imams, but as these policies broke down the old authority system, they eventually had

that effect. The Bud Dajo refugees may even have begun to regard themselves, in the words of Capt. James H. Reeves, as “patriots and semi-liberators of the Moro people.”[95]

Whether patriots or not, one Moro informant described them as “good and pious people … not known to have ever committed any crime,”[96] who fled to the mountain seeking escape from the lawlessness engulfing their homes in the lowlands.[97] Atop Bud Dajo, they stood accused of “harboring two robbers,” but “they have done no harm,” wrote an American.[98] Led by Muslim imams, they sought to construct a new order in the midst of a conflagration that was rapidly reducing their old order to ashes. There they faced the supreme irony of being attacked by Americans who had helped create the disorder from which they were trying to flee.

In yet another irony, Moro *datus* who had lost many of their *sakop* (such as Joakanain, Kalbi, and Indanan) proved only too happy to let American troops punish those disobedient underlings for them. What a good way to make an object lesson of these “troublesome subjects.”[99] Hadn’t they tried to break free of their authority figures, just as Leonard Wood had hoped? By surrounding and attacking them, the Americans would play right into the hands of the very same *datus* that Governor Wood had set out to undermine. In annihilating the socalled rebels, they would help uphold and fortify the old authority structure that had been Wood’s nemesis from the start.[100]

The great tragedy that became Bud Dajo began to unfold in January 1906. Over the next two months, armed bands from the mountain robbed and threatened Moros who had stayed in the lowlands.[101] Interim Jolo governor James H. Reeves concluded that such depredations would “continue nightly until we finish the job and these people are whipped.” Only then, he predicted, would “American authority … be accepted without any more opposition.”[102] Wood agreed and dispatched troops to Jolo. By the morning of March 5, some 752 enlisted men and officers (including 52 Moro and Filipino constables commanded by Capt. John White) had completely surrounded Bud Dajo.[103]

Americans estimated that “about 600” Moros occupied Bud Dajo’s crater, but that number increased as troops encircled the mountain.[104] “People could … be seen running in every direction toward the hill, yelling and shouting defiantly.”[105] Moro fighters had some 80–100 guns, a fraction of the American firepower, but much more than just bladed weapons.[106]

Defenders counted on natural as well as man-made obstacles to impede the American advance. Only three narrow trails offered access to the summit through the heavily wooded terrain. From the western, southern, and eastern sides of Bud Dajo's base, these trails climbed steeply to some 2,100 feet above sea level, and soldiers had to negotiate them single file. Not only Moros imperiled the soldiers, but also logs and boulders ready to be untethered and rolled down on them. Toward the top, each trail became so steep that troops had to crawl and pull themselves up by hand. Defenders had constructed entrenchments and parapets surrounded by deep pits and *abatis*. Two or three *lantakas* guarded each parapet, and loopholes for rifles enabled Moros to fire from cover. At the west trail's summit stood a "large cotta or citadel" that so impressed Col. Joseph W. Duncan, commanding officer of the attacking force, that he decided to concentrate his assault along the south and east approaches, ordering some of his troops at the western trailhead to serve as a "flying column" "reserve force."[107]

Despite these natural and hastily constructed impediments, Moros atop Bud Dajo had little chance against their American foe. With their red war flags and banners silhouetted against the sky, they shouted defiantly and taunted their attackers. But they were outgunned—especially in artillery and machine guns—and they lacked the modern military training necessary for an effective defense. Still another weakness vitiated their defensive preparations: between their three separate contingents, they lacked unity. Datu Adam and his men defended the southern approach, Imam Harib the east, and Imam Sanuddin the west, each operating independently from the others. Recognizing an opportunity to divide and conquer, Interim Governor Reeves tried to coax Datu Adam into betraying the imams by secretly permitting troops to advance up the south trail until they could outflank Moros entrenched along the crater's west and east sides. The plot almost worked, but Adam sensed a double cross and backed out at the last moment. Attacking troops would "cut his head off anyhow," he mused, so he might as well stand up and fight.[108]

As it happened, beginning on March 5, Duncan's forces followed the same divide-and-conquer strategy anyway. Greatly aided by artillery and led by their contingent of Moro and Filipino constables, they climbed and crawled up the south trail to within 300 yards of Datu Adam's men before stopping, exhausted, to bivouac for the night. Although artillery fire also

harassed Imam Harib's defenses on the east, it should have been clear to Bud Dajo's leaders that their main threat came from the south. Instead of reinforcing Adam's beleaguered defenders, however, Harib and Sanuddin spent the night buttressing their own lines, leaving Adam alone to withstand next morning's renewed assault on his strategically crucial position between them.[109]

The assault began with an artillery barrage at 7:15 a.m., March 6.[110] As shrapnel rained down on defenders, troops and constables attacked from all three directions. They met unexpectedly tough resistance, so that no one reached Bud Dajo's summit by day's end. Nevertheless, they succeeded in tightening the noose. As night fell on the battleground, Moro defenders stubbornly held their ground despite sustaining untold numbers of casualties, while their attackers stood poised to assault them the next morning.[111]

The planned simultaneous attack never occurred. On the west side, American troops advanced to within 100 yards of the crest, but they obeyed orders to halt for fear that their continued advance would expose them to friendly fire from the south and east rims. That left the reinforced constabulary on Bud Dajo's south side, together with troops on the east, to lead the charge. But the east side flinched. Complaining that "it is dangerous, as we were up there in position yesterday and they are prepared for us," the officer in charge delayed his advance until 1:00 p.m., finally advancing only when he received a stinging rebuke from Col. Duncan. Without support from either west or east, the south-side troops under Maj. Omar Bundy and the constabulary under Capt. White had to carry the load alone. They did just that in the early morning under cover of their mountain gun. Had Datu Adam received reinforcements from either Sanuddin or Harib, he might have stopped the uncoordinated American assault. He put up a stout defense, firing from *cotta* walls and rifle pits across steep and open ground, killing seven and wounding forty-four, including Capt. White.[112] Stunned by the withering fire and their heavy losses, the attacking force wavered but then charged up the last few yards. When they reached the crest, they brought up their Colt machine gun and leveled "a deadly fire upon the retreating Moros," killing an estimated 150.[113]

When troops and constabulary forces took control of the south rim, Datu Adam's faction ceased to exist. Their annihilation also meant that the attackers could train their weapons directly on Sanuddin's fortress to the

west and Harib's tranches to the east. In particular, they enfiladed the trenches, and "in ten minutes all the Moros in the trenches were killed." Throughout the afternoon, the soldiers' shelling of the fortress caused "great loss to the enemy." With this kind of flanking support, the troops finally overran Harib's eastern defenses. "The Moros … [offered] a desperate resistence [*sic*] with rifles, spears and bolos, killing and wounding many of our men, but … [they were] shot down in their tracks with terrible slaughter so that their cotta and lip of the crater were soon piled up with dead, several bodies deep." The Americans chased retreating Moros down into the crater, burning "shacks" and killing "all Moros who might be alive there." They accomplished their work "thoroughly," and Capt. Henry Lawton counted 400 dead just in the *cotta* and along the eastern rim.[114]

When night fell on March 7, the battle of Bud Dajo should have been over. At least 550 of the Moro defenders had been lost, including Datu Adam and Imam Harib. The Moros had ceded control of the crater's south and east sides, and they had lost any place to hide, except in Imam Sanuddin's fortress, which was now exposed from the east, south, and west. But the fighting did not end that evening. Completely outgunned and outflanked, the remaining Moros nevertheless refused to surrender. It took yet another half-day to complete the slaughter, as Sanuddin and his men fought virtually to the last man. When his *cotta* finally fell on March 8, troops "found a mass of [sixty-seven] bodies piled up." Amid the smoking ruins and mangled corpses, "no living Moro was found." The victorious soldiers "destroyed all of the [remaining] houses and burned about 450 bushels of rice." The battle of Bud Dajo had ended at last.[115]

Maj. Bundy reported that "about 1,000 Moros had been living in the crater, and … of this number, nearly all were killed." No official estimate ever confirmed this number. Over the years, historians have come to accept a body count of from 600 to 900, against American and Moro constabulary losses of 21 dead and 73 wounded. In the report on which this account is based, 150 died on the south rim, 400 on the east, and 91 in the west-rim fortress, making for a total of 641. But these figures do not include Moros killed during the advance against Sanuddin on March 6 and 7. More significantly, they don't include those slaughtered on March 7 and 8 down deep in the crater when troops burned all the houses located there. Very likely, many women and children lost their lives while hiding in those

houses.[116] Although we will never know for certain just how many Moros died on Bud Dajo, a final count of at least 700 and possibly as high as 900 seems justified.[117]

During the forenoon, while the firing gradually abated, Leonard Wood and his aides climbed up to the crest of Bud Dajo. Wood had not been present in the battle's early stages. He had arrived with his successor, Tasker Bliss, on March 7, in time to take over command of the final push but not to exert his influence in favor of any negotiations aimed at ending the slaughter entirely. In retrospect, he had underestimated the courage and determination of the Moros atop Bud Dajo. "I do not think the affair will be serious," he had written just four days before the battle, at which point he did not even plan to take charge "unless there is something more serious than the present outlook."[118] So it happened that he remained on the sidelines for much of an event that did more to damage his career than any other.[119]

An American later remembered seeing, at the height of fighting between Datu Adam's defenders and Capt. John White's constables, Adam jump over the breastworks "with a little baby under one arm and a *kris*" in the other. Both he and his infant died in a hail of gunfire.[120] They represented just two of some 2,350–3,000 Tausug Moros killed by American troops and constabulary forces under Gen. Leonard Wood's command between 1903 and 1906. Considering that only 45,000 Moros lived on Jolo Island, the U.S. military had thus eliminated between 5.2 and 6.6 percent of the population. By comparison, the 620,000 men killed in the American Civil War represented approximately 2 percent of Americans in 1860. As Drew Gilpin Faust has vividly demonstrated, those deaths touched virtually every American family.[121] Joloano losses tripled that percentage, and they had suffered the deaths of another 10 percent of their people in the terrible cholera epidemic in 1902. It must also be noted that body counts of Moros killed in action did not include deaths in Pala's reign of terror and the untold numbers of people who died in Moro-on-Moro violence that swept Jolo in 1904–1906 as the old *datu* order weakened in the face of Wood's efforts to undermine it.[122] And those who escaped death still faced the likelihood of displacement and hardship amid the chaos. Refugees on Bud Dajo served as reminders of how badly that order had ceased to work, for they would never have fled there except to escape the violence that had denied them any safe place to call home.

Like many Jolo battles that had preceded it, Bud Dajo should never have happened.[123] That it did testifies to Gen. Wood's failed direct-rule policies and especially to his imposition of the *cedula*. Despite the spreading anti-Americanism that those policies fueled, Bud Dajo could still have been avoided had it not been for a number of other circumstances, including Governor Scott's leave of absence in January. More generally, it resulted from American inexperience, racial prejudice, contempt for Tausug leadership, and scorn for Tausug society. In the fetid smoke and stink of decaying bodies on Bud Dajo, American–Moro relations reached their nadir.[124] Those relations improved in the years that followed, but they remained deeply scarred by what turned out to be the greatest slaughter of the entire Philippine-American War.

7

Learning to Live with Accommodation

Between 1906 and 1909, both Americans and Moros began practicing the art of accommodation. Facing outrage over Bud Dajo from their home-front press, Americans curtailed their military offensive and searched for common ground. Moros, in the meantime, faced the disintegration of their political order and real possibility that chaos and terror would spread "like the cholera" across all of Jolo Island.[1] They signaled a willingness to shift from "state evading" to "state conforming" as their modus operandi in dealing with Americans.[2] Battlefield defeats also played a role in this shift. As they assessed American strengths and weaknesses, however, they realized that a measure of political power could be preserved if shared. With their proud history of resisting foreign aggression, Moros never felt comfortable collaborating openly with their American overlords. Over time, however, more and more of them grew adept at gaming the colonial system for their own benefit.

Accommodation as a strategy held a number of advantages for all players. Moros by 1906 had discovered how the American military, for all of its menace, could be useful against potentially more treacherous foes. Compared to Filipino nationalists, who opposed any form of Moro autonomy, the American army offered at least temporary protection, as it did from wealthy American entrepreneurs who wanted to annex Mindanao and turn it into plantations. Meanwhile, American military officers began to acknowledge a certain common cause with Moros; both wanted to be left alone. Together, these strange bedfellows could ward off the encroachment of Filipino irredentists on the one hand and American planters on the other. Because both of those potential foes threatened the very existence of Moro Province—Filipino nationalists by promoting the migration of land-hungry Filipinos into Muslim Mindanao and American businessmen by slicing up the province into plantations—it made sense to find common cause.

In addition to their common enemies, American military personnel and Moro *datus* discovered other shared interests. Peace and order represented one of them, with obvious advantages for both sides. As American commanders backed away from Leonard Wood's contentious direct-rule policy, Moro leaders reciprocated and tried to curb outright opposition. Americans substituted small-unit constabulary engagements for big army maneuvers, while Moros avoided overt resistance except for sporadic hit-and-run strikes. This change in tactics followed logically from another shift in American policy. Whereas Wood had intentionally set out to undermine the *datu* system, which he associated with slavery, Americans after 1906 accommodated to the *datu* structure, even permitting chiefs once again to arbitrate disputes. Unthreatened *datus* responded by becoming unthreatening cooperators.

Once the peace-and-order situation had improved, accommodation took many forms. Americans promoted commerce by setting up Moro Exchanges, and Moros willingly bought and sold their produce at these trading outlets. Americans bankrolled infrastructure improvements, and Moros signed on to build the new roads and bridges in exchange for payment in cash. Americans tolerated *datu* arbitration of disputes, and Moros grew accustomed to utilizing the tribal ward judicial system as a court of appeals. Americans initiated public-health improvements that Moros welcomed. And Americans hired teachers and opened schools that Moro children very hesitantly began to attend.

Over time, Americans and Moros just grew more accustomed to each other. To be sure, the colonizers continued to orientalize and exoticize their subjects, and the latter persisted in regarding all American reform initiatives as potential threats to Islam. Americans didn't help their reform efforts by constantly sliding back and forth along an axis that prioritized cooperating with local leaders on one end and bullying those leaders into accepting progressive changes on the other. They sincerely wanted to build friendly relations with Moros, but they also desired to "civilize" these "poor and ignorant savages." The American military mission itself remained torn between two purposes: pacification and modernization. As everyone knew, the quickest way to pacify people called for working with their leaders and otherwise leaving them alone. The quickest way to offend them and spark revolt was to insist on changing their customs and way of life. Although

Leonard Wood and his allies emphasized modernization, and Jack Pershing and his mentors prioritized pacification, both found themselves negotiating their way along that axis like squirrels on a high wire.

In all the negotiating that went on between Americans and Moros in 1906–1909, the latter discovered and exploited a chink in the former's armor. American military officers didn't stick around for long. Just as someone like Hugh Scott started to learn the system and become really good at playing one Moro leader off against another, the army reassigned him elsewhere. Hardly any officer stayed for longer than three years. And when the veterans said good-bye, their replacements arrived with few of the tools needed for successfully negotiating the treacherous space between being an effective change agent and being a fellow *datu*. In that space, Moros discovered lots of room for maneuver.

In 1913, as the U.S. Army prepared to hand over governance of Moro Province to American civilians, the most learned non-Muslim student of Moro history and culture wrote a pamphlet on how those civilians should deal with "the Moro Problem." Najeeb Saleeby had been superintendent of schools during Leonard Wood's tenure. Born into a Lebanese Christian family, he had studied medicine at what later became American University in Beirut and then joined the U.S. Army as a contract surgeon (like Wood). He mustered out in Zamboanga, where his ability to read Arabic uniquely qualified him (among outsiders) to learn about Moro history. In 1905, he published a scholarly analysis of local culture titled *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, and he followed it with *The History of Sulu* three years later.[3] "Daunted and worn out," he wrote, the Moros "lie at present prostrate and inactive." But don't be fooled, he warned, for "their hearts and souls remain unreconciled." "Though it be easy to defeat them in battle, it is a completely different proposition to occupy their land and colonize their country."[4]

Few American military leaders after Gen. Wood's departure disagreed with that assessment. Indeed, Saleeby's pamphlet represents the single best exposition of American military policy in Moro Province during the years of accommodation. First of all, he advised Americans not to think of Moros as just a bunch of Filipinos worshipping in mosques. They had a long history of defiantly resisting foreign aggression. When Americans stumbled into

Zamboanga in 1899, they discovered a populace as proud of their separate history as of their religion, culture, and economy. True, the Moros lacked unity and a single strong leader as sultan, but they held fiercely to a warrior tradition tempered by centuries of fighting against Spanish crusaders and their Filipino converts. Capt. Pershing, Gen. Wood, and other American military leaders had severely compromised that warrior tradition, to be sure. Perhaps even more significantly, Wood had undermined the foundation of Moro political organization, especially in Sulu, by weakening the *datu*ship as an institution and humiliating many individual *datus*. He had left Sulu in "a pitiful state of political disunion." Did Americans want to perpetuate disorder in Moroland? Of course not. "Time to try something else."[5]

Saleeby offered a simple recipe for solving "the Moro Problem": return to a policy of respecting *datus*, working with them as intermediaries, and turning them into "our best agent[s] for governing" the people. Instead of threatening *datus* for being antidemocratic feudal lords, cultivate their friendship and emphasize mutual interests. "Assure the datu of his position and dignity and he will be your obedient servant and faithful assistant." "He should be treated and respected in a manner that makes him … feel that he is a part of the government…. Here lies the whole secret of success in the administration of Moro affairs." Do this, Saleeby concluded with lofty optimism, "and the questions of slavery, nobility, equality of rights, building public works, constructing public roads, maintaining police force[s], establishing schools, securing labor, and acquiring homesteads, all can be solved and dispensed with in a very short while."[6]

Like his American military peers, Saleeby believed in a "natural law of growth and development." According to this law, Moros would be "moved by a natural tendency to imitate superior civilization," so that they would "unconsciously reform … [their] customs and home life and gradually acquire American ideas and new ambitions." Americans need only exercise patience. "An enlightened Moro community, wisely guided by efficient American officials, would undoubtedly work out its own destiny," gradually rising "in wealth and culture to the level of a democratic municipality."[7]

Saleeby's unconscious paternalism reflected the racial and cultural prejudices of his time. Also, his assumption that all civilizations evolve along the same path from primitive to modern (i.e., Western) smacked of historicism and pure naïveté.[8] However, the underlying notion of his policy

recommendation—that Americans should respect Moro leaders—derived from his experience of working with Moros, and it demonstrated a degree of enlightenment that transcended his times. Not every American military official shared his positive view of Moro leadership. Many, in fact, continued to scorn local leaders, especially the sultans, as figures of ridicule. Nevertheless, American policy in the post-Wood years shifted in Saleeby's direction. For example, school superintendent Charles Cameron argued that "our manner of dealing with the Moros—especially the Jolo Moros—is wrong in principle." Instead of discrediting "native rulers," instead of "undermining … the native Sultan and Datus," he said, we should be respecting and even sustaining them. After all, thanks to the constant turnover of American personnel, we have provided nothing to take their place, with the result that the situation in Jolo had declined into "a species of anarchy."[9] Indeed, the time had come to try a new policy.

Accordingly, Americans and Moros learned, very haltingly and gradually, to live with accommodation. They reached an unspoken and ill-defined modus vivendi. Nobody sat down and diagramed this new manner of treating each other, but such a diagram might have looked like this: above a line dividing Progressive from traditional ways of living, Americans would be welcome to initiate new policies; below that line they would stay out, with one exception. Above the line, Progressive economic and infrastructural reforms would be tolerated, including initiatives aimed at commercial progress, agricultural expansion, and improvements in roads, bridges, and public health. Below the line, social, religious, and political structures would mainly be left unchallenged; *datus* would retain their judicial and political authority, women their second-class status, and Islamic religious leaders their social rank. Americans would not be compelled to sanctify inequality; slavery, after all, had been outlawed at Gen. Wood's insistence, and although many Moros continued to languish in indentured servitude, they could not be bought and sold in the marketplace. But American reforms would not include the hierarchy-threatening imposition of universal manhood suffrage. Nor would Americans push guaranteed First Amendment rights, representative government, or separation of church and state. In Joel Migdal's terminology, colonial officials would preside over a "weak state"/"strong (traditional) society" bifurcation.[10] Moros would go along with a variety of economic, commercial, and infrastructural changes. In return,

Americans would refrain from interfering in Moro social, religious, and political ways of life, except for ending the open practice of slavery. They would leave it to the gradual spread of public-school education to effect change in these below-the-line practices.

Americans and Moros did not immediately adopt such an indirectrule philosophy after Leonard Wood's departure. Tasker Bliss had no intention of openly reversing his predecessor's direct-rule policies, and Wood, as commander of the Department of the Philippines, had no intention of letting him do that anyway. In point of fact, neither Bliss nor Sultan ul-Kiram II of Sulu and his advisers knew exactly what to do in 1906. As they contemplated the decaying corpses on Bud Dajo, however, they did know one thing for certain—they didn't want any more of that horror. Some form of accommodation seemed worth trying. And yet Americans continued to belittle Moros as savage slavers and polygamists utterly devoid of democratic virtues, while Moros despised Americans for their wanton slaughter of Muslim innocents. Under these circumstances, real cooperation seemed as unlikely as real friendship.

Where genuine cooperation remained elusive, the pretense of common purpose proved useful. It served both sides' interests to shadow box, to feign friendship while rarely inviting the other into one's home, and to act chummy even while consumed by mutual distaste. How did this drama-drama benefit each side? For Moros, it meant a little respite from overbearing American reformers. For American occupiers, it meant a reprieve from hostile home-front criticism aimed at their brutality. Moros got a taste of what they had always wanted—to be left alone. Americans could turn a blind eye to antidemocratic and patriarchal Moro practices, emphasizing instead their countable successes—new roads and health clinics as well as increasing cash-crop exports and customs receipts. In the one case, Moro leaders consolidated their power under their conquerors' noses; in the other case, Americans touted their amazing achievements. Both sides may not have learned a great deal from each other, but they did learn metaphorically how not to step on each other's toes while they danced.

10. Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram II with prominent leaders, date unknown: Hadji Butu (*seated second from left*), the sultan (*seated center*), Datu Mandi (*standing center*). Box 7/11, RG350-P, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

In accommodating to American power holders without losing touch with their sense of a separate and proud heritage, Moros navigated along their own axis between genuine cooperation on one end and pure opportunism on the other. No Moro demonstrated more willingness to work closely with Americans and none proved more skillful in doing so than the Sulu sultan's principal adviser, Hadji Butu. Having taken the *hadj* twice, once with the sultan, Butu impressed everyone as a devout Muslim with a deep and unshakeable faith in Allah. Thanks to annual trips to Singapore (again with the sultan), he understood that modern technology and Western democracy did not necessarily pose a threat to his faith. He became an exponent of modern reform Islam, and he counseled the sultan accordingly. Sulu governor Scott described Butu as "the wisest and farthest seeing of all the Moros in this archipelago, and the most learned and progressive."[11]

Hadji Butu deferred to powerful Americans such as Bliss and Scott while carefully encouraging their new inclination to rule indirectly through Moro leaders. He assured Americans that Moros had "become accustomed" to the antislavery law and asserted that "nine-tenths of the [Moros'] bad habits … [had] gone." Both figuratively and literally, given Scott's capacious girth, the governor appeared to Butu "like a big elephant, and I a goat…. I walk behind the Governor, and I think I am the son of a big elephant." Even when Scott returned to the United States, concluded Butu, he would "still [be] our father."[12]

Other Moro leaders gravitated toward the opposite end of the accommodation axis. They did not share Hadji Butu's optimism about the future of Moro society under American rule. But they spied an opportunity to consolidate their power by collaborating. For a time, Maharajah Indanan of Jolo proved especially opportunistic in using the Americans to his own advantage. First, they had tracked down and killed his factional rival, Panglima Hassan. Then they had trapped and slaughtered rebels from his Parang ward who had dared to thumb their noses at his authority and flee to Bud Dajo. To the extent that Americans displayed a readiness to share power with *datus*, what more could he ask?[13]

Like Indanan, Datus Joakanain and Kalbi willingly cooperated, although they sulked about their runaway slaves who had received protection from Americans.[14] They, too, had consolidated their power thanks to Gen. Wood's violent winnowing of their local dissenters on Bud Dajo. Instead of losing prestige as a result of the American takeover, these men, together with the sultan, had wised up to the fact that America's military presence could be a windfall for Moros savvy enough to take advantage of it.

With Indanan, Joakanain, and Kalbi on one end of the accommodation spectrum and Hadji Butu on the other end, Moro leaders came together on June 11, 1907, for an extraordinary meeting at Hadji Butu's house. Other attendees included the sultan, two other *panglimas*, and interpreters Charles and Julius Schuck. Opening the meeting, Sultan Kiram urged participants to "co-operate with the Governor of Jolo to find a way to put peace and order in … Sulu." The governor, he argued, "cannot do very much" without "the aid and co-operation of the Headmen and deputies." He should receive that cooperation, because in other Muslim countries "governed by the white people, conditions are nice and peaceful." "Let us … do the same," he concluded, and, anyway, "the time has now come when we must abandon our old savage ways and follow … the civilized people."[15]

That opening sparked a discussion of how best to aid the governor. Indanan began with the astounding recommendation that to "follow the white people's ways we must first … rid the Moros of the[ir] guns, [and] then [their] barongs [cutting weapons]." He called such weapons "the source of all evil." But "no one will give up their guns," objected Datu Joakanain. To this comment, Datu Kalbi answered that "disarming is a good idea, which will sound very pleasant in the ears of the Americans, but we must proceed gradually." "All the Moros … [must] help each other and stop all enmities," added Hadji Butu. The assembled *datus* agreed "to stop all hostilities and become friends" and to pressure outlier wards such as Luuk and Tandu to join them in returning all stolen cattle. They did not, however, act on Charles Schuck's suggestion that they organize a "wandering police force" comprising five men each from six wards.[16] Clearly, old factional identities and suspicions had not disappeared. Nevertheless, Tausug leaders in 1907 did seem ready to join in discussing island-wide problems and solutions and to accept a degree of commonality between their interests and those of their American military occupiers.

Did Moro leaders in Cotabato and Lanao also seek to find common ground with Americans in the years after Leonard Wood's departure? Datu Piang, who prospered as America's best friend among the Maguindanao, certainly did. And Lanao sultans of the north shore Bayabao network gladly participated in the burgeoning trade between Marawi and Iligan. Across all of Moro Province, memories of heroic insurgents such as Hassan, Ali, and the Taraca sultans began to fade. In Sulu, Cotabato, and Lanao, not to mention Davao and Zamboanga, accommodationists gained ground, while inveterate anti-American oppositionists became more scattered and unorganized.

On the American side, the newly evolving indirect-rule policy gained momentum thanks to its implementation by Brig. Gen. Tasker Bliss.[17] Bliss favored the new policy in part because it suited his personality. Unlike his predecessor, he had little inclination to promote his career via heroic military exploits. He had graduated eighth in his West Point class in 1875, where he had earned a reputation for erudition as a student of ancient Western civilization. Whereas Wood, Scott, and Pershing had gone off to fight on the frontier, Bliss took a position teaching French and artillery tactics at the Point. His expertise in European military strategy led to promotion as instructor of military science at the Naval War College and then as military attaché to Spain. When the Spanish-American War began, Bliss demonstrated his talents not just as a scholar and diplomat but also as an administrator. Leonard Wood, acting as governor of Cuba, appointed him chief of the Cuban Customs Service. Bliss transformed that den of thieves into a legitimate government agency, a feat that impressed Secretary of War Elihu Root, who brought him back to Washington to help reorganize the army. After winning promotion to the rank of brigadier general, he helped found and then became the first commandant of the Army War College. By the time of his assignment to Moro Province, Bliss had emerged as one of the army's bright young Progressive leaders, just like Wood and Pershing. But his route to success had entailed no fighting. Rather, he had carved out a reputation as a modern, Progressive, and reform-oriented administrator. He could be expected to enhance that reputation not by battling Moros, but by managing them while also trying to cajole, supervise, and educate them in the ways of Western governance.[18]

When Bliss took over as governor of Moro Province, he tried at first simply to please Leonard Wood. As Bliss's predecessor, Wood had strong convictions about how to deal with Moros, and as commander of the Philippine Division, he had the power to make Bliss's life miserable. So Bliss chose not to make waves. Slowly but surely, however, he made changes. He didn't make an issue of debt servitude. He didn't push secular education on wary Moro leaders. And he set aside Wood's policy of sending out big army expeditions to march through potentially rebellious Moro settlements. By 1908, he had quietly carved out a whole new indirect way of governing that utterly repudiated his predecessor's direct-rule policies.

Understanding that advancing Moro Province's domestic tranquility would also strengthen it against external threats, Bliss made peace and order his first priority. His strategy came to have three prongs: (1) train and deploy highly maneuverable Philippine Constabulary units (including Moros) in keeping the peace; (2) rebuild the traditional Moro structure of justice based on *datu* arbitration for all but capital offenses, while also encouraging litigants to utilize the Tribal Ward Court system for appeals; and (3) protect Moro Province from potentially destabilizing outside forces. Given the fact that at least some Moros had sworn jihad against Americans, it may come as a surprise to discover that in all three of these strategic dimensions Bliss enjoyed strong Moro support and cooperation.

In countering Moro insurgents, Bliss depended on the Philippine Constabulary, arguing that its constables operated much more effectively in keeping the peace than regular army troops. "These men," he wrote, "speak the language of the natives, establish friendly relations with them, and easily pick up information that no one else can acquire." By comparison, "regular troops can accomplish nothing in this sort of work.… The outlaws scatter at their approach while their mere coming excites fear and suspicion in the minds of friendly Moros.… When there is a state of war, the troops can restore peace; but to send columns of troops … among people like these, when the condition is one of general peace, is wanton provocation of war."[19]

Capt. John White had helped Col. James G. Harbord launch the Philippine Constabulary in Mindanao and Sulu on September 1, 1903. They immediately began recruiting and training Moros as well as non-Muslim Filipinos into the force, and by early 1904 their organization numbered 17 American officers and 353 enlisted men, one-third of them Moros. Arming

and training Moros crossed a line for some Americans, who regarded it as a dangerous and foolhardy experiment. “Would they, the fiercest fighting men of the Malay race, be loyal and dependable? Or would they revolt and desert to the hills with their prized firearms?” As a subplot to the larger Philippine Constabulary story, one of its principal chroniclers, Lt. Col. Harold Elarth, commended “these savage Malays,” who did “by and large” prove to be “loyal and faithful soldiers.” Not only did they fight well, but they also often fought heroically, with a number of constabulary units suffering near annihilation in battle. In dozens of police actions, they bore the brunt of Moro armed resistance to American pacification efforts in the Bliss years. And in doing so, “there is no record of any slaughter of the enemy by an overwhelming force of Constabulary.”[20]

A reading of Tasker Bliss’s annual reports leaves the impression that 1906 inaugurated a time of tranquility in Moro Province, with outbreaks of violence just exceptions to the rule. Indeed, his biographer calls him a “peacemaker.”[21] Not everyone, however, agreed with Bliss’s assessment. Constabulary and army accounts by Harold Elarth, Vic Hurley, John White, George Coats, and Cornelius Smith describe a very different state of affairs —that their heroic officers and enlisted men faced endless campaigning against fanatical and indefatigable Muslim guerrillas.[22]

In point of fact, Moros never completely ceased their armed opposition to American occupation, even though they did not necessarily express this hostility in organized resistance. Throughout this period and for years to follow, they resisted American control in dozens of individual or smallunit engagements. In his governor’s report for 1907, Bliss cited examples of ongoing hostility that included a letter from Uti, “Lion of God,” warning, “Do not come in the night, pigs. If you do I will crush you. Come in the daytime so that the Moros can see the dead Americans.”[23]

Although some Moros such as Uti undoubtedly viewed the world as inextricably divided between Muslims and nonbelievers, most fought not as religious warriors, but as local “accidental guerrillas” who objected to Americans “intruding into their space.”[24] Bliss understood that leaving them alone, where possible, would take the edge off their hostility. It would not, however, end their opposition, thanks to the nature of Moro factional divisions, which always ensured that one group would turn anti-American the minute that its age-old factional rival allied with Bliss. His friends today

might turn into his enemies tomorrow, but the factional alignment stayed the same. For Bliss the peacemaker, this factionalism posed a never-ending problem. But it also meant that Moros showed "little or no disposition to unite."[25]

Pacification of Moro Province in the period 1906–1909 thus entailed numerous operations against lawless elements but few against organized anti-American insurgents. The Philippine Constabulary stayed busy; the U.S. Army languished in relative disuse. That said, small-unit police actions could be very nasty and violent. Depicting a "great, unpacified jungle, filled with small roving bands of malcontent Moros," Victor Hurley describes a number of utterly ferocious and often murderous hit-and-run battles with guerrillas.[26]

None of these encounters received more attention than the murder of Davao District's young governor Lt. Edward C. Bolton on June 6, 1906. Although a spectacular case of anti-American animus, it cannot be categorized as anything like organized resistance to American rule.

Investigation into the murder revealed that the perpetrator, a *datu* named Mungalayon, had served as tribal ward headman among the non-Muslim Tagacaolo upland minority in western Davao District. Bolton, described as a "man of rare genius" in working with the Tagacaolo and other tribal minorities (*lumads*) such as the Bagobo, Mandaya, and Manobo, had replaced Mungalayon as headman with an American planter.[27] Demoted to assistant, Mungalayon had motive for exacting revenge. When Bolton hiked, unprotected by constables or troops, into western Davao to conciliate between Tagacaolo tribesmen and American planters there, Mungalayon took advantage of the opportunity and hacked him to death as he slept.[28]

On the surface, Mungalayon (who was tracked down and killed some two months later) murdered Bolton because of personal feelings against the governor, whom he blamed for losing his influence among Tagacaolos. He even boasted: "Now that I have killed the American Governor, I am a man again."[29] Deeper currents of grievance, however, lurked beneath the surface.

Bolton, like Bliss, Wood, and other colonials, had pressured *lumads* such as the Tagacaolo to leave their remote forest settlements and settle in lowland villages, where they could engage in plow agriculture and taste the fruits of American governance. Relocated tribal minorities also provided much-needed labor for American abaca planters. As a rough assortment of

“former soldiers and men with hidden pasts,” however, these planters rankled *lumads* as land grabbers intent on carving up unsurveyed tribal lands into plantations and then exploiting uneducated minorities as hired hands.[30] It didn’t help matters that those planters counted among their number Governor Bolton himself, who betrayed a blatant conflict of interest when he appointed other planters instead of *lumads* as headmen.[31]

When Mungalayon accused Bolton of favoring planters against Tagacaolo laborers, he knew that many of those *lumads* shared his simmering anger. Joining him in a millenarian movement promising abundant crops and invulnerability to bullets, they participated in rituals including a dance and chant by which initiates communicated with a higher being called “Labi.”[32] Two Moros, motivated more by profit (in selling charms to believers) than religion, helped spread this movement. According to them, American soldiers “had gone away,” leaving “natives … to unite and kill all the American planters and officials and all the Filipinos,” after which participants would “set up their own government with a Moro king,” who would rule under the protection of the highest being.[33]

Thus, Mungalayon didn’t act alone when he killed Bolton, but neither did he fancy himself as leading an organized anti-American resistance. He knew that he could count on the approval of many tribal minorities, but he also knew that local issues and beliefs rather than anti-American jihad motivated these *lumads*. One wonders if Bliss, intent on pacifying Moros (not *lumads*), saw the irony in Mungalayon’s lurid act of violence: it was committed by a believer in religious ideas and practices (i.e., the ritual dance and prayers to “Labi”) that horrified most Muslims every bit as much as they appalled Americans.[34]

Like Moros in Davao, those in Cotabato remained relatively restrained in their anti-American agitation between 1906 and 1909. To be sure, constabulary troops stayed busy tracking down outlaws, arbitrating factional disputes, negotiating between Moros and *lumads,* and generally reminding residents that there could be no escaping the law. The most serious uprising came in the Buldun Valley, where it took two years (1906–1908) to impose order.[35] However, the resistance that coalesced around Sultan Pandapatan remained localized, and it never posed a serious threat to American control over Cotabato.

Meanwhile, on Basilan Island in Zamboanga District, conditions of peace and order had declined as Moros robbed Yakans and vice versa, pirates terrorized inhabitants, and a Muslim *pandita* began to turn some of the unrest into an incipient anti-American revolt. Bliss, for one of the few times during his tenure as governor, organized a fullscale army expedition, some 300 strong, and invaded the island. He put Zamboanga District governor John Finley in charge and then regretted his decision when Finley alienated local residents by burning villages suspected of harboring outlaws. Faced with the possibility of stoking a full-scale rebellion, Bliss halted the expedition and replaced army troops with Philippine Scouts and constables stationed strategically in six towns. By 1909, the turbulence on Basilan had quieted, and Governor Bliss had convinced himself once and for all that big Leonard Wood–style army expeditions caused more harm than good.[36]

Much closer to actually being a case of sustained anti-American insurgency, resistance in eastern Lanao District occupied the attention of both constabulary and army forces between 1906 and 1909. We have already seen how Uti, "Lion of God," railed against American "pigs" from his *cotta* near Taraca. He and others allied with Ampuan Agaus, the insurgent leader who had escaped Pershing in 1903 and who mobilized some 300 men with seventy-four firearms in opposing American sovereignty.[37]

Constabulary operations against these insurgents began in March 1907 and continued almost weekly for more than a year, some forty actions in all.[38] Ampuan Agaus hit back with surprise attacks, nearly overrunning a constabulary detachment at Dansalan in January 1908 when eighty Moros with fifty guns carried out a night raid. Another *datu* ambushed and seriously wounded Lanao's governor, Allen Gard, in February. Constabulary counterattacks in March and April 1908 decimated the attackers and forced Agaus to retreat. Mixed constabulary and army patrols kept him on the run, and in June they killed thirty-three of his men in one bloody engagement and twenty-four more in another. But they never captured the famous rebel, and in their campaign against him they suffered casualties as high as 50 percent in one constabulary unit.[39] Bliss felt compelled to call for reinforcements from more pacified parts of the northern Philippines.[40] And he had to admit that Ampuan Agaus could never have succeeded in eluding his forces without widespread popular support from Moro noncombatants all across eastern Lanao.

Where Lanao's insurgents took to the forests and mountains when pursued, Moro raiders in Sulu vanished into the uncharted expanses of the Sulu Sea. These "pirates" (as Americans never failed to label them) terrified Moro coastal communities while also thumbing their noses at American authorities. None of them proved more elusive and threatening than a man called Jikiri.

"With the possible exception of … Datu Ali of Cotabato," wrote one American chronicler, "Jikiri was the ablest [Moro] war leader."[41] He turned to piracy when American and Japanese competitors, colluding with the Sulu sultan and Chinese merchants, cut him out of the immensely profitable pearl-fishing and trading industry.[42] As a Samal, he conducted raids that also bore the markings of ethnic (rather than purely antiforeign) animus as he terrorized Jolo's Tausug population beginning in 1907. And he targeted Chinese, robbing their vessels and pillaging and burning the entire Chinese quarter of Maimbung, Jolo, in a particularly brutal raid.[43] When he murdered three Americans in raiding a Basilan Island lumber camp on Christmas Eve 1907, Bliss ordered American patrols to finish him off. Still, he eluded capture and killed one more American and two British in the process.[44]

By 1908, Jikiri was roving the Sulu Sea all the way to North Borneo. As his fame spread, his armed following grew, but so did his Moro enemies (including the sultan), who called for American naval action against him and cooperated in reporting his whereabouts. The Samal leader continued terrorizing coastal communities, though, not only robbing and murdering but also carrying off men, women, and children for sale into slavery. Bornean Muslims retaliated, but when they tracked him down, he surprised and captured them, cutting off their ears and fingers and sending them back "as a warning that Jikiri is not to be taken."[45]

When the British in North Borneo joined a growing chorus of people demanding action, Bliss called for the return of light-draft gunboats that Gen. Wood had taken with him when he left Moro Province.[46] He got his wish finally, and in July 1909, after two years of marauding, Jikiri found himself bottled up by American troops in a cave on the small island of Patian. He had no allies protecting him and no harbor in which to seek refuge. By July 4, Jikiri's last stand had attracted thousands of Moro onlookers, including Indanan and Sultan Kiram, who offered to help. Not necessary. That morning American rifles, machine guns, and artillery poured

as many as 10,000 rounds into the cave at point-blank range. Between the boom of artillery and bark of gunfire came the sound of voices chanting a "death song" from deep inside the cave. About fifty troopers warily approached. With a shout, Jikiri and his last six warriors burst from the cave mouth and fell upon the soldiers, hacking two to death and wounding twenty others before dying in a hail of gunfire. Out-of-control troopers proceeded to gun down three women when they subsequently emerged, sparing only a baby, probably Jikiri's son, who had been protected by his dying mother.[47]

Jikiri's last stand symbolized the end, at least for the short term, of Governor Bliss's pacification efforts. Despite being described as a "velvet glove," those efforts had resulted in the deaths of some 500–600 Moros.[48] Although indicative of considerable violence, this number pales in comparison with the approximately 4,000 Moros killed during Leonard Wood's tenure. Bliss succeeded in keeping Moro uprisings localized. The targets of constabulary patrols—such as Jikiri in Sulu—terrorized Muslims much more than Americans. Anti-American insurgency arose principally in eastern Lanao, where Ampuan Agaus continued to defy American authorities. In the rest of Moro Province, outlaws and tribal or factional rivals (as opposed to anti-American insurgents) remained the main threat to peace and order. Armed pacification, however, represented just the first dimension of Bliss's counterinsurgency strategy.

The improving peace-and-order situation in Moro Province owed as much to the governor's reinterpretation of judicial policy as to the constabulary's police actions. Bliss came to understand how Tribal Ward Courts, as interpreted by Leonard Wood, had fundamentally threatened the *datus'* power and prestige. As we have seen, these leaders had always settled local disputes by arbitrating between disputants. When Wood's Tribal Ward Courts threatened to supplant them, *datus* quite naturally turned against the new system either by subverting the courts or by revolting against the whole American colonial presence. Bliss set out to find some middle ground between the old *datu* arbitration system and the new, modern, American way of justice.

American policy of dividing up Moros and *lumads* into tribal wards dated back to February 19, 1904, when Moro Province was organized into some fifty-one wards. Policy dictated that each ward would have at its political

apex a single headman appointed by the district governor. As far as practicable, that headman should be the man "already recognized by his people as their chief." But although ordered to "enforce all laws and ordinances within his ward and … report to the District Governor all crimes committed therein," the headman didn't receive the right to adjudicate cases among his own people.[49]

Bliss criticized the Tribal Ward Act for running "counter to all Moro customs." In particular, the subsequent creation of Tribal Ward Courts in 1905 failed to include headmen or any other *datus* in meting out justice. These men had, "from time immemorial, tried and punished the gravest crimes." By not involving *datus* other than as crime reporters, the new court system made it all but certain that those chiefs would protest in the strongest terms. Without posting military garrisons in all parts of the country, law enforcement in Moro Province depended on their cooperation. In any event, *datus* would go on trying and arbitrating disputes just as before, and "if not so tried … [those disputes] would not be tried at all, for our courts would not even know … of the offenses."[50]

Bliss had a better idea. In a comment that must have horrified Leonard Wood, he suggested that Americans "try to absorb the oriental spirit." He hastened to explain that he had not gotten soft on Muslims. Rather, he sought "to anticipate … views of the coming civilized Moro." Looking for a code that would appeal both "to the inherited ideas and practices" of Moros and to those of "a civilized government," he came up with a compromise. He would "vest the headmen with certain limited powers to try, and even to dispose of fines [fixed by law] in accordance with their custom, giving the convicted party the right of appeal to the tribal-ward court."[51]

Even though his proposal never received formal endorsement from his superiors in Manila, he quietly went ahead with it, thereby giving at least the ward headmen unofficial authority to "continue their ancient practice of trying and punishing offenses." That authority did not extend to crimes of violence, which went directly to the Tribal Ward Courts or to the Court of First Instance.[52] Nevertheless, *datus* welcomed the governor's acknowledgment of their age-old prerogatives. The new policy also reversed open American disapproval of justice by arbitration. Unofficially, it sanctioned the notion that at least one *datu*, the appointed headman of each ward, could arbitrate justly between disputants. Gen. Wood had ridiculed

that idea.[53] Under Bliss, it represented a perfect example of how local custom could and in this case did bend colonial policy in ways that Americans had not anticipated.

But what about indentured servitude? As we have seen, few commoners had sufficient capital to cool their opponents' hot hearts in disputes. They depended on their *datu* both to help arbitrate their case and to guarantee payment of damages considered just by all sides. To the extent that they became indebted to their *datu* for this guarantee, they had to pay off their debt by serving him in some way. If what they owed amounted to a substantial debt, they became, for all intents and purposes, indentured servants.

For Governor Bliss, therefore, acknowledging *datus* as potentially legitimate participants in the judicial system meant, in effect, accepting indentured servitude as a reality in Moro Province. Didn't this fly in the face of the antislavery law that Leonard Wood and the Legislative Council had passed in 1903?

That's exactly the question Bliss asked his provincial attorney in 1908. Noting that "debt slavery" was "the root of the datu system" and that it had been a "source of untold evil," he wondered if it constituted "involuntary servitude" or slavery. Back came the opinion, of critical importance to Bliss's proposed judicial compromise, that debt "peonage" did not "come within the definition of slavery." After all, such peonage remained "prevalent in many of the southern states." If this practice had gained acceptance in the American South, then surely it could not be considered illegal in America's colony.[54]

In addition to employing the Philippine Constabulary as his principal peacekeeping force and choosing to overlook debt servitude in acknowledging *datus* as key participants in maintaining peace, Bliss did one other thing to help stabilize Moro society. He encouraged Moro leaders to see him as an indispensable father figure in protecting the province from potentially threatening outsiders. As noted, Moros considered two types of outsiders as threatening to their way of life: Filipino politicians adamantly opposing Moro autonomy and determined to integrate Moros into the larger Philippine polity and American planters intent on carving up Moro lands into plantations.

Bliss's desire to be seen as a great white protector of Moros against Filipino nationalists comes as no surprise. Just as those same nationalists suspected, he and other American colonial officials, such as Interior Secretary Dean Worcester, understood that a divided Philippine polity could be a more easily controlled Philippine polity. Aiding and abetting age-old Moro hatred of Christian Filipinos made good strategic sense at a time when Filipino nationalists aimed to present a united front in their campaign for Philippine independence. Bliss, like most Americans at that time, betrayed racial prejudice in believing that Filipinos lacked fitness to govern themselves. He predicted that they would try to control Moro lands and suppress Moro culture unless the American military prevented them from doing so. Thus, when he learned of a Filipino effort to end the Moro Province's autonomous status in 1908, he threatened to resign if the Philippine Commission permitted that to happen.[55]

Just as Governor Bliss fought to keep Moro Province autonomous from the rest of the Philippine Islands, so too did he fight against its annexation as a territory of the United States. His position put him in opposition not only to Filipino nationalists but also to American expatriates, for whom Zamboanga's newspaper the *Mindanao Herald* served as a mouthpiece for annexation. Against the *Mindanao Herald*, he argued for ongoing American military protection of Moro Province, so that it "will continue indefinitely to be the home of the people who now inhabit it." Believing that "the white man will never come here in such numbers as to … [oust] the native from his occupation of the soil," he disagreed with the *Herald*'s declaration that "Moro Province is a white man's country." Likewise, he opposed the Zamboanga Chamber of Commerce's resolution that the "portion of the Philippine Islands lying south of the Straits of Surigao should be created by act of Congress a territory of the United States."[56]

More and more, Bliss regarded American planters, who numbered seventy-four in all, as being at best a mixed blessing in Moro Province. Although they helped to boost trade, especially in abaca, he mused that "we all know what men will do on a remote frontier…. The universal experience has been that they will oppress the native to the extent that their opportunities make possible." He even feared that "a system of peonage or slavery" might be evolving "under American auspices, although that is one of the very things that we are here to prevent."[57]

Bliss would permit no such oppression. American administration of Moro Province, he argued, must "be so conducted that when the native is left … in undisputed possession of the territory, … he will not have been robbed of all … his patrimony." Neither American planters nor Filipino settlers would rob him of that patrimony.[58] Protecting Moros against such exploitation represented, in Bliss's mind, the American military's principal excuse for its temporary "despotic machine." The "bounden duty" of the United States must be to rule "these people for their own good," educating and developing in them "an intelligent community" and training them for self-government, so that eventually Americans could grant them self-rule.[59]

No one, of course, would dream of giving Moros and pagans selfgovernment right away. "The most advanced of them," in Bliss's opinion, had "no conception of what the word means." No. "If we assume the responsibility of forcibly holding anyone, we had better also assume the responsibility of governing him [well]."[60] That good governance would begin by training tribal ward headmen and bringing them gradually into an American-style judicial system. But it would involve much more than that, including long-term changes in infrastructure, public health, commerce, agriculture, and education. As Governor Bliss paternalistically contemplated reforms in these categories, he prioritized some and de-emphasized others. A close examination of what he allocated money for and what he neglected tells a great deal about the evolving American counterinsurgency effort in the years of accommodation.

If words alone told the tale, then education stood atop Tasker Bliss's priority list as governor of Moros. After all, hadn't the United States carved out a separate Moro Province specifically to put these people on "all fours" vis-à-vis other Filipinos? Pacifying and protecting them necessitated an ongoing military presence. The military's "ultimate success," however, transcended pacification, depending on "the extent to which we can train, develop and civilize them." Only then could Moros hope to attain equal status with Christian Filipinos in a rapidly changing and modernizing Philippine homeland.[61]

Declaring "war upon Moro and pagan ignorance," Bliss set aside 134,008 pesos for education and another 5,656 pesos for school construction in 1906, with the combined amount representing more than 20 percent of his total

budget that year.[62] No other line item except public works received more money. With ninety-four teachers in fifty-seven schools (plus ten night schools), it seemed that the war on ignorance had begun in earnest.

But then came 1907, when school funding received only 109,539 pesos, followed by 84,192 in 1908 and 82,101 in 1909. In terms of percentages, education steadily dwindled from 20 percent of the total budget in 1906 to 11.6 percent in 1909. During that same period, publicschool teachers increased in number by only three (to ninety-seven), while the total number of schools in Moro Province remained stuck at fifty-seven. Meanwhile, the average daily attendance of Moro children in these schools increased only slightly, from a tiny enrollment of 300 in 1906 to a mere 500 three years later. Given the estimated Moro population of 450,000, with perhaps 80,000 school-age children (seven to sixteen years old), less than 1 percent of those kids attended public school. What on earth happened to Bliss's vaunted war on ignorance?[63]

"Lack of money," answered the governor,[64] who predicted that "if 1,000,000 [pesos] were to be immediately available for … [education]," rapid growth and development would quickly follow.[65] A look at his budgets for 1906–1909, however, suggests that lack of money was not the real answer. Although the province's total revenues grew 29.1 percent, from 522,930 pesos in 1906 to 675,216 pesos in 1908–1909, educational disbursements declined 41.2 percent. Meanwhile, allocations for public works climbed by 61.5 percent, for public health by 62.7 percent, and for commerce by 138.1 percent.[66] These figures suggest that education suffered from more than lack of money. To the contrary, the Bliss administration intentionally de-emphasized education among its priorities. Why?

To be fair, the dismal figures on public education did not reflect a lack of effort by educational administrators. Superintendents Najeeb Saleeby (who resigned effective June 30, 1906) and Charles Cameron certainly tried persuading Moro leaders to educate their children. They had some success, as when Sultan Kiram informally advised Jolo *datus* to "send their sons to school."[67] They also hoped that officially mandating compulsory education for school-age children would help.[68] To no avail.

Part of the problem had to do with finding qualified teachers. Few Moros had experience teaching subjects other than the Qurʾan. They comprised just eleven of the ninety-four teachers in 2006 and numbered just eight of the

ninety-seven in 1908–1909. Twenty-seven Americans helped out in 1906, a number that dwindled to fourteen in 1909. All the rest were Filipinos. Since Moros resisted attending schools taught by Filipino Christians, those teachers ended up instructing non-Muslim children rather than Moros. Just as Filipinos made up the great majority of Moro Province's teachers (60 percent in 1906, rising to 77.3 percent in 1908–1909), Filipino children made up the bulk of the province's students (85 percent in 1906 and 83.35 percent in 1908–1909). Most of these Christian students resided in or near Zamboanga town. Elsewhere in that district and in the other four districts, very few teachers taught very few Moro students.[69]

Although finding and training Moro teachers posed a problem, the main reason for such anemic Moro participation in public education involved widespread opposition to the very notion of secular education. Among the Moro populace, reports circulated that the Americans intended "to take their children away from them."[70] Many *datus* did not distrust Americans quite that much, but Bliss admitted that they found "our system of book instruction repugnant."[71] Superintendent Cameron swore to change this attitude. He proposed a "Datu School" in Zamboanga specifically for "sons of Sultans, Datus and Headmen" and supervised by a sheik. "Great care," he promised, would "be taken to teach … [students] to respect their religion and live in accordance with its mandates." Americans would teach math, reading, writing, and science, but students would also be taught to read and write in their own dialect and to read and translate the Qurʾan. Despite this effort to enlist the support of Moro leaders, and despite the sultan's informal endorsement, Cameron failed to sign up enough students to make the Datu School feasible. He and Bliss simply faced too much suspicion from Moros across the board.[72]

What, then, could they do? First of all, keep in mind that "general disorder and resistance to governmental authority" might convulse the province again at any time.[73] Separation of church and state made sense to Americans, but state-sponsored secular public schools looked like an anti-Islamic Trojan horse to many Moro religious leaders. Ever watchful of keeping the peace, Bliss decided that public education should not be forced on Muslims who didn't want it.[74]

Instead of utilizing public education to broadcast American progressive ideas, Governor Bliss advocated giving Moros what they wanted. "The Moro

is a hard worker and a natural artisan," he wrote. "He is fond of money and will work hard to get it." Why not help Moros make more money by teaching students "to make better boats, better plows, better carts, better houses," thereby enabling them to prosper? Instruction of this kind might encourage them to think well of their American overseers rather than prompting them to revolt.[75]

Bliss thus tried establishing "the largest possible number of industrial and agricultural training schools in which, at the outset, no books will be used." They would not use American teachers either, unless those Americans could speak the local dialect. At the outset, teaching would be done in a language understood by Moro students. "In time, the teaching of English to the great mass of pupils will naturally come, but it should be the last thing taught them instead of the first." Offered a useful and practical education in their own language, Moros would lose their suspicion of public education and flock to the new schools over time. There they would eventually absorb "modern ideas" and become the vanguard for a new Moro way of life.[76]

Bliss's very gradual approach would have outraged Leonard Wood except for the fact that few Moros enrolled their children even in these manual-training schools. In the meantime, Bliss's opening to Islamic or *pandita* schools must have infuriated Wood even more. Reasoning that if the mountain wouldn't go to Muhammad, then Muhammad must go to the mountain, Bliss started funneling a little education funding to four such schools. There, students studied and memorized the Qurʾan. The local *datu* and his community furnished the school building and paid the *pandita;* Moro Province's government provided books, paper, blackboards, and other supplies. "Limited as this instruction is," wrote Bliss, "these simple establishments … serve to win the sympathies and arouse the interest of Moros[,] … [who are] beginning to learn that the attitude of the Government is sympathetic and not hostile." "In time," he predicted, "there will be a natural transition from the Pandita schools to the lowest grade of the public school system."[77]

Leonard Wood criticized Bliss for "too much academic discussion and writing, and too little traveling about." Governor General of the Philippines William Cameron Forbes agreed, calling Bliss a "misfit" as governor of Moro Province.[78] For a peripatetic officer such as Wood, such criticism made

sense. But Bliss's comparative inaction owed less to "academic discussion" than to intentional policy. Over time, he quietly disagreed with Wood. As he traveled about Moro Province, he saw what it meant to try civilizing Moros with a sword. "The Moros as a rule are quiet and peaceful," he opined. Had American military might cowed them into submission? Yes, but they had become more peaceful mainly "because we interfere with them to the least possible degree."[79]

Although Governor Bliss came largely to repudiate Leonard Wood's counterinsurgency strategy, it remained to be seen if his successor would repudiate him in turn. Insofar as Wood had followed a direct-rule policy, whereas Bliss inclined toward a more indirect approach, would the next governor of Moro Province support one approach or the other or try to carve out a middle way between the two? For a few months, under the interim governorship of Col. Ralph Hoyt, it looked as if Gen. Wood's way would win the day.

Tasker Bliss left Moro Province in April 1909. John J. Pershing, appointed as his replacement, didn't arrive until November. During most of the interim period, Col. Hoyt ran the show. In his short tenure, he managed to antagonize just about everyone except the American business community in Zamboanga. Moros feared that he would terminate Bliss's policy of accommodation and protection. Filipino nationalists denounced him as an imperialist intent on annexing Moro Province. And the new American governor general of the Philippines, William Cameron Forbes, regarded him as a loose cannon that endangered everyone.

Hoyt alienated all of these people by turning his annual report for 1909 into a manifesto for making Moro Province into a "permanent foothold of absolute American influence in the Orient," just exactly what American planters and other business interests in Zamboanga wanted.[80] Like his predecessor, he fancied himself as the paternalistic protector of Moros against Filipino politicians who openly called for amalgamation of Moros into the Philippine national polity. Unlike Governor Bliss, however, he took the side of American business interests rather than the side of the Moros.

Lest anyone regard Moros in a positive light, Hoyt emphasized their ongoing lawlessness and backwardness. "The Moro," he declared, "is by nature a robber." To be sure, "the little red school house" had appeared in some Moro settlements, but instruction languished "for want of a trained

corps of teachers or … [any capacity among Moros to] appreciate the advantages of an education." For the time being, "peace would be impossible without the actual presence of troops—for this country is neither ready nor has it ever known any other form of government." Indeed, Moros understood nothing but brute force, and Hoyt predicted that an American military presence in Moro Province would be "indispensable … for generations to come."[81]

Reasoning that "there are certain evolutional channels through which society must pass in its onward march from barbarism to civilization," Hoyt insisted that Americans "must use the authority we possess" to bring Moros out of darkness into light. Just as the "wilful [*sic*] child or … idle schoolboy" must be "subjected to a mild despotism for the good of themselves and … society," so too must the "semibarbarian" Moro.[82]

So long as Moro Province remained riven by violence and its future prospects threatened by non-Muslim Philippine nationalists, American investors, Hoyt argued, would stay away. To date, only seventy-four planters had dared take the risk, carving out a mere forty-five plantations in Davao, twenty in Zamboanga, five in Lanao, three in Sulu, and one in Cotabato. They needed more certainty, or they would never set down roots in sufficient numbers to help Moros overcome their backwardness. Governor Hoyt, therefore, recommended that the United States "effect a permanent separation" of Mindanao, Sulu, and even Palawan from the rest of the Philippines. "The southern group of islands thus segregated, might be called the Mindanao Plantations, to designate it from the rest of the Philippines. It should be declared territory of the United States, not as a colony, but to be occupied as coaling stations and a Naval base, with a civil-military government" similar to its present regime. Within the "Mindanao Plantations," "natives might be assigned to reservations," with "the balance of the territory to be divided into plantations and forest reserves open to occupation and development."[83]

Thus would American control over the Moros be changed once again from indirect to direct rule. In remarkably short order, Ralph Hoyt threatened to reverse three years of accommodation between Americans and local inhabitants of Moro Province. By November 1909, however, he had gone. What policy would the new governor, Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, follow?

8

John Pershing and Full-Spectrum Counterinsurgency in Moro Province, 1909–1913

When John Pershing returned to the Philippines on November 3, 1909, he discovered that many things had changed in Moro Province. The job of countering insurgency had become much more complex and political. Moros had grown more savvy and certain of their shared identity vis-àvis both Americans and non-Muslim Filipinos. He, too, had changed, returning as a brigadier general accompanied by his wife and children and as a man with much more administrative experience and political perspicacity. Then, too, the American approach to counterinsurgency warfare had changed, not just once but twice, zigzagging between his and Gen. Davis's own tentative experiments in ruling through *datus* (1901–1903), Gen. Wood's unabashedly direct approach (1903–1906), and Gen. Bliss's quiet abandonment of that direct approach in favor of full-scale indirect rule (1906–1909). These shifting approaches offered the new Moro Province governor valuable case studies of what had worked and what had failed in both counterinsurgency approaches. He could pick and choose as he wished. What would Pershing do to navigate successfully between all the players and stakeholders awaiting his return? And would he, at last, achieve the counterinsurgency goals of clearing insurgents, holding and securing the countryside, and then building a stable and progressive society? He had promised to stay for four years. Could he legitimately declare victory and leave (taking the army with him) in that brief space of time?

A hint of Pershing's new approach to counterinsurgency can be gleaned from notes he scrawled in a small notebook sometime before 1909. "There are two ways of looking at the Moro problem," he wrote. Revealing a significant shift away from his indirect approach of 1902–1903, he discredited the first way—one that involved "non-interference and the

consequent continuance of datu domination of crime and oppression, polygamy and slavery." This indirect way betrayed "sentimental inexperience." "Government through the datu," he now contended, won't work "because the datu cannot be trusted. He will continue to rule as a representative of the Mohammedan church and will continue to uphold the rule of oppression and exploitation."

What about the second, more direct way associated with Gen. Wood, who had used unrelenting military force to establish law and order? Declared Pershing in his notes, the "suppression of crime and the establishment of law and order" had "met with the entire approval of the Moros themselves." He admitted, however, that none of them wanted American troops marching across their lands and through their villages, humiliating Moros and treating them as enemy combatants.

Without specifically outlining a third way, Pershing inclined in that direction. He suggested that "strong men among the Moros" could be "developed" who would "rule under rational laws" rather than according to the dictates of their traditional patriarchal customs. These new leaders would govern "not as Mohammedan datus, but as individual political representatives of a just and productive government." Training and working with them, Americans would balance traditional "customs and law" with "the fundamental principles of our own civil laws," respecting both and always seeking a happy medium.[1]

Pershing's new ideas regarding how to deal with Moros resemble today's "full-spectrum" counterinsurgency as defined in the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. Offensive operations in Moro Province had largely come to an end, but extensive police work remained to be done, close relationships with Moro leaders still needed to be nurtured, and progressive efforts in infrastructure development, public health, education, and governance had a long way to go.[2]

Success or failure in this full-spectrum effort hinged on one thing: politics. To quote the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, "political factors are primary." "At the beginning of a COIN [counterinsurgency] operation, military actions may appear predominant as security forces conduct operations to secure the populace and kill or capture insurgents; however, … resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution."[3]

The new governor came equipped with a fair amount of know-how about politics, thanks to his experience from January 1906 to August 1908 as commander of the American garrison at Fort McKinley outside of Manila. There he had rubbed shoulders with American governor generals as well as with Filipino politicians such as Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña. He had learned how much his success as a military commander depended on his facility in fostering strong personal relationships with such leaders. But the political situation that awaited him in Zamboanga bristled with so many pitfalls that navigating it successfully would test the political skills of any man.

Pershing understood that in trying to pacify and govern Moro Province, he couldn't even depend on all Americans to support him. He had learned that lesson back in Washington, D.C., when his name came up for promotion from captain to brigadier general. Thanks to enthusiastic support from President Theodore Roosevelt and resolute advocacy from his father-in-law, Wyoming senator Francis E. Warren, chair of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, he landed that promotion in late 1906. It didn't matter that he had distinguished himself with his march around Lake Lanao in 1903 or that the president had singled him out for praise in his annual message to Congress.[4] What mattered to 862 senior officers was that he had been advanced over their heads. Within the American military, there thus existed the makings of a very disgruntled faction that could be counted on to second-guess Pershing's every step and to sing the praises of his army critics, such as Gen. Wood.[5]

Other Americans had other political motivations and priorities in Moro Province. President William Howard Taft worried that any major military action resulting in the slaughter of Moros might damage his bid for reelection in 1912. Indeed, Americans nation-wide had lost their taste for blood-letting in the Philippines, necessitating that the new governor scale back military operations against Moros where possible. And yet vocal American planters and investors in Moro Province insistently called for aggressive military efforts against lawless elements threatening their plantations, and Pershing knew that potential American capitalists would hesitate to invest in the province unless he could guarantee peace and order there.

Still another American political leader constrained Pershing's freedom of action. Philippine governor general William Cameron Forbes had become a close friend who "like[d] him the best of all the generals of the army." But Forbes, too, wanted to avoid sensational reports of body counts in Mindanao and Sulu that might convince Americans to abandon their colonial experiment in Asia.[6] Like his successor, Francis Burton Harrison, Forbes prided himself on cultivating close personal relations with Filipino nationalist politicians, who adamantly opposed any policy separating Moro Province from the rest of the Philippine polity. Just by creating a separate Moro Province, Americans had already encouraged Moros to think of themselves as autonomous from the rest of the Philippine Islands. Filipino leaders and their supporters in Zamboanga called for integration, not separation. Anything that Pershing did to foster Moro separatism would surely raise a hue and cry among not only Filipino nationalists but also their American allies, such as Forbes and Harrison.

And yet another American entered the political equation. Interior Secretary Dean C. Worcester had carved his own domain out of northcentral Mindanao in 1907 by creating the Agusan Province, with its subprovinces Bukidnon and Butuan. Governed by neither Filipinos nor the American military, Agusan fell under Worcester's Department of the Interior. Not content with these "non-Christian tribal" areas of Mindanao, Worcester wanted to incorporate all of Mindanao into his department.[7] Accused by Filipinos of trying to create his own fiefdom independent of Filipino influence, he also drew criticism from his military compatriots and Forbes, who opposed such blatant divide-andrule politics. As the new Moro Province governor, Pershing knew that he would have to cultivate Forbes's support against Worcester.

One other group of Americans also had close ties to Filipino politicians sworn to end American military rule over Moro Province and to integrate Moros into the Philippine mainstream. The Philippine Constabulary, which Pershing came to rely on for maintaining law and order, worked closely with Filipino leaders at all levels of Philippine society, from municipal headmen to national politicians. Its effectiveness depended on this close, even symbiotic relationship, and its leaders, Gen. Harry Bandholtz and Col. James Harbord, prided themselves on being friends with Quezon, Osmeña, and others.[8]

What about the Moros themselves? Pershing had taken great pride in his friendship with Maranao headmen such as Amai Manibilang. But the Maranaos were only one of many Moro groups, each with its own *datus* and sultans. What about the Sulu sultanate? What about Datu Piang and the Maguindanao? Under American rule, Moros had remained as disunited as ever. If anything, they had grown more divided politically as some *datus* responded positively to progressive American initiatives, while others continued to stand against all threats to their traditional power. Facing off against Filipino integrationists, Moros—whether Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, Samal, Yakan, or any other group—could unite. Those same people, however, proudly retained their separate identities, adding still another crucially important layer of complexity to the political equation facing Moro Province's new governor in 1909.

Politics didn't come naturally to Pershing. He hated public speaking, and when forced to address a crowd, he came across as wooden. But by 1909 he had developed a fairly sophisticated sense of how to politick between different factions, including Americans, Moros, and non-Muslim Filipinos. He could also draw on his personal experience in Mindanao in 1899–1903 to help in dealing with the complexities of his new job. Compared to his predecessors, Governors Wood and Bliss, he arrived in Moro Province well briefed on how to launch and sustain a sophisticated, multipronged, and politically smart counterinsurgency program that just might work well enough to enable him to declare victory and go home in four years.

By July 1903, when the forty-three-year-old Capt. Pershing returned to the United States after his first posting to Mindanao, he had distinguished himself in the eyes of his countrymen for his courage, boldness, and agility in pacifying Moros without massacring large numbers of them. President Roosevelt singled him out, along with Leonard Wood, as just the kind of vigorous, Progressive officer that America's new, modern, twentieth-century army needed. Roosevelt invited him to the White House together with boxing greats John L. Sullivan and Jake Kilrain. "I really would like to see you go at it for a couple of rounds," he told the boxers, and "I'd even like to put the gloves on with you myself. You two are square fighters, … and here's another square fighter, one of our military men, Captain Pershing."[9]

Not only the president embraced the gallant Jack Pershing. At a dance on December 9, 1903, Pershing met Helen Frances Warren, a young Wellesley College graduate twenty years his junior. “Have lost my heart,” “oh joy!” Frankie confided to her diary after dinner with the captain, who described her as a “jolly girl.”[10] Pershing wooed her all through 1904 in visits to her home in Cheyenne, Wyoming, before asking Senator Warren for her hand. By all accounts, he, too, had lost his heart. In letters to her, he expressed a tender side not apparent to the public. And in his diary he wrote: “She is certainly an angel and I love her to very madness.”[11] President Roosevelt invited the couple to lunch in the White House, and he joined hundreds of other Washington luminaries for their wedding on January 26, 1905. In honor of his father-in-law, the Senate recessed for the occasion.[12]

The newlyweds set out immediately for Japan, where Jack served as attaché to the American minister in Tokyo and as a keen observer of the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria.[13] “Comparing China and Japan,” he later wrote in his memoirs, “one finds a story almost biblical in its implications, where a favored son heavily endowed with land and resources has squandered his opportunities, while the poorly-endowed brother has made himself mighty.”[14]

In the new couple’s absence from Washington, Senator Warren politicked aggressively for Jack’s promotion to brigadier general. His efforts paid off when Roosevelt nominated Warren’s son-in-law for promotion in September 1906. That same month Frankie gave birth to Helen, their first child. When Jack’s nomination won Senate approval, he suddenly vaulted from being a relatively old captain to a relatively young brigadier general at age forty-six.

Coinciding with these joyous events came scandal as news burst of Pershing’s two “half-breed children” by Joaquina Bondoy Ignacio while he lived in Zamboanga in 1900–1902. Likely spread by jealous officers whom Jack had jumped over in his promotion, the story threatened to destroy his promising career. Despite Pershing’s firm denial, army personnel serving in Zamboanga had known about the affair for some time.[15] In December 1906, when he and his family arrived in Manila, where he would command the American brigade at Fort McKinley, a cloud of scandal darkened his every move.

During Gen. Pershing’s nineteen-month assignment at Fort McKinley, he tried to avoid scrutiny by the Manila press as much as possible and worked

day and night to make the fort a model garrison. He and Frankie hosted dozens of private social events, including grand receptions, dinners, and balls for American visitors. Rarely, however, did their social calendar include Filipinos among their guests.

In his memoirs, Pershing wrote that he tried making connections with Filipinos in Manila society. He admitted, however, that "generally speaking, the Americans lived very much to themselves and did not mix with the Filipinos except officially." "Differences in race, dress, and manners" played a role in this segregation, and "innate prejudice" could not be denied.[16] In addition to sharing that "innate prejudice," he believed that Filipino politicians lacked the ethical impulse necessary to govern minority populations fairly.[17] Moros and other tribal minorities, he believed, required American tutelage and protection against prejudiced and corrupt Filipino politicians intent on controlling them and exploiting their resources. What's more, those scoundrels had deeply embarrassed him by jumping all over his alleged affair with Ms. Ignacio. They had stoked lurid stories in the Manila press and had fostered an outpouring of sympathy for Joaquina as a Filipina Madame Butterfly shamefully jilted and left in the lurch (with her children) by her dishonorable lover Jack Pershing. It didn't help that Puccini's opera had premiered just five years earlier with a plot tailor made for Philippine nationalists intent on exposing the hypocrisy of their American overlords.

In avoiding anything but perfunctory contact with Filipino leaders, Pershing missed an opportunity to cultivate relationships that certainly would have proved useful to him later as governor of Moro Province. He came across as anti-Filipino, anti–Philippine independence, and anti–Philippine integration. When he returned to Zamboanga as governor in 1909, local Filipinos boycotted his inaugural and intentionally plotted to embarrass him by hiring prostitutes as the only Filipinas attending his reception.[18] No doubt their animus owed something to his public rejection of their fellow Zamboangan, Joaquina Bondoy Ignacio, as well.

Where Pershing failed to cultivate strong interpersonal relations with Filipino leaders, he succeeded brilliantly in doing so with Americans. In particular, he and William Cameron Forbes became close friends. "I find … [him] great fun, full of sport and enthusiasm and entering into everything," wrote Forbes in his journal. The two men rode and played golf together, and Forbes often stayed with the Pershings when he visited Fort McKinley. As

an indicator of their close friendship, Jack and Frankie asked Forbes to be godfather of their second daughter, Anne, born in March 1908.[19] And when Pershing eventually took over as governor of Moro Province, Forbes warned the Moros, “When General Pershing speaks to you, it is as though I were speaking to you. His thoughts are my thoughts; his words are my words. We think exactly alike.”[20]

Pershing also went out of his way to woo William Howard Taft. He genuinely liked and admired the secretary of war, who had proved his good will by endorsing him for promotion. He generally supported Taft’s colonial policies, although he did not agree that Filipinos in 1907 possessed sufficient political maturity to have their own elected Philippine Assembly. He remained wary of Taft’s popularity among Filipinos, who, he believed, harbored deep and age-old prejudice against Moros.[21] Despite these reservations, he hosted a grand banquet when Taft visited Manila in October 1907 to officially open the new assembly. To Taft’s great pleasure, a miniature White House covered with thousands of small white flowers graced the dinner table, its front door facing the man who would soon become America’s next president.[22]

As commander of the U.S. Army’s largest overseas post, Pershing left his mark as both a strict disciplinarian and a thoroughly Progressive military leader. Reminiscent of his days of training the University of Nebraska’s crack Pershing Rifles, he set out to turn Fort McKinley’s troops into showpieces of spit-and-polish drilling.[23] He instituted a regular program of callisthenic exercises, athletic training, rifle practice, and horseback riding. In daily close-order drills, he succeeded in instilling a new sense of pride and vigor in the troops. Visitors lauded the brigade for its apparent readiness to conquer every foe and keep the Philippines safe for Filipinos and Americans alike.[24]

But reality trumped appearance. Pershing knew that the United States remained woefully unprepared for an attack on its Pacific colony. In particular, he worried about the rising power of Japan, and his fears did not diminish when he paid his second visit to that proud nation in October–December 1907. He determined to prepare his brigade at Fort McKinley in more than appearance. Thus, he ordered extensive field maneuvers for his troops,[25] opened officer-training schools,[26] and led long practice marches to prepare his men for the real thing. When he departed McKinley at the end of

July 1908, he left behind a well-trained American military force. His brief posting there had also helped make him a much more broadly experienced military leader. By the time of his return to the Philippines in 1909, he possessed not only considerable knowledge about working with Moros but also the necessary leadership skills for successful command of a very complex and difficult military assignment.

Pershing's return to Moro Province inaugurated a four-year period in which the still nascent concepts of Progressive counterinsurgency came to be practiced more completely than ever before. Under his leadership, the military mostly accomplished the clearing process, significantly advanced the holding effort, and promoted the building of a new Moro society in a number of ways. Under his direction, counterinsurgency in Moroland took on a modus operandi tangibly personal, relational, restrained, flexible, knowledgeable, and resolute, while also remaining limited and realistic in its long-term objectives.

In early November 1909, the Pershings spent just a few days in Manila before getting away to Zamboanga. Jack, Frankie, Helen, Anne, and new baby Warren (born in June 1909) stayed with Governor General Forbes in Malacañan Palace. There the general and governor general "talked Mindanao and Moro provinces [*sic*] busily" all day and discovered that they "agree[d] in general on the Moro problem."[27]

Life in Zamboanga bore little resemblance to a war zone. Jack's family occupied the spacious, two-storied Governor's Residence, "a veritable palace" located right on the beach, where they took "a dip in the sea" almost every morning, although the general "never [felt] confident as a swimmer." The finest residence Pershing had ever lived in, "it overlooked the Straits of Basilan, from which came cool breezes to temper the tropical heat."[28]

As both governor and military commander of Moro Province, Pershing occupied a perfect position to develop and practice all aspects of counterinsurgency. Whereas in 1902–1903 he had won fame as a warrior, in 1909 his gubernatorial responsibilities required that he "see like a state," to use James C. Scott's phrase.[29] His duties included not just pacifying the population but also administering the province, presiding at Legislative Council meetings, and paying attention to all sorts of comparatively humdrum details. Roads and bridges had to be maintained, budgets

balanced, taxes collected, diseases kept at bay, schools opened, customs receipts collected, agriculture encouraged, exports expanded, and police trained and deployed. He had to answer not just to his military superior, Leonard Wood, but also to his civilian boss, William Cameron Forbes, and to address numerous written reports to each. He had to oversee commerce and fret about budget deficits. His daily schedule often required that he present public addresses, attend ceremonies, preside over committees, and carve out time for interminable discussions with local leaders.

11. John J. Pershing with Frankie, Helen, Anne, and Warren in Zamboanga, c. 1911–12. Photograph LC-USZ62-107733, Lot 12362, Prints and Publications Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

Fortunately, Pershing had learned the skill of listening during endless *bicharas* with Maranao Moros around Lake Lanao. There he had come to understand that successful counterinsurgency warfare involves a great deal of very unwarlike parleying. Little glory eventuated from all that talking or from all the desk work that his new position required. At day's end, however, he realized that this blend of unglamorous administering and active campaigning, of civil and military occupations, spelled success. It demanded patience and perseverance and won him few accolades, but it represented a significant step in the evolution of Progressive counterinsurgency as a full-spectrum military strategy.

Before Pershing arrived in Zamboanga, he received a letter from Tasker Bliss. In it, Bliss somewhat surprisingly warned that the new governor's principal problems would be posed not by Moro insurgents but by American civilians and, as a close second, Filipinos nationalists in Zamboanga. In particular, American planters couldn't be trusted. Their main source of profit came from selling liquor not just to Moros (against their religion) but also to Filipino and American "camp followers," including prostitutes. Compared to this bunch of ne'er-do-wells, Moro lawless elements posed little threat. To be sure, Ampuan Agaus still eluded capture in Lanao, and the Sulu sultan remained untrustworthy, thanks to being "weak," "cowardly" and "bad" in general. Moro acts of violence, however, didn't necessarily reflect anti-American animus. They often boiled down to factionalism as *datus* jockeyed for power and influence in the belief that American rule would soon end. A light touch would work best in dealing with them. In dealing with American and Filipino civilians, however, he would be best served by an attitude of healthy distrust.[30]

In large part, Pershing agreed with Bliss's analysis. His predecessor, however, had tended to stick "too close to the coast and to the military posts." He had not gotten out among the people enough. The new governor intended to remedy this situation right away by setting off on an inspection tour around his domain, meeting with former Moro friends, and listening to their side of the story.[31]

Their side of the story both gratified and worried Pershing. Greeting him as "a father to … his children," they welcomed him back. But they complained of being "like orphans," "oppressed" and "injured" by American troops and Philippine Constabulary police. "We hope that [once again] our rights will be respected," they told him, now that he had returned to Moro Province after six long years.[32]

Pershing made no promises, nor did he respond when they asked him to return their "slaves, who have all emigrated." He had come, he said, "merely to visit my old friends."[33] At another time he would return to deal with issues and settle disputes. He understood that successful counterinsurgency strategy began with relationship building and the attainment of in-depth knowledge about local conditions. His inspection tour in December 1909 focused on those goals.

Once back in Zamboanga, he continued cultivating relations with Moros. He flattered local leaders with "little courtesies," urged them to study the Qurʾan, insisted that "this is the Moro's country, not American," and traveled among them unarmed, asserting, "I'll take my chances with the Moros."[34] That said, the man who returned in 1909–1913 had changed from his younger and more dashing incarnation of 1900–1903. He acted more cautiously, took fewer risks, and always watched his back. As a general, he impressed friend and foe alike as a quintessential authority figure. And just like his predecessor, Tasker Bliss, he came to see himself as a father figure to the Moros. Although he continued to emphasize the crucial importance of cultivating direct personal relationships, those relations had ceased to be among equals. In 1902–1903, Capt. Pershing had negotiated as a fellow *datu*. In 1909–1913, Gen. Pershing related with Moros "like a father toward his children."[35]

The new father figure quickly set out to redefine Moro insurgency. In Pershing's mind, non-Muslim Filipino nationalists threatened Moro autonomy much more than Americans did. In fact, Moros and their parental American overlords shared a common cause. As early as 1908, he began formulating this redefinition in an article entitled "Conquest of the Moros." Americans had gradually convinced Moros that they had no intention of threatening their religion. Christian Filipinos, in contrast, potentially imperiled them. Warfare between Moros and Spaniards (with their Filipino allies) had continued right up to the arrival of American troops in 1899. It

could flare up again between Moros and Christian Filipinos if the Americans went home. “By fair treatment and square dealing we gained the confidence of many dattos and made them our friends.” Not surprisingly, “a large number rejected our overtures” and initially opposed American conquest. Indeed, “the true conquest must be accomplished by the tedious process of education,” achieved over time. In the meantime, “Americans and Moros must work together as friends and perhaps even family in fighting for the common cause of Moro evolution.”[36]

Pershing thus set out, quite creatively, to reinterpret the American military mission in Moro Province. From anti-Moro counterinsurgency, the mission’s ostensible purpose morphed into pro-Moro paternalistic protection. To be sure, there would always be irreconcilables, who necessitated continued deployment of counterinsurgent troops. Working together, however, Moros and Americans would fashion a new relationship founded on common interests and adversaries. They would strengthen Moro Province against Filipino nationalists, secure the peace against local outlaws, and share mutually in a new prosperity.

Filipino newspapers repeatedly accused “the military regime” in Moroland of “fomenting antagonisms and prejudices, and … sowing hostility, division and hatred between Moro Filipinos and Christian Filipinos.”[37] It did this “with the manifest design” of preventing Muslim and Christian Filipinos from “uniting their forces to form a Filipino Fatherland. One might [even] believe,” editorialized *La Democracia*, “that the military government holds the Moro Filipinos in great esteem, seeing them treated with flattery while the Christians are nullified and subordinated.”[38] Little did *La Democracia*’s editors know how close to the mark their accusations hit.

“It may be stated as a scientific fact,” wrote Pershing some three years after these editorials, “that no Filipino of purely Malayan blood has ever attained any prominence in the Islands.” Those few prominent Filipinos who stood out as exceptions to this rule did so because of “the infusion of other blood beside Malayan, usually Chinese.” Threefourths of the population, he estimated, as yet labored “under the spell of ignorance and superstition, while the Moros and wild tribes must still be classed as barbarians or savages.”[39]

Granting immediate Philippine independence, therefore, denoted an abrogation of moral responsibility. It would also be a betrayal of Moros, who

remained “the deadly enemy of all other Filipinos, and would not submit to a government by any of them.” “Hostility between … adherents of the two religions” formed “an insurmountable obstacle to the independence of the Philippine Islands.” Filipinos condescended to Moros as backward and savage, and Moros “regarded the Filipinos as fit material for slaves only.” When Secretary of War J. M. Dickinson paid a visit to Zamboanga in 1910, one *datu* announced publicly that “if it should come to pass that the Filipinos are set over us, my people will all fight and I will lead them.” Pershing did not doubt the seriousness of this threat, for “all who know the aggressiveness and virility of the Moro” acknowledged that the Moro population would be “entirely uncontrollable by a Filipino government.”[40]

What, then, should Americans do in Moro Province? They must do their “duty toward these people.” Until such time as they judged Filipinos to be fit for establishing a government “by the people,” including Moros and other minorities, Americans must not betray their charges but rather hold fast to their responsibility as their patrons and protectors.[41]

If Americans no longer threatened Moros but rather protected them from other outsiders, how might one explain ongoing Moro acts of armed opposition? The answer to that question required another redefinition. Just as Americans magically metamorphosed from counterinsurgents into protectors, Moros shape-shifted from insurgents into mere outlaws. No longer did the American military have to root out rebels. Rather, it could focus on protecting Moros from both outsiders and their own bad characters alike. Thus did counterinsurgency take on the new appearance of small-scale police work in which a majority of Moro leaders cooperated with Americans in policing lawless elements among themselves.

Outlawry in Pershing’s Moro Province took a number of different forms. In 1909–1911, the most significant outbreaks of violence didn’t occur among Moros, involving instead tribal minorities in the northern districts Zamboanga and Davao. By this time, American authority embodied by the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary had reached far into the interior of Mindanao. Upland tribal groups, or *lumads,* had already been riled by American planters in Davao. Catholic priests and Protestant missionaries, Filipino settlers and traders, and Moro land seekers increasingly threatened *lumads*, whether intentionally or not, as it became

less treacherous for migrants to settle inland away from Mindanao's coasts. Fearful uplanders reacted in different ways to all these forces of change. Some, such as the Bukidnons of north-central Mindanao, proved skilled at accommodating to agents of change even as they held fast to their separate identity.[42] Others, including many Subanus of northern Zamboanga, responded to the encroachment of lowland Filipinos by retreating deeper into the mountains and joining a millenarian movement.

According to Pershing's annual report for 1910, "several thousand Subanos were induced to desert their homes under the influence of two false prophets from … Misamis" and "certain Moro datus from Lake Lanao." These unscrupulous schemers had convinced them that they must gather on a mountain "preparatory to ascending into Heaven just before the destruction of the earth by fire and water."[43] Notably, the Subanu millenarians left their homes and retreated into the interior not because they had turned anticolonial or anti-American, but because the remote mountain region offered a safe haven from all intruders—Filipino, Moro and American alike.[44]

Constabulary captain H. H. Elarth received orders "to break up this assembly." Pershing deemed it necessary to do this even though he regarded the Subanus as "simple," "timid," and "pastoral."[45] Although they posed no danger to Americans, they threatened to disturb peace and order in Zamboanga District. Time to nip their movement in the bud before it spread.

When Capt. Elarth reached the Subanus' remote encampment on November 28, 1909, what had hitherto been a peaceful assemblage quickly dissolved into a wild melee.[46] A "throng of armed warriors" encircled Elarth's fifteen men as they attempted to negotiate with Subanu leaders. As the conference stalled, Elarth "observed with growing concern the increasing unruliness of the assembled warriors." Then came a warrior, "his eyes red with the rage of an amok, … leaping toward the Captain, swinging his *kampilan* and yelling, '*Patai-na*' (you die now!)."

> Elarth shot! Three very quick shots! Three very dead Moros were piled at his feet. The hillmen threw their spears and then charged! The air was thick with steel and five soldiers went down before they could fire a shot, their bodies bristling with war spears. A sixth was pulled out of the formation by the charging savages and hacked to pieces in a matter

> of seconds. But ten … rifles were pouring a hail of death into the living mass of hillmen; suddenly they broke and fled! Only sixty shots were fired in this action, but *sixty-eight* dead warriors were left on the field.[47]

It took two months of "difficult work" by a scout company led by district governor Maj. John P. Finley before "peace was restored." Not until five years later, however, did the last holdouts surrender, ending the worst *lumad* uprising of Jack Pershing's tenure as governor.[48]

In his report, Elarth speaks of the Subanus' colossal "error of judgment" when they attacked him. Given the fact that their movement posed little threat to American control, however, it seems that Pershing, Elarth, and the constabulary had committed an even greater "error of judgment." They unwisely precipitated anti-American fury among a tribal minority that hitherto had never demonstrated any anti-American feeling at all. They acted out of ignorance, confusing non-Muslim Subanus with Moros. And they violated one of Pershing's principal admonitions: always base military action on good intelligence.[49]

Like the Subanus, the Manobos living in the hills of Davao District's Sarangani Peninsula began defying the constabulary and, it seemed to Pershing, threatening an uprising. Unlike the Subanus, they did not resort to a millenarian movement. In fact, had they confined their violence to acts of hostility against each other, Pershing might well have ignored them. But when they murdered an American planter, he had to act. In 1910, he personally led scouts, infantry, and a troop of cavalry against these "pagans." Claiming that Manobo warriors plus some Tagacaolas (who had been involved in the murder of Governor Bolton) and Bila'ans had begun banding together in parties of 50 to 100 and rampaging around the countryside "exterminating their enemies," he sent columns against them from several directions, vigorously hunting them down, killing and capturing them, and breaking up the bands.

Throughout this military action, Pershing insisted that the Manobos' murderous rampaging hearkened back to their tradition of measuring a man's bravery and prowess by the number of lives he had taken. Unofficially, however, he admitted that American planter exploitation of upland people contributed to the violence. A "planter must deal fairly with his [tribal] laborers," he wrote to Forbes, but planters instead often paid workers only

fifty cents a day, jacked up prices by 50 to 100 percent at the company store, and sometimes didn't even provide decent shelter for the laborers and their families. Unfortunately, such exploitation had threatened to turn intertribal Manobo violence into an "uprising" against Americans. Thus did American mistreatment, like American ignorance in the Subanu case, play a significant role in *lumad* violence. It appeared that Americans had become (or continued to be) their own worst enemies.[50]

While Manobo and Subanu unrest in 1909–1910 arose at least in part because of American abuses and misjudgments, Moro outlawry continued to disturb the peace in many localities regardless of American policies. True, Cotabato District enjoyed relatively tranquil conditions, thanks not so much to American law enforcers as to Datu Piang, the pro-American strongman of the Rio Grande, whose control over riverine trade gave him great power and leverage.[51] Likewise, Sulu District experienced "a larger measure of peace and prosperity than ever before." As in Cotabato, in Sulu the Moros did most of the policing, arresting "a larger number of outlaws and murderers … than in any like period since American occupation." Meanwhile, in Lanao "several bands … plunder[ed] peaceful rancherias and kill[ed] unoffending Moros and Filipinos." "White troops, Scouts and Constabulary" eventually had to conduct a "vigorous campaign" that drove these outlaws "to the utmost extremities."[52] Violence, however, remained a nagging problem.

In combatting this localized violence, Pershing preferred the Philippine Scouts over Philippine Constabulary. The latter had three strikes against them. They and their American leaders, such as Harry Bandholtz, got along too well with Filipino politicians who could not be trusted. As an arm of civilian government, the constabulary also drained Pershing's meager gubernatorial budget, unlike the scouts, whose pay came from the military. Finally, from Pershing's point of view, the constables lacked discipline.[53] For example, when called upon to settle the Buldun countryside along the Lanao–Cotabato border in early 1909, they had, according to one report, engaged in "wanton destruction, burning houses, destroying cattle and crops," and leaving the place "a deserted waste." Their leader, Lt. Leonard Furlong, allegedly "murdered Datu Kali [Pandapatan], killed approximately one hundred prisoners," and "detained and used for immoral purposes [Moro] women."[54] All of these charges were later refuted. Nevertheless, Pershing's inspection tour of December 1909 convinced him that abuses, if

not atrocities, had too often accompanied constabulary actions in the province. In 1910, he asked that all constabulary forces be removed from his domain.[55] His request went nowhere.

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12. Moro scouts, 1904. Philippine Insurrection File, RG111-SC-85934, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

13. Moro constabulary, date unknown. Box 32/10, RG 350-P, Still Pictures Branch, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.

To keep the peace and maintain everyday contact with inhabitants, Pershing deployed fourteen constabulary and twenty scout companies in forty-two widely scattered posts or garrisoned towns.[56] Not including constables, he commanded 5,500 troops, 3,600 of them American and the rest native scouts. But he needed more, arguing that "hardly a day [went by] … that a report did not come in of disturbance somewhere."[57] He asked specifically for scout reinforcements.[58] But his superior, Gen. Wood, not only turned him down but also removed two scout battalions from the province.[59]

When Pershing lost his bid for more scouts and fewer constables, he concluded that military rule over Moros would not last much longer. That realization profoundly changed his approach to countering insurgency in Moro Province. By mid-1911, he began emphasizing the virtues of civilian rule so long as the highest civil officials hailed from the United States and not the Philippines. Making a virtue of a necessity, he also turned more to constabulary personnel at a time when scouts and American regulars received assignments elsewhere.[60] "White troops and scouts are necessary to suppress or exterminate rebellious bands," he wrote, "but the constabulary is better for the pursuit of individual criminals."[61] And he firmed up his strategy of strengthening Moro Province against Filipino wolves at the door when the American military finally left the province.

As a starting point for building a strong and autonomous Moro Province, Pershing came to the remarkable conclusion that Moros must be disarmed. At first glance, on the one hand, disarming Moros made no sense at a time when the American military's days in Moro Province neared an end. It would be sure to stir the pot and goad angry Moros into full-scale rebellion, necessitating a longer rather than shorter American military commitment. On the other hand, full disarmament might deliver on Pershing's promise to protect Moros not only from outsiders but also from their own bad elements. By reducing widespread Moro outlawry once and for all, it would also encourage American investors to supplement a cash-strapped government that could not afford to prime the pump of economic growth. That government, in turn, could focus on countable improvements in

infrastructure and health care while going slow on more controversial and potentially peace-disturbing initiatives in education, legal reform, gender equality, and democratic institution building. If all went well, perhaps Pershing could hand over the reins of government to civilian Americans in a few short years, declaring victory at last in a thirteen-year-long military campaign against Moro insurgency. In mid-1911, that became the new Pershing strategy.

Pershing's disarmament decision reversed his previous stance on the issue. Back in April 1911, he had written that "the time has not yet come" for disarming Moros, arguing that doing so peacefully would be next to impossible.[62] Three months later the general had "little doubt" that disarmament could "be accomplished if undertaken quietly and resolutely and without publicity or ostentation." "Much," he argued, could "be done through the leading Moros by appealing to their reason and … taking them into one's confidence." He proposed "to license each headman or datto to carry as many arms as I think he will require to enforce law and order in his ward or among his people." In return for this license, the headmen would be expected to "assist in gathering up fire arms and edged weapons" from their "common people." "Some force … may be necessary in a few cases," but "disarmament must come," and Pershing "desire[d] to have it accomplished under the present insular and provincial administration."[63]

Governor General Forbes admitted that he had "been coming slowly to the [same] conclusion." He approved Pershing's "disarmament scheme," opining that his "plan of going at it slowly … [was] extremely wise."[64] With the governor general's approval, Pershing promulgated Executive Order No. 24 on September 21, 1911, declaring it to be

> unlawful for any person within the Moro Province, to acquire, possess or have custody of any rifle, musket, carbine, shotgun, revolver, pistol or other deadly weapon … , or to carry, concealed or otherwise on his person, any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, campilan, spear, or other deadly cutting or thrusting weapon, except tools used exclusively for working purposes having blades less than fifteen inches in length, without permission of the Governor of the Moro Province … , or unless otherwise authorized by law to possess and carry such weapons.[65]

To say that this disarmament order sparked controversy would be an understatement. Pershing himself acknowledged that many people with "considerable experience among the Moros" opposed it as "unfair" for criminalizing "a custom that had existed for hundreds of years among them."[66] Col. James G. Harbord, head of the Philippine Constabulary, confessed to having "little faith in a peaceful disarmament," given that "the kris … is as much a part of the well-bred Moro's dress as trousers are of ours."[67] And Gen. Wood agreed, criticizing the order as "extremely ill-timed" and doubting the need for it, given the improving peace-and-order situation in Moro Province.[68]

In addition to raising eyebrows among his contemporaries, Pershing's disarmament order contradicts the American military's twenty-firstcentury *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. "Counterinsurgent activities intended to be benign or benevolent," it warns, "might have negative results if the populace's perceptions are not considered." By way of example, the manual specifies how confiscating weapons, even from criminals, might be perceived by locals as unfair when those criminals are seen as providing protection (like Robin Hood) against corrupt officials and police.[69]

Pershing dismissed caveats of this sort, writing to Frankie that it would be "an error to sit idly by and let these savages shoot you up without going after them, politics or no politics."[70] So long as it remained legal for Moro men to carry arms in public, Moro Province would maintain its reputation as "a dangerous place, where no man's life was safe," he wrote in a later annual report. "Possible settlers and investors" would continue to hesitate before investing or settling there. Outlawry, especially in Lanao and Sulu, would just go on and on. The military could never, in good conscience, declare their mission accomplished. He could never turn control over to American civilians with confidence that they would succeed in building a progressive, stable and durable Moro polity. He had a job to finish, even if "the result should be a general uprising or a holy war."[71]

To sweeten the pot and also remain consistent with his longstanding inclination to work amicably with local Moro leaders, the general offered two enticements. First, he would pay for all arms turned in before December 1, 1911. And, second, he would consider granting his "permission" to cooperating Moro leaders that they could continue carrying arms as a reward for helping to disarm their *sakop*. As he had explained to Forbes, those

leaders would be expected to help collect weapons from the “common people” in return for the privilege of bearing arms. Far from threatening the *datu* leadership structure, therefore, the disarmament order actually had the potential to strengthen the power of cooperating *datus*. It might even co-opt them into the American-led authority structure. Aside from Philippine Constabulary personnel and scouts, they would be the only people permitted to carry weapons.

It was a bold and perhaps foolhardy move. But in the context of Pershing’s evolving strategy—to ensure domestic tranquility, effect measurable public improvements, and turn over governance to American civilians—it made all the sense in the world. And to anyone who might object, he could answer that the military bore responsibility to secure order and prepare the people for civilian tutelage. After two years of talking and testing the waters, Pershing had come up with a defining strategy. It remained to be seen if he could bring it off.

Success in implementing the new order called for disarming Moros in a flexible and gradual way. Flexibility would be exercised by prioritizing the collection of firearms over cutting weapons.[72] Because Moros did not possess large numbers of guns, and because troops had been confiscating the guns anyway (especially if they had gone missing from American encampments), this first step did not impress residents as a great change right away. And troops did not immediately start descending on villages to collect guns, preferring to wait and see how many Moros turned in their weapons for cash. Even after the deadline for reimbursements had passed in December, Pershing adopted a gradual approach. He did not begin seizing guns in all five districts at the same time. Rather, he exercised caution in the two most volatile regions—Lanao and Sulu.

In Lanao, he feared that forcibly confiscating guns would drive pacified Maranaos into the arms of armed bands still roaming the countryside. To prevent this, he did not immediately order the aggressive seizure of firearms. He also sought to isolate the outlaws. In particular, he went after Ampuan Agaus, who continued to defy all efforts to track him down. The son of Cotabato’s late *datu,* Ali, posed another threat and may have joined Agaus in the rugged country east of Lake Lanao.[73] Other bands had also eluded capture in the Buldun region along the Cotabato border. Together with

Ampuan Agaus and Ali's son, they had attained heroic stature among locals as social bandits.

Pershing pulled out all the stops, deploying "white troops" as well as scouts and constables from three "semi-permanent camps" to hound the Lanao Moros into submission. Within a month of his disarmament order, he reported that "the Moros of Lake Lanao have been practically disarmed." Not so. Rather than withering, disaffection in Lanao spread even to the constabulary, as eleven Moro constables deserted with sixteen rifles, suddenly becoming well-armed and trained outlaws. Already chary of constabulary personnel, Pershing withdrew all Moro constables from field operations in Lanao, contending that their "sense of loyalty … to the Government counts but little against the influence of their Panditas."[74]

The year 1912 witnessed scout, regular-army, and (non-Moro) constabulary units "incessantly hounding" Ampuan Agaus and other disaffected elements in Lanao. They failed to catch Agaus, but a year later Pershing felt justified in declaring the district "as peaceful as any part of … Moro Province," with no more than "fifty unauthorized arms left." By that time, they had destroyed, captured, or driven off all outlaw leaders except Agaus.[75] Meanwhile, pacified Moros joined work details "constructing roads on both sides of Lake Lanao," and "ninetynine Moros out of a hundred in that district honestly desire[d] to aid us in maintaining peaceful conditions."[76]

For all the headaches that Maranao Moros gave their American pursuers, Tausug Moros on Jolo Island gave them even more. Pershing wrote a plaintive and paternalistic letter to *datus* in the Taglibi District who had fired on troops sent to disarm them. "I am sorry the soldiers had to kill any Moros," he lamented. "All Moros are the same to me as my children, and no father wants to kill his own children." He continued: "I want my children to come in and stop fighting.… Too many Moros and their women may be killed…. I do not want to punish you and your people any more. If you turn in your guns, no one will be arrested and your people may return to their homes to cultivate their fields. If your people need rice to eat, the government will give it to them."[77]

Despite his assertion that "we do not want any more fighting," Pershing ordered five columns of troops to march through Taglibi District, aggressively confiscating firearms. "I have moved so swiftly and so

secretly," he wrote Frankie, "that the Moros are … scared to death."[78] Predictably, "scared to death" Moros fled, and in December 1911 hundreds of them began congregating once again atop Bud Dajo, hallowed site of the massacre in 1906. For the general, it seemed that his critics had been right after all. His worst nightmare, another massacre of women and children on Bud Dajo, looked imminent, with him rather than Leonard Wood as the chief villain.

Approximately 600 Moros, armed with some 100 rifles and including women and children, occupied Bud Dajo's crater.[79] By mid-December 1911, they had constructed fortifications that Pershing described as "rather formidable."[80] They had not, however, accumulated supplies sufficient to withstand a prolonged siege. Pershing took personal command and surrounded the mountain with close to 1,400 infantry, cavalry, artillery, scout, and constabulary troops.[81] It helped that Americans knew the Bud Dajo terrain well, thanks to maps from the engagement in 1906. They had even named each of the main trails after an officer involved in that battle. But this time they carved lateral trails some 300 yards from the crater, connecting their outposts and exposing some sixteen or seventeen more footpaths hitherto unknown to them. "I think we have got this place so thoroughly closed in that a cat could not sneak out," Pershing boasted to Frankie.[82]

Once Pershing had sealed off all access to the mountain top, he called upon Moro allies to intercede and persuade their compatriots to let their women and children leave. Nothing worried him more than the possible slaughter of innocents whom he, their American father figure, had promised to protect. "These women and children on Dajo distress me very much," he confided in his diary on December 19. "Am going to get them down if possible" by shutting off their supplies "until these people are forced down and out. I can wait."[83] Counseling "patience," he wrote to Gen. Franklin Bell, then commander of the U.S. Army's Philippine Division: "It is not my purpose to make any grandstand play … and get a lot of soldiers killed, and massacre a lot of Moros, including women and children." "No one man of any prominence" exercised authority over these "foolish" people. Assaulting Bud Dajo would only make them "resolve to die and try to get as many people to die with them as they can."[84]

Pershing may have been right about the “foolish” people atop Bud Dajo, but he didn’t try very hard to figure them out. Most of them didn’t possess firearms. Why, then, did they object to disarmament? Did it occur to him that they had fled to the mountain just as American troops came marching through their villages? Might there be a connection? In the meantime, they certainly suffered from hunger, poverty, and powerlessness, yet the troops surrounding them made little effort to mitigate their misery. Missing throughout the confrontation was any American effort to sit down and talk with or try to understand them. Negotiations with a man named Panglima Unga focused only on getting them to lay down their arms and come down. Pershing, in his certainty that these people objected solely to his disarmament order, did nothing to address deeper causes of their distress.

Nevertheless, the siege strategy worked. Between December 19 and 23, Moro men, women, and children gradually gave themselves up. By Christmas Eve day 1911, the crater stood deserted. Except for some mopping up in which six Moros were killed and forty-eight others captured, the second battle of Bud Dajo thus ended without major bloodshed.[85] In all, one American and two Philippine Scouts had been wounded, and twelve Moros killed. The campaign represented Pershing’s finest hour as governor of Moro Province. Described by Cameron Forbes as “extremely masterly,” it received praise as “one of the army’s finest moments in the southern Philippines.”[86]

Even as accolades poured in, however, Pershing worried about Moros from the ever-simmering Taglibi District. In 1912, they had begun “talking of fortifying [Bud] Bagsak, a peak about 2,200 feet high” situated inland from the north coast of Jolo. “This crowd will be larger than Daho,” he predicted. “I should dread to think of having to kill women and children.”[87]

How many more mountains would defiant Jolo Moros turn into fortresses before they accepted Pershing’s disarmament order? He had avoided a massacre on Bud Dajo, denying journalists lurid copy of innocents slaughtered. Thank heaven for that because his friend and fellow Progressive, President William Howard Taft, disapproved of grizzly reports about Americans massacring Moros, fearing that such news could be used against him in his reelection campaign. For Pershing, it all added up to one thing: time to back off on disarmament, at least in Jolo, until after Taft’s reelection bid ended in November 1912.[88] He may not have been much of a politician, but he understood that much about politics.

Pershing's go-slow strategy worked for a while, but in December 1912 (after Taft lost the election to Woodrow Wilson) he renewed his disarmament campaign. Then on January 23, 1913, a combined force of scouts and constables, supported by a mountain-gun detachment, assaulted a *cotta* near Taglibi town where Datu Sahipa defied the order to disarm. It proved to be a much bloodier fight than the attackers had anticipated. Ten of them were killed, and twenty-three wounded, while Sahipa suffered fifty killed and many others wounded, and he just barely escaped with his life. Within days, Moros "stampeded to Bagsak," just as Pershing had feared.[89] Once again, he tried to outwit them as he had done on Bud Dajo, but once again he did little to address their deeper grievances. Within days, the multitude of disaffected Moros atop Bud Bagsak grew from hundreds to thousands. Their open defiance of disarmament made violent confrontation all but inevitable.

A decade earlier, when faced with open defiance in Lanao, Datu Pershing had met and tirelessly negotiated with Maranao leaders in long *bicharas* for which he became famous. Not so in 1913. He never sat down and talked face-to-face with Panglima Naquib Amil or any other Tausug Moro on Bud Bagsak. He relied, instead, on Sultan Kiram, a man for whom he had nothing but disdain,[90] and on Datu Mandi, a very westernized and pro-American Muslim from Zamboanga who struck Moro dissidents as only slightly less foreign than Pershing himself. If the American commander sought to avoid conflict again, his lack of personal contact with opposing leaders raises questions of his sincerity. On the one hand, there can be no question of his genuine desire to avoid killing women and children. On the other hand, if he could find a way to get innocents (estimated to outnumber warriors by five to six times) off the mountain, he wouldn't object to killing every Moro fighter who stayed behind. With the end of American military occupation looming, time was running out to complete the task of pacifying Moro Province once and for all. This might be his last opportunity to teach Moros a hard lesson: cooperate with American authorities or die.[91]

But perhaps that wouldn't be necessary. Following his Bud Dajo strategy, Pershing drew a noose of troops around Bagsak, hoping that slow strangulation would force dissidents to the negotiating table. "My avowed and announced policy … has been to disarm them by any means except by fighting," he wrote Forbes. "I … am especially anxious to avoid a big fight. I have been trying to scare, bluff or tire them out, and am willing to do

anything, except run away, to avoid shooting them up."[92] Once again, this strategy worked, and in mid-February Panglima Amil signaled his willingness to negotiate. There followed some weeks of talks, capped by a three-hour conference between the sultan, Datu Mandi, and Panglima Amil on March 7. In return for promises of amnesty and troop withdrawal, Amil agreed to come down with his people. He did not, however, acquiesce to surrendering his firearms. Even though Pershing had given in and not insisted on disarmament, he rejoiced in yet another victory achieved with minimal bloodshed.[93]

Without disarmament, the March 7, 1913, agreement could best be described as a temporary truce. Through March and April, Pershing exerted pressure on Amil to surrender his firearms. "Guns are all we want," he pledged, agreeing to let the *panglima*'s followers keep their cutting weapons.[94] But Amil steadfastly held onto his guns, and by late May he and his warriors had returned to Bagsak, openly declaring "that they would never lay down their arms."[95] Concluding that the time had come to disarm these people by force, Pershing began making plans for a surprise attack that would catch Amil's war party atop the mountain and destroy them before their families could get in the way.[96]

Fearing that even rumors of an American attack might send hundreds of women and children stampeding up the mountain, Pershing maintained strict secrecy. He had never, he said, "done so much lying in his life," ruefully admitting that he "didn't let even his most intimate officers know what he was planning."[97] Quietly, he mobilized an expeditionary force of some 1,000 troops, including two companies of Moro scouts (the Fifty-First, comprising Maguindanaos from Cotabato, and the Fifty-Second, made up of Maranaos from Lanao).[98] Under cover of darkness and heavy rain on June 10–11, they converged at Bun Bun on the coast just north of Bud Bagsak. Personally commanding the force, Pershing declared that their objective consisted of disarming, "with as little loss of life as possible, those hostile Moros who have refused to give up their arms." Split into three columns, they attacked at daybreak on June 11, 1913.[99]

There ensued "probably no fiercer battle since American occupation."[100] Thanks to the element of surprise, Pershing's troops got to within 1,200 yards of the Moro positions before encountering resistance.[101] Once discovered at 7:15 a.m., they came under withering fire. All morning they

fought. One of the two Moro scout companies, the Fifty-First, scaled "a sheer cliff hand-over-hand on bejuco vines for a hundred feet or more" as they assaulted one stronghold. The Fifty-Second, together with another company of Philippine Scouts, crawled and climbed "through … heavy timber and dense underbrush," surprising and taking a second fortress in hand-to-hand fighting. By shortly after noon, troops occupied three strong points that had been their first day's objective, closing Bagsak's crater to any Moro reinforcements or family members. They spent the afternoon repelling repeated attempts to dislodge them.[102]

Despite their first day's success, it took four more days of bitter fighting to clear the mountain. On June 12, Amil and his son led "successive rushes" against Americans defending a mountain gun that effectively shelled Moro positions. The attacks failed, and Amil died in leading them, but the Moros refused to give up. Pershing's forces returned to the offensive on June 13, assaulting and eventually taking another stronghold in a savage struggle. Meanwhile, the general and a small detachment crawled up the crater's ridge to within seventy-five yards of the Bagsak *cotta* in a hazardous reconnaissance mission. By daybreak on June 14, the mountain gun (disassembled and hand carried up the precipitous terrain) began wreaking havoc on that *cotta* as the strongest fortress still standing.[103]

Still, the Moros fought on. On June 14, the two Moro scout companies, supported by a cavalry detachment and mountain gun, fought their way to a knoll within 600 yards of the *cotta*. After spending a sleepless night awaiting expected bolo attacks, those scouts, covered by the cavalry and two other scout companies, moved forward through the lifting fog. Their advance up a steep and exposed ridge took nine hours of fighting "characterized by ferocious, fanatical counter attacks by groups of Moros."[104] Ahead of them lay "a succession of standing trenches connected with each other and protected by heavy logs and earth."[105]

"Things at this time looked rather precarious," Pershing's aide James Collins wrote in his diary.[106] When his boss ordered more American officers to help lead the assault, attacking troops finally broke through.[107] "The few Moros still alive jumped out of their trenches and hurled themselves at our line," remembered Collins.[108] The commander of the Fifty-First Company reported that the Moros yelled defiance and threw "spears, bolos, rocks, cooking utensils and every conceivable object."[109] "I doubt," wrote Collins,

if there was a man on Bagsak at the finish who had not the greatest admiration for the enemy and the courageous stand he had made."[110] Fighting to the last man, Moro defenders killed six scouts and wounded thirteen.[111]

The last strong point finally fell late on the afternoon of June 15, ending the battle of Bud Bagsak after five brutal days of fighting.[112] "A number of hostile Moros escaped," but not many. Pershing estimated that some 500 warriors had defended the mountain, and it appears likely that most of them perished.[113] The victors collected 180 guns.[114] American and Philippine losses totaled fifteen killed (three Americans, three Philippine Scouts, and nine Moro scouts) and twenty-five wounded (six Americans, six Philippine Scouts, and thirteen Moro scouts).[115] Despite the fact that they had suffered more casualties than any other unit, the two Moro scout companies received orders to stay behind while all other troops withdrew. There atop Bud Bagsak, they buried the Moro dead. It took them five days.[116]

That many Tausug Moros died on Bud Bagsak cannot be denied. Whether the dead numbered 300 or 500, a terrible slaughter had occurred between June 11 and June 15, 1913.[117] As many as 100 Moros had perished for every three troopers. Pershing did not count the dead. Body counts measured brutality rather than victory, in his mind. They infuriated Filipinos—Muslims and non-Muslims alike—and riled up the home front by reminding people of the violent side to American colonial beneficence. Body counts also corroborated a counternarrative that raised doubts about the popularity of America's civilizing mission in the Philippines by revealing how many Moros would rather die than accept American rule. That counternarrative embarrassed colonial officials and reenergized anti-imperialist calls for Philippine independence. Best not to talk about body counts. Best to dismiss Amil and his people as "hopeless fanatics, … cattle thieves and desperadoes."[118]

Many years later, in the minds of Moro National Liberation Front members Bud Bagsak became synonymous with American imperial cruelty and anti-Islamic animus. For Pershing and his peers, it represented an equally historic event, but for very different reasons. It marked, for them, the last great battle in a fourteen-year-long campaign to pacify the Moros. Over that time span, a small but violent minority of Philippine Muslims had persistently resisted

American efforts to pacify them. The Americans had learned a degree of patience in dealing with those rebels. They had discovered (not without making “errors of judgment”) a third way in counterinsurgency warfare between the direct approach of Gen. Wood in 1903–1906 and the indirect methods of Gen. Bliss in 1906–1909. They had cultivated strong interpersonal relationships with Moro *datus*. They had begun to reconceptualize themselves as paternalistic protectors of Moros, while rebranding diehard insurgents as common criminals or religious fanatics. They had emphasized shared Moro and American interests in standing up against outsiders. And they had largely avoided domestic American criticism of antidemocratic Moro customs except for slavery. In the meantime, they had dared to disarm Moros in the interest of long-term stability and order, knowing that separating Moro men from their cherished weapons would occasion short-term unrest and outrage. After Bagsak, Pershing believed that Moros could rightfully welcome the dawn of a new era. At last, he could declare the military’s job “well done,” turn over command to American civil servants, and go home.[119]

9

Declaring Victory

The third-way counterinsurgency strategy that Jack Pershing formulated and came to practice in Moro Province between 1911 and 1913 took a while and required a great deal of experimentation. It eventually included the following critical elements in addition to its emphasis on building strong interpersonal relationships with Moros:

1. Redefine Moro insurgency. No longer regard Americans and Moros as adversaries but rather as allies in a common struggle against potentially threatening outsiders, such as Filipino nationalists opposed to Moro autonomy.
2. In this new struggle of Americans and Moros against Filipino integrationists (especially in hostile Zamboanga town), cultivate allies in high places.
3. Small-scale and localized warfare should permanently replace regular-army maneuvers. Train and deploy, where possible, Moro scouts and constabulary to keep the peace and win Moro trust.
4. In a three-stage strategy, most of stage one—clearing—had been accomplished, stage two (holding) should be emphasized, and stage three (building) should get started. But beginning to build a viable Moro polity requires disarming Moros. In a firm but flexible manner, complete the task of pacification by isolating recalcitrants on mountaintops and defeating them without great loss of life to women and children. Once the military has completed stage one and most of stage two, it can turn over control to American civilian administrators with confidence that stage three can be fully implemented by them.
5. In counterinsurgency warfare, fighting should contribute not only to pacification and stabilization but also to a long-term political solution.

Helping to create a strong and legitimate Moro leadership cadre represents a key goal.

6. If political legitimacy holds true as a principal goal, then tactical flexibility represents the primary means for achieving that goal.
7. Unity of effort between American civilians and military personnel as well as between Americans and an emerging Moro leadership cadre cannot be overemphasized. The governor, thanks to his control of both military and civil matters, occupies an ideal position to do this. Civic action should follow pacification, although budget constraints limit infrastructure improvements in the short term.
8. Facing severely limited budgetary resources, encourage American capital investment to help prime the pump of economic growth in the province.
9. Constraining Progressive reformist impulses to build schoolhouses, liberate women, and launch regular elections makes sense for the time being. Stick to the principle of keeping the state separate from religion by not interfering in Muslim religious practices. Over the long term, however, urge civil authorities to implement Progressive reforms gradually.
10. Disarming recalcitrants, training new Moro leaders, and starting to build a legitimate Moro political state—all of these steps will take time. Americans need to make a long-term commitment to their former adversaries, the Philippine Muslims. That commitment, however, should not be purely military. The army should leave the bulk of stage three to American civilians, declaring victory and heading for home.

Chapter 8 examined the first four elements of Pershing's counterinsurgency strategy. This chapter discusses the remaining six, beginning with the second part of point four—preparing to transition from American military to civilian control.

As early as April 1913, Pershing had begun making the case for American troop withdrawal and the transfer of power from American military to civilian leaders. "The time is near," he wrote Governor General Forbes, "when, without any changes in the form of government, the governorship of Moro Province and other important offices … might wisely be placed in civil hands."[1] American troops stationed in the province had

already been reduced from four regiments to one and a half. American officers, once regarded by Pershing as crucial for the effective governance of all five districts, had never actually been the best choice for these positions after all.[2] Their average tenure in office had been only one year and two months.[3] Here today and gone tomorrow, they would be transferred just when they had begun to win the local Moro leaders' trust. In any event, they had ceased to be indispensable because "the end of opposition … [was] at hand." Even before the campaign at Bagsak, American civilians had replaced military governors in three of five districts. Fourteen constabulary companies (later raised to eighteen[4]) could adequately keep the peace. "With selected men of our own race as officials," Pershing concluded, "the work of civilization so splendidly begun … under the military regime may be carried on under a civil regime without halt or hindrance."[5]

Just four days after the fighting ended on Bud Bagsak, Governor Pershing formally recommended that all remaining American troops be ordered out of Moro Province. In addition to the constabulary companies, twenty companies of scouts would be "enough … to maintain peace." Those scouts—especially the Fifty-First and Fifty-Second Companies of Moro scouts—had proven their mettle in the Bagsak battle. Not for nothing had he made them into the point of the spear and then left them behind to bury the dead. Could he trust them to remain loyal? In response, they had resoundingly answered, "Yes!" They could, indeed, be depended on. Clearly, the need for large-scale military occupation of Moro Province had ended.[6]

In Pershing's mind, therefore, Bud Bagsak signified an end to the second of three phases of counterinsurgency: clear, hold, and build. After years of clearing out pockets of insurgents, he had succeeded in holding Moro society in a state of relative security and stability. Having confiscated more than 7,000 firearms, he had sufficiently disarmed Moros so that the third phase of counterinsurgency could proceed at full speed.[7] He had cleared and held; now it was the time to build.

Civilian Americans would do most of the heavy lifting in building a new Moro society, but the military had already made a start. Pershing had begun the process by shaking up the political elite—championing selected new leaders and shunning discredited old chieftains such as the Sulu sultan—in

an effort to legitimize a new and pro-American leadership cadre. He promoted secular education, although not as aggressively as some Americans wanted. He advocated changes in the legal system, making it better attuned to American concepts of good jurisprudence. He took pride in the construction of new roads and bridges linking remote parts of his domain with coastal centers of trade. He sponsored public-health improvements. And he primed the pump for economic development, commerce, and foreign investment, most specifically by hosting a great fair in Zamboanga. In sum, he aimed to build a strong foundation for Moro Province's long-term viability while retaining a fairly light imperial presence. It would remain for civilians to finish the job.

In legitimizing a new, progressive, and pro-American leadership cadre, Pershing began by recommending a house cleaning of old leaders, such as Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram II, whom he described as a "puppet" and a man of "licentious nature." "By his lack of character and by his habits," he had "lost the respect of his people." He had spent his government stipend "in the maintenance of an excessive number of wives and concubines." In short, he had "forfeited" his right to continue receiving an annual stipend of $3,000. He could, of course, continue acting as head of the Islamic religion in Sulu. The United States would always honor the separation of church and state in its colonial territory. It should not, however, continue depending on the discredited sultan for any secular leadership.[8]

Not that Pershing had depended on the Sulu sultan anyway. He had come to rely mainly on Hadji Butu, Datu Mandi, Datu Piang, and, in Lanao, remnants of Amai Manibilang's network. These allies, however, could not be described as members of a new leadership group. Pershing's approach had always been to draw leaders from the ranks of hereditary chiefs rather than to promote new names from among their followers. "The authority of … hereditary chiefs should not be broken down without something better to replace it," he advised in 1910, and he followed that practice throughout his tenure as governor.[9] Instead of threatening the old *datu* structure by instituting free and open democratic elections, he preferred to train the old to create the new.

He did this in three ways. First, he continued to enlist hundreds of Moros from leading families as Moro scouts and constables, disciplining and training them to fight (under American tutelage, of course) for a more

peaceful, prosperous, and modern way of life. Second, he set out to co-opt "the headmen and leading datus" by frequently calling them together, as he had in Lanao back in 1903, to discuss with their respective district governors "questions affecting the general welfare," while impressing on them "the purposes and aims of the government."[10] And third, he appointed seven Moros as deputy district governors (two in Lanao, one in Cotabato, one in Zamboanga, and three in Sulu). This experiment aimed to show "that loyal and efficient service is rewarded; and … to develop sufficient native talent … to fill minor governmental offices in the future."[11]

Pershing did not undertake to mold a modern leadership cadre in a more direct and ambitious way, such as by creating a school specifically for the sons of *datus*. That had been tried in 1906 and had failed.[12] The governor did authorize annual government scholarships for five Moros (later raised to ten) to attend high school in Zamboanga in an effort to "build up a corps of Moro teachers."[13] He also praised a school for Moro girls that opened in Cotabato, and, like Bliss, he promoted agricultural and trade schools for boys in each district.[14] But he "disavowed any intention of interfering with the [Moro] religion" and preferred to go slow on education rather than take the chance of sparking a backlash from Moro leaders anywhere in the province.[15] Under his leadership, the education budget remained stuck at a level below that of 1907. Only in 1913, the year of his departure, did he finally approve a larger budget outlay for education.[16] By that time, 7,568 students attended school in the province, 68 percent boys and 32 percent mostly non-Muslim girls, with an average daily attendance of 4,535. That marked an enrollment increase of 18 percent over the previous year. Of this total, however, Moro students numbered only 1,825, up from 1,274 in 1912 but representing only 24 percent of the overall enrollment in 1913.[17]

Pershing's conservative and don't-make-waves approach toward building a viable, pro-American, and politically legitimate local Moro leadership cadre can best be seen in his treatment of *datus* as legal authorities. *Datus* had a vested interest in maintaining the old order and opposing any changes that might jeopardize their power. In particular, they opposed any threat to their arbitration prerogative in settling disputes among their *sakop*. If those *sakop* appealed for justice to American judges rather than to their *datus*, they would be declaring, for all intents and purposes, independence from their traditional chiefs. *Datus*, therefore, stood in the way of any meaningful

progress toward building a more egalitarian society led by democratically inclined new leaders.[18]

How, then, to build a new cadre of Moro chiefs without alienating the *datus*, on whom the Americans continued to depend for the preservation of peace and order? "Up to the present," Pershing wrote in his annual report for 1913, it had been necessary to work through "the local leaders as we have found them. And we are hardly yet prepared to disturb the peaceful operation of this rather loose organization, but must continue it until … we can substitute something better for it."[19]

The general's solution to this dilemma consisted of leaving the *datu* arbitration system in place at the local level but refashioning the American-mandated Tribal Ward Court system so that Moro commoners would come to favor it over their *datu* arbitrators. As a rule, Moros liked to rely upon "the man immediately over … [them to] get quick action with as little red tape as possible."[20] The new system would not threaten "the man immediately over" them—that is, the *datu*. But it, too, would offer "quick action." As before, aggrieved parties could appeal their *datus'* decision to the Tribal Ward Court. But now they had the added option of circumventing their *datus* and seeking justice directly, thereby helping to break the cycle of dependence that had hitherto prevented them from gaining personal independence. Act 268, passed by the Moro Province Legislative Council on June 8, 1911, gave Tribal Ward Courts (composed of the district governor and district secretary) the right to try and determine all civil cases in which the settlement did not exceed 2,000 pesos and all criminal cases other than those involving capital punishment.[21] The Tribal Ward Courts thus brought the American system of jurisprudence directly to the people. Wrote Pershing about this new legal modus operandi, "The Moros are very much pleased with the change. District governors [who visit their tribal wards regularly] are likely as a rule to be lenient, but judgment is reached at once, … and all concerned go back to work."[22]

Pershing admitted that his administration continued to work with "the native organization" (i.e., the *datu* system), but he insisted that the slow process of social change had begun. Under American tutelage, the individual Moro had learned "to strike out for himself and become something more than a dependent and ignorant retainer." The American colonial regime had "recognized personal and private rights" by abolishing

slavery and registering land in privately owned and surveyed lots. As one of those American colonialists, he had spread secular education “as rapidly as circumstances would warrant.” And his Tribal Ward Courts had started removing “the administration of justice from the arbitrary control of the mercenary datus, … [placing] it in the hands of a disinterested judiciary.” “The power of the datu … [was] being gradually superseded.” Slowly but surely, the Moro people had begun progressing “along the path of individual evolution.” With any luck, they would eventually have “a fair chance in competition with other Filipino people.”[23]

Beyond his modest attempts to forge a modern leadership cadre, Pershing engaged in a full spectrum of civic actions aimed to advance agriculture, commerce, trade, and the general health and prosperity in Moro Province. Here again, his efforts remained less than robust owing to a very tight budget. In his first full year as governor, Moro Province’s expenditures exceeded revenues by almost 28,000 pesos (779,575 pesos to 751,776). Unexpended carry-over balances and refunds saved the day, but cuts clearly had to be made, and it “became necessary to close down public works” except for basic maintenance.[24] Instead of making major civic improvements, therefore, the new governor had to start out by reducing expenditures, which he did to 508,831 pesos in 1911.[25] Against revenues of 755,631 pesos, that made for a surplus of 246,800 pesos. All of that surplus, however, got eaten up the following year when expenditures of 1,124,158 pesos far exceeded revenues of only 728,123.[26] By 1913, the budget imbalance had not improved, requiring loans to make up the difference. Although the governor’s annual report that year did not include a full treasurer’s report and never mentioned total expenditures against revenues of 735,308 pesos, expenses for public works and education alone encumbered most of that amount.[27] We can conclude that revenue limitations throughout Governor Pershing’s tenure greatly hampered his ability to effect major improvements in infrastructure and education.[28]

Perhaps if he could clean the place up a little, spruce up the towns, and improve Moro sanitary habits, maybe that would help attract more outside investment. Governor General Forbes had been appalled by the filth and general disorder in Moro Province. “I did not like the way … public works were handled,” he wrote just before Pershing arrived in 1909. “Road

maintenance … [was] in worse shape than is in any way excusable." As for the Moro food markets, their general state of squalor "would have caused the suspension of Filipino presidentes in the civilized provinces."[29] No wonder that Moro mortality rates remained high, especially for infants.[30]

Pershing wasted little time in declaring war on all diseases, but in many cases his efforts took the form of supporting private, nonprofit initiatives rather than funding projects from his meager budget. The establishment of thirty-seven dispensaries across the province proved to be the most significant exception to that rule. These outlets provided medicines and medical treatment to local inhabitants, who paid for the service only if they could afford to do so. Moros flocked to these dispensaries, making them perhaps the single most popular feature of the entire American occupation. For more serious medical cases, Moros had access to military hospitals. Moros in Zamboanga could also choose a small, municipal hospital, and residents of Davao had available a private, twenty-bed hospital in that town. Some 7,472 patients received treatment in that private facility in the first half of 1913 alone.[31] The governor enforced sanitary rules in all eight municipalities (Zamboanga, Jolo, Davao, Cotabato, Malabang, Dapitan, Iligan, and Siasi). He detailed two companies of Moro scouts as sanitary inspectors in Zamboanga, where they and local authorities stamped out an epidemic of cholera in the town.[32] He served as president of a free dispensary in Zamboanga to feed sick infants and to instruct their mothers in hygienic feeding and caring for children. He saw to it that students at the summer Normal School learned about tuberculosis, malaria, and other common diseases and about healthy practices in their classes. Meanwhile, health officials regularly inspected the sanitary condition of schools and made occasional visits to remote settlements in their districts.[33] In Zamboanga, they taught hygiene and the use of antiseptics to local midwives. And in all municipalities (if not tribal wards) "the systematic daily collection and disposition of human waste" was monitored, leading Pershing to claim that visitors "generally looked upon [Moro Province towns] as models of cleanliness."[34]

Missing in this list of public-health accomplishments, unfortunately, is any mention of a provincial hospital. It must also be noted that most of the sanitary improvements occurred in the eight municipalities, while tribal ward settlements only occasionally saw a health official. Provincial

authorities made “considerable effort … to sink artesian wells,” but their attempts met with little success. Outside of Zamboanga town, not a single civilian physician practiced in the whole province.[35] Throughout Pershing’s tenure as governor, budget totals for public health remained meager at best (15,255 pesos in 1909; 26,852 in 1910; only 8,890 in 1911; figures for 1912 and 1913 not available).[36] To the extent that Pershing led a war on disease, therefore, he had to do it on the cheap.

If he could just prime the pump a little, he hoped that the economy would grow and afford him a rising tax base. Given the reality of a tight budget, however, he had to impose new taxes just to pay the bills. In May 1911, he raised the assessed value of property in order to increase the land-tax revenue, but those revenues grew incrementally at best.[37] Annual *cedula* collections of one peso per adult male didn’t rise any faster.[38] And road-tax revenues failed to help prime any pumps either.[39] Throughout Pershing’s tenure, Moro Province remained stubbornly dependent on customs receipts.[40]

Perhaps he could attract foreign-capital investors to help grow the province’s economy. With this in mind, Pershing hosted a grand trade fair in Zamboanga in February 1911. “For the first time in history,” some 20,000 Moros, *lumads*, and Christian Filipinos “peaceably assembled together for friendly intercourse.”[41] They exhibited their trade wares, put on dramatic exhibitions, and marched through town in a colorful array of Moro finery. Governor General Forbes, always an advocate for capital investments in the province, attended and praised the fair lavishly. Other Americans raised the possibility of breaking Mindanao away from the rest of the Philippine Islands, reserving it for American investments as a separate protectorate. This idea went nowhere, thanks to Forbes’s firm determination not to alienate the great majority of Filipinos who regarded Moro secession as nothing less than national amputation. American investors, therefore, stayed back, fearing that the peace-and-order situation in Moro Province might deteriorate once the era of American military rule ended.

The principal exception to this rule involved American plantation owners, especially in Davao.[42] Pershing had conflicted feelings about these expatriots, as we have seen. On the one hand, he praised them as “pioneer[s],” “broad-minded, sturdy, self-reliant and determined,” under whose guidance Moros would become “industrious and peaceful.”[43]

Privately, however, he had doubts. Planters oftentimes did not provide shelter for their laborers, who had "to work out in the broiling sun or the pouring rain," supporting their families on a "pittance." No wonder that these Americans had trouble finding and keeping their workers![44] At the very least they had to "get along with wild labor," by which Pershing meant the tribal minorities (Bagobo, Manobo, Tiruay, and others), who would offer a localized and readily accessible labor supply if treated decently.[45]

In addition to protecting Moros from exploitative trading practices, and in spite of his doubts about American planters, Pershing tried to be a booster for economic growth and entrepreneurship. "This Province certainly has a great future," he wrote Clarence Edwards, the director of the U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs, urging him to advertise Mindanao among potential investors. "We are very anxious to do all that is possible to encourage Americans to come here for investment. As you know, there stands the great, rich Cotabato Valley ready to make millionaires out of men who have the courage to judiciously invest a few dollars." Beyond that valley, opportunities abounded for the "cultivation of rubber, hemp, tapioca and rice," and vast expanses awaited development in forestry and ranching.[46] Pershing turned the San Ramon Prison Farm into an "experimental station for trying out all sorts of new plants and methods." He promoted the building of a railroad in Lanao District.[47] He supported individual investors by trying to have the allowable time period for a foreign concession extended from twenty to thirty or even forty years.[48] And he promised "to provide labor for any enterprise desiring to locate in the Moro Province," as he wrote to *Manila Times* editor Martin Egan, asking that Egan advertise Mindanao in his newspaper.[49] In hopes of attracting investors, he also sought unsuccessfully to increase the size of plantations permitted by the colonial regime, hoping that an increase beyond the 1,024-hectare (2,500-acre) limit would spur Americans to take the risk. "Every encouragement should be extended to capital to enter the virgin field of Mindanao," he wrote, predicting that investors would help "to develop the almost unlimited areas available for rice, cocoanuts, rubber, hemp and sugar cane."[50]

The general's efforts to prime the commercial pump and attract foreign investors helped spur development of a cash-crop economy in Moro Province, where exports tripled from 2,135,386 to 6,468,587 pesos in value

between 1909 and 1913.[51] Pershing insisted that Moros would prove to be a good investment, regardless of the risks and obstacles. He even tried his own hand at making money. Together with constabulary leaders Col. James Harbord and Capt. Mark Hersey, he invested in the Kolambugan Lumber Company. When the company applied for a lumber concession near Iligan, Pershing saw to it that Moro Province complied. When War Department secretary Lindley Garrison got wind of this flagrant conflict of interest, he asked Pershing's longtime nemesis, Leonard Wood, then the army's chief of staff, about the possibility of a court-martial. Wood recommended publishing a letter of censure, writing, "I cannot imagine what got so good a man as Harbord into it," but "I am not at all surprised to find Pershing in it."[52] Tipped off by Gen. Franklin Bell, Pershing quickly sold his shares in the company and avoided censure. By then, though, he had already left Moro Province and headed for home.[53]

Whereas the Kolambugan case sheds light on Pershing's pecuniary interests, another controversy illuminated his evolving policy priorities and those of his civilian and military bosses. On one level, this controversy might be dismissed as purely personal. On another, however, it reveals a deep political divide among American leaders in the Philippines. Most importantly, it compelled Americans, military and civilian alike, to make up their minds on just how noninterventionist they would be regarding Islam and its practice in Moroland.

Nothing helps to clarify opinions and harden policy positions more quickly than someone who challenges those opinions and positions. Plenty of Moros had opposed American policies over the years, of course, but their resistance had come as no surprise. When a new challenge emerged from within the American camp, however, it caught Pershing and his peers off guard. The in-camp culprit didn't help his cause by being so full of himself that he left a stream of offended and infuriated fellow Americans, including Pershing, in his wake. And yet he (with the help of his wife) had a knack for self-promotion, too, cultivating patrons just as assiduously as he collected enemies. If on the one hand he had the characteristics of a popinjay, on the other he possessed personal qualities that had better not be taken lightly.

Maj. John Finley had arrived in Zamboanga in 1903 as a protégé of Leonard Wood, who appointed him governor of Zamboanga District.[54] He set about learning the language and cultural practices of his wards, impressing everyone with his hard work ethic, energetic micromanaging, and sympathy for suffering minorities such as the Subanu. Over the years, however, he began to fancy himself as a paternalistic father figure, white rajah, or Lord Jim, requiring Moros and Subanus to address him as "Tuan Maas" (which he translated as "Guide," "Teacher," or "Father for All Time to Come") and instructing them to pray for him daily. Predictably, as he elevated himself in the eyes of his wards, he slipped in attending to orders from his superiors. Pershing ran out of patience with him within a year of his arrival as governor of Moro Province. "I have no words of praise too strong for Finley's work," he assured Wood, but he "has been out here too long" and has "become irritable and exclusive in his habits … and very difficult to get along with."[55] When the well-connected Finley received glowing plaudits in an *Outlook* article by Atherton Brownell titled "Turning Savages into Citizens," this did not improve the governor's mood.[56] "He antagonizes almost everyone with whom he comes in contact. I must either transfer him … or … let him out," he warned Gen. Wood.[57] Shortly thereafter, when Finley failed to reply to his boss's request for information, Pershing chastised him. "You waste the time of our stenographers on unimportant and long-winded documents," he charged, "and yet you seem to find it difficult to keep up with current correspondence." "This sort of thing cannot go on much longer."[58] Indeed, it could not, and Pershing subsequently determined to force Finley out. But Finley, as a War Department appointee who could not be fired by Pershing, refused to go. Open warfare between the two men followed.

In addition to calling Finley a "brusque, gruff, overbearing and exclusive" man, "a bull in a china shop," and a "pessimistic wind bag," Pershing proceeded to build a case against him as a "total failure."[59] He challenged Finley's claims that his Moro Exchanges deserved praise as "the secret of all governmental success" among Moros, arguing that nothing could be farther from the truth. In point of fact, the Moro managers of those exchanges in Zamboanga District frequently charged 10 to 20 percent for every transaction instead of the permissible one percent. By requiring that Moros and Subanus trade at these stores and not on the open market, Finley

had also acted to restrain and curtail trade. And when Americans, Filipinos, and Chinese complained, the so-called Tuan Maas accused them of exploiting these poor, innocent people, whom he pledged to protect like a father shielding his children.[60] Pershing couldn't stand it. Regardless of whether the exchanges merited praise or criticism, he shut them down and replaced them with three Industrial Trading Stores in Zamboanga District (plus three in other districts) run by Americans and signaled that Moros and *lumads* could use or ignore them as they liked. He also accused Finley of being unnecessarily punitive in exercising his gubernatorial power to settle disputes in Tribal Ward Courts. All in all, Finley should not be considered just an irritant, Pershing insisted. He had "entirely overstepped the bounds of common sense."[61]

Pershing's criticism of Finley would normally have prompted the latter's dismissal. That Finley stayed stubbornly in place owed very much to his status as Gen. Leonard Wood's protégé. The dispute between provincial and district governors, therefore, took on more than just the dimension of personal animosity as Finley became a pawn in the long-standing conflict between titans Pershing and Wood. When the Moro province governor first complained about his difficult subordinate, Wood urged him "to hang on to Finley."[62] When Pershing demanded the man's recall, he received the admonition to "be kind" to him.[63] Meanwhile, Wood advised Finley to "stick to your work," and he publicly praised him for establishing the Moro Exchange system. Finley had done "great good." Indeed, he had contributed "one of the most valuable pieces of work that has been done by anyone in the Islands."[64]

If Finley had remained no more than a thorn in Pershing's side or a pawn in Leonard Wood's chess game, he would not merit mention in this analysis of American counterinsurgency tactics in the Muslim Philippines. But then came his extraordinary mission to the Ottoman Empire's sultan in 1913. That bold effort forced Americans—friends and foes alike—to take notice of him and decide what they really wanted the future of Moro Province to look like.

At the behest of Leonard Wood, who may have been contriving to have him succeed Pershing as governor of Moro Province, Finley took leave in April 1912 and traveled to Washington, D.C. There he met not only with Wood but also with Secretary of War Henry Stimson and even President

William Howard Taft. He represented himself as the Moros' chosen emissary to Turkey, soliciting the White House's endorsement of his proposed overture to the Ottoman sultan. Remarkably and to Pershing's profound consternation, he got that endorsement. He then set out for the Levant with a proposal in hand that the sultan accept him as an emissary from Philippine Moros and that he designate a teacher to help purify Philippine Islam of its corrupt practices. When Finley reached Istanbul, he managed to gain an audience with the sultan, who decorated him and also "authorized a letter promising teachers, and condemning murder, prostitution, drunkenness, gambling, and robbery."[65] Then he proudly returned to the Philippines, bearing the letter along with assorted gifts and expecting to be welcomed with praise and adulation.

On his return, however, he met a united front of American officials tormented by second thoughts.[66] Did they really want to encourage—indeed, foster—a closer Moro identification with the international Muslim community, or *umma?* Did they want to get involved in the emerging division among Muslims between reformers and traditionalists?[67] Was it wise to promote a separate Islamic identity from the rest of the Philippines, thereby incurring the wrath of Filipino nationalist leaders? Might the Americans be accused of plotting to annex Moro Province as a separate American protectorate? What, indeed, was Finley seducing them into?[68]

And so Maj. John Finley forced American decision makers willynilly to show their hand. In a chorus, they responded that, no, they didn't want to nurture a completely separate Philippine Islamic identity. No, they didn't want to encourage an Islamic reform movement.[69] No, they didn't want to split Moro Province off from the rest of the Philippines as an autonomous state. No, they didn't want to needlessly antagonize Filipino nationalist politicians. And no, they weren't prepared to make their Moro wards into an American protectorate. In a way, Finley had called their bluff. And when the tug-of-war ended, Pershing had a much more unified command structure than he had ever imagined. From top to bottom, from the president and secretary of war to the governor general and all the way down to himself, Americans agreed on a more limited and hands-off policy regarding reform Islam, one that definitely did not support the separation of Moro Province from the rest of the Philippines. Finley couldn't even get permission to reenter Zamboanga District in 1913 except for one short visit.

The Islamic teacher sent from Istanbul lasted only a year before departing. And Pershing could declare victory not only over Moros but over Gen. Wood and Maj. Finley as well.[70]

Before Jack Pershing left Moro Province for home, he completed the last pages of his annual governor's report for 1913, standing back to make some "observations on the Moros." In these pages, he made it clear that he and the American military had accomplished their selfdefined limited mission in Moroland. They had pacified the Moros, put into place a sustainable political and economic order, and begun building the infrastructure and schoolhouses for a promising future. They could legitimately declare victory. But he hastened to point out that the job remained incomplete. Much still needed to be done, and it would take a long-term commitment to accomplish it. For the American civilians who would succeed him, he had some ambitious marching orders. On their shoulders, not those of the military, rested the responsibility of completing the task of civilizing Philippine Moros.

American civilian governors would at least have worthy people with whom to work, he began. "The average Moro possesses a strong and virile personality which, unfettered by superstition and directed into civilized channels, would eventually make him dominant among the natives of the Philippines…. Given lasting peace conditions and the guidance of modern methods, he would soon crowd the Filipino for agricultural supremacy." Furthermore, "the higher types of Moros are warm in their personal friendships and seldom break a promise."

Unfortunately, Moros still possessed some "savage characteristics" that made them "difficult … to handle. Naturally suspicious and often deceitful … [a Moro] is always treacherous and cruel in dealing with … his enemies." The Joloano Moros especially merited condemnation as "the most illogically perverse and doggedly unreasonable of all uncivilized tribes."

As for "Mohammedanism," it remained for all Moros only "skin deep"; they had "accepted a few convenient dogmas and … [become] but partial imitators of the forms of that religion." They had retained "many pagan beliefs and pagan rites," and their *panditas* had reared "their followers in ignorance" and held "them in superstition." Moro schools had "little in the

curriculum … except the Koran, and of this only those particular parts … that suit the purposes of the datus." The "licentious Sultan of Sulu" had earned neither reverence nor respect from his people, so they lacked any sense of central governance. Certainly, "no form of representative government … could possibly succeed in this Province with its teeming thousands of uncivilized Malays." For the time being, therefore, Moro Province, "enlarged to include the entire island of Mindanao, should be governed and controlled permanently by American officials and under American sovereignty."

Although the American military under his direction had completely avoided dealing with antidemocratic Moro practices except slavery, Pershing urged his American civilian successors to expunge "the degrading slavery of concubinage and polygamy." The Moro "can not [*sic*] progress far while he is bound down by the chains of polygamy and female slavery," he insisted. "A code which recognizes plurality of wives and authorizes concubinage can not prevail against civilized standards of morality." And yet under "the cloak of religion, … women and girls … are bought and sold like chattels to become wives or concubines." Something must be done about this perfidy. "Up to the present, we have gone no further than to suppress crime, prevent injustice, establish peaceful conditions, and maintain a general supervisory control." American leaders in the future would have to spend a great deal more time and energy building on this foundation to right all the wrongs still existing in Moro society.

They would have to start by taking on the *datu*. Even though he, Gen. Pershing, had resolutely refused to challenge *datu* powers during his governorship, he insisted that his civilian heirs confront these petty tyrants. Moros could not advance under the rule of men who lacked "moral sense." They could "never approach political freedom," nor could "they ever get beyond a state of serfdom" so long as they languished "under the sway of their Mohammedan datus." As a consequence, he concluded with breathtaking vagueness, "personal encouragement [by American civilians], whatever form it may take, must be the more insistent and the more charitable."

Pershing's rather sudden opposition to the *datu* system shaded over into distaste for the religion of Islam itself, at least in the persons of Islamic clerics. The weaker their influence, "the less opposition we shall have to a

rational solution of the problems that confront us," he wrote, no doubt with Finley's aborted Turkish effort in mind. But he advised that "we should proceed slowly." At the very least, plural marriages must be prohibited, the purchase of women as concubines discontinued, families settled upon separate homesteads free of *datu* control, and individual personal rights among Moros recognized regardless of their social status. "These reforms," he believed, "will in the end overthrow the oppression of datu rule, start the Moros along the path of individual evolution, and give them, as a whole, a fair chance in competition with other Filipino people."[71]

How should we interpret this document? As Pershing hedging his bets in making recommendations that conflicted so radically with his own conservative approach to governing Moro Province without making waves? As Pershing currying favor with the home front, fending off criticism that he had used his power as governor just to perpetuate the old patriarchal order? As grudging acknowledgment that Moro opposition to egalitarian reforms remained so strong and unified that only long-term civilian commitment, not short-term military expediency, could succeed in overcoming it? Or as just Pershing being hypocritical in assigning tasks to American civilians that he had steadfastly refused to do himself?

There can be little doubt that Pershing believed in the rightness of slowly building an egalitarian and democratic social-political-economic order in Moroland. He did not, however, agree that this long-term democratic effort should be the American military's responsibility. In this sense, it might be said that Pershing came to espouse a military philosophy of limited engagement.

10

Progressive Counterinsurgency and COIN

Changing American military tactics employed against Moros in 1899–1913 offer a laboratory for learning about counterinsurgency warfare in its different iterations. Gen. George Davis's ideas, as implemented by John Pershing in 1902–1903, provide a good example of the indirect method. In 1903–1906, Gen. Leonard Wood masterminded a much more aggressive and direct approach. Gen. Tasker Bliss quietly moved away from Wood's efforts to revolutionize Moro society, in 1906–1909 gradually carving out an even fuller expression of indirect counterinsurgency than Pershing's. Finally, in 1909–1913 Governor Pershing experimented with and ultimately adopted a more balanced approach.

Throughout these years, Moros also experimented. In each of the three major arenas of conflict—Lanao, Cotabato, and Sulu—some fought to the death against foreign troops invading their domain and threatening their religion. On the other end of the spectrum stood Moros such as Hadji Butu, who welcomed American initiatives in infrastructure, health care, commerce, and education, seeking to mediate between the foreigners and his fellow Moros. Between these two extremes stood the vast majority of Moros. For them, the middle ground represented a vast land of opportunity. If they could find ways to navigate successfully through this land, they could emerge victorious against their traditional Moro factional rivals. By manipulating American power to their own advantage, they would also become leading arbitrators in a changing Moro culture.

On both sides—American and Moro—arbitration became the key operating principle. Pershing discovered that the best way to pacify Moros involved becoming a fellow *datu*, a master negotiator who listened and learned, built up trust, looked for ways to cool hurt feelings, and cultivated relationships that would discourage, if not end, violent resistance. Unlike

Leonard Wood, he did not see himself as a revolutionary. With one important exception, disarmament, he attempted to fit into the Moros' world and become an arbitrator rather than an enforcer of change. He emphasized alliance building with the majority and military assault on recalcitrants. Although the exercise of military power remained vitally important, he regarded it as just one of many tools in his counterinsurgency toolbox. Talk, talk, talk, connect, connect, connect, but accompany arbitration with military force. Dare to promulgate an unpopular disarmament decree. Purposely draw out those who refused to disarm. Isolate them (from noncombatants as well as from less-militant Moro factions). Destroy them, if necessary. Then go back to negotiating.

How does Pershing's Progressive counterinsurgency methodology compare with current theory, as delineated in *The U.S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual?*[1] Spearheaded by Gen. David Petraeus and first published in 2006, this manual introduced the world to the acronym COIN for "counterinsurgency." On which tactics would Pershing and today's American military leaders agree, and where would they differ? And what can we learn about effective counterinsurgency warfare by studying its century-old antecedent?

America's Moro conflict and its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan appear to hold little in common. Few if any Taliban, Al Qaeda, or Islamic State fighters acknowledge indebtedness to Moro warriors who resisted American conquest more than a century ago. Likewise, American authors of the COIN field manual pay no attention to the Moro campaign. For all intents and purposes, it never happened.

The differences between American–Muslim conflicts today and the American–Moro struggle of 1899–1913 are so numerous that the two discourage comparison. Philippine Moros did not receive significant support from Muslims in the Middle East or elsewhere. Few felt they were fighting as part of an international Islamic movement. They didn't get weapons from Muslims abroad, nor did armed Muslim allies flock from far and wide to join them. All that would change over time, but early-twentieth-century Moros who took up arms against Americans did so pretty much alone.

The Moros' aloneness made it easier for Americans to isolate militants and defeat them without fear of igniting a wider war. Against individual

cottas or fortresses on volcanic peaks, the military could surround and cut off Moro warriors. They had to negotiate terrain much less extensive than that which confronts American combatants in Afghanistan or Iraq and Syria today and inhabited by a much less numerous population. As for American weaponry a century ago, it bore little resemblance to U.S. arms today in firepower, accuracy, and lethality, but it provided an even greater advantage against Moro *krises*, lances, *lantakas*, and occasional rifles. All told, it seems reasonable to conclude that Pershing faced a less-challenging adversary than American commanders face today.

A closer look at the Moro struggle, however, reveals some intriguing similarities with the Afghan War and, to a lesser extent, with the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. It bears repeating that each of these conflicts has pitted Americans against people who have identified as warriors of Islam. It behooved Pershing, just as it does American commanders today, to avoid actions likely to convince Muslims that they must unite in fighting a religious war against anti-Islamic crusaders. Likewise, it has greatly advantaged the American military across time to accentuate differences among Muslim tribes and ethnicities in a strategy of divide and rule. Meanwhile, in both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, American military leaders have had to keep a close watch on American home-front political realities and on any changes in the popular appetite for war. Those changes have been especially important given the protracted nature of recent conflicts. In each case, victory has come to be equated with the limited objective of political and economic sustainability. And finally, in each case the conflict itself has inspired unusually new and creative thinking about how best to conduct COIN operations.

*The U.S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* defines COIN as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”[2] In its breadth and scope, COIN represents a “radical” departure for the American military. Right off the bat, the manual proclaims that successful counterinsurgency requires much more than war fighting. By including political, economic, psychological, and civic dimensions in the military’s COIN mission, it “challenges much of what is holy about the American way of war.” It offers a detailed and comprehensive “recipe for conducting the most complex and

maddening type of war," but following that recipe doesn't come easily.[3] Acknowledging that "counterinsurgency is difficult to fight well and win" and that "political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity," the manual argues that it nevertheless can be done as long as America aligns "its ethical principles with the nation's strategic requirements."[4]

Let's count the principal ingredients in COIN's approach:

1. *Countering insurgency can best be accomplished holistically by prioritizing noncombatant security while also battling insurgents in smallscale operations*. Focusing just on insurgent fighters, bombing and destroying them without regard for the welfare of noncombatants, spells disaster. The United States tried that in Vietnam with ruinous consequences, winning virtually every battle while still losing the war. Shock and awe in Afghanistan and Iraq, featuring armored assaults accompanied by awesome firepower, did not greatly change the Vietnam strategy. With laserlike focus, American commanders concentrated on killing enemy combatants and overthrowing enemy regimes. They accomplished these tasks swiftly and decisively, only to find themselves facing burgeoning insurgencies fueled by calls for Islamic jihad.

The *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* completely alters the focus of American military action. It "directs U.S. forces to make securing the civilian, rather than destroying the enemy, their top priority." Instead of concentrating on insurgent fighters, it insists that "the civilian population is the center of gravity—the deciding factor in the struggle." It predicts that whichever side—insurgents or counterinsurgents—wins civilian support, that side will win. And it asks: How can civilians be separated from insurgents "to deny the insurgent 'fish' the cover of the civilian 'sea'"?[5]

COIN thus advances a population-centered approach. It argues that successful counterinsurgents must convince the civilian population that they, rather than insurgents, represent the people's best interests in a violently contested environment. Winning the people's support (or at least acquiescence) constitutes "the real battle."[6]

"Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs" and consenting to be governed by local leaders supported by the United States. Achieving this level of success necessitates eliminating as many causes of the insurgency as possible. An array of

actions contributes to this goal. War fighting represents just one option among many. Insurgents understand this and typically use all available tools. Americans, as counterinsurgents, must use all tools as well: political, informational, military, social, infrastructural, and economic.[7] Rather than ask, “How can we kill the greatest number of insurgents?” they must ask, “How can we counter the insurgents’ strategy?”

2. *Implicit in this population-centered approach is that COIN’s methodology cannot be limited strictly to military actors*.[8] Full-spectrum COIN involves (indeed emphasizes) multiple lines of operation, including combat operations, the building of host-nation security forces, essential services, good governance, economic development, and information operations. It requires “unity of effort,” with “significant and ongoing civilian involvement at virtually every level of operations.” Some of the “most important actors in counterinsurgency warfare are not self-identified warriors.”[9] Nongovernment organizations “often play an important role at the local level.”[10] “Civilian actors and agencies … become centrally engaged in the field alongside combat forces.” However, in the absence of civilians (due to lack of security, for example), ground forces must be prepared to “assume the roles of mayor, trash collector, and public works employer.”[11]

3. “*The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government*. Counterinsurgents achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and non-military means.”[12] Six possible indicators of legitimacy for a government stand out: (*a*) the government must have the ability to provide security for its populace; (*b*) its leaders must be selected in a just and fair manner; (*c*) a high level of popular participation in the political processes must be initiated; (*d*) corruption must not exceed a culturally acceptable level; (*e*) political, social, and economic development must proceed at a culturally acceptable pace; and (*f*) there must be a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.[13] For all six of these indicators, what the local populace regards as legitimate counts more than what Americans think or want. “The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. U.S. forces and agencies can help, but HN [host-nation] elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory.” “Eventually all foreign armies are seen as interlopers or

occupiers." "The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well."[14]

4. "*The political and military aspects of insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable.*"[15] Between these two aspects, however, the field manual suggests that the former holds more importance, citing a Chinese Central Committee member under Chairman Mao Zedong as saying that "revolutionary war … [is] 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military."[16] "Political objectives must guide the military's approach. Commanders must, for example, consider how operations contribute to strengthening" their allies' legitimacy. And it must never be forgotten that "resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution."[17]

5. *Every counterinsurgent must ask the following question every day: "What have you done for the people today?"*[18] *Just as COIN stands for more than military action, so it stands for more than political action as well*. Peacesupport operations, including reconstruction and nation building, remain crucially important. "Success in COIN relies upon non-kinetic activities like providing electricity, jobs, and a functioning judicial system" "A more holistic form of human security is important for overall mission success," including not just physical security but also "economic, social, civil and political rights." It seeks to address the "rights continuum."[19]

6. *In COIN, even more than in conventional warfare, success depends on good intelligence, including deep knowledge of the local culture and environment, the people, the topography, the economy, the history, the religion, and the language*.[20] To be successful, counterinsurgents must have a "thorough understanding [of] the society and culture." They must understand the organization of key groups in the society and relationships between them; their ideologies, narratives, values, interests, and motivations; and the society's leadership system.[21] They should "know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance."[22] They should study and memorize the map, both social and physical, every night.

Counterinsurgents should not assume that insurgents are united. "An insurgency is basically a competition among many groups, each seeking to mobilize the populace in support of its agenda." Which local people have joined the insurgency and why? Do they include people injured by American bombs? People victimized by corrupt government personnel or

security forces? People alienated by patriarchal landlords? Starving people who have nothing to lose? People for whom the former patron–client system has broken down? Traditional factional opponents?

Counterinsurgents must talk with the people. “There are never enough linguists.” Then they should base their operations on intelligence gathered from the people. A political and cultural adviser with good skills at cross-cultural relationship building should be attached to each company. The smartest soldiers belong in intelligence. “If this sounds unmilitary, get over it.”[23]

7. *The lowest common denominator to success in counterinsurgency warfare involves protecting the population*.[24] “The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.”[25] U.S. forces must establish and expand secure areas. To the extent that they can bring security as well as a better life to noncombatants, they will win their support and the war. However, civilian casualties must be avoided at all costs. When counterinsurgents become unwitting threats to civilians due to “friendly” fire errors, they will lose the civilians’ support and the war.

8. *Commanders should “transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible,” and they should train local security forces to conduct most of these law enforcement activities*. “When insurgents are seen as criminals [as opposed to heroic fighters], they lose public support.” Meanwhile, when local security forces come across as effective protectors of peace and order, they gain legitimacy. “Using a legal system established in line with local culture and practices to deal with … [insurgent] criminals enhances the [host-nation] government’s legitimacy.”[26]

9. *COIN requires preparation for protracted warfare*. It demands a long-term commitment. The local populace “must have confidence in the staying power” of counterinsurgents. It follows that gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted deployment should be a priority.[27]

10. *“The COIN dictum of enhancing host nation legitimacy may require severely compromising Western conceptions of justice.”* COIN fosters stability. It “favors peace over justice” and does not “effectively support a revolutionary grand strategy.” “Imposing a revolution from the outside provides a weak and illegitimate basis from which to defeat an

insurgency."[28] Therefore, COIN does not prioritize potentially destabilizing actions, such as efforts to create a more egalitarian society. More or less, it sacrifices a just society for a stable one.

11. *Although the field manual lists three types of counterinsurgency approaches—clear, hold, and build; combined action; and limited support—the first of the three remains the most comprehensive*.[29] It begins with "clearing" one village, area, or city at a time and then expanding to other areas.[30] Counterinsurgent forces work deliberately and methodically to "remove all enemy forces and eliminate resistance in an assigned area." They do this by conducting reconnaissance to learn about local networks and points of division. When ready, they turn their attention to "destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants." Then they get to work rooting out the "insurgent infrastructure." Seeking to isolate enemy combatants from their support base, security forces move around, establishing "a constant presence throughout the area," "conducting periodic patrols," and cutting off external support for the insurgents. Those activities constitute the "clearing" phase.[31]

Then comes the "holding" phase. "Ideally [home-nation] forces execute this part of the clear–hold–build approach." With American support, these forces work to secure the populace and effectively reestablish the home nation's government presence at the local level. They emphasize "creating or reinforcing the [home-nation] government's legitimacy." Operations during this stage include

- Continuously secur[ing] the people and separat[ing] them from the insurgents.
- Establish[ing] a firm government presence and control over the area and populace.
- Recruit[ing], organiz[ing], equip[ping] and train[ing] local security forces.
- Establish[ing] a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus.
- Develop[ing] a dependable network of sources by authorized intelligence agents.[32]

“Building” constitutes the third phase of COIN. In this phase, the maxim that COIN involves more than war fighting becomes most obvious. Building support for the local government obviously necessitates protecting the populace as a first priority. But it requires more than protection. With the help of local workers, essential services must be established or reestablished.[33] Schools, markets, roads, bridges, and public-health facilities must be built or rebuilt.

“The most important activities during the build stage are conducted by nonmilitary agencies.” Local-government political leaders and civil servants do their jobs. “National and international development agencies [help] rebuild infrastructure and key facilities…. Life for the area’s inhabitants begins to return to normal.”[34] As local leaders and civilian development agencies take over, COIN military forces turn their attention outward. They expand their area of operations. Always working with local allies, they clear, hold, and build among a broader circle of potential supporters. In doing so, they always employ the next tactical imperative (number 12).

12. *COIN tactics prioritize flexibility*. In their foreword to the field manual, Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. James Amos emphasize one point over all others: that “conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.”[35] This quote captures the key watchwords in COIN: *flexibility, agility*, *adaptability*, and *cultural sensitivity*. “Insurgents constantly shift between military and political phases and tactics…. Skillful counterinsurgents can [and must] adapt at least as fast.”[36]

Summary: “Killing insurgents [clearing them]—while necessary, especially with respect to extremists—by itself cannot defeat an insurgency. Gaining and retaining the initiative requires counterinsurgents to address the insurgency’s causes through stability operations as well. This involves securing and controlling the local populace and providing for essential services [hold]. As security improves, military resources contribute to supporting government reforms and reconstruction projects [build]…. *Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency*.”[37]

How does Progressive counterinsurgency as described in this book compare and contrast with modern COIN as delineated in the field manual? In point of fact, the two share many similarities. A close analysis of the twelve principal ingredients of COIN reveals general agreement on at least nine of them.

2. *Full-spectrum COIN involves* (*indeed, emphasizes*) *multiple lines of operation*. Pershing gained a full appreciation of this point as military governor of Moro Province. He found himself responsible not only for military operations, including disarming Moros, but for all services. Local security forces—the Philippine Constabulary—had to be trained and deployed to keep the peace. Roads and bridges had to be constructed, wells dug, and telecommunication lines strung. Trade had to be boosted, and disputes arbitrated. School buildings had to be erected, teachers trained, and students recruited to fill the classrooms. Governor Pershing quickly found that his initial appointees to supervise these tasks—army officers—rotated out too quickly to succeed in completing them. More and more, especially in his last two years as governor, he turned to civilians. He appointed them as governors of Moro Province districts and as civil servants responsible for essential services, adjudication of disputes in courts of law, and economic development. He recommended a civilian—Frank Carpenter—as his replacement and welcomed Carpenter as the new governor. In every way, he came to understand that successful COIN requires "unity of effort" with "significant and ongoing civilian involvement at virtually every level of operations." He also understood that the "most important actors in counterinsurgency warfare are not [necessarily] self-identified warriors." By the end of his four-year governorship, he had become in every way a full-spectrum counterinsurgent.

5. "*What have you done for the people today?"* Pershing would agree that counterinsurgents should ask this question every day. In particular, he set out as governor to improve infrastructure, expand trade, monetize the economy by paying Moros for their work on roads and bridges, broaden the availability of health services, and build a judicial system consistent with both local notions of arbitration and American concepts of justice. He also supervised the construction and staffing of a limited number of schools open to girls as well as boys. Beyond these efforts, however, he did not go. A strict fiscal conservative, he took pride in staying within and even

reducing a very tight budget. And beyond fiscal conservatism, he remained a believer in limited intervention. He did not see himself as a nation builder. He did not equate his mission's success with enhancing social, civil, and political rights for women and other disenfranchised people. He did not seek to address the "rights continuum." For him, democratizing Moro society remained the job of civilians, both American and Moro. He believed that it should be done, especially for women and children, but that the military—his military—should stick to its primary mission of achieving pacification, disarmament, and sustainable security.

6. *In COIN, even more than in conventional warfare, success depends on good intelligence*. Whereas Pershing would grant only qualified approval of point 5, he would throw his support completely behind this COIN imperative. From the moment that he took command of American troops in Iligan and Camp Vicars, he set out to be an expert on Maranao culture, topography, economy, religion, and even language. Moros became for him a mania. He wanted to understand their political organization, how individual leaders related to one another, what motivated insurgents to fight against him, what might motivate them to join him, and what factional lines of division might prove useful to him. Though he did not expect army troops to immerse themselves in Moro culture, he urged his officers to know their potential enemies well. Nobody needed to tell him that "if this sounds unmilitary, get over it."

7. *The lowest common denominator to success in counterinsurgency warfare is protecting the population*. In Lanao and Sulu especially, Pershing understood that U.S. forces must establish and expand secure areas, just as the field manual recommends. He carved out safe areas, expanded them, and gradually secured the countryside, isolating insurgents in remote forests or atop volcanic cones on the island of Jolo. All the while, he determined to limit civilian casualties. The best example of this determination occurred at Bud Bagsak in 1913. There his troops surprised insurgents with a night landing on the Jolo coast and then cut them off from their civilian relatives and supporters, leaving them isolated atop the mountain, where he decimated them in a five-day battle that avoided large numbers of civilian casualties.

8. *Transition security activities from combat operations to law enforcement as quickly as feasible, and train local security forces to*

conduct most of these law enforcement activities. Although initially somewhat prejudiced against the Philippine Constabulary, Pershing had by 1911 become a thorough convert, deploying constables all over Moro Province in countless police actions against outlaws and never-say-die insurgents. Just as he turned over civil government functions to American and Moro civilians, he "Moroized" and "Filipinized" peacekeeping operations. At the same time, he established a legal system aligned with both local concepts of justice by arbitration and, at the appeals court level and in capital cases, American ideas of criminal prosecution.

9. *COIN requires preparation for protracted warfare*. I doubt that anyone in the American military establishment has ever understood the protracted nature of counterinsurgency war better than Jack Pershing. He spent nine years as an officer in the Philippines, seven of them devoted specifically to pacifying Moros. By the time he left the Philippines in 1913 at age fifty-three, he fully comprehended what Americans 100 years later have only begun to realize: COIN doesn't promise any quick fixes, and Muslim fighters in particular must never be underestimated.

10. *The COIN dictum of enhancing host-nation legitimacy may require severely compromising Western conceptions of justice*. Like COIN advocates today, Pershing favored "peace over justice" and did not "support a revolutionary grand strategy." Unlike his fellow Progressive Leonard Wood, he did not see himself or his troops as a revolutionary vanguard. To the contrary, he left few stones unturned in his effort to connect with local Moro leaders. Knowing that he could not hope to win the trust of *datus* if he threatened their culture, he didn't take issue with Moro practices that he personally found abhorrent, including polygamy and, for a time, slavery. He took great pride in becoming one of them, a fellow *datu*, who cultivated a unique talent for arbitrating between cultures.

Over time, Pershing believed that Americans should become change agents in Moro Province. In his final governor's report, he made it clear that civilian Americans should begin pushing Moros to adopt egalitarian reforms. They should abolish all forms of indentured servitude. They should use the vehicle of secular education to spread ideas of male / female equality. They should initiate political reforms, including regular elections first at the local and then at the provincial level. And they should phase out *datu*ship altogether. But these efforts at nation building in Moro Province

should follow the military's COIN priorities of clearing and holding, not building.

11 and 12. *In addition to adopting an approach conforming with stages one and two of COIN's clear–hold–build strategy, Pershing's Progressive counterinsurgency adumbrated most of modern COIN's tactics as well.* Based on his actions as discussed throughout this book and especially on those he carried out as governor of Moro Province in 1909–1913, he fully understood the crucial importance of flexibility, agility, and adaptability in COIN warfare. He continuously reassessed his operational environment. He became an expert on Moros and their politics and culture as he determined to know the "real enemy" and not just a cardboard cutout of them. He recognized that successful counterinsurgency requires mastering the skill of building alliances and personal relationships. He based operations on an increasingly sophisticated intelligence network. Over time, he limited military engagements to small-unit actions by highly mobile Philippine scouts and constables. Those units established an ongoing presence in villages beyond the population centers, avoided asymmetric use of force, and practiced unpredictable deterrent patrolling. On his orders, they sought (although not always successfully) to provide security and mobilize popular support, tailoring tactics to local issues, factions, and conditions and trying to avoid collateral damage among noncombatants.

Like today's authors of the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, Pershing would agree that COIN "is art, not science." All-in-all, his actions suggest a maturing understanding of COIN's tactical summary, that "killing insurgents—while necessary, especially with respect to extremists—by itself cannot defeat an insurgency."[38]

How ironic that John J. Pershing is remembered in select American political circles today for having committed a terrible atrocity against Moros. He supposedly lined up fifty Moros and then executed fortynine of them in cold blood, using bullets dipped in pig fat as a gratuitous insult to their Islamic faith. According to the story, he then ordered the fiftieth Moro to run off and persuade his cohorts to lay down their arms or face the same fate. The story concludes by asserting that Moros learned their lesson and remained peaceful for the next four decades. By implication, it begs listeners to draw a broader conclusion: that the best way to deal with

Muslim insurgents is not to practice COIN's population-centered and culturally sensitive approach, but rather to commit atrocities.

This fictional narrative possibly derives from the five-day Bud Bagsak battle in which 300 to 500 Moro warriors died. However, it cannot be farther from the truth. I have not found a shred of evidence to support either its factual accuracy or its broader conclusion. As already noted, Pershing took pains to avoid civilian casualties in and around Bud Bagsak. He also took pride in not gratuitously insulting Moros or their religion, to the point where Maranao Moro leaders elected him as a *datu* among *datus*. He received orders from President Theodore Roosevelt to avoid atrocities, and he built his reputation on doing just that. Wherever possible, he turned to arbitration rather than to terror as his way of solving problems. I calculate that he spent at least four hours talking with Moros for every hour of fighting them. Throughout his seven years among them, his approach stressed winning their support rather than terrorizing them into abject submission.

Despite their many points of agreement, Progressive counterinsurgency as developed and practiced by John Pershing differed from modern COIN in a number of important ways.

First off, Pershing's approach remained simpler and more limited than modern COIN. It focused principally on steps one and two in the clear–hold–build triptych. American troops should concentrate on what they do best—fighting, pacifying, and peacekeeping. With few exceptions, they should leave the social work to civilians and simply prepare the way for them by *clearing* out insurgents, training local defense forces to protect the populace, and arbitrating between factions to keep the peace. Once they reached a sustainable *holding* pattern, they should declare victory or negotiate from a position of strength and go home. They should leave the task of *building* a new society principally to civilians and the Moros themselves. None of this would happen quickly, so they should prepare the home front for a protracted conflict.

A comparison between Pershing's and today's counterinsurgency approaches can leave little doubt that points 1, 3, and 4 of COIN differentiate it most significantly from its predecessor: (1) *countering insurgency can best be accomplished holistically, by prioritizing*

noncombatant security; (3) *the primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government;* and (4) *the political and military aspects of insurgencies are so bound together as to be inseparable*. To be sure, the two approaches share broad areas of agreement within these three points. After all, who would disagree that providing security for noncombatants should be a high priority? Who would deny that counterinsurgency cannot succeed without a government that the local population regards as legitimate? And who would take issue with the conclusion that "resolving most insurgencies requires a political solution"? Where Pershing's counterinsurgency and modern COIN part company has to do more with *who* should take long-term responsibility for achieving these objectives than with the objectives themselves. Beyond establishing security for civilians, Pershing believed that the military should limit its mission, concentrating on the immediate task of defeating insurgents. Making noncombatants the center of gravity—American civilians would do that once the army had retired.

Based on his actions during seven years of interacting with Moros, Pershing came to espouse a policy of limited military engagement. Whereas the COIN manual argues for "unity of effort" with "significant and ongoing civilian involvement at virtually every level of operations," Pershing's approach was more linear. First, the military should do its job of clearing and holding. Then civilian Americans should play a major role. And although the civilian role would be small at first, the military's responsibility for stage three of the triptych—nation building—would be modest at best.

Pershing also resisted getting the army involved in politics. Personally, he hated politics, and (unlike Leonard Wood) he felt that politics and the military shouldn't mix. Let civilian Americans, such as his gubernatorial successor, Frank Carpenter, deal with setting up a Moro government for the province. Creating conditions in which a legitimate Moro government could thrive—that remained the task of army personnel. Beyond that, they should not venture.

Limited engagement would characterize the American counterinsurgency effort under Jack Pershing. He had in mind an engagement that would be limited in two ways. First, although his time limits remained vague, he clearly did not believe in a long-term military occupation. His would not be

a semipermanent peacekeeping mission like the current American commitment in Afghanistan, nor would it be a seemingly endless military defense of Moro Province on the model of South Korea today. American troops would achieve sustainability in terms of security and stability; then they would let civilian Americans negotiate from a position of strength.[39]

Pershing acknowledged these limits in his annual report for 1913, saying that "up to the present, we have gone no further than to suppress crime, prevent injustice, establish peaceful conditions, and maintain a general supervisory control."[40] Yes, the American occupiers would try to win the hearts and minds of noncombatants. Yes, they would help to improve the infrastructure and economy. Yes, they would seek collaborators from among the elite. And yes, they would utilize multiple nonlethal tools from their counterinsurgency toolbox. But no, they would not engage in the much more ambitious enterprise of armed social action.

By November 1913, their "purpose," he declared, had "been accomplished." "A point of permanence … [had] been reached where the local Constabulary … [could] handle any situation," with Philippine Scouts in reserve. The time had come for the "discontinuance" of military occupation.[41] American teachers stood ready to educate Moro children. American experts trained in everything from animal husbandry to public health would help build the new society. American civil servants would help shape a political leadership cadre regarded as legitimate by Moro families. How unrealistic to expect untrained troops to take on these vast and long-term responsibilities. Let the military do what it does best; let civilians do what they do best; don't overtax the former with what the latter should be doing. Don't bog down the army in an endless morass of nation building. Limit expectations. Limit military commitment. Limit the army's engagement.

The most challenging thing about Progressive counterinsurgency, the thing that should make it compulsory reading for COIN practitioners today, is that it evolved into arguably the most successful example of American counterinsurgency warfare in history. To quote Patricio Abinales, the American military's effort in Mindanao and Sulu "was a relatively successful project of suppression, domination and legitimation." In the course of some fourteen years, "the army … transformed Moro Mindanao

from a backwater into one of the most productive provinces in the Philippines."[42]

Jack Pershing does not deserve sole credit for the military's relatively successful counterinsurgency experiment in the Muslim Philippines. He called it quits and set sail for home on December 15, 1913. The civilian Americans who followed him wrote the last chapter in America's colonial governance of Moroland. It goes beyond the scope of this work to offer a detailed treatment of American civilian leadership in this case. That said, a number of initiatives deserve to be highlighted in this analysis of comparative counterinsurgency.

In October 1913, when Francis Burton Harrison arrived in the Philippines to take William Cameron Forbes's place as governor general, he asked Pershing to stay on as governor of Moro Province.[43] The general might have done so had the request come a little earlier, but by late 1913 he eagerly anticipated returning with his family to the States.[44] He strongly recommended that an American civilian replace him as governor and that "military authorities be relieved of all further responsibility." "It is my firm conviction," he wrote, "that it would be for the best interests of all concerned to transfer … responsibility for … Moro Province from the Army to a civil government…. Moro Province is entirely able to stand alone, financially and [in] every other way, and if ever the Army is to be relieved from this burden now is a favorable time."[45]

Pershing recommended not only that an American civilian replace him, but that a specific American civilian, Frank Carpenter, do so. "Knowing Carpenter to be a man who has risen by his own efforts through the ranks of the army to almost the top round of the ladder," he concluded that Carpenter would "be a splendid Governor for the Moro Province."[46] "A better man," he later said, "could not have been chosen."[47]

On December 20, 1913, five days after Pershing left the Philippines, Frank Carpenter took over as governor of the new Department of Mindanao and Sulu.[48] Thus did Moro Province transition rather abruptly from military to civil rule. Its governor reported not to the commanding general of the army's Department of the Philippines, but to the civil governor general and the Philippine Commission.[49]

Carpenter turned out to be a good choice, in part because he had both military and civil service experience in the Philippine Islands. In the army,

he had built such a good reputation as a dedicated and hard-working officer that he won appointment as assistant executive secretary when civil government replaced military rule of the Philippine Islands. In 1908, he earned promotion to executive secretary of the Insular Government and chief of the Executive Bureau. By that time, he had learned to speak both Spanish and Tagalog and had gained the respect of Filipinos as well as Americans. Governor General Forbes lauded him for "incalculably great service."[50]

In his inaugural address as governor, Carpenter praised "the men of Mindanao and Sulu … [as] master men" with whom he pledged to "serve" and "stand shoulder to shoulder." Together, they would "harvest the golden grain, … build towns where cottas have been, … make the trails … [into] highways of commerce," and do everything necessary to make their world into "the civilization of today." Through their hard work and dedication, these yeomen would earn all the "rights of man." These rights, however, did not come without strings attached. First, Moros must exhibit "unfaltering obedience and unswerving loyalty, not of the lip alone, but of the heart." Appealing to them as "fairminded men" who would want to repay their American overlords for all "the privileges of free men," he stipulated that they demonstrate loyalty to "local officials, and through them to [a] higher authority[,] … the Government of the United States."[51]

That represented Carpenter's first, but not last, quid pro quo. He also made it known that Moros must begin to see themselves no longer as separate from their fellow Filipinos, but as sharing a common identity.[52] This statement signified a dramatic shift in American colonial policy. Whereas American military officers had paternalistically encouraged Moros to regard them as protectors of a separate Moro identity against Filipino nationalists, civilian leaders promoted unity between Moros and their fellow Filipinos. Henceforward, Moros should integrate with other Filipinos under the banner of Filipinization. The new American bête noir in Moroland would take the form not of Filipino nationalist politicians intent on thwarting Moro separatism, but of fundamentalist Muslims seeking to strengthen Moro identity with the worldwide Muslim *umma* at the expense of Filipinization.[53]

Carpenter wasted little time in implementing the new policy. The new governor appointed Filipino non-Muslims to replace Americans in civil

service positions all across the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. By January 1915, only five Americans remained in those positions. He also welcomed Filipinos to replace American constabulary officers called away for duty in the Great War.[54] Finally, he encouraged Filipino migration from the northern islands into agricultural colonies staked out in Cotabato, although these colonies met with very limited success.[55] Meanwhile, Moros for the first time showed up in Manila as national legislators. Hadji Butu won appointment as the Department of Mindanao and Sulu's first senator in 1916, and Datu Piang and Lanao's Datu Benito became the first Muslim members of the Philippine House of Representatives that same year.[56]

Not surprisingly, Pershing didn't like this policy shift. "I do not know that I am in entire accord with the idea of appointing so many Filipinos to office" in Mindanao and Sulu, he wrote to Carpenter. Moros remained "the deadly enemy of all other Filipinos, and would not submit to a government by any of them." Citing Najeeb Saleeby, he pointed to centuries of conflict between Muslims and Christians as reason enough for quashing all hope of religious harmony in the archipelago. Indeed, "the religious and racial hatred between … Moros on the one hand and … Spaniards and Christian Filipinos on the other … [has become] so bitter that, probably, it will never be overcome."[57]

Frank Carpenter didn't agree. He went ahead and hired dozens of Filipinos to help him run the department. By and large, it worked. Despite their wariness regarding non-Muslim Filipinos, Moros did not take up arms in a new insurgency. "There appears," wrote Carpenter in 1915, "no reason for anticipating any general disturbance of peace conditions or armed resistance … more serious than that of an occasional small and purely local band of criminals bent on robbery or the vendetta."[58] Exceptions tarnished this optimistic assessment, in part owing to ongoing enforcement of Pershing's disarmament decree.[59] These exceptions included Datu Alamada, joined by the son and nephews of Datu Ali, who resisted pacification in the mountains between Lanao and Cotabato. At one point, Alamada claimed a following some 3,000 strong. His movement, however, never spread. After numerous smallscale engagements with the Philippine Constabulary and Philippine Scouts, Alamada surrendered with 500 followers (including Ali's son and nephews) in May 1914, agreeing to disarm in return for peaceful resettlement of his people on farmland in Cotabato.[60]

Another uprising came three years later when the *datus* of Bayang, Lanao, once again rose up in defiance, as they had done back in 1902. They refused to disarm and, against government regulations, set about rebuilding their *cotta*. Carpenter assumed that he could settle the matter peacefully, but when the *datus* spurned his ultimatum to disarm and disperse, he sent in the constabulary and scouts. He vividly described what followed: "After some hours of destructive fire on the cota … the datus and several of their followers communicated a desire to surrender…. After coming out of the cota … , [they] went amuck in a desperate effort to kill me … and other officials." A wild melee ensued in which government forces killed "the datus and panditas who led the rush" but suffering no mortal wounds among themselves. They demolished the *cotta* while a crowd of Moros watched. This "practical extinction of the recalcitrant Bayan datus," concluded Carpenter, had a "tremendous effect in … strengthening … Government control throughout the region."[61]

During Carpenter's tenure, Jolo also had its share of violence. The most serious threat to peace and order occurred in 1918, when constables killed thirty-one Moros and captured eighteen others in almost four months of police operations against "bandits" led by two escaped felons.[62] These operations, like others throughout the department in 1914–1920, took the form not of counterinsurgency warfare, but of law enforcement efforts as constables rounded up robbers, smugglers, slavers, pirates, and other petty criminals. At no time did it become necessary to call upon the military for support, and in 1917 all but one of the scout stations (at Zamboanga) closed.[63] Carpenter even succeeded in persuading Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram II to abdicate his temporal powers in 1915 without causing a major new uprising in Sulu.[64] Jack Pershing's bold disarmament push in 1911–1913 definitely paid off for civilian rule over Moros in the years that followed.

Taking advantage of generally peaceful conditions in the department, Governor Carpenter's administration, including many non-Muslim Filipino civil servants, recorded an impressive list of achievements in 1914–1919. It grew the economy, extended the road network, expanded public education (including education for girls), and improved public health. Department revenue collections more than doubled, from 735,308 pesos in 1913 to 1,599,991 pesos five years later.[65] Meanwhile, the value of exports (principally abaca, lumber, copra, and pearl shells) rose threefold, from

6,468,587 pesos to 18,121,817 pesos.[66] Roads constructed by 1913 totaled only 80 kilometers classified as first class. By 1918, that figure had grown to 115 kilometers, helping open up the department to expanded trade, commerce, communication, private ownership of land, and a monetary economy.[67] More impressively, telephone lines expanded from 343 to 1,208 kilometers between 1913 and 1918.[68] In the area of education, the number of public schools increased from 72 in 1913 to 336 in 1919.[69] Teachers in 1913 numbered only 116; by 1919 that number had risen to 788.[70] Student enrollment grew from 7,568 (only 1,825 of whom were Moros and 525 were *lumads*) to 28,739 in the same period (8,421 Moros and 3,129 *lumads*).[71] Despite this dramatic increase, only 40 percent of school-age children (ages seven to fourteen) actually attended school in 1919, and there continued to be significant opposition among Moro *datus* to the education of girls.[72] In the public-health sector, thirty-seven dispensaries in 1913 grew to eighty-one in 1916 (including Agusan and Bukidnon), and public hospitals multiplied from one small facility in Zamboanga to six in 1918, where thousands of Moros and "pagans" received free treatment. In the absence of Moro and American physicians, patients completely depended on non-Muslim Filipino doctors. Filipinos also served as paramedical sanitary inspectors, who traveled far and wide teaching about sanitary practices, mosquito eradication, and measures for guarding against water-supply contamination.[73]

Carpenter's very relational leadership style, his ceaseless travels to all corners of the department, and his innumerable conferences with local *datus* and other leaders help to explain why Moros accepted a degree of Filipinization without overtly rebelling. In many ways, his modus operandi may be likened to that of young Captain Pershing in Lanao in 1902–1903. Far from revolting en masse, Moros remained largely loyal to the United States. During the Great War, some even bought Liberty Bonds to support the American Expeditionary Forces in France.[74]

In 1921 and again in 1924 and 1935, groups of Moros petitioned the American president and Congress, requesting that part or all of Mindanao and Sulu be retained under American control. None of these petitions represented anything like an official Moro resolution or declaration. More than likely, they reflected ongoing Moro unhappiness with the prospect of non-Muslim Filipino national rule rather than satisfaction with American

colonial governance.[75] Nevertheless, in their report for 1921 Leonard Wood and William Cameron Forbes concluded that “the Moros … are united for continuance of American control and, in case of separation of the Philippines from the United States, desire their portion of the islands to be retained as American territory under American control.”[76]

In this twenty-first-century age of widespread anti-Americanism across the Islamic world, Americans might be startled to read the words of a prominent Sulu Moro, Arolas Tulawie. Writing to his old friend Jack Pershing in 1923, he recalled the good old days when American military forces occupied Zamboanga. Speaking for himself “and many others of my people,” he wished “those days or rather those conditions with us again. Not that we have not made any progress, but we believe that we should have made much more if we had been left under the wise guidance of Americans instead of Filipinos.”[77]

How might we measure success in counterinsurgency warfare? A few points come to mind as we contemplate this question.

- The achievement of a sustainable political environment that will not be jeopardized by insurgents within months of American military withdrawal.
- The attainment of a condition of life characterized by peace, security, and stability.
- The establishment of a rule of law acceptable to the local populace.
- The achievement of improved conditions of life for everyone, including women, with less poverty and despair and more hope for a better future, especially through access to education.
- The attainment of all the above at a reasonable cost in terms of lives, resources, and time.

Measured against these criteria, the American counterinsurgency effort among Philippine Muslims, led by Jack Pershing more than any other American, must be judged a relative success. Over the course of twenty years, including fourteen years of military occupation followed by six years of civilian rule, Moros took significant steps in education and institution building. Over time, these steps brought them closer and closer to

fashioning a sustainable political environment with a distinctly Moro face. Conditions of peace and order reached a point where civilian Americans, Filipinos, and Moros alike could live and prosper without fear of widespread and daily violence. Moros grew accustomed to a blended legal system that honored both the local customs of *datu* arbitration and imported notions of American jurisprudence. The quality of life for many Moros, including women, improved incrementally if not dramatically, with less poverty and more access to education for all. And all of these improvements were achieved without massive loss of life or resources by either insurgents or counterinsurgents.

Although Jack Pershing didn't play a leading role in all of these developments, and although his own profound prejudices regarding both Moros and non-Muslim Filipinos cannot be overlooked, he left a substantial legacy in Moro Province. It may be that many Moros today look favorably upon him principally as a warrior with whom they identify as fellow warriors. But it remains noteworthy that many towns across Mindanao to this day proudly display at their center a public square named "Pershing Plaza."

What, then, might we conclude as we compare Progressive counterinsurgency in the early-twentieth-century Philippines with COIN today? As already noted, perhaps conditions 110 years ago differed so much from the challenges faced by today's American counterinsurgents that we should not conclude anything. That said, we can draw at least a few modest inferences from the first sustained American military encounter with Islamic fighters a century ago, recognizing at the same time that the modern COIN manual is chock full of good ideas and strategies.

First, perhaps the time has come for the military to acknowledge its limitations in terms of social action. The example of Progressive counterinsurgency in Moro Province suggests that limited military engagement in both time and scope can be relatively successful. Instead of expecting young American soldiers to engage successfully in armed social work among people very different from themselves, the military should clear and hold and then leave the rest of the work—that is, nation building—to civilians. Limited engagement. That's exactly what Pershing did in 1913.

Second, COIN should take into consideration costs versus benefits. Pershing came to understand that he could not depend on the home front for unlimited resources or a limitless timeframe. He accepted these limits, mandated disarmament, completed sustainable pacification, and then went home. The American military in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria today needs to arrive at the same understanding.

Third and last, Americans can do only so much to create and sustain a legitimate political organization in a country where insurgency thrives because people lack trust in their traditional leaders. Pershing, a century ago, didn't try to fashion a legitimate Moro political structure. If he had commanded 50,000 American troops in country, perhaps he would have tried to do more. But he had available never more than one-tenth that number at any one time. He had no choice but to work with local *datus*, whether he liked them or not. He put political change and social reform on the back burner, focusing on steps one and two—clear and hold—of the counterinsurgency triptych. As for the rest, he left that for civilians. Perhaps the American military can and should do no more today.

Notes

Introduction

1. George W. Davis, “Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis, Headquarters Seventh Separate Brigade, Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, August 1, 1902,” in Adna R. Chaffee, *Annual Report of Major General Adna R. Chaffee, United States Army, Commanding the Division of the Philippines, September 30, 1902* (Manila: Philippines Bureau of Public Printing, 1902), appendix GG, 3:18–27.

2. According to Davis, President Roosevelt ordered that “no expedition against Moros be made until all efforts by negotiations were exhausted” (ibid., 3:29). In a letter to Pershing in early March, Davis refers to Division Commander Adna Chaffee’s belief that Colonel Baldwin had been too eager in his advance and had exceeded his instructions.” Davis “was sent, by order of the President, to join the column” (George W. Davis to Mr. Secretary, Box 281, Folder: “Personal Military Career of Capt. Pershing,” John J. Pershing Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).

3. Quoted in Robert A. Fulton, *Moroland: The History of Uncle Sam and the Moros 1899–1920* (Bend, Ore.: Tumalo Creek Press, 2009), 110.

4. Davis, “Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis,” 3:26.

5. Box 279, Folder: “Field Notes,” Pershing Papers.

6. Ibid. In the “Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis,” the dimensions of *cottas* are described in more modest terms. Ditches were estimated to be from five to thirty feet deep. The walls were said to be only seventy-five to one hundred feet long on a side and only ten to twelve feet high. Obviously, *cotta*s ranged widely in size and height. The report also notes a significant weakness in these fortresses, saying, “There is no known instance of a well or water cistern inside any of these works” (3:45).

7. “Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis,” 3:33.

8. Half of the eighty-three survivors were shot and killed when they tried to escape (Fulton, *Moroland*, 115).

9. Ibid., 112–15.

10. It should be noted that the criticism came after initial expressions of congratulation, including President Roosevelt’s May 5 cable to Chaffee thanking Davis and Baldwin “for the splendid courage and fidelity which have again carried our flag to victory” (“Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis,” 3:35).

11. Quoted in Phyllis Marie S. Teanco, “The Battle of Bayang Recounted after a Century: Maranao Perspective,” February 13, 2011, at https://www.facebook.com/notes/notes.moriatao-diwan-kinship-the-battle-of-bayang-recounted-after-a-century/126667854072285.

12. Gregg Jones, *Honor in the Dust: Theodore Roosevelt, War in the Philippines, and the Rise and Fall of America’s Imperial Dream* (New York: New American Library, 2012), 218.

13. Jones clarifies the connection between American domestic politics and changing military strategy in 1901–1902 (ibid.).

14. Quoted in ibid., 236–37, 333. Also see U. S. Senate, Committee on the Philippines, *Affairs in the Philippine Islands*, hearings, Doc. 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., May 5, 1902.

15. Quoted in Jones, *Honor in the Dust*, 322–23.

16. "Sharp Comment on the Philippines," *Washington Times*, April 26, 1902, quoted in ibid., 331.

17. Quoted in Jones, *Honor in the Dust*, 312, 333.

18. Karine Walther, *Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821–1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 13.

19. Frank E. Vandiver, *Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing*, 2 vols. (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1977), 1:101–3, 124–25.

20. Ibid., 1:105–36.

21. Quoted in ibid., 1:126, 134.

22. Ibid., 1:137, 158–59.

23. Ibid., 1:231.

24. Ibid., 1:246.

25. Ibid., 1:84–95.

26. Ibid., 1:99–101.

27. Ibid., 1:104; Walther, *Sacred Interests*, 19–20.

28. Quoted in Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:104.

29. Quoted in ibid., 1:151. Pershing's success in leading black troops carried over into the Spanish-American War, when he was assigned once again to the Tenth Cavalry for duty in Cuba. After the fighting there, he wrote to Assistant Secretary of War George Meiklejohn, asserting that "no one can say that Colored troops will not fight; 18 percent of the regiment killed or wounded, … and all fought gallantly" (John J. Pershing to George Meiklejohn, July 11, 1898, quoted in ibid., 1:216).

30. Ibid., 1:171.

31. Ibid., 1:248. Just as Pershing had befriended Chief Red Cloud in South Dakota, so he quickly struck up a friendship with Datu Mandi, a Spanish mestizo and leading Moro in Zamboanga.

32. Pershing to Meiklejohn, April 4, 1900, quoted in ibid., 1:254.

33. See Pershing to Bishop Charles Brent, August 9, 1913, cited in Walther, *Sacred Interests*, 224.

34. Kobbe was ordered to relieve Bates on March 20, 1900, and Davis in turn relieved Kobbe on August 31, 1901.

35. John J. Pershing, *My Life before the World War, 1860–1917: A Memoir, General of the Armies John J. Pershing*, ed. John T. Greenwood (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 142.

36. See Ronald K. Edgerton, *People of the Middle Ground: A Century of Conflict and Accommodation in Central Mindanao, 1880s–1980s* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008), 73–93.

37. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of the Philippine Islands Taken in 1903* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1905), 2:49, 123–27, 400–407. It should be noted that census estimates came after the terrible cholera epidemic that decimated the Moro population. The census also counted approximately 80,000 non-Muslim upland tribal people and 40,000 Christian Filipinos living in what became Moro Province.

38. Pershing, *My Life*, 144.

39. Quoted in Donald Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing* (New York: Scribner's, 1973), 64.

40. In addition to the reasons discussed for his not wanting to leave Zamboanga, Pershing also made many friends among the local populace. On John the Baptist Day in 1901, local "children ran

Pershing all through the market trying to douse him" (William Kobbe Diary, entry for June 24, 1901, Box 1, William Kobbe Papers, U. S. Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa.).

41. Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:252. In his highly exoticized narrative entitled *Myself and a Few Moros* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, Page, 1923), Sydney Cloman chooses to regale his readers with tales of "flying foxes," house snakes, blowguns, and his pet bear but says nothing about his time in Zamboanga.

42. Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:252.

43. Ibid., 1:325, 328.

44. Ibid., 1:390.

45. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 128; Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:403–7.

46. Quoted in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 131. A copy of Ignacio's affidavit dated January 19, 1907, is in volume 44, Francis E. Warren Papers, University of Wyoming Archives, Laramie. Directly contradicting this affidavit is Gen. Henry C. Corbin's private comment to Leonard Wood dated September 14, 1906: "[Although] Pershing will make a very excellent general officer," "the Army as a whole is deadly opposed to … [his confirmation], and I shall be very much mistaken if he is not confronted with his illegitimate child at Zamboanga. I find the service knows all about it and is talking of it in no uncertain way" (Box 38, Folder 1, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).

47. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 132; Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:252–53. In his diary, Brig. Gen. William Kobbe, Pershing's commanding officer in Zamboanga, makes no explicit comment on Pershing's relationship with Joaquina. But he mentions his disapproval of the "separate establishments" that his officers kept. He issued orders requiring them "to be on quarters from 12:30 a.m., to Revielle." See entries for October 29 and 30, 1900. In a later entry for July 20, 1901, he mentioned a grand ball hosted by Datu Mandi, saying that "about all the officers and ex-officers were there and the Queridas" (Box 1, Kobbe Papers).

48. Still another Pershing biographer, Richard O'Connor, discusses the "querida [sweetheart] system" in the Philippines, quoting the *New York World* (December 21, 1906) as follows: "The querida system, officers with experience in the Philippines say, is very popular with some army men and does not throw discredit on the woman concerned. The sweethearts live together as long as they wish and then separate" (*Black Jack Pershing* [Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1961], quote on 88).

49. Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 150, 160–61.

50. Ann Laura Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's* History of Sexuality *and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), 6.

51. Quoted in Paul A. Kramer, "The Darkness That Enters the Home: The Politics of Prostitution during the Philippine-American War," in *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History*, ed. Ann Laura Stoler (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2006), 392.

52. Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 110–11.

53. Ibid., 111.

54. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood*, 137, 181–84.

55. Kramer, "The Darkness That Enters the Home," 384.

56. Ibid., 381–82. In her affidavit, Ms. Ignacio described herself as "merely an acquaintance" (quoted in Wayne Wray Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province: Wood, Bliss, and Pershing in the Southern Philippines, 1903–1913," Ph.D. diss., University of California at San Diego, 1975, 179). As commander of the Philippine Division, Gen. Leonard Wood was briefed on Pershing's

relationship with Joaquina Ignacio. He wrote in his diary that he had been shown photos of the children and other evidence (Leonard Wood, typed diary, entry for December 18, 1906, Box 3, Wood Papers).

57. Pershing to Judge Charles E. Magoon, January 28, 1903, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

58. Fulton, *Moroland*, 74.

59. Ibid., 74–79.

60. "General Davis' Report on Moro Affairs," October 24, 1901, in Chaffee, *Annual Report … 1902*, appendix 1 of appendix GG, 3:1–3.

61. Ibid., 3:8–9.

62. Karine Walther makes a convincing case for the dominant anti-Muslim narrative shared by Americans then and now. See *Sacred Interests*, especially chapter 1.

63. "General Davis' Report on Moro Affairs," October 24, 1901, 3:9.

64. Davis to Adna R. Chaffee, April 17, 1902, Box 32, Folder 15, George W. Davis Papers, U. S. Military History Institute.

65. Marguerite Duras, *The Sea Wall* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1967), 135–36, quoted in Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 15, 13.

66. Pershing, *My Life*, 150.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., 151.

69. Ibid., 152–53.

70. Pershing to Adjutant General, Seventh Separate Brigade, February 20, 1902, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers. Pershing's visit to Amai Manibilang took place from February 16 to February 19, 1902. Pershing's discovery of a Moro capacity for reason is a good example of what Paul Kramer refers to as "a set of overlapping reorientations and reframings" in transnational history ("Race, Empire, and Transnational History," in *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Francisco A. Scarano [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009], 200).

71. See enclosures A, B, and C in John J. Pershing, "Report on Moro Affairs," May 1902, in Chaffee, *Annual Report … 1902*, appendix 8 of appendix GG, 3:105–13.

72. Enclosure D in ibid., 3:114.

73. Enclosure X in ibid., 106–7.

74. Enclosure X in ibid., 107.

75. George T. Bowman, "The Malanao Moros," n.d., Box 281, Folder: "Personal Military Career of Capt. John J. Pershing," Pershing Papers.

76. Pershing, *My Life*, 157–59.

77. Enclosure H in Pershing, "Report on Moro Affairs," in Chaffee, *Annual Report … 1902*, appendix 8 of appendix GG, 3:116.

78. Davis to the Secretary of War, March 10, 1906, Box 281, Folder: "Personal Military Career of Capt. John J. Pershing," Pershing Papers.

79. For many examples of how the American–Filipino colonial interaction not only influenced Philippine history and society but helped shape American history and society as well, see Alfred McCoy and Francisco Scarano's edited volume *Colonial Crucible*.

1. Pershing and Early Counterinsurgency among Maranao Moros, 1902

1. Pershing to Fountain [full name not given], May 9, 1902, Box 278, Folder: “Lanao Campaign,” Pershing Papers.

2. Pershing, *My Life*, 160.

3. Col. J. P. Sanger (inspector general for Chaffee) to Davis, May 13, 1902, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

4. Pershing, *My Life*, 160–61.

5. John J. Pershing Diary for 1902, draft of letter to General Davis, Box 1, Pershing Papers; Pershing, *My Life*, 161.

6. Quoted in George T. Bowman, “The Malanao Moros,” n.d., Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

7. Pershing, *My Life*, 162.

8. For the population estimate of 78,000, see “Facts about the Moro Province,” n.d., Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers. For Maranao products, see John J. Pershing, “Report of Census for District No. 54, Lake Lanao, Mindanao,” May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

9. Peter G. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos—Heritage and Horizon* (Quezon City: New Day, 1979), 2. Gowing conflates the Maranao with the Ilanun living near or along the coast of Illana Bay, calling them the “Maranao-Ilanun.” But he also distinguishes between these groups, saying, “The Maranao are Ilanun who, centuries ago, migrated from the shores of Illana Bay to the Lake Lanao area where minor cultural and linguistic differentiations from their Ilanun kinsmen have occurred.” Because of these differentiations and because of their separate locations, this study uses the name “Maranao” to mean only “the People of the Lake.”

10. “General Davis’ Report on Moro Affairs,” October 24, 1901, in Chaffee, *Annual Report … 1902*, appendix 1 of appendix GG, 3:3. Davis also called the Maranao “the least known and most unfriendly of all.”

11. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, 4. Also see Henry Florida Funtecha, *American Military Occupation of the Lake Lanao Region, 1901–1913: An Historical Study* (Marawi, Philippines: Mindanao State University Research Center, 1979), 5–6. Funtecha notes the failure of Spanish efforts to pacify the Maranao Moros in 1891–1892 under the leadership of Governor General Valeriano Weyler. Governor General Ramon Blanco had more success in 1895, but three years later the Spaniards were gone.

12. Davis to the Adjutant General, Division of the Philippines, August 1, 1902, in Chaffee, *Annual Report … 1902*, appendix GG, 3:19–21.

13. Pershing, *My Life*, 152–53.

14. Pershing to Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers. When rank-conscious Maranaos speak of royal blood, they refer to those who can trace their origins, using the Maranao genealogy (*salsila*), to Radya Indarapatra, their founding hero. Royal descent is also traced to a second progenitor, Sarip Kabungsuwan, who is believed to have brought Islam to Mindanao. See Melvin Mednick, *Encampment of the Lake: The Social Organization of a Moslem-Philippine* (*Moro*) *People*, Research Series no. 5 (Chicago: Philippine Studies Program, University of Chicago, 1965). It is not clear if Pershing’s count of 150 sultans was accurate. Mamitua Saber states that there were “originally” forty-three Maranao sultanates, fifteen of them being “higher,” and the rest being “lower.” But “as a result of internal rivalries within each sultanate, or between the two categories of power, the … sultanates have been gradually subdividing into hundreds” (“Maranao Social and Cultural Transition,” in *The Muslim Filipinos: Their History,*

Society, and Contemporary Problems, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis [Manila: Solidaridad, 1974], 220).

15. "Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis," in Chaffee, *Annual Report … 1902*, appendix GG, 3:42.

16. Francisco L. Gonzalez, *Lanao: Violent Land of Many Sultans*, Occasional Paper no. 6 (Manila: Institute for Popular Democracy, June 1997), 10.

17. Ibid., 51–54. A fourth *pangampong* is the Baloi (at least twenty-one clans). Their territory is north of the lake.

18. Pershing to Adjutant General, May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

19. "Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis," 3:42.

20. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, 48.

21. "Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis," 3:43.

22. Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, 47–49.

23. Mamitua Saber, Mauyag M. Tamano, and Charles A. Warriner, "The Maratabat of the Maranao," in *The Muslim Filipinos*, ed. Gowing and McAmis, 230–32.

24. Ibid., 230–34.

25. Gonzalez, *Lanao*, 1, 4–6.

26. In his diary entry for May 18, 1902, Pershing reported "that Maciu and Taraca people sacked Bayan[g] after the fight, taking horses, cattle, carabao, household goods and women" (Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers). This suggests that Manibilang was not alone among Moros in taking advantage of Bayang's misfortune.

27. Pershing, *My Life*, 135–36.

28. "General Davis' Report on Moro Affairs," October 24, 1901, 3:3.

29. In his October 24, 1901, report, Davis claimed that "our treatment of the Mindanao Moros and the pagan tribes … is based on the same general rules" that had applied against "the Indian tribes on our western frontier" (ibid., 3:1).

30. "Report of Brigadier General George W. Davis," 3:43–44.

31. Davis visited Camp Vicars with Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner in July 1902. Pershing said of him: "General Davis … always kept in close touch with [Lanao] developments. He never forgot the names of important Moros and frequently inquired about them and their attitude…. Whatever measure of success I may have had among those alien people was due largely to his support" (Pershing, *My Life*, 168).

32. Ibid., 166.

33. David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), xiv.

34. Hand-written memo that begins with the words "Major Pershing in writing on the Moros of Lake Lanao says" (n.d., Box 369, Folder 3, Pershing Papers).

35. Pershing, *My Life*, 163.

36. For a searing critique of American racial stereotyping in the Philippines, see Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

37. Funtecha, *American Military Occupation*, 21. The sultan of Binadayan, in fact, had little or no power over Datu Tangul, who had led the attack. When arrested, Binadayan resisted and "attempted to draw his dagger but was knocked down by soldiers and disarmed" (Pershing Diary, entry for July 19, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers).

38. At one point, the sultan's followers tried to trick Pershing by handing over a body they claimed to be Tangul. "But this Moro whom they thought dead regained consciousness long enough to tell the true story. He said he was only one of the Sultan's slaves and simply a member of the attacking party. In resisting arrest by his own people he had been mortally wounded and the Moros had then conceived the idea of palming him off on us as Tangul" (Pershing, *My Life*, 169–70).

39. In his letter to Gen. Davis on August 28, Pershing reported two Moro attacks on the two nights before the sultan of Binadayan was killed: "It is believed that the Sultan heard the Moros yell when they attacked the outpost and that he thought his sons were involved. Indeed, both attacks might well have been efforts to free the Sultan" (Pershing to Davis, August 28, 1902, Box 369, Folder 3, Pershing Papers).

40. Pershing, *My Life*, 170.

41. I am indebted to Peter G. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos 1899–1920* (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Advanced Studies, University of the Philippines System, 1977), 97–100, for this description of *juramentado* and *amuk*. See also the discussion of *parrang sabbil* (or *perang sabil*) in chapter 6 of my text.

42. Pershing to Lahi Duciman, August 14, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "May 1902 to March 1903," Pershing Papers.

43. Pershing to General Davis, August 28, 1902.

44. The sultan of Binadayan was arrested on July 19 and killed on August 13 (Pershing Diary, entry for August 15, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers). Pershing described his moves to make Vicars "a more concentrated Camp and one more easily guarded" in Pershing to General Davis, August 28, 1902. Also see Chaffee to the Adjutant General, Washington, August 17, 1902, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

45. "Major Pershing in writing on the Moros of Lake Lanao says … ," n.d.

46. See Pershing to Amai Manibilang, August 10, 1902, Box 319, Folder 6, Pershing Papers.

47. Pershing, conversation with Amai Manibilang of Madaya, July 22, 1902, Box 319, Folder: "Interrogations," Pershing Papers.

48. Manibilang complained to Pershing that at least some Maranaos treated him as an outsider thanks to his close relationship with the American, saying that the people of Bacolod "have considered me as one not from Lanao" (Manibilang to Pershing, n.d., Box 319, Folder: "August 5–28, 1902," Pershing Papers).

49. Pershing, conversation with Amai Manibilang of Madaya, July 22, 1902.

50. Ibid.

51. Pershing Diary, entry for June 26, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers.

52. Pershing Diary, entry for August 4, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers.

53. Pershing to Lahi Duciman, August 9, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "May 1902–March 1903," Pershing Papers.

54. Pershing to Amai Manibilang, August 14, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "May 1902–March 1903," Pershing Papers.

55. Amai Manibilang to Pershing, n.d., Box 319, Folder: "August 5–28, 1902," Pershing Papers.

56. For an insightful example of how Americans perceived the institution of slavery in Maranao society, see Bowman, "The Malanao Moros," with cover letter dated May 15, 1903. Bowman argued that slavery existed among Maranao Moros "in an extremely mild form." Originating in three ways—capture, debt bondage, and heredity—slavery was practiced in such a way that "slaves are treated as

members of the household and it is difficult to distinguish between them and other Moros." Slaves were bought, sold, and held as property, "the average slave costing about forty dollars." Women were more highly valued than men because they did more work, but virtually all manual labor in Maranao society was performed by slaves, who received nothing more than room and board for their labor. Bowman, however, noted some reports of extreme cruelty toward slaves, as when one had his mouth slit from ear to ear for lying.

57. Pershing included this comparison in Pershing to the Adjutant General of the Philippine Division, May 10, 1902, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

58. Bowman, "The Malanao Moros," Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

59. Pershing, *My Life*, 167. Although noncommittal for the time being, Pershing agreed with Davis that Moro slavery was a comparatively benign variant of the pernicious institution. On the same page in his memoirs, he wrote that "very few cases of Moros treating their slaves as other than members of the household ever came to my notice…. I was of the opinion that few of the so-called slaves would leave their masters if given the opportunity."

60. "General Davis' Report on Slavery," July 3, 1902, in Chaffee, *Annual Report … 1902*, appendix 2 of appendix GG, 3:13–22.

61. Box 319, Folder 2, of the Pershing Papers, includes Maranao-language vocabulary lists that Pershing used in learning the language. Folder 3 also contains translated copies of Spanish histories of Mindanao, indicating that Pershing sought to learn about the local historical context of Lanao as well.

62. Pershing Diary, entry for May 24, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers.

63. Pershing to the sultans of Maciu and Bacolod, May 23, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "May 1902–March 1903," Pershing Papers.

64. Pershing to Amai Manibilang, May 27, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "May 1902–March 1903," Pershing Papers.

65. Pershing to Amai Manibilang, August 14, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "May 1902–March 1903," Pershing Papers.

66. Pershing to the sultan of Taraca, May 24, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "May 1902–March 1903," Pershing Papers.

67. Pershing to the sultans of Maciu and Bacolod, May 23, 1902.

68. Translation of letter from the "children of the Sultan of Binadayan, Relatives and other Elders of said Sultan, and Dattos of the same," August 8, 1902, Box 319, Folder: "August 5–28, 1902," Pershing Papers.

69. Sultan of Uali to Pershing, July 6, 1902, Box 319, folder: August 5–28, 1902, Pershing Papers.

70. Sultan of Bayang to Pershing, August 18, 1902, Box 319, Folder 8, Pershing Papers.

71. Sultan of Maciu to Pershing, August 28, 1902, Box 319, Folder 8, Pershing Papers.

72. Amai Manibilang to Pershing, September 8, 1902, Box 319, Folder 5, Pershing Papers.

73. Sultan of Oato and Rajamuda to the Commandante, received December 13, 1902, Box 319, Folder 5, Pershing Papers. Before his arrest and death, the sultan of Binadayan had also signaled his readiness to enter into a dependency relationship with the Americans by directly asking for a loan of $100 (Pershing Diary, entry for June 7, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers).

74. See Pershing's "list of some of the sultans and Dattos of various rancherias in the Laguna de Lanao" (diary entry May 15, 1903, Box 317, Folder 3, Pershing Papers).

75. Pershing, *My Life*, 163. While in his autobiography Pershing does not mention paying Adta for his loyalty, in his diary he says that he gave Adta 100 pesos and an American flag for bringing in the bodies (Pershing Diary, entry for June 28, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers).

76. Pershing Diary, entry for May 21, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers. Other confidants included Datu Pedro ("a kind of tramp Dato," entry for May 22, 1902), the sultan of Gadungan (entry for May 24, 1902), Amai Sumaigaian of Pualas (entry for August 6, 1902), and Sultan Kadingilan (entry for August 15, 1902). Also see Pershing's interview with Amai Tampugao, June 23, 1902, Box 319, Folder: Interrogations, Pershing Papers.

77. Pershing to General Davis, August 28, 1902.

78. Pershing Diary, entries for June 21 and 26 and July 14, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers.

79. Pershing Diary, entries for June 23 and July 10, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers.

80. Interview dated June 24, 1902, Box 319, Folder: "Interrogations," Pershing Papers.

81. Interview dated June 21, 1902, Box 319, Folder: "Interrogations," Pershing Papers.

82. Conversation with the sultan of Pualis (Benito), June 4, 1902, Box 319, Folder: "Interrogations: Memos of Conversations," Pershing Papers. In this interview, Pershing also asked for detailed information about Bacolod's defenses and manpower.

83. Conference with Amai Manibilang, the sultan of Ganasi, Amai Tampugao, and representatives of Pualas and Bayang for the adoption of the treaty between the Moros and U. S. authorities, August 6, 1902, Box 319, Folder: "Interrogations," Pershing Papers.

84. Conference with Sajiduciman and Amai Manibilang, August 5, 1902, Box 319, Folder: "Interrogations," Pershing Papers.

85. Conference with Amai Manibilang et al., August 6, 1902.

86. "Treaty between the United States Military Authorities and the Moros of the Laguna de Lanao," n.d., Box 319, Folder 6, Pershing Papers.

87. Ibid. There was one caveat, however, stating that if the tribunal's decrees were "not in accordance with law" or if the tribunal failed to come to a finding, then the matter would be referred to "the Military Authorities for adjudication."

88. That Pershing recognized the similarity of his tribunal to the Moro dispute-settling system is clear from his comment that "they have something like this tribunal in their custom of referring matters of dispute to their elder men" (Pershing to General Davis, August 28, 1902).

89. Conference with Amai Manibilang et al., August 6, 1902.

90. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, reports, October 15, 1902, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

91. Amai Manibilang reported in a letter to Pershing that the women had fled Bayang (n.d., Box 319, Folder: "August 5–28, 1902," Pershing Papers).

92. Pershing to "my adopted daughter Bancurung of Bayan," November 6, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "Letters 40–77," Pershing Papers.

93. Sultan of Oato and Rajamuda to the Commandante, received December 13, 1902.

94. Pershing to the sultan of Bayang, November 20, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "Letters 40–77," Pershing Papers.

95. Pershing to Sajiduciman, December 15, 1902, Box 318, Folder: "Letters 40–77," Pershing Papers.

96. In a letter to Amai Binaning dated March 9, 1903, Pershing mentioned that at least one Moro leader had said that “he is willing that I be the arbitrator of your disputes” (Box 318, Folder: “Letters 40–77,” Pershing Papers).

97. Pershing to General Davis, August 28, 1902. There was also a plague of locusts and epidemics of rinderpest and surra that afflicted livestock and the horses and mules of Camp Vicars.

98. Cholera spread across the lake region in December 1902 and on into 1903. On December 10, 1902, Pershing posted a message to “all Moros in the Laguna Lanao” offering medicine and asking them to follow specified rules of hygiene (Box 318, Folder: “Letters 40–77,” Pershing Papers). For other correspondence on the cholera epidemic, see Pershing to Davis, January 23, 1903, Box 281, Folder: “Personal Military Career of Captain Pershing,” Pershing Papers; Pershing to Judge Charles E. Magoon, January 28, 1903 (noting the total quarantine in effect around Camp Vicars), Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers; letter of the sultan of Bacayauan, asking Pershing to “send me some medicines and money,” February 19, 1903, Box 319, Folder: “December 17, 1902–May 1903,” Pershing Papers; and “Courteous Letter of the Sultan of Tugaya,” saying that “the disease has appeared in my rancheria and over a hundred of my people have died,” February 19, 1903, Box 319, Folder: “December 17, 1902–May 1903,” Pershing Papers.

99. Pershing to Magoon, January 28, 1903.

100. General George W. Davis to Amai Manibilang, October 7, 1902, Box 369, Folder 3, Pershing Papers.

101. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, December 5, 1902, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

102. Ibid.

103. Pershing, *My Life*, 192.

104. Unsigned document dated February 11, 1903, Box 281, Folder: “Personal Military Career of Captain Pershing,” Pershing Papers.

105. Ibid. Also see “Pershing Is Consecrated a Datto of the Moros,” *Manila Times*, February 18, 1903, and a greatly embellished article titled “Savages Ruled by Chicago Man,” *Chicago Inter-Ocean*, April 12, 1903, both in Box 369, Folder 4, Pershing Papers.

106. Pershing, *My Life*, 193.

2. The Mailed Fist of Progressive Counterinsurgency

1. Datto Panandungan and the sultan of Bacolod to Pershing, received June 17, 1902, Box 319, Folder 7, Pershing Papers.

2. Sultan of Bacolod and the Panandungan to Pershing, received July 4, 1902, Box 319, Folder 7, Pershing Papers. Pershing estimated 700 Moro attendees in Pershing to Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903, in George W. Davis, *Annual Report of Major General George W. Davis, United States Army, Commanding Division of the Philippines, from October 1, 1902 to July 26, 1903* (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1903), appendix 3, 82–83.

3. Sultan of Bacolod and the Panandungan to Pershing, received July 4, 1902, Box 319, Folder 7, Pershing Papers.

4. Sultan of Bacolod and the Panandungan to Pershing, August 1, 1902, Box 319, Folder 8, Pershing Papers.

5. Sultan of Bacolod “to the General, Colonel and other Captains,” received November 3, 1902, Box 319, Folder 5, Pershing Papers.

6. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, "Report of Activities from June 30, 1902, to May 15, 1903," May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

7. Pershing Diary, entry for August 12, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers.

8. Pershing to Davis, August 28, 1902, Box 369, Folder 3, Pershing Papers.

9. Pershing, *My Life*, 171.

10. Pershing Diary, entries for August 12–21, 1902, Box 369, Folder: "Diary, May 15–Sept. 14, 1902," Pershing Papers.

11. Pershing, *My Life*, 171.

12. Pershing to Davis, August 28, 1902.

13. Chaffee to General Samuel Sumner, September 5, 1902, in Davis, *Annual Report … 1903*, appendix 3, 75–76. Actual Field Orders were dated September 17 (Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:282).

14. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, "Report of Activities from June 30, 1903," May 15, 1903.

15. Chaffee to Sumner, September 5, 1902, in Davis, *Annual Report … 1903*, appendix 3, 75–76.

16. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, October 15, 1902, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid. Fulton estimates twenty-five Moros killed and twenty wounded, but he gives no source (*Moroland*, 129).

21. Field Orders #17, L. C. Andrews by command of Brigadier General Sumner to Pershing, September 25, 1902, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers; Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, "Report of Activities from June 30, 1903," May 15, 1903.

22. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, October 15, 1902.

23. Pershing, *My Life*, 178.

24. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, October 15, 1902. Funtecha also mentions Amai Bancurong of Oato and Datu Adta of Paiguay as allies (*American Military Occupation*, 28).

25. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, October 15, 1902.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. *Manila Times*, October 22, 1902, quoted in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 90.

29. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, October 15, 1902.

30. Ibid.

31. Pershing, *My Life*, 180.

32. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, October 15, 1902.

33. Ibid. Fulton estimates fifty killed and fifty wounded (*Moroland*, 130).

34. Pershing, *My Life*, 181.

35. A *panandungan* is a retired sultan who continues to serve as a counselor and who in this case turned out to wield more influence than the sultan himself, from whom he took control in a power struggle. "In fact the Sultan seemed strongly inclined to be friendly and wrote several letters to that effect; he was probably overruled by more warlike Dattos" (Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner to

Adjutant General, Division of the Philippines, June 13, 1903, Davis, *Annual Report … 1903*, appendix 3, 74).

36. Pershing "to All Moros in the Laguna de Lanao," March 1, 1903, Box 318, Folder: "Letters 40–77," Pershing Papers.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. The "savage pride" quote is from Pershing to General Davis, March 4, 1903, Box 281, Folder: "Personal Military Career of Captain Pershing," Pershing Papers. Information on the troop strength is from Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903. A. Henry Landor wrote glowingly of the expedition in *The Gems of the East* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1904).

40. Landor, *Gems of the East*, 297.

41. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 96–97.

42. Pershing to Meiklejohn, April 27, 1903, quoted in ibid., 97.

43. Pershing to Meiklejohn, April 27, 1903, quoted in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 97.

44. In his colorful account, Landor mentioned that the sultan of Ganasi, "a personal amigo of Captain Pershing, and a very jolly and honest-looking old man," "came out gaily dressed in yellow of the most bilious tints" when the Americans passed through his settlement. Local residents were occupied in driving millions of grasshoppers toward a long trench, where they were trapped and burned. That night the Americans made their camp "among graves of freshly deceased—possibly of cholera—and not deeply buried corpses, somewhat highly scented as the horses trod upon and removed what little earth was on them" (*Gems of the East*, 288–89).

45. Pershing, *My Life*, 195.

46. Ibid., 196; Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, "Report of Exploring Expedition from Camp Vicars to Marahui, April 5–16, 1903," May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers. Also see Landor, *Gems of the East*, 290–92.

47. Landor, *Gems of the East*, 292–93.

48. Pershing, *My Life*, 196; Pershing to the Adjutant General, "Report of … April 5–16, 1903," May 15, 1903.

49. As told in Landor, *Gems of the East*, 293.

50. Pershing, *My Life*, 196.

51. In his autobiography, Pershing says: "They chose to fight to the end and I then gave orders for the assault" (ibid.).

52. Pershing to Meiklejohn, April 27, 1903, quoted in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 97.

53. George C. Shaw, "Around Lake Lanao," unpublished manuscript, 1905, in his unpublished autobiography, George C. Shaw Papers, in possession of Mrs. Edmund K. Daley, Arlington, Va., cited in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 100.

54. Pershing to the Adjutant General, "Report of … April 5–16, 1903," May 15, 1903.

55. Ibid.

56. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 100.

57. Pershing to George T. Bowman, April 23, 1903, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers. Also see Funtecha, *American Military Occupation*, 30, and Landor, *Gems of the East*, 299.

58. Funtecha, *American Military Occupation*, 31.

59. Pershing to the Adjutant General, "Report of … April 5–16, 1903," May 15, 1903.

60. Ibid.

61. Landor, *Gems of the East*, 302–4.

62. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, “Report of May 2–10, 1903,” May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

63. Major Robert L. Bullard to Adjutant, Iligan, April 24, 1903, Box 1, Folder 2, insert to Diary 2, Robert L. Bullard Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

64. Pershing, *My Life*, 198.

65. Ibid. Pershing noted that his troops suffered more from cholera than from enemy fire. In spite of careful and repeated orders, some men failed to drink only boiled water, with the result that nine enlisted men and four packers contracted the disease, and eight of them “did not recover” (*My Life*, 199).

66. Pershing to Meiklejohn, April 27, 1903, quoted in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 102.

67. Bullard to Adjutant, Iligan, April 24, 1903.

68. Ibid.

69. Davis to Sumner, April 10, 1903, in Davis, *Annual Report … 1903*, appendix 3, 77–78.

70. Landor praised Pershing for his “tact, consideration, patience, and strategic skill,” concluding that “if there is one man who truly deserves to be made a brigadier-general, it is this gallant officer, Captain Pershing” (*Gems of the East*, 316–17).

71. Pershing to the Adjutant General, “Report of May 2–10, 1903,” May 15, 1903. In advance of the march, Pershing sent the usual letter to “all the leading Moros on the east shore” assuring them of his good intentions, soliciting their assistance, and warning them against any interference.

72. Ibid.

73. Pershing, *My Life*, 199.

74. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 92.

75. Pershing to the Adjutant General, “Report of May 2–10, 1903,” May 15, 1903.

76. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 103.

77. Fulton, *Moroland*, 139. Vandiver notes that Pershing thought Shaw’s courage worthy of the Medal of Honor (*Black Jack*, 1:313). Thanks to Pershing’s recommendation, Shaw later received that honor.

78. Pershing never felt comfortable with body counts and never chose to emphasize how lethal his attacks could be. In this case, he reported that “according to Moro accounts some two hundred and fifty Moros lost their lives” (Pershing to Adjutant General, “Report of June 30, 1902, to May 15, 1903,” May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers). In “Report of May 2–10, 1903,” May 15, 1903, he estimated that the loss of Moro lives was “over two hundred.”

79. Pershing, *My Life*, 201.

80. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 104.

81. Pershing, *My Life*, 201. Bullard wrote critically of Pershing in his diary, saying that “Capt. Pershing’s last expedition did not accomplish much. The Moros near the scene of his fight are still full of fight” (Bullard Diary 2, entry for May 18, 1903, Box 1, Folder 2, Bullard Papers).

82. In “Report of June 30, 1902, to May 15, 1903,” May 15, 1903, Pershing also mentioned that ten *cottas* were destroyed.

83. Pershing, *My Life*, 201.

84. Pershing to Adjutant General, “Report of June 30, 1902, to May 15, 1903,” May 15, 1903.

85. Pershing, *My Life*, 201.

86. Quoted in ibid., 202.

87. Lt. Col. Alexander Rodgers, a supporter of Pershing’s indirect-rule policies, replaced him.

3. Seeking Balance in the Scaffolding of Progressive Counterinsurgency

1. Sumner to Pershing, May 10, 1903, in Davis, *Annual Report … 1903*, , appendix 3, 78.

2. Davis to the Adjutant General, February 19, 1903, Box 369, Folder 3, Pershing Papers.

3. Davis to the Adjutant General, July 26, 1903, in Davis, *Annual Report … 1903*, appendix 3, 45.

4. Smythe quotes Lt. Ben Lear, who regarded Pershing as "a very cold oneman individual" (*Guerrilla Warrior*, 106–7).

5. "List of some of the Sultans and Dattos of various rancherias in the Laguna de Lanao … Furnished by Captain John J. Pershing, 15th Cavalry," May 15, 1903, Box 317, Folder 3, Pershing Papers. See also the undated list of leaders and their *sakop*, Box 317, Folder 5, Pershing Papers.

6. Guy H. Preston, July 15, 1903, quoted in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 106.

7. Davis to the Secretary of War, March 10, 1906, Box 281, Folder: "Personal Military Career of Capt. Pershing," Pershing Papers.

8. Pershing mentions the small hill in his autobiography, *My Life*, 189.

9. Linok is mentioned in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 95, where it is noted that the Linok Moros "were chagrined to think that he [Pershing] did not consider them important enough for a battle." Smythe bases his account on George C. Shaw's manuscript, "Around Lake Lanao," 1905, 14–15.

10. Pershing, *My Life*, 190; Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 1, Pershing Papers (where he refers to "an unfriendly faction" having taken over Gata).

11. First Lt. George T. Bowman to William Cary Sanger, Assistant Secretary of War, May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

12. Pershing to "my friend Amai Benanning," March 9, 1903, Box 318, Folder: "Letters 40–77," Pershing Papers; Pershing to Davis, March 4, 1903, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

13. Mention of Gata's warm reception in early May 1903 is in Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903.

14. Pershing to Bowman, April 23, 1903, attached to Bowman's letter to William Cary Sanger, May 15, 1903, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

15. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903.

16. See Pershing's somewhat exasperated report on the Taraca campaign in ibid.

17. Pershing, *My Life*, 203.

18. Pershing to Davis, January 23, 1903, Box 281, Folder: "Personal Military Career of Captain Pershing," Pershing Papers.

19. Robert Fulton makes the point that Root valued the advice of Magoon, "law officer of the Bureau of Insular Affairs and its primary legal authority on Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines" (*Moroland*, 150).

20. Pershing to Charles E. Magoon, January 28, 1903, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

21. Pershing, *My Life*, 202.

22. Davis to the Secretary of War, March 10, 1906.

23. Pershing to Davis, March 4, 1903, Box 281, Folder: "Personal Military Career of Capt. Pershing," Pershing Papers.

24. Before October 1, 1902, the Department of Mindanao was known as the Seventh Separate Brigade. See Gen. Samuel Sumner's report, June 30, 1903, in Davis, *Annual Report … 1903*, appendix 2.

25. For a good analysis of the politics of Wood's appointment and his views on how to rule Moros, see Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 6–52.

26. Quoted in Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:325.

27. Pershing to "my friend Amai-Manibilang of Madaya," May 29, 1903, Box 318, Folder: "Letters 40–77," Pershing Papers.

28. Pershing, *My Life*, 201.

29. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903.

30. Pershing to "my friend Nuzca of Remayn," May 29, 1903, Box 318, Folder: "Letters 40–77," Pershing Papers.

31. Pershing, *My Life*, 202–3.

32. President Roosevelt had also promised Wood that his assignment in Zamboanga would be temporary and that he would be promoted to major general and commander of the Philippine Division in due time. See Fulton, *Moroland*, 153–60.

33. On June 26, 1903, Davis wrote: "When the time comes for the Department to make selection of general officers for promotion from the grade of captain, I hope that Captain Pershing may be selected for brigadier-general" (Davis to the Secretary of War, March 10, 1906). It is likely that the general also encouraged Pershing to leave the Philippines, fearing that if he returned to Zamboanga and renewed his acquaintance with Joaquina Ignacio, this would scandalize the army's officer corps and greatly diminish Pershing's chances for promotion.

34. Davis, *Annual Report … 1903*, 39. This quote from Davis's report differs slightly from the act itself, which states that "the provincial governor and engineer may be officers of the Army." See "An Act [No. 787] Providing for the Organization and Government of the Moro Province" (hereafter "Moro Province Act"), in *Public Laws and Resolutions Passed by the Philippine Commission during the Quarter Ending August 31, 1903*, vol. 12 (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1903), 16.

35. "Moro Province Act," 16; see also 17–23, enumerating each official's responsibilities and salary.

36. Ibid., 17, 28. Each District Board comprised the district governor, secretary, and treasurer. The first district governors were Maj. Hugh L. Scott for Sulu, Maj. John P. Finley for Zamboanga, Lt. Edward C. Bolton for Davao, Capt. Carl Reichmann for Cotabato, and Maj. Robert L. Bullard for Lanao. See Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 113 n. 11.

37. "Moro Province Act," 16–17.

38. Ibid., 23. Each of the six Legislative Council members had voting power. In case of a tie, "the proposition which shall have received the vote of the governor shall prevail."

39. Ibid., 24–27, 35.

40. George W. Davis, "Notes on … Non Christians," August 25, 1902, in George William Jornacion, "Time of Eagles: United States Army Officers and the Pacification of the Philippine Moros 1899–1913," Ph.D. diss., University of Maine, 1973, appendix 3. Also see Pershing to Magoon, January 28, 1903, in which he states unequivocally that "a military government for a long time to come is the only one for these or any of the Moros."

41. Pershing shared Taft and Davis's view, insisting that "the man at the head of it [Moro Province] ought to be a vigorous, active, wide awake officer with a thorough knowledge of the people" (Pershing to Magoon, January 28, 1903).

42. "Moro Province Act," 17–18.

43. Ibid., 22.

44. Ibid., 25. Perhaps the best expression of how to strike a balance in governing Moros can be found in Pershing's report for May 15, 1903, where he states that "their government should … for

some time remain in charge of the military, either directly or indirectly," but then adds that local governance "by the Sultan or Datto … should be disturbed as little as possible," by which he meant that "the people should be managed through the Dattos themselves" (Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903).

45. "Moro Province Act," 28.

46. Ibid., 35. Among the exceptions: (1) when the Legislative Council determined that a Court of First Instance should try a case between Moros and other non-Christians and (2) when a case involved habeas corpus, at which point it would automatically be tried in a Court of First Instance.

47. Ibid., 25–26. Likewise, in all civil and criminal actions arising between non-Christians of the same tribe, their customary laws should govern if consistent with the act of Congress entitled "An Act Temporarily to Provide for the Administration of the Affairs of Civil Government in the Philippine Islands."

48. Davis, "Notes," appendix 3 in Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 291–92. Note the similarities between the district court system and Pershing's proposal for a Maranao Moro Tribunal to be composed of "friendly Dattos agreeable to both parties" who "could be relied upon to satisfactorily adjust their differences" (Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903; Pershing to Davis, August 28, 1902, Box 369, Folder 3, Pershing Papers).

49. Elihu Root, "Report for 1902," in U. S. War Department, *Five Years of the War Department Following the War with Spain, 1899–1903, as shown in the Annual Reports of the Secretary of War* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. War Department, 1904), 262–65.

50. "General Davis' Report on Slavery," July 3, 1902, in Chaffee, *Annual Report … 1902*, appendix 2 of appendix GG.

51. Pershing to Magoon, January 28, 1903.

52. "Moro Province Act," 27.

53. Davis, "Notes," appendix 3 in Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 294.

54. Davis to the Adjutant General of the Philippine Division, October 23, 1901, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers.

55. Davis, "Notes," appendix 3 in Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 287–88.

56. Pershing to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, May 15, 1903.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Brigadier General J. J. Pershing, "Conquest of the Moros," August 1908, three-page retrospective in Box 278, Folder: "Conquest of the Moros," Pershing Papers.

4. Leonard Wood and Counterinsurgency in Lanao and Cotabato

1. Gowing estimates 3,000 Moro and 70 constabulary and American deaths (*Mandate in Moroland*, 151, 164), but these figures are only for Jolo. When deaths from fighting in Lanao and Cotabato are added, the number rises to approximately 4,000 and 100, respectively.

2. John R. White, *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (New York: Century, 1928), 190–91.

3. For Wood's comment about "armed resistance," see Leonard Wood, "Report to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division," April 15, 1904, in United States Army, Adjutant General's Office,

Records of the AGO, 1780s–1917, Record Group (RG) 94, Enclosure in Consolidated File 523713, National Archives (NA), Washington, D. C. (these records are hereafter referred to only as RG 94).

4. Biographer Jack Lane points out that Wood sometimes turned loyalists into enemies by badgering them so aggressively for help in promoting his career that they completely lost patience with him (*Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood* [Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978], 23).

5. Jack McCallum, *Leonard Wood: Rough Rider, Surgeon, Architect of American Imperialism* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 126.

6. Hermann Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood: A Biography*, 2 vols. (New York: Harper, 1931), 1:2.

7. McCallum, *Leonard Wood*, 9–16.

8. Ibid.

9. Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood*, 1:123; Lane, *Armed Progressive*, 20.

10. Leonard Wood Diary, entry for May 4, 1886, quoted in McCallum, *Leonard Wood*, 27.

11. McCallum, *Leonard Wood*, 52–53.

12. Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, October 5, 1897, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 1, ed. Elting E. Morison (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), 689.

13. McCallum, *Leonard Wood*, 67.

14. Lane, *Armed Progressive*, 33. Roosevelt added to the regiment some twenty-five "gentlemen rankers" from Yale, Harvard, and the Knickerbocker Club. The mix of "prominent Eastern socialites and polo players with Western frontiersmen" helped make the Rough Riders "characteristically American" (Lane, *Armed Progressive*, 30).

15. McCallum, *Leonard Wood*, 152–59. Taking advantage of his Harvard ties, Wood sent 1,450 Cuban women to Harvard for teacher training. In the Philippines, English, not Spanish, became the language of instruction.

16. Wood to Elihu Root, January 19, 1900, quoted in ibid., 183.

17. McCallum, *Leonard Wood*, 184. These infringements included sale or lease of naval stations to the United States and acknowledgment (with exquisite irony) of America's "right to intervene for the protection of Cuban independence."

18. Ibid., 184–96, 111–33. Wood felt no compunction about interfering in the elections on behalf of candidates he liked, even firing mayors who opposed his favorites.

19. Leonard Wood Diary, entry for May 20, 1902, quoted in ibid., 197.

20. McCallum, *Leonard Wood*, 189.

21. For Wood's advocacy of annexation, see ibid., 190.

22. Ibid., 207.

23. Leonard Wood, *First Annual Report of Major General Leonard Wood, U. S. Army, Governor of the Moro Province* (Zamboanga, Philippines: Mindanao Herald, September 1, 1904), 9.

24. Wood, "Report to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division," April 15, 1904.

25. Ibid.

26. Wood Diary, entry for November 30, 1903, Box 3, Folder 2, Wood Papers.

27. R. L. Bullard, "Report of Acts of Lawlessness Committed by Moros in the District of Lanao, Moro Province, Period from July 1st, 1903, to March 31st, 1904," n.d., Box 10, Folder 3, Frank Ross McCoy Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; "Overt Acts Committed by Moros of Lake Lanao against American Soldiers July 1, 1903–March 1904," n.d., RG 94, Consolidated File 520834, NA.

28. Bullard, “Report of Acts of Lawlessness”; “Overt Acts Committed by Moros.”

29. Bullard, “Report of Acts of Lawlessness”; “Overt Acts Committed by Moros.”

30. Bullard Diary, entry for September 9, 1903, Box 1, Folder 2, Bullard Papers.

31. Bullard Diary, entry for September 17, 1903, Box 1, Folder 2, Bullard Papers.

32. Bullard Diary, entry for September 12, 1903, Box 1, Folder 2, Bullard Papers.

33. Bullard Diary, entry for November 29, 1903, Box 1, Folder 2, Bullard Papers.

34. Ibid.

35. Bullard to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, January 26, 1904, Box 1, Folder 2, Bullard Papers.

36. Bullard, “Report of Acts of Lawlessness”; “Overt Acts Committed by Moros.”

37. Wood, “Report to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division,” April 15, 1904.

38. Capt. G. Langhorne, Eleventh Cavalry Chief of Staff, “Memoranda Concerning Taraca Expedition,” April 16, 1904, RG 94, Consolidated File 523713, NA.

39. Wood, “Report to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division,” April 15, 1904.

40. Wood Diary, entry for April 4, 1904, Box 3, Folder 2, Wood Papers.

41. Col. Horace P. Hobbs, *Kris and Krag: Adventures among the Moros of the Southern Philippine Islands* (N.p.: Horace P. Hobbs Jr., 1962), 129.

42. Wood, “Report to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division,” April 15, 1904. Wood’s repeated statements regarding his efforts to avoid unnecessary bloodshed came in response to Secretary of War Elihu Root’s explicit statement in a cable to Maj. Gen. James F. Wade, commander of the Philippine Division, dated March 14, 1904: “Secretary War very anxious that correction of undesirable customs among Moros shall be effected by peaceful means rather than by force. This refers also to enforcement of recent laws affecting slavery. So inform General Wood” (RG 94, Consolidated File 520834, NA).

43. Wood, “Report to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division,” April 15, 1904, and Wood Diary, entry for April 7, 1904, Box 3, Folder 2, Wood Papers. The Taraca sultan remained at large despite concerted American efforts to catch him. See Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, April 16, 1904, Doc. 533373, RG 94, NA.

44. Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, March 29, 1904, Doc. 529582, RG 94, Consolidated File 520834, NA.

45. Leonard Wood, “Report on Taraca,” April 15, 1904, RG 94, File 523713, NA.

46. Wood, *First Annual Report*, 21.

47. Bullard Diary, entry for April 19, 1904, Box 1, Folder 3, Bullard Papers. Bullard followed up the Taraca expedition with a raid on Bacolod and Cauayan, where two of Taraca’s leaders (the sultan and Amai Binaning) had reportedly sought refuge. The supposedly “scared” locals put up a fight at Cauayan during which some fifty Moros were killed, but the fugitives flew the coop. In the meantime, unrepentant Moros in Taraca surprised and killed the officer who had been left in charge (Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, April 16, 1904, and Bullard Diary, entry for April 19, 1904, Box 1, Folder 3, Bullard Papers). Bullard grew weary of the never-ending “wrangle” with Moros. On June 6, saying “I’ve had all I can stand,” he “sat down on the lake shore and wrote … [his] resignation.” He left the Philippines in July (Bullard Diary, entry for June 9, 1904, Box 1, Folder 3, Bullard Papers).

48. Wood, “Report to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division,” April 15, 1904.

49. In his diaries, Wood chronicles a life lived with amazing vigor. He often swam or went horseback riding in the morning, and he was a passionate hunter. He rarely stayed in his Zamboanga headquarters more than a few days, preferring to lead expeditions into the most remote reaches of

Moro Province. What's missing in the diaries is an equal commitment to building relationships with Moros.

50. I am indebted to Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto for the discussion of Maguindanao society. See Ileto's book *MAGINDANAO, 1860–1888: The Career of Datu Uto of Buayan*, Data Paper no. 82, Southeast Asia Program (Ithaca, N.Y.: Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1971). Also see Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos*, 9.

51. Ileto, *MAGINDANAO*, 1.

52. Ibid., 5.

53. Ibid., chaps. 1 and 2.

54. In their first census in 1903, Americans estimated the population of Cotabato District at 125,875, with 113,875 of them being Muslims and the remainder pagans (U. S. Philippine Commission, *Census of the Philippine Islands Taken in 1903* [Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1905]). Although Maguindanaos represented the largest group of Philippine Muslims, their district was quite sparsely populated considering its size and rich agricultural lands. The census did not distinguish between *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*, but the latter outnumbered the former significantly. Also see "Facts about the Moro Province," 1913, Box 369, Folder 2, Pershing Papers. For a list of *sa-raya* products, see Ileto, *MAGINDANAO*, 22.

55. Ileto, *MAGINDANAO*, 33.

56. Ibid., 13–15.

57. Ibid., 14, 18.

58. Ibid., 17–18.

59. Ibid., 20. Uto's father died in 1872, after which Uto took over. In 1878, "he appeared at Cotabato at the head of an armada of eighty to a hundred vintas loaded with armed warriors." It was "a dashing show of strength, representing the height of his career" (ibid., 20).

60. Ibid., 23.

61. José Fernandez Cuevas, "Relación de un viaje de exploracion a Mindanao, 1860," quoted in Ileto, *MAGINDANAO*, 25.

62. Ileto, *MAGINDANAO*, 35.

63. Ibid., 37–38. According to Jeremy Beckett, Uto was also feared as "a monster of cruelty, cunning and caprice," whose followers, sickened by his cruelty, eventually abandoned him ("The Defiant and the Compliant: The Datus of Magindanao under Colonial Rule," in *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus [Honolulu: University Press of Hawai'i, 1982], 399).

64. Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Journal of Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1967): 267–83.

65. Ileto, *MAGINDANAO*, 45, chap. 5. Turn-of-the-century visitors commented on the growing numbers of *panditas*, mosques, and madrassas in Maguindanao.

66. Ibid., 63.

67. Beckett points out that Datu Ayunan, who helped the Spanish defeat Uto, later passed his title on to his brother Balabaran, father of Datu Sinsuat ("The Defiant and the Compliant," 400, 404).

68. Piang was born to one of Uto's bondswomen and a Cantonese trader. Originally an armor maker for Uto, he rose to become the wealthiest man in Cotabato thanks to gaining control over the timber and gutta percha trade. According to Richard Barry, "Piang made the money and [Datu] Ali spent it" on gambling and women ("The End of Datto Ali," *Collier's*, June 9, 1906). One American report described Piang as "the only prominent Moro who seems to appreciate what the American invasion means and the business opportunities it brings with it. The Chinese blood in him makes him

a shrewd business man, and he has accumulated quite a fortune and is daily adding to it. He practically controls all the business of Cotabato, especially exports, through his Chinese agents" (U. S. War Department, *Annual Reports for 1902*, 528, quoted in Beckett, "The Defiant and the Compliant," 401).

69. Ileto, *MAGINDANAO*, 64, 7–8. Also see the Wood Diary, entry for October 20, 1903, Box 3, Folder 2, Wood Papers. Piang bore at least partial responsibility for Cotabato's descent into disorder between September and December 1899, the short period between Spanish withdrawal and American advance. He looted Spanish military posts, appropriating their cannon and *lantakas* for his own fortifications. Together with Datu Ali, he also consented to a pogrom against Filipino Christians in Cotabato City. "Filipino revolutionary officials were executed … ; their women were publicly shamed; [and when Cotabato City was sacked,] … the Christian population fled to the hills" (Barry, "The End of Datto Ali"). Wood blamed "[Datu] Ali and his brother Djimbangan." According to him, they "sacked Cottabato, destroying a large portion of the town, killing the Filipino men, and after stripping and parading their women took such as pleased them into captivity. These excesses were accompanied by many acts of great cruelty and brutality" (Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, March 17, 1904, Doc. 529582, RG 94, Consolidated File 520834, NA).

70. Hobbs, *Kris and Krag*, 118; White, *Bullets and Bolos*, 235. As a constabulary captain, White "was entitled to a small and scrawny fowl" (*Bullets and Bolos*, 235).

71. Barry, "The End of Datu Ali."

72. Cornelius C. Smith Jr., *Don't Settle for Second: Life and Times of Cornelius C. Smith with Illustrations by the Author* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1977), 73.

73. Hobbs praises the commanding officer in Cotabato, Maj. Edward Chynoweth, for strongly opposing the "policy of trying to change Moro customs [such as slavery] by proclamation," recommending "patience and a gradual process of education" instead (*Kris and Krag*, 118). John White praises Col. Febiger for befriending Ali and shutting his eyes to Moro customs such as slavery (*Bullets and Bolos*, 216).

74. When Gen. Kobbe visited Cotabato in August 1900, both Piang and Ali accompanied him on his tour of inspection upriver (Kobbe Diary, entry for August 20, 1900, Box 1, Kobbe Papers).

75. Barry, "The End of Datu Ali"; Fulton, *Moroland*, 217–18.

76. Act 8, "An Act Defining the Crimes of Slave Holding and Slave Hunting, and Prescribing the Punishment Therefor," September 24, 1903, in Wood, *First Annual Report*, 36–37. In his diary entry for September 21–30, 1903, Wood wrote: "Got the slavery law through the Council during the last few days, and hope now to gradually enforce it in such a way as to give rise to the minimum amount of opposition" (Box 3, Folder 2, Wood Papers).

77. Wood, *First Annual Report*, 9.

78. Mention of *panditas* and holy war comes from Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, March 17, 1904.

79. Governor Carl Reichmann to the commanding officer, Cotabato, February 17, 1904, RG 94, Consolidated File 520834, NA.

80. Wood to the Executive Secretary of the Philippine Commission, March 16, 1904, RG 94, Consolidated File 520834, NA; Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, March 17, 1904; Wood to General Wade, cable, quoted in Wade to the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., March 17, 1904, RG 94, Consolidated File 520834, NA.

81. Wood Diary, entry for March 10, 1904, Box 3, Wood Papers.

82. Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, March 17, 1904.

83. Ibid. The discrepancy is between Wood's official report and his nonofficial comments. In his diary entry for March 11, 1904, he speaks of many dead and evidence of heavy losses (Box 3, Wood Papers). In a letter to General Frank Greene, September 5, 1904, he estimated 108 killed and wounded (General Correspondence, Wood Papers).

84. Frank McCoy Notebook, entry for March 14, 1904, Box 1, Folder 2, McCoy Papers.

85. Wood to the Executive Secretary, March 16, 1904.

86. Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, March 17, 1904; Barry, "The End of Datto Ali."

87. Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, March 17, 1904.

88. Wood Diary, entry for May 24, 1904, Box 3, Wood Papers; Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, June 4, 1904, Doc. 911744, RG 94, Box 3639, filed with Consolidated File 523713, NA. According to Wayne Wray Thompson, nine Moros died ("Governors of the Moro Province," 69). According to Horace Hobbs, "the two captured men were well treated by the Moros" (*Kris and Krag*, 134).

89. Fulton, *Moroland*, 226–27.

90. Ibid., 226.

91. Wood Diary, entry for May 24, 1904, Box 3, Wood Papers.

92. Wood to the Adjutant General, Philippine Division, March 2, 1904, RG 94, Consolidated File 520834, NA.

93. Wood to Col. Edward Davis, August 2, 1904, General Correspondence, Wood Papers, quoted in Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 69. Also see Wood to the Adjutant General, June 4, 1904, Doc. 911744, RG 94, Box 3639, NA.

94. Frederick L. Wernstedt and Joseph E. Spencer, *Philippine Island World: A Physical, Cultural, and Regional Geography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 545.

95. H. S. Howland, "Field Service in Mindanao," *Journal of the United States Infantry Association* 2, no. 2 (October 1905): 36–47; Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 145–46.

96. Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 145–46; Howland, "Field Service in Mindanao," 36; White, *Bullets and Bolos*, 223.

97. Smith, *Don't Settle for Second*, 74.

98. Wood Diary, entry for September 1–5, 1904, Box 3, Wood Papers.

99. Wood to Maj. H. J. Slocum, August 29, 1904, Box 34, Wood Papers, cited in Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 145.

100. Wood Diary, entry for September 18, 1904, Box 3, Wood Papers.

101. Wood to the Military Secretary of the Army, June 30, 1905, Doc. 1047622, RG 94, Box 4339, NA, typescript of Wood's annual report for June 1904 to June 1905.

102. Howland, "Field Service in Mindanao," 43. Thompson says that more than 10,000 returned to their villages in early 1905 ("Governors of the Moro Province," 70, citing Wood to Gen. Henry Corbin, March 13, 1905, General Correspondence, Wood Papers).

103. Smith, *Don't Settle for Second*, 75, 77–78.

104. Ibid., 84–85, 88–90.

105. Wood Diary, entry for September 18, 1904, Box 3, Wood Papers.

106. Wood Diary, entry for July 14, 1904, Box 3, Wood Papers; Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 142.

107. Smith, *Don't Settle for Second*, 81; Fulton, *Moroland*, 241–42.

108. Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 70.

109. McCoy Notebook, entry for July 14, 1905, Box 11, Folder 3, McCoy Papers; Fulton, *Moroland*, 252–53.

110. Langhorne to Wood, August 23, 1905, General Correspondence, Wood Papers, quoted in Fulton, *Moroland*, 253; Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 71.

111. Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 149; First Lt. Arthur Poillon, report, n.d., Box 11, Folder 6, McCoy Papers.

112. White, *Bullets and Bolos*, 216.

113. Ibid., 191.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., 273–79.

116. Ibid., 273–79.

117. Wood to Gen. Frank Green, September 5, 1904, Box 35, Wood Papers.

118. White, *Bullets and Bolos*, 221.

5. Comparative Counterinsurgency and the Moros of Jolo

1. John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 26–29.

2. See Kramer, *The Blood of Government*, introduction, 217–20, and chapter 4 especially.

3. See Michael C. Hawkins, *Making Moros: Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines' Muslim South* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2013).

4. All of these quotes are found in Peter G. Gowing, "Moros and Indians: Commonalities of Purpose, Policy, and Practice in American Government of Two Hostile Subject Peoples," *Philippine Quarterly of Culture & Society* 8 (1980): 125–28.

5. Andrew J. Birtle, *U. S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860–1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), 7.

6. Ibid., 5.

7. Ibid., 34, 36 (quote from Sherman), 101. President Lincoln signed General Orders 100, "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," on April 24, 1863.

8. Birtle, *U. S. Army Counterinsurgency*, chap. 3. Important books for young army reformers included George Crook, *Resumé of Operations against Apache Indians, 1882 to 1886* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. War Department, 1886); Elwell Otis, *The Indian Question* (New York: Sheldon, 1878); Oliver Howard, *My Life and Experiences among Our Hostile Indians* (Hartford, Conn.: A. D. Worthington, 1907); and Nelson Miles, *Serving the Republic* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1911).

9. Birtle, *U. S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 89–92.

10. These points are adapted from the twenty-eight articles of company-level counterinsurgency given in David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29–49.

11. Wood Diary, entry for November 30, 1903, Box 3, Wood Papers.

12. *The U. S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 288.

13. In the months preceding the massacre on Bud Dajo in March 1906, Governor Scott described the depredations of people on the mountain as being directed primarily against other Moros, not Americans (Hugh Lenox Scott, "The Moros of Jolo Island," memorandum for the Secretary of War, n.d., Box 55, last folder, Hugh Lenox Scott Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).

14. See Norman Owen, ed., *Compadre Colonialism: Studies on the Philippines under American Rule*, Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia no. 3 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1971).

15. Thomas M. Kiefer, *The Tausug: Violence and Law in a Philippine Moslem Society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 2.

16. Thomas M. Kiefer, "Parrang Sabbil: Ritual Suicide among the Tausug of Jolo," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Anthropologica* 129, no. 1 (1973): 109.

17. George Ade, *The Sultan of Sulu: An Original Satire in Two Acts* (New York: R. H. Russell, 1903).

18. Kiefer, *Tausug*, 22.

19. Kiefer, "Parrang Sabbil," 111.

20. James Francis Warren, *The Sulu Zone 1768–1898*, 2nd ed. (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007), xxxv.

21. Michael Salman, *The Embarrassment of Slavery: Controversies over Bondage and Nationalism in the American Colonial Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 62–63.

22. Warren, *Sulu Zone*, part 2.

23. Kiefer, "Parrang Sabbil," 108.

24. William Howard Taft, *Philippine Commission Report, 1901*, 1:36–38, quoted in Salman, *Embarrassment of Slavery*, 77.

25. General Kobbe to Adjutant General, November 20, 1900, RG 94, File 366585, NA, quoted in Salman, *Embarrassment of Slavery*, 45, 84–85.

26. Elihu Root to Albert Bushnell Hart, February 3, 1902, in U. S. Bureau of Insular Affairs. *Records of the Bureau of Insular Affairs*, File 2869–1, RG 350, NA (these records hereafter referred to as RG 350 only), quoted in Salman, *Embarrassment of Slavery*, 86.

27. "Agreement between General John C. Bates, United States Army, and the Sultan of Sulu, Together with Certain Sulu Chiefs, Signed at Jolo August 20, 1899," appendix B in Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 348–49; Secretary of War to General Otis, October 27, 1899, quoted in Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 35.

28. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 349. The Bates Agreement included other *datu* signatories on the payroll as well.

29. Quoted in ibid.

30. See U. S. Senate, *Report of John C. Bates on Agreement with Sultan of Sulu*, Doc. 136, 56th Cong., 1st sess., February 1, 1900.

31. Renato T. Oliveros, S.J., "Islam in the Moro-American War (1899–1913): Implications on Mindanao, the Philippines," Ph.D. diss., Temple University, 2005, 65–68.

32. Warren, *Sulu Zone*, 104–25.

33. Salman, *Embarrassment of Slavery*, 61–67.

34. Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," 100–101.

35. Warren, *Sulu Zone*, xliii–xliv.

36. Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," 101.

37. Kiefer, *Tausug*, 93–94.

38. Oliveros, "Islam in Moro-American War," 65–68. I am indebted to Renato Oliveros for making this distinction.

39. Ibid., 67. Also see Najeeb M. Saleeby, *The Moro Problem: An Academic Discussion of the History and Solution of the Problem of the Government of the Moros of the Philippine Islands* (Manila: E. C. McCullough, 1913).

40. Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," 67.

41. Quoted in Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 21.

42. Quoted in Hagedorn, *Leonard Wood*, 2:6.

43. Wood to William Howard Taft, December 16, 1903, Box 33, Wood Papers.

44. Also *perang sabil*. See Joshua Gedacht, "Holy War, Progress, and 'Modern Mohammedans' in Colonial Southeast Asia," *Muslim World* 105, no. 4 (October 2015): 446–71.

45. See Victor Hurley, *Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros* (New York: Dutton, 1936), as just one example.

46. Kiefer, "Parrang Sabbil," 109.

47. Ibid., 119–20.

48. Ibid., 109.

49. "Parrang sabbil was usually done aginst [*sic*] soldiers; it was more likely to be done against men than women, and was never done against children" (ibid., 112).

50. Ibid., 112–15.

51. "Report of Cases of Lawlessness Etc., Committed by Moros within the District of Jolo, during the Period from September 2nd, 1903 [to] March 31st, 1904," with addenda for April and May 1904, Box 55, Folder: "Official File: Philippines March, 1904," Scott Papers. According to Jornacion, there had been more *parrang sabbils* before the antislavery law, five in March 1903 alone ("Time of Eagles," 112).

52. Ibid.

6. Hard War in Jolo

1. In his report dated June 30, 1904, Governor Scott argued that Hassan's following on October 6 "was said to exceed 2000 armed men with hostile intent" (Scott to the Secretary of the Moro Province, June 30, 1904, Box 55, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, June 1904," Scott Papers). Also see a document listing each Jolo leader and the number of "armed men and rifles" under his command that supports this estimate: "Island of Jolo, Sulu Archipelago, Philippine Islands," Box 3, Folder: "Miscellaneous," Kobbe Papers.

2. The term *panglima* signifies the leader of a district in Jolo (Luuk, Parang, etc.), appointed by the sultan. A *panglima* was supposed to be the sultan's representative, but the sultan lacked power of enforcement, so that *panglimas* such as Hassan operated independently (Frank DeMitt, Senior Inspector, to the Adjutant, 5th District, Bureau of Constabulary, June 2, 1907, Box 57, Folder 4, Scott Papers).

3. Hugh Lenox Scott, *Some Memories of a Soldier* (New York: Century, 1928), 299.

4. Jornacion notes that in October 1902 the Fifteenth Cavalry had made a reconnaissance of Jolo Island, receiving a friendly reception except in Hassan's district, where the *panglima* "was not cordial" ("Time of Eagles," 111, quoting a report by Col. Wallace, 1903, in U. S. War Department *Annual Report of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1903* [Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1904], 5:354–55).

5. Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 113–14.

6. Quoted in Salman, *Embarrassment of Slavery*, 102; Wallace to Wood, August 17, 1903, Box 55, Scott Papers.

7. Wood Diary, entry for August 28, 1903, Box 3, Wood Papers.

8. Scott, *Some Memories*, 332.

9. Quoted in ibid., 298, 300.

10. "Ballad written and sung by Jolo Moros," n.d., Box 57, Folder 4, Scott Papers; "Ini Kissa Kan Panglima Hassan," appendix D in Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," 262–70.

11. Quoted in Frank McCoy to Frank Carpenter, December 2, 1903, Box 10, Folder 2, McCoy Papers.

12. Scott, *Some Memories*, 293. Biroa eventually surrendered to Scott on October 23, 1903. He was tried in a Moro arbitration court, fined $25, and released, proving to Americans who thought like Wood that Moro justice represented, in fact, no justice at all. For descriptions of the Biroa case, see Fulton, *Moroland*, 191–96; Salman, *Embarrassment of Slavery*, 103–5; and Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 114–19.

13. Scott gleefully describes the *rajah mudah*'s humiliation in *Some Memories*, 279–80. As the sultan's brother, the *rajah mudah* declined to pay his respects to Wood, complaining that he suffered from boils. Like a stern schoolmaster questioning the excuse of a truant child, Wood sent Scott to investigate. Scott demanded that he "show the boil." According to McCoy, as the *rajah mudah*'s "[s]arong went up [his leg], the horrible boil kept ahead," until it was proven that he had no boil after all, whereupon the American "doctor pronounced him fit to mount his pony and obey orders" to visit the general (McCoy to Carpenter, December 2, 1903).

14. McCoy to Carpenter, December 2, 1903.

15. Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 129.

16. Scott, *Some Memories*, 300.

17. U. S. Philippine Commission, *Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission*, vol. 1 of U. S. War Department, *Annual Report of the War Department … 1903*, 527–28.

18. Ibid., 528.

19. Ibid.

20. W. M. Wallace "to my son, his highness the Sultan of Jolo, from his father, the governor of Jolo," May 12, 1902, in ibid., 493–94.

21. Ibid., 528.

22. Scott, *Some Memories*, 293.

23. Ibid., 301–2.

24. Ibid., part 2. In 1897, Scott was posted to the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, where he worked on Indian sign languages.

25. Even the attainment of greater experience in Sulu did not free Scott from all of his prejudicial baggage. In his published memoirs, he continued to argue for "firmness" in dealing with "inferior races" (*Some Memories*, 320), sounding very much like his boss, Gen. Wood. He also remained critical of the "pacifist" (316) policy of his predecessors, such as Gen. Davis and Capt. Pershing.

26. Wood to Philippine Governor William H. Taft, December 16, 1903, in U. S. Philippine Commission, *Fourth Annual Report*, 487–88. Wood gives the impression that Jolo swarmed with *juramentados* or *parrang sabbils*, when in fact the Philippine Commission had counted only eight such cases between October 30, 1902, and September 25, 1903 (*Fourth Annual Report*, 542).

27. Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," 117–18, citing Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) in explaining the Jolo war. I disagree with this assessment.

28. Scott, *Some Memories*, 331.

29. See Oliveros's analysis of the Qurʾan and slavery in "Islam in the Moro-American War," 124–26, 151.

30. Scott to the Secretary of the Moro Province, September 3, 1904, Box 56, Folder 1, Scott Papers.

31. Adjutant General to General Wood, November 5, 1903, Box 10, Folder 2, McCoy Papers.

32. "Ballad written and sung by Jolo Moros."

33. Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 55.

34. Scott, *Some Memories*, 326–30.

35. See Hobbs, *Kris and Krag*, 102.

36. The "woman warrior" comment is in Samuel K. Tan, *Sulu under American Military Rule, 1899–1913* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1968), 60–61, based on an article in the *Manila Times*, December 9, 1903. Also see Leonard Wood, "Report of the 2nd Sulu Expedition," RG 94, File 52015, NA, cited in Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 123–29, and Fulton, *Moroland*, 202, mentioning plunder.

37. Wood Diary, entry for November 25, 1903, Box 3, Wood Papers.

38. Najeeb M. Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1908), 127. The terrible cholera epidemic that killed 10 percent of Jolo's population became a source of anti-American mobilization in the Luuk and Parang Districts, according to Col. Wallace, because Americans were "accused of poisoning water and food" (exhibit dated January 13, 1903, in Scott report, September 3, 1904, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, August–December 1904," Scott Papers).

39. The quotes are taken from Wood to Military Secretary, Philippines Division, May 22, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, Apr.–May 1905," Scott Papers. By the end of his third expedition in Jolo, Wood had clearly developed a new respect for the difficulty of fighting determined Moros such as Hassan in Jolo.

40. Scott to the Adjutant General, Department of Mindanao, March 31, 1906, Box 57, Folder 3, Scott Papers. The date on this report, 1906, might be an error.

41. Scott to the Secretary of the Moro Province, June 30, 1904. In subsequent interviews, Scott learned that there had been "about 400" Moros in the *cotta*, including women and children. See the eighteen pages of interviews, February 15–20, 1904, Box 55, Folder: "Jan–Feb, 1904, Interviews," Scott Papers.

42. The title *laksamana* means "assistant to the *panglima*" (Frank S. DeMitt to the Adjutant, Fifth District, Bureau of Constabulary, June 2, 1907, Box 57, Folder 4, Scott Papers).

43. Interviews, February 15–20, 1904.

44. Wood, "Report of the 2nd Sulu Expedition," cited in Jornacion, "Time of Eagles," 123–29; Scott to the Secretary of the Moro Province, June 30, 1904; Scott, *Some Memories*, 349–50. Scott sent Hassan's *kris* and *barong* to Wood, requesting that he forward the latter to President Roosevelt (Scott to Wood, March 9, 1904, cited in Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 58).

45. Scott, *Some Memories*, 350.

46. Scott to the Secretary of the Moro Province, June 30, 1904.

47. See the document titled "Hadjis Butu and Abdullah on Various Topics," May 9, 1904, Box 55, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, May 1904," Scott Papers, in which Abdullah says: "Usap sent word … to the Sultan that he would surrender to the Sultan if the Parang people were withdrawn. He did not come out, though, because he was afraid that the Parang people would occupy the cotta."

48. It is not suggested that these issues were the only ones to fuel anti-American sentiment but rather that they generated the most opposition. Other American policies—such as the antislavery law,

imposition of customs duties and other taxes, and the change-over to a national Philippine peso currency—sparked protests as well.

49. President Roosevelt formally ordered abrogation of the Bates Agreement on March 2, 1904, but the sultan didn't learn of this until March 21. The decision met with unanimous agreement among Americans, including Gen. Wood and Governor Scott. See "Report of General Wood as to Abrogation Bates Treaty," December 16, 1903, in U. S. Philippine Commission, *Fourth Annual Report*, part 1, exhibit T, 489–542. Although all stipends were initially cancelled, American leaders changed their minds and actually increased them from $4,200 to $6,750. See U. S. Philippine Commission, *Fourth Annual Report*, part 1, 13.

50. Passed by Gen. Wood's Moro Province Legislative Council as its fifth act on September 10, 1903, the *cedula* required every Moro male from age eighteen to age fifty-five to buy an annual registration card for one peso. Moros regarded it as a poll or head tax, called it a *jizya*, or tribute tax, and conflated it with submission to the infidel. Scott delayed implementation of the *cedula* in Jolo until January 1905 and eventually came to oppose it.

51. Quoted in Fulton, *Moroland*, 229.

52. Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," 135, lists the stipends for the sultan and his associates.

53. Scott to Wood, April 17, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, April–May 1905," Scott Papers. Also see Scott to Wood, March 9, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines: Jan–Mar 1905," Scott Papers.

54. Scott interview with Hadji Butu and the Maharajah of Talipao, August 1, 1904, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, Aug–Dec, 1904," Scott Papers.

55. For Scott's threats against Usap, see his meeting with Bandahalla and Hadji Taib, August 12, 1904, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, Aug–Dec, 1904," Scott Papers. "I want Panglima Bandahall[a] to bring him in or kill him," he says. "Pull him right out of his cotta."

56. Scott interview with Laksamana Usap, August 17, 1904, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, Aug–Dec, 1904," Scott Papers.

57. "Report of Field Operations of Third Squadron 14th. Cavalry and One Platoon 18th. Battery, Field Artillery from December 26th. 1904 to January 15th. 1905," Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, Jan–Mar 1905," Scott Papers.

58. Oscar J. Charles to Maj. H. J. Slocum, January 9, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, Jan–Mar 1905," Scott Papers.

59. Scott to the Secretary of War, "The Moros of Jolo Island," memorandum, n.d., Box 55, last folder, Scott Papers.

60. Datu Hassan of Bual's report to Governor Scott, March 10, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, Jan–Mar 1905," Scott Papers.

61. Charles to Slocum, January 9, 1905. In his diary entry dated February 19, 1904, Wood estimated that 300 were killed in all (Box 3, Folder 2, Wood Papers).

62. "Report of Field Operations of Third Squadron."

63. Datu Kalbi, quoted in Scott to Wood, handwritten letter, April 19, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, April–May 1905," Scott Papers.

64. Scott to Wood, handwritten letter, April 19, 1905. Also see Scott to Wood, April 17, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, April–May 1905," Scott Papers.

65. Scott to Wood, April 19, 1905.

66. Tan, *Sulu under American Military Rule*, 63.

67. Ibid.; Scott to the Military Secretary, Department of Mindanao, May 28, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, April–May, 1905," Scott Papers.

68. Tan, *Sulu under American Military Rule*, 67.

69. Ibid., 65.

70. Scott to Department of Mindanao, March 25, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, Jan–Mar 1905," Scott Papers.

71. Tan, *Sulu under American Military Rule*, 65–67.

72. Wood told Scott that he "did not wish to ask for more troops because … [he had] reported Jolo as being quiet" (Scott to Wood, April 17, 1905, Box 56, Folder 3, Scott Papers).

73. Tan, *Sulu under American Military Rule*, 67; Scott to the Military Secretary, Department of Mindanao, May 28, 1905.

74. Wood Diary, entries for May 2, 3, and 4, 1905, Box 3, Wood Papers. Wood gave no estimate of Moro losses. The number 100 comes from Tan, *Sulu under American Military Rule*, 68.

75. Scott to the Military Secretary, Department of Mindanao, May 28, 1905.

76. Wood Diary, entry for May 5, 1905, Box 3, Wood Papers; Wood to the Military Secretary, Philippines Division, May 22, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, Apr–May 1905," Scott Papers.

77. Scott to Capt. George Langhorne, handwritten letter, August 28, 1905, Box 56, Folder: "Official File: Philippines, June–Aug 1905," Scott Papers.

78. Scott did not rule in murder cases. The Court of First Instance took care of these cases, and convicted parties were usually sent to Bilibid Prison in Manila. One exception was Sariol, a member of the Moro Constabulary, who was convicted of murdering Capt. Hayson and hanged November 20, 1905, on the island of Siassi ("Annual Report of the District of Sulu," June 30, 1906, Box 57, Folder 2, Scott Papers).

79. Salahuddin, chief of Siunugan, report to the Governor, August 20, 1904, Box 56, Folder: "Letters Re Philippines, Aug–Dec 1904," Scott Papers.

80. "Annual Report of the District of Sulu," June 30, 1906. In this report, the acting governor, Capt. James H. Reeves, lists the following as leaders of the 200 who retreated to Bud Dajo: Panglima Imlan, Imam Harib, and Ako, all of Lati; Imam Sanudan (Sanuddin) and Adam of Pansul. To this list Charles Schuck added: Kamlam, Bibang, Arggil, and Asanuf (Mr. Charles Schuck, Interpreter, statement, March 29, 1906, Exhibit C attached to Capt. James H. Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906, Box 37, Folder: "Correspondence 1906," Wood Papers). Sawajaan added Jinani and Jalaidi, who congregated with Imlan, Harib, and Ako on the mountain's east side, as well as Sulai, who joined Sanuddin and Arggil on the west (Sawajaan, statement, June 12, 1905, exhibit B of Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906).

81. Scott, *Some Memories*, 379–81.

82. In *Some Memories*, Scott says that Datus Joakanain, Kalbi, and Indanan told him that the events at Bud Dajo would never have happened had he stayed in Jolo (386).

83. Because Datus Joakanain, Kalbi, and Indanan (along with the sultan) had reached an accommodation with Scott and had agreed not only to pay the *cedula* but also to compel their followers to pay it as well, refusing to do so spelled the s*akop*'s disobedience against their authority. For more on the importance of the *cedula* as a contributing factor to the events at Bud Dajo, see Schuck, statement, March 29, 1906.

84. "Silsilah sin Lupa Sug," translated in Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," appendix F, 275.

85. Ibid., 275–77. Oliveros cites the “Silsilah sin Lupa Sug” in arguing that many Bud Dajo refugees intended to die as *parrang sabbils*, so that even when Scott assured them that they would not have to pay a *cedula*, they chose to stay and die.

86. Sawajaan, statement, December 4, 1905, exhibit A of Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906, saying that the people on Bud Dajo are “all afraid.” Also see Schuck, statement, March 29, 1906, in which Schuck says that Moros “had not gone upon the hill because they were criminals, but because of fear.”

87. Sawajaan, statement, December 4, 1905.

88. Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906, mentions the “two distinct parties” on the mountain. Also see Schuck, statement, March 29, 1906. Schuck pointed out that those who did give up and come down, including Datus Ako, Kamlam, and Asanuf, had to endure jeers from those who held out and condemned them as Americanos and cowards. Panglima Haiyuddin confirmed this, saying that “the reason … they would not come off the hill was because [*sic*] they thought they would be disgraced … if they surrendered” (conversation with Moros onboard USCT *Sabah* at Jolo, April 13, 1906, Box 3, Folder 4, Wood Papers). Also see the assessment of Adam by Reeves, cited in Capt. G. T. Langhorne to Wood, February 9, 1906, Box 37, Folder: “Correspondence 1906,” Wood Papers.

89. Oliveros, “Islam in the Moro-American War,” 155; Wood Diary, entry for January 31, 1906, Box 3, Wood Papers.

90. Conversation with Moros onboard USCT *Sabah*, April 13, 1906.

91. Reeves to Langhorne, March 1, 1906, Box 37, Folder: “Correspondence 1906,” Wood Papers.

92. Comment attributed to Bud Dajo leader Arggil in Schuck, statement, March 29, 1906.

93. This quote is from Datu Joakanain in the conversation of Moro leaders with Wood onboard USCT *Sabah*, April 13, 1906.

94. Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906, mentions “Imam Harib and other leaders,” who began clearing ground on top of Bud Dajo in early 1905. Also see Exhibit A attached to Reeves’s letter, in which Sawajaan mentions that Imam Harib and Imam Sanuddin had influence over all the people on the mountain. Datu Joakanain confirmed to Wood the importance of religious leaders among the people on Bud Dajo, saying that “the leaders were mostly priests” (conversation of Moro leaders with Wood onboard USCT *Sabah*, April 13, 1906). In “Islam in the Moro-American War,” Oliveros suggests that there may have been as many as four imams leading followers on Bud Dajo, with Imams Sahirun and Illih joining Harib and Sanuddin (157–58).

95. Reeves report, March 1, 1906, exhibit E of Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906.

96. Quoted in Schuck, statement, March 29, 1906.

97. When Governor Scott asked an informant why Moros had gone to Bud Dajo, he learned that they had gone “not to fight. They do not have any intention to fight” (Sawajaan, statement, June 12, 1905).

98. Maj. Elon Willcox, Fourth Cavalry, to Langhorne, February 28, 1906, quoted in Fulton, *Moroland*, 268. Willcox proposed alternatives to direct assault: either fire the mountain and smoke out the Moros or starve them out in a siege. Willcox also recommended that the *cedula* not be collected in Sulu.

99. Indanan, quoted in conversation of Moros leaders with Wood onboard USCT *Sabah*, April 13, 1906. One of these troublesome subjects was a follower of Joakanain who had been tried and fined by the *datu* but had refused to pay his fine, fleeing to Dajo instead (Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906).

100. Wood accused the Moro leaders of doing just this: “I suppose that all the chiefs are glad that all the men they could not handle went up on the hill, are they not? They have gotten rid of all their

bad people? … You could not handle them, they were beyond your control, and they were left for the soldiers to handle" (conversation with Moros onboard USCT *Sabah*, April 13, 1906).

101. Jens E. Stedje to the Adjutant, February 1, 1906, exhibit D in Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906. As early as February 9, Capt. George Langhorne, left in charge of Moro Province when Wood received appointment as commander of the Department of the Philippines, advised that the people atop Bud Dajo "will probably have to be exterminated" (Langhorne to Wood, February 9, 1906).

102. Reeves report, March 1, 1906, Exhibit E of Reeves to Secretary, March 31, 1906. See Sawajaan, statement, December 4, 1905.

103. Fulton, *Moroland*, 277–79.

104. Col. J. W. Duncan, Sixth Infantry, "Report of Engagement with the Moro Enemy on Bud-Dajo, Island of Jolo, March 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th, 1906," p. 7, Box 278, Folder: "Battle of Bud Dajo, 1906," Pershing Papers.

105. Schuck, statement, March 29, 1906.

106. Charles Schuck's estimate in conversation of Moro leaders with Wood onboard USCT *Sabah*, April 13, 1906. Fulton estimates 100 to 150 rifles and probably half that number of pistols (*Moroland*, 277).

107. Duncan, "Report of Engagement," 7–8.

108. Ibid., 4–5. Oliveros cites Panglima Gumbahali and the Silsilah sin Lupah Sug for the assertion that Datu Adam did turn traitor, accepting "two sacks of money and gold" in return for permitting the Americans to take the south rim. Whether Datu Adam actually accepted the bribe or not, he and his warriors fought to the death against the allied advance (Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," 160–61, appendix D).

109. Duncan, "Report of Engagement," 9–14.

110. White, *Bullets and Bolos*, 307.

111. Duncan, "Report of Engagement," 14–24.

112. White, *Bullets and Bolos*, 310–11.

113. Duncan, "Report of Engagement," 24–27.

114. Ibid., 27–32. Also see Capt. George Langhorne, "Notes on Bud Dajo Expedition," Box 3, Folder 4, Wood Papers.

115. Duncan, "Report of Engagement," 33–36. Duncan notes that Capt. Lewis Koehler reported killing another twenty-four Moros that morning, in addition to the fifty dead reported by Capt. Henry Lawton.

116. In the conversation with Wood aboard the *Sabah* on April 13, 1906, Indanan claimed that he had seen "about 100 to 200 women and children" on Bud Dajo before the battle. Hadji Butu said that "more women went up there" after the Americans arrived to surround the mountain.

117. Panglima Gumbahali, in an interview with Gerard Roxhon, estimated 700 dead and five survivors (cited in Oliveros, "Islam in the Moro-American War," 159 n. 110). Estimates of those who escaped ranged from just 30 to 100. Although Wood never ordered an official and systematic count of the dead, he estimated that "all the defenders were killed … about six hundred" (Wood to "Andrews, Manila," telegram, March 9, 1906, Box 3, Wood Papers).

118. Wood to Tasker Bliss, March 2, 1906, Box 38, Folder 4, Wood Papers.

119. Wood was as surprised by criticism of the "massacre" in the American press (which likened it to Wounded Knee) as by the ferocity of Moro resistance on the mountain. He grew especially defensive after receiving a cable from Secretary of War Taft asking that he respond to charges of "wanton slaughter [of] Moros, men, women, and children" (Taft to Wood, cable, March 12, 1906, Box 3, Wood Papers). Wood admitted that "a considerable number of women and children were

killed in the fight, number unknown," but he insisted that "Moro women wore trousers and were dressed and armed much like the men and charged with them," while "children were, in some cases, used by the men as shields while charging troops" (Wood to Taft, March 13, 1906, Box 3, Wood Papers). For an extensive collection of documents on the battle, see U. S. Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, *Attack by United States Troops against Moros on Mount Dajo, Philippine Islands*, hearings, Doc. 289, 59th Cong., 1st sess., March 23, 1906.

120. Vinton Hill, interview with Wayne Sanford, and "John R. White Constabulary Report," both cited in Fulton, *Moroland*, 285–86.

121. Drew Gilpin Faust, *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War* (New York: Knopf, 2001).

122. Gowing's estimate of 3,000 deaths in all of Moro Province between 1903 and 1906 appears low (*Mandate in Moroland*, 164).

123. Gen. Wood would not agree with my assessment. He insisted that the "action was unavoidable" (Wood to the Military Secretary, War Department, April 22, 1906, Box 3, Wood Papers). Scott was less certain that it was unavoidable. See his memorandum for the secretary of war titled "The Moros of Jolo Island," n.d., Box 55, last folder, Scott Papers.

124. Yet one more controversy arising from Bud Dajo was that American troops left most of the Moro dead unburied or only lightly buried when they abandoned the battlefield. Wood admitted that "orders were given … not to attempt to bury their dead, as Moros prefer to do this themselves" (Wood to the Military Secretary, War Department, April 22, 1906).

7. Learning to Live with Accommodation

1. Remark by Panglima Haiyudin to Gen. Wood, in conversation with Moro leaders onboard USCT *Sabah*, April 13, 1906, Box 3, Folder 4, Wood Papers.

2. These terms are taken from James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009); see especially chapter 6.

3. Najeeb M. Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, Ethnological Survey Publications vol. 4, no. 1 (Manila: Bureau of Public Printing, 1905), and *The History of Sulu*.

4. Saleeby, *The Moro Problem*, 15, 21.

5. Ibid., 15, 22.

6. Ibid., 18–19, 23, 25–26.

7. Ibid., 30.

8. See Hawkins, *Making Moros*.

9. Charles Cameron to David Barrows, September 24, 1909, Box 38, Folder: "Correspondence, Cameron," Pershing Papers.

10. Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

11. Scott to Secretary of Moro Province, June 30, 1906, vol. 44, Tasker Bliss Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. (hereafter Bliss Papers LC).

12. Conversation between Scott and Butu, July 7, 1906, Box 57, Folder 2, Scott Papers.

13. Indanan won the respect of Governor James Reeves as "the most progressive" of all Moro chiefs in Jolo, and Governor William Cameron Forbes acknowledged that Indanan "had been friendly … from the start and had helped the administration in many ways." He had, however, "an amiable weakness for opium, and also for profiting from the exploits of … cattle thieves in his vicinity…. When he was ordered to arrest a thief whom he had been protecting and with whom he had been

sharing profits," he had the man killed, arguing that he had the right to do so as a *datu*. He was arrested for murder and sentenced to be hanged. Pershing agreed with the sentence, but Forbes persuaded him and the judge to commute it to life imprisonment. For the quote from Reeves, see his report dated August 2, 1906, vol. 44, Bliss Papers LC. Forbes's comments on Indanan are in William Cameron Forbes, Journal V, entry for March 22, 1913, footnote, William Cameron Forbes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

14. Reeves to Scott, August 17, 1906, Box 57, Folder 2, Scott Papers.

15. "Minutes of the Moro Meeting," probably taken by Charles or Julius Schuck, June 11, 1907, Box 57, Folder 4, Scott Papers.

16. Ibid.

17. Bliss's appointment to replace Wood as governor was supposed to take effect on March 1, 1906, but Wood did not actually relinquish authority until six weeks later, on April 16, after the Bud Dajo massacre.

18. Frederick Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934). In addition to his strengths as an administrator, Bliss played a good game of tennis, an occupation he much preferred to pursuing Moro outlaws.

19. Tasker H. Bliss, *The Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1908* (Zamboanga, Philippines: Mindanao Herald, 1908), 22. Bliss specifically asked Gen. Wood not to send new troops to Davao when Governor Bolton was murdered. In addition to worrying about "any random shooting up," he complained that the Twenty-Fourth Infantry was "rotten" with venereal disease. See Bliss to Col. W. S. Scott, July 3, 1906, and Bliss to Wood, July 7, 1906, vol. 44, Bliss Papers LC.

20. Harold Hanne Elarth, ed., *The Story of the Philippine Constabulary* (Los Angeles: Globe, 1949), 21, 84 (Elarth is identified as the editor of this book, but he is in fact its author and refers to himself in the third person). The Philippine Constabulary dated to August 8, 1901, when it was created by Act 175 of the Philippine Commission. Units were never larger than companies of forty-five to sixty.

21. Palmer, *Bliss, Peacemaker*.

22. Ibid.; Hurley, *Swish of the Kris;* Vic Hurley, *Jungle Patrol: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary* (New York: Dutton, 1938); White, *Bullets and Bolos;* George Yarrington Coats, "The Philippine Constabulary: 1901–1917," Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1968; Smith, *Don't Settle for Second*.

23. Quoted in Tasker H. Bliss, *The Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1907* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1907), 28.

24. Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerrilla*, xiv.

25. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1907*, 29.

26. Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 276.

27. Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 143–44.

28. Tasker H. Bliss, *Annual Report of Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, U. S. Army, Governor of the Moro Province. From April 16, 1906, to August 27, 1906* (Zamboanga, Philippines: Mindanao Herald, 1906), 97; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 173–74.

29. Quoted in Bliss to Wood, June 16, 1906, vol. 43, Bliss Papers LC.

30. Bliss confidentially ordered Col. W. S. Scott to investigate "harsh treatment of natives by planters as explaining … a certain amount of the ill-feeling of the latter toward Americans" (Bliss to Col. W. S. Scott, July 3, 1906, vol. 44, Bliss Papers LC).

31. In one of his reports, Bliss speaks of “numerous intending settlers … in that district seeking desirable locations” (*Annual Report … 1906*, 98–99).

32. Davao District governor Allen Wallace to the Secretary, Moro Province, August 9, 1906, vol. 44, Bliss Papers LC. Also see Captain Eleventh Cavalry to Bliss, July 2, 1906, Box 38, Folder 1, Wood Papers, describing the movement.

33. Captain Eleventh Cavalry to Bliss, July 2, 1906.

34. Bliss to Wood, July 25, 1906, vol. 44, Bliss Papers LC.

35. Elarth, *Story of the Philippine Constabulary*, 92, 99; Fulton, *Moroland*, 341–42. Wood recommended that Bliss “send a battalion of infantry out to the Buldung country,” but Bliss resisted using infantry, turning to the Philippine Constabulary instead (Wood to Bliss, July 17, 1906, Box 38, Folder 2, Wood Papers). As it turned out, both were needed.

36. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1908*, 25; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 181–82; Fulton, *Moroland*, 346–47.

37. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1908*, 22–23; Coats, “Philippine Constabulary,” 369. Other bands of outlaws, in addition to Ampuan Agaus, also plagued American authorities in Lanao.

38. Fulton, *Moroland*, 345.

39. Coats, “Philippine Constabulary,” 370–71; Elarth, *Story of the Philippine Constabulary*, 92–93, 95–98.

40. Fulton, *Moroland*, 345.

41. Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 301.

42. Thompson, “Governors of the Moro Province,” 157–58.

43. Ibid.; Fulton, *Moroland*, 347.

44. Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 302–3.

45. Hurley, *Swish of the Kris*, 204–7; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 180.

46. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1908*, 24.

47. Forbes, Journal III, entries for July 7 and 9, 1909, Forbes Papers. The cave description is taken from Forbes, who visited the site on July 9. Two other Americans were killed before the attack, bringing American deaths to four. Also see Fulton, *Moroland*, 353–58; Hurley, *Jungle Patrol*, 301–10; Hurley, *Swish of the Kris*, 198–208; and Elarth, *Story of the Philippine Constabulary*, 94–95.

48. This estimate is drawn from annual reports of the Moro Province governor from 1906 to 1909: Davao, 40; Cotabato, 80; Zamboanga, 100; Lanao, 200; Sulu, 150 (see Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906*, *Annual Report … 1907*, *Annual Report … 1908;* Ralph W. Hoyt, *Annual Report of Colonel Ralph W. Hoyt, 25th United States Infantry, Governor of the Moro Province, for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1909* [Zamboanga, Philippines: Mindanao Herald, 1909]).

49. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1907*, 42.

50. Ibid., 43. Tribal Ward Courts were created by Act 142 on October 6, 1905. This law made district governors and secretaries ex officio justices. Headmen and deputy headmen were deputy officers of the court within their tribal ward, but they could not try cases, whether trivial or important (44).

51. Ibid., 41–46.

52. Ibid.

53. In his 1907 report, Bliss admitted that *datus* had continued to arbitrate local disputes regardless of Wood’s efforts to replace arbitration with an American system of justice. It is “what they do anyway,” he said, and “we have no means to prevent it” (*Annual Report … 1907*, 45). On at least one occasion, Bliss actually recommended Moro arbitration over American law. When disputants brought a case that “involved intricate questions of Mohammedan law and custom” to the Court of First

Instance, he told them that "even under American law such a case as theirs could be settled out of court," at which point they appointed their own arbitrators and settled the dispute in four days (34–35).

54. Bliss to the Moro Province Attorney, March 11, 1908, and Moro Province Attorney to Bliss, March 27, 1908, vol. 89, Bliss Papers LC.

55. Philippine attorney general Gregorio Araneta argued that the Philippine Commission did not have the legal right to delegate authority to the Legislative Council of Moro Province, a position that, if approved by the Philippine Commission, would have terminated Moro Province's autonomous status in 1908. See Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 137–39, 141.

56. Quoted in ibid., 140–41, 118.

57. Bliss to W. S. Scott, July 3, 1906, vol. 44, Bliss Papers LC. Also see Bliss to Wood, July 25, 1906, vol. 44, in which Bliss confirms his "growing suspicion" that "some of the planters [of all nationalities] were responsible for some part of the … hostility of the native tribes." In 1907, Bliss also opposed a scheme by a group of American businessmen to lease much or all of the Rio Grande Valley in Cotabato for rubber production (Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 103–4).

58. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1907*, 34.

59. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906*, 69–70.

60. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1907*, 23.

61. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906*, 81.

62. Ibid., 83, 48–50.

63. Figures in this paragraph are taken from the Moro Province governor's annual reports for 1906 to 1909 (Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906, Annual Report … 1907, Annual Report … 1908;* Hoyt, *Annual Report … 1909*). The estimate of 80,000 school-age children is by Bliss in Bliss to the Governor General, May 25, 1906, vol. 43, Folder: "Correspondence March–June, 1906," Bliss Papers LC.

64. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906*, 83.

65. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1907*, 19.

66. See the Moro Province governor's annual reports for 1906 to 1909 (Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906, Annual Report … 1907, Annual Report … 1908;* Hoyt, *Annual Report … 1909*).

67. Schuck to Hugh Scott, June 10, 1906, Box 57, Folder 3, Scott Papers. One reason the sultan gave for advocating that sons of *datus* should attend school was his fear that public schools would attract mainly slaves or other low-class people, so that learned former slaves would end up ruling over *datus*. Thus, he also advised *datus* not to send slaves to school.

68. Act 167, passed on June 20, 1906, mandated compulsory education for boys and girls from seven to thirteen years of age, with certain exceptions.

69. Figures taken from Moro Province governor's annual reports for 1906 to 1909 ((Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906, Annual Report … 1907, Annual Report … 1908;* Hoyt, *Annual Report … 1909*).

70. E. Z. Steever to Bliss, November 20, 1906, Box 15, Folder 4, Tasker Bliss Papers, U. S. Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa.

71. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906*, 82.

72. Cameron to Director of Education David Barrows, September 24, 1906, Box 38, Folder: "Correspondence, Cameron," Pershing Papers. According to Charles Schuck, *datus* worried that "the man … [who had] learned some things" would supplant "the man of family" as leader, while the sultan worried that educated slaves would become masters over their *datus* (Schuck to Hugh Scott, June 10, 1906, Box 57, Folder 3, Scott Papers).

73. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906*, 79.

74. “It is not,” Bliss wrote,” the policy of the government to inject these schools into communities where they can be maintained only by force of arms” (Bliss to District Governor of Sulu, July 26, 1906, vol. 44, Bliss Papers LC).

75. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1906*, 83.

76. Ibid., 80, 82.

77. Bliss, *Annual Report … 1908*, 13.

78. Wood Diary, entry for June 21, 1909, Box 3, Wood Papers, quoted in Thompson, “Governors of the Moro Province,” 159. For Forbes’s assessment of Bliss, see Forbes, Journal III, footnote to the entry for July 7, 1909, Forbes Papers.

79. Bliss to Wood, January 8, 1908, Folder: “General Correspondence,” Wood Papers.

80. Hoyt, *Annual Report … 1909*, 5.

81. Ibid., 8, 3–4.

82. Ibid., 29–31.

83. Ibid., 5, 7–8.

8. John Pershing and Full-Spectrum Counterinsurgency in Moro Province, 1909–1913

1. Pershing, undated notes in a small brown notebook, Box 428, Folder 10, Pershing Papers.

2. *U. S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 34.

3. Ibid., 39–40.

4. “Extract from President Roosevelt’s Message at Opening of Second Session, Fifty-Eighth Congress,” December 7, 1903, Box 370, Folder: “Promotion to Brigadier General 1903,” Pershing Papers. The same folder contains a letter dated November 18, 1910, from Roosevelt to Senator Warren in which Roosevelt writes: “To promote a man because he marries a senator’s daughter would be an infamy; and to refuse him promotion for the same reason would be an equal infamy.”

5. Smythe points out that Pershing was not the first to be jumped from captain to brigadier general. Albert L. Mills, Leonard Wood, and J. Franklin Bell had preceded him, the latter by leaping over 1,031 seniors (*Guerrilla Warrior*, 125–27).

6. Forbes Journal III, entry for November 4, 1909, Forbes Papers.

7. See J. Franklin Bell to Wood, April 3, 1911, Box 370, Folder: “Governor of Moro Province #2,” pp. 15–16, Pershing Papers.

8. For a superb analysis of the Philippine Constabulary’s close ties with Filipino politicians, see Michael Cullinane, “The Politics of Collaboration in Tayabas Province: The Early Political Career of Manuel Luis Quezon, 1903–1906,” in *Reappraising an Empire: New Perspectives on Philippine–American History*, ed. Peter W. Stanley (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 59–84.

9. Quoted in Pershing, *My Life*, 218.

10. Helen Frances Warren Diary, entries for December 11 and 12, 1903, Box 1, Pershing Papers.

11. Pershing Diary, entry for March 30–31, 1905, Box 5, Folder 3, Pershing Papers.

12. Pershing Diary, entry for December 25, 1904, Box 5, Folder 2, Pershing Papers; Pershing, *My Life*, 215–16.

13. The Russo-Japanese War was Pershing’s introduction to the horrors of trench warfare and the effectiveness of the machine gun and massed artillery. He also came away from this experience with new respect for Japan.

14. Pershing, *My Life*, 209.

15. Senator Warren to Lt. Gen. Henry C. Corbin, n.d., quoted in Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:398.

16. Pershing, *My Life*, 251.

17. John J. Pershing, "Observations on Philippine Independence," enclosed in Pershing to William Cameron Forbes, May 13, 1913, Box 371, Folder: "Governor of Moro Province #5," Pershing Papers.

18. Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 194. A "Confidential Memorandum for General Pershing" listed three prostitutes as the only Filipinas to attend a public reception given for him at the provincial capitol building on November 13, 1909. Each of these women named a local Filipino leader as having given her an invitation (Box 373, Folder 3, Pershing Papers).

19. Forbes, Journals II and III, entries for April 30, May 5, and August 15, 1907, March 16, May 4, and May 23, 1908, Forbes Papers.

20. Quoted in Col. James Harbord to Wood, October 7, 1910, Doc. 389, vol. 3, James G. Harbord Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

21. Pershing "Observations on Philippine Independence."

22. Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:428–33.

23. Pershing, *My Life*, 248.

24. Vandiver, *Black Jack*, 1:417–22.

25. Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 134.

26. Pershing, *My Life*, 249.

27. Forbes, Journal III, entry for November 4, 1909, Forbes Papers.

28. Pershing, *My Life*, 272.

29. James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).

30. Bliss to Pershing, September 27, 1909, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers.

31. Pershing to Forbes, December 24, 1909, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers.

32. Statements by Moros at conferences with Pershing in Marawi and Camp Vicars, Lanao, December 7 and 9, 1909, Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

33. "General Pershing's Conference with the Moros of Vicars," December 9, 1909, Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

34. Quoted in Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 146–48.

35. "Statement of the Moros at the Conference with Gen. Pershing on December 7, 1909," Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

36. J. J. Pershing, "Conquest of the Moros," [August?] 1908, Box 278, Folder: "Conquest of the Moros," Pershing Papers. Pershing's prejudicial assumptions about the Moros' backwardness were shared by virtually all Americans in the early twentieth century. See Walther, *Sacred Interests*, especially the introduction and chapters 5 and 6.

37. "Jamalul Kiram," editorial, *La Vanguardia*, December 2, 1910, translation, Box 278, Folder: "*La Vanguardia*," Pershing Papers.

38. "The Military Regime," editorial, *La Democracia*, September 2, 1910, translation, RG 350, Box 403, NA.

39. Pershing, "Observations on Philippine Independence."

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. See Edgerton, *People of the Middle Ground*.

43. John J. Pershing, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province for the Year Ending August 31, 1910* (Zamboanga, Philippines: Mindanao Herald, 1910), 20. In the letter to Forbes dated December 24, 1909, Pershing reported that "this fanatical uprising was instigated by Filipinos from the Misamis Strip and afterwards taken advantage of by two Moro dattos." Believing that the whole affair was part of a Filipino plot to separate northeastern Zamboanga from Moro Province, he recommended that the whole Misamis Strip "be incorporated in the Moro Province."

44. In his report "A Synopsis of the Progressive Development of the Moro Province," dated August 27, 1912, a copy of which he sent via Leonard Wood to President Taft, the Zamboanga District governor John Finley referred to the Subanu relationship with lowland Filipinos as one of "commercial peonage" (enclosed in Leonard Wood to Mr. President, September 11, 1912, Box 1, John P. Finley Papers, U. S. Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa.).

45. Pershing, *My Life*, 279, 282. Pershing based his opinion of the Subanus on John Finley's assessment. The recognized American expert, Finley wrote of them: "The Subanu [people of the river] have … long been in subjection to the Mohammedans and Christians who surround them" (John Finley, "Ethnographical and Geographical Sketch of Land and People," part 1 of *The Subanu: Studies of a Sub-Visayan Mountain Folk of Mindanao* [Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1913], 31, 36).

46. In his report, Elarth claims that a month earlier he had spent three weeks among the Subanu, "visiting nearly every tribe." They had been peaceful then. "But here the situation was different: the peaceable farmer of yesterday now was a savage in whom the fighting spirit had been aroused—and the primitive mind can hold but one idea at a time" (*The Story of the Philippine Constabulary*, 100).

47. Ibid., 100–101. Elarth's claim that he shot three Moros is puzzling because Subanus did not consider themselves to be Moros. In *Annual Report … 1910*, Pershing lists six constabulary soldiers killed, one corporal of the Dapitan Municipal Police, three *cargadores*, one Moro leader, and "many Subanos" (20–21).

48. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1910*, 21. Also see Finley's report quoted in Pershing, *My Life*, 282.

49. Elarth, *Story of the Philippine Constabulary*, 101.

50. John J. Pershing, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province for the Year Ending June 30, 1911* (Zamboanga, Philippines: Mindanao Herald, 1911), 24–25; Pershing, *My Life*, 283–84; Pershing to Forbes, December 24, 1909.

51. In one letter, Pershing calls Piang "the same old staunch friend of the Americans [that] he always has been" (Pershing to Wood, January 5, 1912, Box 215, Folder: "Correspondence, Leonard Wood," Pershing Papers). Also see "General Pershing's Conference with Datto Piang, of Cudaranga," December 11, 1909, Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

52. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1910*, 20; Pershing, *Annual Report … 1911*, 23, 25.

53. Pershing, *My Life*, 281. According to Col. James Harbord, Pershing was "not satisfied with the tactical and strategical use of Constabulary…. He wants it to be entirely an army proposition" (Harbord to Wood, October 7, 1910, Doc. 389, vol. 3, Harbord Papers).

54. Fulton analyzes the charges against Furlong. Furlong demanded a formal court-martial, but after days of "intensive proceedings, the court martial board threw all the charges out" (*Moroland*, 396–97, 407–9, 416–18).

55. Harbord to Wood, October 7, 1910.

56. See "Memorandum for General Bell" on stations of scouts and army regulars in Moro Province, February 16, 1912, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers.

57. Pershing, *My Life*, 281, 284.

58. Pershing to Bell, April 2, 1911, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers.

59. Harbord to Wood, October 7, 1910; Pershing to Wood, October 12, 1910, and January 18, 1911, Box 215, Folder: "Correspondence, Leonard Wood," Pershing Papers.

60. In a letter to Gen. Bell on April 2, 1911, Pershing asked for more scouts. Three months later, after his request for scouts was denied and two battalions of them reassigned, he changed his tune, arguing that because conditions of peace had improved so much, he now needed more constabulary police, who were "preferable for police … work" (Pershing to Harry Bandholtz, July 17, 1911, Box 370, Folder 6, Pershing Papers).

61. Pershing to Forbes, July 28, 1911, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers. Like his two previous requests, first to reassign constabulary to other provinces and then to send him more scouts, this request received a firm denial (Forbes to Pershing, August 17, 1911, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Camron Forbes," Pershing Papers.

62. Pershing to Bell, April 22, 1911, Box 370, Folder 6, Pershing Papers.

63. Pershing to Forbes, July 28, 1911.

64. Forbes to Pershing, August 17, 1911.

65. John J. Pershing, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province for the Year Ending June 30, 1912* (Zamboanga, Philippines: Mindanao Herald, 1912), 15. Technically, this executive order was not new. Rather, it extended provisions of Legislative Council Act 221 (August 1, 1908), applicable to the whole province.

66. Ibid., 14. To understand why the disarmament order was controversial, just think what would happen if a state governor in the twenty-first-century United States ordered the confiscation of all guns in his or her state.

67. Harbord to Wood, October 29, 1911, Doc. 473, vol. 4, Harbord Papers.

68. Wood to Harbord, December 4, 1911, Doc. 474, vol. 4, Harbord Papers.

69. *U. S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 313–15.

70. Pershing to Frankie [Helen Frances Warren Pershing], December 2, 1911, Box 3, Pershing Papers.

71. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1912*, 14.

72. According to Thompson, Pershing never strictly enforced the confiscation of cutting weapons ("Governors of the Moro Province," 203).

73. Pershing to Forbes, October 23, 1911, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers.

74. Pershing to Bell, October 23, 1911, Box 370, Folder 3, Pershing Papers. A copy of this report is also in Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers. In the report, Pershing also mentions that "prior to this occurrence the constabulary had lost 24 guns by desertion." It took more than a year to round all of them up. Moro constables withdrawn from Lanao were reassigned to Luzon.

75. John J. Pershing, *Annual Report of the Governor of the Moro Province for the Year Ended June 30, 1913* (Zamboanga, Philippines: Mindanao Herald, 1913), 61–62. In this report, Pershing specifies that Amai-Gindalungan's band was "destroyed" in 1911; Mamingtun was captured in March 1912; Mapandi was driven out, and his band destroyed; Dimasanka was killed by friendly Moros; and Nakabalang was captured.

76. Pershing to Wood, July 9, 1913, Box 370, Folder 3, Pershing Papers. In his report for 1912, Pershing counted some 4,000 "serviceable arms" collected in Lanao (*Annual Report … 1912*, 16).

77. Pershing to Moros Nakib-Amil, Sansaui, Sabdani, Japal, and other Moros, December 6, 1911, Box 371, Folder 5, Pershing Papers.

78. Pershing to Frankie, December 8, 1911, Box 3, Pershing Papers.

79. These figures are taken from the nine-page document “Extracts from the Diary of Lieut. Boswell Regarding the Investment and Surrender of Dajo,” Box 371, Folder 5, Pershing Papers.

80. Pershing to the Adjutant General of the Army, May 31, 1912, Box 371, Folder 5, Pershing Papers.

81. “Extracts from the Diary of Lieut. Boswell.”

82. Pershing to Frankie, December 21, 1911, Box 3, Pershing Papers.

83. Pershing Diary, entry for December 19, 1911, Box 6, Folder 6, Pershing Papers. He addressed his entries in this diary to “Darling Frances.”

84. Pershing to Bell, December 16, 1911, Box 370, Folder 3, Pershing Papers.

85. Pershing later exchanged the prisoners for firearms (Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 172).

86. Forbes to the Secretary of War, December 27, 1911, Box 76, Folder: “Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes,” Pershing Papers; Thompson, “Governors of the Moro Province,” 204.

87. Pershing Diary, entry for unknown date in December 1911, Box 6, Folder 6, Pershing Papers.

88. Pershing to the Adjutant General of the Army, October 15, 1913, Box 371, Folder 5, Pershing Papers. In this report, Pershing admits that “the final effort to finish the work of disarmament was begun December, 1912,” after the U. S. presidential election.

89. Pershing to Bell, January 27, 1913, Box 370, Folder 3, Pershing Papers. Pershing estimated that fifty Moros were killed but made no mention of allied casualties. See Fulton, *Moroland*, 433, for the latter numbers. See Pershing to Forbes, February 28, 1913, Box 76, Folder: “Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes,” Pershing Papers, for the stampede quote.

90. In a report to Governor General Harrison on December 10, 1913, Pershing referred to the sultan as a “puppet” whose “absence would be a good thing for his people” (Box 371, Folder 1, Pershing Papers).

91. Pershing to Forbes, February 28, 1913. In this letter, Pershing indicated that he fully expected a fight but urged “coolness and patience” until the women and children had returned to their lowland homes, leaving only warriors behind.

92. Pershing to Forbes, February 7, 1913, Box 76, Folder: “Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes,” Pershing Papers.

93. Pershing to W. W. Gordon, March 9, 1913, Box 278, Folder: “Disarmament,” Pershing Papers. Pershing promised Gen. Bell: “Of course, I am going to disarm these people,” but he “would rather defer the final outcome several months than to be guilty” of killing innocents (Pershing to Bell, March 11, 1913, Box 370, Folder 3, Pershing Papers). Also see Pershing to Bell, cable, March 18, 1913, RG 94, Box 7154, Consolidated File 2016194, NA.

94. Pershing to Gordon, April 10, 1913, Box 278, Folder: “Disarmament,” Pershing Papers.

95. Pershing to the Adjutant General of the Army, October 15, 1913.

96. Vernon Whitney to Maj. W. M Wright, June 21, 1913, in United States Army. *Records of United States Army Overseas Operations and Commands, 1898–1942*, Doc. 2379, RG 395, Box 77, NA (these records referred to hereafter as RG 395 only). According to Whitney, “Pershing concluded [that the] psychological time [had] arrived [to] settle [the] question for this and coming generations by force of arms.”

97. Forbes to Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, June 21, 1913, Doc. 9892/211, RG 350, NA.

98. Pershing to the Adjutant General of the Army, October 15, 1913.

99. Ibid.

100. Pershing to Adjutant General, June 13, 1913, Doc. 2047521, RG 94, Box 7154, Consolidated File 2016194, NA.

101. Maj. James L. Collins, “The Battle of Bud Bagsak and the Part Played by the Mountain Guns Therein,” *Field Artillery Journal*, November–December 1925, 563.

102. Pershing to Adjutant General of the Army, October 15, 1913; Collins, “Battle of Bud Bagsak,” 564.

103. “Report of Thirty-First Company, Philippine Scouts: Of Participation in Bagsak Operations June 10th to June 16th, 1913,” Doc. 23579, RG 94, Box 7154, Consolidated File 2016194, NA. See also Collins, “Battle of Bud Bagsak,” 565–66.

104. Collins, “Battle of Bud Bagsak,” 567.

105. Pershing to the Adjutant General of the Army, October 15, 1913.

106. Collins, “Battle of Bud Bagsak,” 567.

107. For his personal leadership in this battle, Pershing was recommended for the Medal of Honor. He declined to be nominated, however, writing the War Department, “I do not consider that my action … was such as to entitle me to be decorated with a Medal of Honor.” He also declined the Distinguished Service Cross in 1922 when he was chief of staff. He finally accepted that award on his eightieth birthday when President Franklin Roosevelt personally presented the medal to him in 1940 (Smythe, *Guerrilla Warrior*, 204).

108. Collins, “Battle of Bud Bagsak,” 568.

109. Capt. George C. Charlton, Commanding Officer, Fifty-First Co., Philippine [Moro] Scouts, June 23, 1913, RG 395, Box 77, Consolidated File 23579, NA.

110. Collins, “Battle of Bud Bagsak,” 569.

111. Pershing to Adjutant General of the Army, October 15, 1913.

112. Whitney to Wright, June 21, 1913. Also see Pershing to Frankie, June 19, 1913, Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

113. Smythe estimates the Moro dead at “more than 500” and says that 5–10 percent of them were women and children (*Guerrilla Warrior*, 200, 202). Fulton estimates 200–300 dead, saying that “as the fighting neared an end, a large number of defenders were observed fleeing, perhaps up to one-third escaped” (*Moroland*, 450).

114. Forbes to the Secretary of War, August 8, 1913, Doc. 9892/228, RG 350, NA.

115. Pershing to Adjutant General of the Army, October 15, 1913; “Casualty List,” Doc. 2108, RG 395, Consolidated File 23579, NA. Vernon Whitney’s report on the battle estimates that there were “between three and four hundred hopeless fanatics and desperate cattle thieves” on the mountain and that “few Moro defenders escaped; remainder annihilated, including Amil and his principal lieutenants” (Whitney to Wright, June 21, 1913, Box 281, Folder: “Situation in Jolo,” Pershing Papers).

116. Second Lt. E. J. Oliver, Commanding Officer, Fifty-Second Co., Philippine [Moro] Scouts, July 26, 1913, Doc. 23785, RG 94, Box 7154, Consolidated File 2016194, NA.

117. John McLean alleged a much higher number of 1,600 dead, claiming in an interview that 196 of them were women and 340 were children. Although widely discredited (McLean was not present at the battle), his account was nevertheless picked up and widely circulated in the American and Philippine press. See Box 278, Folder: “Clippings from Army & Navy Journal of the Philippines, August 9, 1913,” Pershing Papers. Also see Pershing to Commanding General, Philippine Department, September 28, 1913, stating flatly that McClean’s account was “untrue” (Doc. 2065548, RG 94, Box 7154, Consolidated File 2016194, NA). Despite McClean’s lack of evidence, his claims were published as facts in Marion Wright, “School of the Butcher,” *International Socialist Review* 14, no. 4 (October 1913): 197–99. Wright embellished McClean’s account, adding that the Americans did not take “a single prisoner,” that Pershing ordered all bodies to be burned, that he

arrested three war correspondents in an effort to censor the news, and that Amil "was beheaded and his head presented to General Pershing."

118. Bell to AgWar, cable, July 3, 1913, Box 278, Folder: "Disarmament," Pershing Papers.

119. One of the best expressions of this narrative line is where Bell points out that Pershing had been "subjected [to] much criticism because of patient negotiations, forbearance and efforts [to] avoid … fighting." He had "succeeded [in] avoiding unnecessary injury [to] non-combatants." "Conditions [were] now better and more peaceful than heretofore." "Organized resistance" had ended. "The conclusion of this affair [Bagsak] marked an end to such resistance from Moros" (ibid.). The time had finally arrived for peaceful and industrious Moro farmers to prosper.

9. Declaring Victory

1. Pershing to Forbes, April 7, 1913, Box 371, Folder 5, Pershing Papers.

2. Harbord to Wood, October 7, 1910, Doc. 389, vol. 3, Harbord Papers.

3. Pershing to the Commanding General, Philippine Department, November 1, 1913, Box 371, Folder 4, Pershing Papers.

4. Pershing to Wood, November 20, 1913, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers.

5. Pershing to Forbes, April 7, 1913, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers. By November, a fourth civilian had been appointed as district governor (Pershing to the Commanding General, Philippine Department, November 1, 1913, Box 371, Folder 4, Pershing Papers).

6. Pershing to Bell, June 19, 1913, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers; Pershing to Wood, July 9, 1913, Box 370, Folder 3: "Moro Governor," Pershing Papers. Bagsak was not actually the last battle. Scouts, cavalry, and constables killed some eighty Moros at Johandal's *cottas* on June 27–28, 1913, and thirty-two more at Sahipa's *cotta* two days later. Troops also fought Moros who retreated to Bud Talipao in August and October 1913 (Fulton, *Moroland*, 450; Capt. Harry R. King, Philippine Scouts, to Commanding Officer Augur Barracks, Jolo, "Capture and destruction of Jahandal's Cottas (2)," July 2, 1913, Doc. 2108517, RG 94, Box 7154, Consolidated File 2016194, NA; Gowing, *Mandate*, 242).

7. The number 7,000 comes from Pershing interview, January 13, 1914, Box 373, Folder 3, Pershing Papers.

8. Pershing to the Governor General, memo, December 10, 1913, Box 371, Folder 4, Pershing Papers; Pershing to the Governor General, November 1, 1913, Box 280, Folder: "Status of the Sultan," Pershing Papers.

9. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1910,* 19.

10. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1911,* 23.

11. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913,* 54.

12. Charles R. Cameron to David P. Barrows, September 24, 1909, containing a prospectus of the proposed Datu School, Box 38, Cameron File, Pershing Papers.

13. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913,* 31.

14. "Meeting of the Leading Sultans, Dattos, Headmen and Other Prominent Moros of the District of Lanao, Held at Marahui, P.I., May 29 and 30, 1911," Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers; Pershing, *Annual Report … 1911,* 18; Pershing to Forbes, February 7, 1913, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers.

15. Pershing to Bishop Charles Brent, April 1, 1913, Box 34, Folder: "Correspondence, Charles Brent," Pershing Papers. Karine Walther, noting Pershing's friendship with Brent and his support for

a number of Brent's projects in Moro Province, concludes that Brent was one of a number of "American colonial officials [who] would later encourage missionaries to work among Moros" (*Sacred Interests*, 201, 222–26). I see little evidence of this in the case of Pershing or Bliss, both of whom were very wary of missionary interference that might convince Moros to rise up against Americans as Christian threats to their Islamic faith.

16. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 28. He estimated the education budget for 1913, including 102,250 pesos for school construction, at 220,207 pesos, well above the budget of 93,924 pesos for 1912.

17. Ibid., 30. Two-thirds of the students were "Christian Filipinos." Another 7 percent were "pagan." In 1912, 72.3 percent of the students were "Christian Filipinos."

18. Forbes wrote in his journal about a *datu* who complained that "fines and fees that had always been their [the *datus'*] perquisites were now [being] taken away, which greatly reduced their power and revenue" (Journal IV, entry for March 10, 1910, Forbes Papers).

19. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 72.

20. Pershing to Forbes, August 2, 1911, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers.

21. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 87–88.

22. Pershing to Forbes, August 2, 1911.

23. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 72–74.

24. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1910*, 15.

25. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1911*, 12.

26. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1912*, 6.

27. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 19, 27, 28.

28. See ibid., 25–27. Between 1910 and 1913, the province built only thirteen bridges, not including multiple culverts. In those same years, it built only ten schools.

29. Forbes to the Secretary of War, August 10, 1909, Doc. 14120/3, RG 350, Box 708, NA.

30. Pershing reported that deaths of infants in Zamboanga, one of the cleaner localities in the province, almost equaled the deaths of all other age groups combined in 1909–1910 (*Annual Report … 1910*, 22).

31. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 37–38.

32. Ibid., 21–22.

33. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1911*, 21–22, and *Annual Report … 1912*, 11.

34. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 37–43.

35. Ibid., 39–40, 43.

36. See the annual Moro Province governor's reports (Hoyt, *Annual Report … 1909;* Pershing, *Annual Report … 1910, Annual Report … 1911, Annual Report … 1912, Annual Report … 1913*).

37. Land-tax revenues collected were as follows: 40,985 pesos for 1908–1909; 52,551 pesos for 1909–1910; 33,339 pesos for 1910–1911; 40,000 pesos for 1911–1912; and 55,413 pesos for 1912–1913. See the annual Moro Province governor's reports (Bliss, *Annual Report … 1908;* Hoyt, *Annual Report … 1909;* Pershing, *Annual Report … 1910, Annual Report … 1911, Annual Report … 1912, Annual Report … 1913*).

38. *Cedula* collections were: 37,285 pesos for 1908–1909; 36,448 pesos for 1909–1910; 42,599 pesos for 1910–1911; figures for 1911–1912 not available; and 43,947 pesos for 1912–1913. See the annual Moro Province governor's reports (as listed in the previous note).

39. Road-tax revenues were: figures for 1908–1909 not available; 42,887 pesos for 1909–1910; 43,362 pesos for 1910–1911; figures for 1911–1912 not available; figures for 1912–1913 not

available (see the annual Moro Province governor's reports as listed in note 37). In 1912, the road tax and *cedula* were combined into a single tax of three pesos per year (one peso for the *cedula* and two for the road tax) assessed on each "male non-Christian between the ages of eighteen and sixty years." Delinquents who paid neither the *cedula* nor the road tax had to work fifteen days on public roads and trails each year, whereas those who paid the *cedula* had to work ten days (Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 25).

40. Customs receipts were: 363,877 pesos (54 percent of all revenues) for 1908–1909; 396,182 pesos (54 percent) for 1909–1910; 440,088 pesos (58 percent) for 1910–1911; figures for 1911–1912 not available; 420,230 pesos (57 percent) for 1912–1913. See the Moro Province governors' annual reports as listed in note 37.

41. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1911*, 3.

42. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1910*, 5. Although most plantations produced hemp, there was growing interest in rubber, sugar cane, and tobacco for export as well.

43. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1911*, 11.

44. Pershing to Forbes, December 24, 1909, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers.

45. Pershing to Frances Warren, April 20, 1910, Box 394, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

46. Pershing to Clarence Edwards, February 9, 1910, Box 69, Folder: "Correspondence, Clarence Edwards," Pershing Papers.

47. Wood to Pershing, March 23, 1910, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers.

48. Pershing to Forbes, April 11, 1910, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers.

49. Pershing to Martin Egan, May 2, 1910, Box 69, Folder: "Correspondence, Martin Egan," Pershing Papers.

50. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 9.

51. See the governor's annual reports from 1910 to 1913 (Pershing, *Annual Report … 1910, Annual Report … 1911, Annual Report … 1912, Annual Report … 1913*).

52. Wood Diary, typescript entry for December 15, 1913, cited in Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 248.

53. I am indebted to Thompson, "Governors of the Moro Province," 246–49, for this discussion of Pershing's investment in the Kolambugan Lumber Company.

54. According to Thompson, Wood knew Finley's brother, "a prominent Washington dentist" ("Governors of the Moro Province," 227).

55. Pershing to Wood, October 12, 1910, Box 215, Folder: "Correspondence, Leonard Wood," Pershing Papers.

56. Atherton Brownell, "Turning Savages into Citizens," *Outlook* 96 (December 1910): 921–31.

57. Pershing to Wood, January 28, 1911, Box 215, Folder: "Correspondence, Leonard Wood," Pershing Papers.

58. Pershing to John Finley, May 5, 1911, Box 73, Finley File, Pershing Papers.

59. Pershing to Senator Warren, February 9, 1912, Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers; Pershing to Forbes, January 4, 1913, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers; Pershing to Frank McIntyre, March 25, 1913, Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers.

60. See Pershing to Senator Warren, February 9, 1912, and Pershing to McIntyre, March 25, 1913.

61. Pershing to McIntyre, March 25, 1913, and Pershing to Forbes, February 10, 1912, Box 76, Folder: "Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes," Pershing Papers.

62. Wood to Pershing, November 30, 1910, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers.

63. Pershing to Wood, January 28, 1911; Wood to Pershing, February 9, 1911, Box 215, Folder: “Correspondence, Leonard Wood,” Pershing Papers.

64. Quoted in “RE Lieutenant Colonel John P. Finley, United States Army,” pp. 10, 12, Box 73, Finley File, Pershing Papers.

65. Quoted in Thompson, “Governors of the Moro Province,” 236.

66. These American officials were joined by the Zamboanga Chamber of Commerce, which cabled the U. S. Bureau of Insular Affairs on March 12, 1913 (“Spaniards, Moros, Chinese, Filipinos, Americans strongly protest Major Finley return,” Box 73, Finley File, Pershing Papers).

67. For a good analysis of how Finley promoted modern Islam versus the bad old Muslims with their degraded practices such as *parrang sabbil* (*perang sabil*), see Gedacht, “Holy War.” Gedacht, however, overemphasizes Finley’s importance among American colonials, who unanimously rejected his efforts.

68. See Finley to Pershing, January 1, 1910, Box 320, Folder: “Governor, Moro Province, Zamboanga, 1907–12,” Pershing Papers, in which Finley calls for all of Mindanao to be incorporated in Moro Province. See Finley to Secretary Moro Province, October 1, 1907, Box 68, Bliss Papers, for his belief in separating Moro Province from the rest of the Philippines and keeping it under American protection.

69. Regarding Finley’s interest in purifying Islam, Pershing noted not only his own opposition but also that of Bishop Brent and other Protestants in the Philippines. He wrote to Brent: “I think sending Major Finley to Turkey was a very grave mistake. I understand that he asked to have a teacher of Mohammedanism sent to the islands. This is the very last thing we want. Mohammedanism has been the cause of our trouble in the southern islands. Instead of encouraging Mohammedanism, we should discourage it in every way” (Pershing to Brent, August 9, 1913, Box 34, Folder: “Correspondence, Charles Brent,” Pershing Papers).

70. For a blow-by-blow account of Finley’s Turkish initiative, see Thompson, “Governors of the Moro Province,” 234–42, and Box 73, Finley File, Pershing Papers. Also see Frank Carpenter to Pershing, April 7, 1914, Box 40, Folder: “Correspondence, Frank Carpenter,” Pershing Papers.

71. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 69–74.

10. Progressive Counterinsurgency and COIN

1. *The U. S. Army * Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (hereafter *CFM*).

2. Ibid., 2 (1:2); every paragraph in the *CFM* is numbered, so I have parenthetically included chapter and paragraph numbers in each citation to help readers go directly to the material quoted or cited.

3. Sarah Sewall, “Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition: A Radical Field Manual,” in *CFM*, xxi.

4. Ibid., xxii, xxxiii; *CFM*, 2 (1:4).

5. Sewall, “Introduction,” xxv.

6. Ibid., xxiv–xxv.

7. *CFM*, 2 (1:4).

8. Ibid., chap. 2.

9. Sewall, “Introduction,” xvii–xviii, xxxi.

10. *CFM*, 39 (1:122).

11. Sewall, “Introduction,” xxxii, xxxi.

12. *CFM*, 38 (1:116), italics added.

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 47 (1:147), 49 (1:154).
15. Ibid., 40 (1:123), italics added.
16. Quoted in ibid., 39 (1:123).
17. Ibid., 40 (1:123).
18. Sewall, “Introduction,” xv, italics added.
19. Ibid., xxiii, xxx.
20. *CFM*, chap. 3.
21. Ibid., 40 (1:124).
22. Ibid., 287–88 (A:2).
23. Ibid., 288–91 (A:6, 7, 8, 12, 16).
24. Sewall, “Introduction,” xv.
25. *CFM*, 42 (1:131).
26. Ibid., 42 (1:131), 46 (1:143), italics added.
27. Ibid., 44–45 (1:135).
28. Sewall, “Introduction,” xl, xxxix, italics added.
29. See *CFM*, 174–88 (5:50–5:89), italics added.
30. Ibid., 174 (5:52).
31. Ibid., 175–77 (5:56–58).
32. Ibid., 177–78 (5:60–67).
33. Ibid., 179–80 (5:68–70).
34. Ibid., 182 (5:80).
35. Gen. David Petraeus and Gen. James Amos, foreword to ibid., xlvi.
36. *CFM*, 46 (1:144)
37. Ibid., 5–6 (1:14), italics added.
38. Ibid.
39. In COIN warfare, victory is elusive. The best that usually can be expected is to negotiate an end to insurgency from a position of strength. Pershing never addressed this issue. It can be argued, however, that Frank Carpenter as governor did negotiate from a position of strength. In the course of six years, he attained a “lasting victory” through “conciliation.” See Anthony J. Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 8–9.
40. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 72.
41. Pershing to the Commanding General, Philippine Department, November 1, 1913, Box 371, Folder 4, Pershing Papers.
42. Patricio N. Abinales, “The U. S. Army as an Occupying Force in Muslim Mindanao, 1899–1913,” in *Colonial Crucible*, ed. McCoy and Scarano, 411, 414.
43. Pershing interview, January 13, 1914, Box 373, Folder 3, Pershing Papers.
44. See Pershing to Wood, July 22, 1913, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers, in which Pershing asks Wood to extend his tour until spring 1914, and Pershing to Wood, November 20, 1913, Box 370, Folder 7, Pershing Papers, in which he asks for immediate reassignment due to health issues. Pershing also had his eye on the Mexican Revolution and a possible assignment on the border.
45. Pershing to the Commanding General, Philippine Department, November 1, 1913, Box 371, Folder 4, Pershing Papers. Also see Pershing to Wood, November 20, 1913.

46. Pershing to Forbes, November 20, 1913, Box 76, Folder: “Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes,” Pershing Papers. Also see Mark Hersey to Pershing, March 21, 1914, Box 370, Folder 1, Pershing Papers, confirming that Carpenter was Pershing’s choice.

47. Pershing interview, January 13, 1914, Box 373, Folder 3, Pershing Papers.

48. Forbes to Pershing, cable, December 15, 1913, Box 76, Folder: “Correspondence, William Cameron Forbes,” Pershing Papers.

49. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 260–69. In addition to the five districts of Moro Province, the Department of Mindanao and Sulu included Agusan and the subprovince Bukidnon. For eight months, the department’s administrative structure remained the same as that of the former Moro Province, except that civilians rather than military personnel ran it. That structure changed on September 1, 1914, when the Department of Mindanao and Sulu’s Organic Act went into effect, dividing it up into seven provinces (Agusan, Bukidnon, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Sulu, and Zamboanga) and subdividing it into municipalities and municipal districts. Supervision of the department rested with the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes under the U. S. secretary of the interior in 1916. Carpenter became the first director of this bureau. Moro governance remained under this administrative structure until 1920, when the Philippine Legislature abolished the Department of Mindanao and Sulu.

50. Ibid., 258–59.

51. Frank Carpenter, “Inaugural Address as Governor of Mindanao and Sulu,” n.d., sent to Pershing, April 29, 1914, Box 40, Folder: “Correspondence, Frank Carpenter,” Pershing Papers.

52. Ibid.

53. As noted in the previous chapter, there existed important differences on this point among American military officers. Whereas District governor John Finley openly worked to encourage a separate reformist Islamic identity among Moros, Pershing strongly opposed Finley.

54. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 276.

55. Ibid., 289–94. Thanks to a near-biblical succession of disease, locusts, floods, smallpox, influenza, and drought, only 470 Christian and 473 Moro families remained in six Cotabato agricultural colonies by 1919.

56. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 271–73.

57. Pershing to Carpenter, August 22, 1915, Box 40, Folder: “Correspondence, Frank Carpenter,” Pershing Papers. Pershing wrote this letter from Fort Bliss, Texas. Three days later his wife, Frankie, and their three daughters, Helen, Ann, and Mary Margaret, died when fire engulfed the Pershing home in Presidio, San Francisco. Only son Warren survived. The tragedy devastated Pershing. Regarding Carpenter’s Filipinization policy, Pershing agreed for once with Leonard Wood, who commented in 1921 that “minor disturbances in the Moro regions” were due in part “to the too sudden imposition upon the disarmed Mohammedans of what amounts to an absolute control by Christian Filipinos” (Leonard Wood and W. Cameron Forbes, *Report of the Special Mission on Investigation to the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War* [Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1921], 24).

58. U. S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, July 1, 1913, to December 31, 1914* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1915), 338.

59. Ibid., 341. In 1914 alone, the constabulary confiscated 447 firearms in the department.

60. Ibid., 338. Despite the generally peaceful situation, Carpenter complained that the constabulary (numbering 60 officers and 972 men in twenty-six stations, plus five scout stations) was “wholly inadequate” (ibid., 339, 341). In response, the Philippine Commission in 1915 and 1916 added seven

constabulary companies and three more scout stations (U. S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, 1915* (*January 1, 1915, to December 31, 1915*) [Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1916], 250).

61. Carpenter's report of this incident is in Governor General of the Philippine Islands, *Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, 1917* (*January 1, 1917, to December 31, 1917*) (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1917), 72.

62. Governor General of the Philippine Islands, *Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War, 1918* (*January 1, 1918, to December 31, 1918*) (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1919), 71–72.

63. Ibid., 70.

64. Up until this agreement on March 22, 1915, the sultan had never relinquished his claim to de jure sovereignty. In the agreement, he recognized the sovereignty of the United States in Sulu. In return, the government recognized the sultan as "titular spiritual head of the Mohammedan Church in the Sulu Archipelago." Unmentioned in the formal agreement, the government also agreed to continue for life the sultan's annual pension (U. S. Philippine Commission, *Report of the Philippine Commission … 1915*, 287–92, 297–300).

65. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 19; Governor General, *Report of the Governor General … 1918*, 59. These figures and subsequent figures given in the text do not include Agusan and Bukidnon, which were added to the Department of Mindanao and Sulu in 1914.

66. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 19; Governor General, *Report of the Governor General … 1918*, 92. The figures for 1913 are underreported by not including products shipped to other Philippine ports for export. Accounting practices had also improved by 1918. And it should be noted that the worldwide drop in abaca (hemp) prices in 1919 caused export receipts to decline to 16,012,599 pesos in the five original provinces.

67. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 26–27; Governor General, *Report of the Governor General … 1918*, 79–84.

68. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 27; Governor General, *Report of the Governor General … 1918*, 79–84.

69. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 305. These figures do not include *pandita* schools.

70. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 29; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 305.

71. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 30; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 304–5.

72. In *Report of the Special Mission*, Wood and Forbes attributed disturbances in the Moro region "principally to energetic and sometimes overzealous efforts to hasten the placing of Moro children, especially girls, in the public schools" (24). Of 8,421 Moro students, girls numbered only 724 (Governor General, *Report of the Governor General … 1918*, 75). Gowing notes that "some ranking Moro princesses of Sulu were encouraged to become teachers, including a daughter of Hadji Butu, and Princess Tarhata, the niece of Sultan Jamal-ul Kiram II" (*Mandate in Moroland*, 304). Princess Tarhata later graduated from the University of Illinois (303).

73. Pershing, *Annual Report … 1913*, 37–38; Governor General, *Report of the Governor General … 1918*, 74; Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 307–8.

74. Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 277, 281.

75. Ibid., 254, 311.

76. Wood and Forbes, *Report of the Special Mission*, 21.

77. Quoted in Gowing, *Mandate in Moroland*, 327.

Glossary

abati (*abatis*)	defensive barrier usually consisting of felled trees
adat	customary law
agama	kinship-based community among Maranao Moros
agung	brass gong
amuk (*amok*)	to attack in a wild and murderous frenzy
bangon	clan among Maranao Moros
barakat	Allah's blessing or grace
bichara	conversation
camote	sweet potato
cedula	regarded as a tribute tax, it was a requirement that every Moro male from age eighteen to fifty-three buy an annual registration card for one peso
cotta	fortress
datu	chief (usually local) among Moros and *lumads* in Mindanao and Sulu
hacendero	owner of a *hacienda* or landed estate
hadj	pilgrimage to Mecca
halip tul rasul	successor of the prophet (as in sultan) among the Tausug Moros
jizya	annual tribute tax imposed by an Islamic state on its non-Muslim subjects
juramentado	ritual suicide by a Moro who took an oath to kill non-Muslims
kampilan	single edged long sword with tapered blade
khalifah	Allah's representative (as in sultan) charged with executing Allah's will as prescribed in the Shariah
kris	two-edged, usually wavy sword
laksamana	title of assistant to the *panglima* among Tausug Moros
lantaka	small, muzzle-loaded brass cannon usually of Chinese manufacture
lumad	term for upland tribal minorities in the southern Philippines
luwaan	people regarded by the Tausug derisively as clients or "that which was spat out"
maratabat	honor, face, and amour propre among Maranao Moros
negeri	riverine state in insular Southeast Asia
panandungan	retired sultan who serves the sultan as a counselor
pandita	Moro religious leader or cleric
pangampong	power center among Maranao Moros
panglima	leader of a district in Jolo who was appointed by the sultan
parrang sabbil	ritual suicide in the path of Allah

poblacion	town center
prahu (*perahu*)	small sailing vessel usually with triangular sail and single outrigger
rajah mudah	heir apparent to the sultan
rancheria	adopted Spanish term for small, rural settlement
rido	violent feud among Maranao Moros
sa-ilud	the lower valley of the Pulangi (Rio Grande) in Cotabato
sakop	subject or follower of a *datu*
sa-raya	the upper valley of the Pulangi (Rio Grande) in Cotabato
vinta	traditional outrigger sailing vessel

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